The Annual Conference of
The Australian Sociological Association

Refereed Proceedings of TASA
2015 Conference

Neoliberalism and Contemporary Challenges for the Asia-Pacific
James Cook University, Cairns, Queensland
23 - 26 November, 2015
Editors: Theresa Petray and Anne Stephens
ISBN: 978-0-646-94798-3
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Social Wellbeing, Locality and Ageing: A Snapshot of the Social Lives of Older People in Rural Australia

Louise Bethany Keough
University of South Australia

The older population in Australia (65+) is expected to double in coming decades, creating many multi-faceted implications for Australian society. The sociology of ageing suggests that older people experience their social world in a distinct way that is uniquely shaped by their memories, historical life events and group membership. Moreover, it is deeply influenced by where they choose to live as they grow older. This paper summarises research currently being undertaken at the University of South Australia within the school of Natural and Built Environments. The central objective of this research is to identify the various roadblocks to achieving social wellbeing for older Australians with diverse demographic characteristics in a variety of urban and rural living environments. The services available in different localities vary, as do the local community networks, and the collective attitudes and life experiences of older people in the community. This paper begins by presenting a summary of current ageing trends and offers a review of published gerontology research. The paper considers the social construction of age, and the role that social capital; social isolation and loneliness play in shaping the dynamic social experiences and well being of older people in rural settings.

Keywords: Ageing, Wellbeing, Rural Ageing, Social Isolation, Loneliness, Social Capital

Introduction: A Snapshot of Ageing Statistics

Australia’s population is ageing at an unprecedented rate, parallel to global population trends. Global ageing, in the latter half of the twentieth century, has been driven by fertility decline, rapid urbanisation and improved life expectancy (United Nations 2013). In 2000 the median global age was 26.6 years and this has been predicted to reach 37.3 in 2050 and 45.6 by the year 2100 (Lutz, Sanderson & Scherbov 2008). In western countries like Australia, this trend will be enhanced in the coming two decades as the ‘Baby Boomer’ population continue to move into the over 65 age group (Anderson & Hussey 2000; Rowland 2003). Current predictions suggest that by the mid 2050’s there will be around 40,000 Australians over the age of 100, in 1975 there were 122 (Australian Government - The Treasury 2015). Furthermore, the number of Australians 65 years and over, is predicted to double between now and the mid 2050’s, and the number of older people in the age group of 85 and over, will increase from the current 2 per cent, to close to 5 per cent (Australian Government - The Treasury 2015). This trend will continue as long as mortality and fertility rates remain in decline.
Ageing is further compounded for Australian rural population groups. Older cohorts are over represented in rural areas in most Australian states and territories (Davis & Bartlett 2008; EPSA 2011). Approximately 36% of older Australians live rurally and outmigration of younger Australians from rural towns to cities, means that rural Australia continues to grow older more rapidly than other parts of Australia (Davis & Bartlett 2008).

The Sociology of Ageing and the Significance of Space and Place
The sociology of ageing suggests that older people’s experience of their social world is distinctly shaped by their memories, earlier life experiences and group membership (Harper 2006; Willson 2007). Sociological approaches to ageing recognise the social aspects of ageing from an individual as well as societal perspective (Willson 2007). By adding a life course approach to the sociological ageing lens, we can recognise that an individual’s experience at a certain age is not just about their chronological age in years, but about the generation to which they belong, and the collective experiences they have had through their racial, gender and/or class affiliations. The life course approach considers the timing of these experiences and which life course events occurred prior to one another (Harper 2006). This recognises the limitation of simple age stratification in analysis of the issues facing older people in society. Further to this, memories, life experiences and group membership, can be inherently linked with space and place, as suggested by Rowles (1978).

An individual’s experience of space and place is distinctly dynamic and complex (Milbourne 2012; Rowles 1978). In a study completed in the 1970s in an inner city suburb in the United States, Rowles (1978) argued that three changes occur in the relationship with space as an individual grows older. First is the constriction that occurs as physical movement and social engagement is limited, individuals become more dependent on their immediate home and local community. Second is their attitude to and intensification of attachment to certain spaces that they are spending more time in, and the third is a sense of enrichment that emerges when a geographical space is acknowledged in comparison and connection to the myriad of spaces that the individuals has witnessed in their life. With a focus on the rural context, Milbourne (2012) suggests that this holds significant weight for modern day assessments of the experiences of space and place in the process of growing older and posits that place satisfaction, quality of life and social capital are reportedly strong in rural communities across the globe.

Social Wellbeing and Older People
Social isolation and loneliness are prevalent among older people (Grenade & Boldy 2008; Shahtahmasebi & Scott 1996; Victor, Scambler & Bond 2009) and the experience of these can be markedly influenced by the relationship that an older person has with the area in which they live. Social isolation is defined by low levels of contact with others (de Jong Gierveld, Van Tilburg & Dykstra 2006; Havens et al. 2004) (in some cases intentionally due to preference), loneliness however, is the perceived negative emotions resulting from that isolation (Chappell & Badger 1989; de Jong Gierveld, Van Tilburg & Dykstra 2006; Grenade & Boldy 2008; Havens et al. 2004; Van Baarsen et al. 2001). Wellbeing, quality of life and improved physical and mental health are negatively impacted by social isolation and loneliness (Patulny 2009). The experience of these can vary significantly at different times throughout the life course and can be triggered by many factors, including; gender, ethnicity, being widowed, family networks, situations of care, childlessness, living situations, i.e. housing and neighbourhood design, having other health related problems or experiencing grief gender (Grenade & Boldy 2008; Shahtahmasebi & Scott 1996).

Measuring, predicting and preventing loneliness and/or social isolation are difficult. Once identified, however, our understanding of what can be done to abate them can be enhanced through investigating the lived experience of older people using qualitative research methods.
(Denzin & Lincoln 2007; Matthews & Ross 2010). Understanding what helps older people mitigate loneliness and isolation in various settings can promote greater wellbeing (Koopman-Boyd & Waldegrave 2009). Location and the ability to participate socially in local communities as well as with long distance contacts are vastly important for the experience of wellbeing for older people (Bartlett 2003).

In a study assessing the wellbeing of older rural Australians, Inder et al. (2012) attributed greater well-being in older rural Australians (as compared to younger rural Australians) to a generational ‘survivor’ attitude. The authors argued that wellbeing can be enhanced when there is a perception of community and personal support (Inder, Lewin & Kelly 2012). Local community engagement and the development of social capital significantly influence experiences of social isolation, loneliness and wellbeing. The rural setting can both enrich and hinder the propensity for loneliness and social isolation however.

Social Capital, Social Engagement in Rural Australia

Older people typically socialise and seek support through local community groups, clubs and associations (Findlay 2003; Grenade & Boldy 2008). Milbourne (2012) draws on evidence from the National Seniors Australia ‘Getting Involved in the Country’ report (2010) that found that older people in rural Australia reportedly feel safer and experience greater social connection and interaction than their urban counterparts. When studying measures of trust and reciprocity, there aren’t substantial differences in social capital between rural and urban localities (Ziersch et al. 2009). Social capital has been strongly correlated with socio-economic status and thus the demographic context of the rural or metropolitan setting plays a significant role when measuring social capital outcomes.

Some literature suggests however that Australian rural communities typically score very high on counts of bonding social capital, which encompasses trust affiliations between community members, but score low on counts of bridging social capital, which encompasses the trust between community members and government groups and also new and unfamiliar groups and individuals (Davis & Bartlett 2008; Onyx & Bullen 2000; Ziersch et al. 2009). Australian rural communities tend to foster camaraderie, particularly for longstanding locals. However whilst rural communities tend to be more homogenous that their urban counterparts, and have a typical stronger social glue so to speak, complex challenges in the social relationships within these communities do exist, i.e. indigenous and non-indigenous population groups, land owners and labourers etc. Strong social capital in rural areas could be associated with greater homogeneity and the natural interdependence that emerges when there are limitations around local formal services. Maximising social capital and networks of trust at the local level has been at the forefront of rural policy consideration in the past two decades; the social and economic decline in rural Australian communities has increased demand for informal networks of trust and reciprocity.

Disadvantages and Pressures for Older people in Rural Australia

Despite the fact that rural areas offer prosperous platforms to foster social capital, which at the local level can aid in overcoming disadvantage (Alston 2002), disadvantages such as poor health, poverty, educational disadvantage, unemployment, disability and shorter life expectancy are also more common in rural Australia (Alston 2002; Ziersch et al. 2009). It has also been argued that the deregulation/restructuring of the welfare state in Australia shifted responsibility for disadvantage to local community organisations where the impetus moved to local networks fostering informal support. As a result many of the most disadvantaged people living in remote areas have lost adequate access to essential services (Alston 2002). As ageing has become more and more apparent, volunteering organisations have often been stretched where services like public transport are often lacking or non-existent.
Many rural areas are faced with growing service demands and diminishing work force participation. In very remote parts of rural Australia, older resident numbers are in some cases diminishing due to migration to regional centres and coastal retirement destinations that are more amenity and service rich, thus placing more pressure on service in these destination towns (Davis & Bartlett 2008). This trend is exacerbated as younger people leave remote areas to seek education and employment opportunities in the city. Many rural populations are ageing more rapidly than their metropolitan counterparts as a result of this youth out-migration (Argent & Walmsley 2008; Davis & Bartlett 2008; EPSA 2011). For older people in the community this means there is a smaller workforce available to manage local aged and health care services, or initiate progress for physical community infrastructure development like transport and footpaths (Davis & Bartlett 2008; Humphreys, Wakeman & Wells 2006), further compounding disadvantage in some settings. There is in fact some suggestion that the ‘National strategy for an Ageing Australia’ has failed to focus on flexible policy with scope to address the unique needs of older people living in remote and isolated situations (Conley, Venz & Watkins 2009)

The Social Implications of Ageing in Place

HACC (Home and Community Care) has been a national program for providing in-home care in rural and metropolitan areas that has been highly regarded for its promotion of service equity and enabling older people to ‘age in place’ (Keleher 2003). As of July 2015 the HACC program, along with three other core commonwealth government care programs, has been transitioned into the Home Support Programme (HSP) (Department of Social Services 2015). The current service approach towards ‘ageing in place’ has evolved over many decades and is founded on the notion that familiarity with both home and neighbourhood and inherent connections enable autonomy; most older people prefer to remain independent within their home community for as long as possible (Jeong & Stein 2003; Lehning, Scharlach & Dal Santo 2010). Jeong and Stein (2003) however, also consider the prospect that ageing in place can deepen isolation, particularly as individuals become less mobile and in some instances are reluctant to request help.

The issues faced by older persons in rural communities are multifaceted and depend on distance, mobility, family and kinship ties, and local services just to name a few (Bartlett 2003). It cannot be assumed that every older person wants to be socially engaged, but the facilitation of social engagement ultimately seeks to foster improved wellbeing.

Summary and Conclusion

There is a lack of Australian literature offering comparisons between rural and metropolitan settings to identify the social implications of location for the ageing population. This paper discusses some of the core sociological issues underpinning current PhD research at the University of South Australia exploring the impact of social capital, community engagement and location on the wellbeing of older people in both rural and metropolitan settings, research that seeks to investigate individual perceptions around loneliness and unique community opportunities. Many factors can impede wellbeing, but social isolation and loneliness are known to be core contenders. Proximity to and availability of services and social groups is central in mitigating loneliness and social isolation. Empirically, it has been suggested that rural communities have stronger social fabric, but there are negative aspects to rural living in older age, in some instances and settings social opportunities and access to adequate services are vastly limited. Gaining a greater understanding of these issues through in-depth discussions is integral as a means of adequately shaping local policy decisions for a future population that is remarkably older than that of the present.
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Argent, N & Walmsley, JIM 2008, ‘Rural Youth Migration Trends in Australia: an Overview of Recent Trends and Two Inland Case Studies’, *Geographical Research*, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 139-152.


Political Cleavages in Timor Leste

Birrin Hooper

Abstract: The difficulty of governance in some developing nations in Asia and the Pacific is obvious. Governance has broken down and conflict has arisen in several developing nations in the region. This paper examines Timor Leste's 2006 political crisis and the cleavages within Timorese society that may oppose each other. It does so by using Stein Rokkan's theory of political cleavages to better understand the roots of the 2006 conflict, and the groups that may oppose each other in Timorese society and why.

Governance is particularly hard in developing nations. Whilst many approaches have claimed to be the panacea to this problem, many developing nations in our region still struggle. Neoliberalism and its chiefly laissez-faire approach to governance should empower citizens to reach previously unforeseen economic wealth. Economic growth however, is dependent on society being unrestricted and stable; conditions seldom present in many developing nations. Timor Leste since independence in 2002 has struggled to maintain a fully democratic and stable society. This paper will use Stein Rokkan's theory of political cleavages to understand issues that have affected governance in Timor Leste. Political cleavages within Timorese society have jeopardised social stability, thereby making neo-liberal approaches to governance difficult.

Timor Leste has started from scratch to create a system of governance. The government has been creating state infrastructure, establishing an efficient administration and bureaucracy, as well as building a national culture and identity. The goal of governance in the modern era is to create a harmonious and prosperous nation-state with free and fair elections. This is the starting point for understanding political cleavages. To have elections, some parts of society will cling to one political party whilst other parts of society cling to another party, think liberals and conservatives. Political parties however, do not appear at elections without a history. Political parties are rooted within the political cleavages of society. An effective examination of political cleavages within society is integral to understanding the social cohesion of a nation.

Joel Selway describes a political cleavage as:

Political cleavages are a vital issue for developing countries working on governance and nation-building processes. If the political cleavages are not united or “crosscut”, social cohesion will be problematic and democratic reform will not become stable enough to have elections and society may disintegrate into conflict or civil war. The study of political cleavages, and uniting or cross-cutting of political cleavages is a vital issue for effective governance of developing nations as cleavages effect stability, peace and prosperity. States destabilised by warring cleavages then become breeding grounds for terrorist groups, thereby becoming an issue for regional and world security.

Rokkan created the concept of political cleavages whilst analysing nation-building in post-World War 2 Europe. Political cleavages were found to occur between groups based on issues of region, race, language, religion and income:

- Region being the geographical Centre (or capital) vs. peripheries: the regional areas may have different ethnic and/or language groups that oppose the dominance of the Centre's ethnicity or language.
- Church vs. Secular State: rejection of central (religious) culture based on opposing religions or moralist reasons.
- Worker vs Owner: issues of wage and labour conditions.
- Rural/agricultural vs. urban/industrial interests: issues based around regional governance and service and regional economic input.

Nation-states have a centre, the capital. This is the base of governance and nation-building, where the political elites are geographically located. Stein Rokkan introduces a geographically based model to understand the structure of political organisations and the cleavages between them. These cleavages are dependent on:

1. The unique and culturally inclusive consolidation efforts of the centre and the centre’s economic, political and cultural strength;

2. The cultural/social/political/ethnic as well as geographical distance of the peripheries from the centre and if the peripheries economic resources and political structures are strong enough to resist against integration into the centre;

3. The internal strength of the centre and its external resources that are able to link and embed the central culture across the nation-state in locally organized subcultures such as churches, sects and other groups;

4. The internal economic strength and the external resource links of nationally spread, locally organized economic units that help to incorporate the peripheries into the centre such as; trade associations, credit systems and international corporations.\textsuperscript{10}

The starting point to help understand Timor Leste’s political cleavages is its first democratic election which was dominated by FRETILIN and the Presidential election in 2002, that was dominated by Xanana Gusmão (CNRT), an ex-FRETILIN member who had drifted from the group since 1987.\textsuperscript{11} Xanana however, has been strongly supported by FRETILIN since independence, with FRETILIN leaders agreeing with Gusmão in many areas and quickly resolving disputes, with both CNRT and FRETILIN holding coalition Governments the entire period from 2002-2014.

Political cleavages in Timor Leste emerged as an issue during the time of Portugal’s decolonisation and brief period of independence in 1975, and the subsequent occupation by Indonesia from 1975 until 1999. During this time political conflict occurred between political groups/parties in Timor. The Timor Popular Democratic Association (APODETI) was a political party formed in May 1974 and was pro-Indonesia so much that its original name was Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia.\textsuperscript{12} They believed that East Timor could not survive as an independent state and annexation into Indonesia would be more prosperous.\textsuperscript{13} They believed that Indonesia could guard them from outside threats, preserve their culture and protect Timor from communists.\textsuperscript{14}

The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) was the first political party formed in Timor Leste, it was created in May 1974 by 13 Timorese locals and one Portuguese plantation owner. Originally they called for Timor to stay a part of (or at least strongly connected to) Portugal. Portuguese leaders however, confirmed this would not happen so they asked for a transition period. They then formed a coalition with FRETILIN and after this collapsed, they called for integration into Indonesia.\textsuperscript{15} THE UDT party’s support came from the rich who wished to maintain the status quo, mostly landowners who owed their success to Portuguese rule.\textsuperscript{16} Critics of UDT see them as neofascist.\textsuperscript{17}

FRETILIN or the “Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor” began life as a political party under the name of the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) which started


\textsuperscript{12} Damien Kingsbury, East Timor: the Price of Liberty (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 44.

\textsuperscript{13} Bill Nicol, Timor: A Nation Reborn (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2002), 73-74.

\textsuperscript{14} Idid., 75.

\textsuperscript{15} Bill Nicol, Timor: A Nation Reborn (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2002), 83.

\textsuperscript{16} Bill Nicol, Timor: A Nation Reborn (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2002), 84.

\textsuperscript{17} Damien Kingsbury, East Timor: the Price of Liberty (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 47.
in May 1974, but fell apart after a propaganda error. It was reformed in September 1974 as FRETILIN and has enjoyed great support across the nation since 1975. FRETILIN has a Marxist approach, opposed to Portuguese colonisation and has stood defiantly against Indonesian occupation. Critics of FRETILIN claim they are influenced too much by China and subscribe to communism. The differences in these three distinct parties show the political cleavages in Timor Leste. APODETI had support from (some) traditional leaders, UDT from elites and rich land and business owners and FRETILIN from many different groups.

Timor Leste has ethnic, linguistic and regionally based political cleavages. Whilst the official language is Tetum, there are many languages widely used. Tetum, Portuguese, Indonesian and Mambai related languages will be the main focus. Tetum (and dialects of) historically had been a geographically western language. Mambai related languages are historically linked to central-east Timor (and the ethnically Mambai people). Portuguese is seen as a language used by elites and English as language learned by Timorese people learn it in the hope of securing work with international organisations or foreign companies. According to the Timor Leste 2010 census only 36.6% of the total population spoke Tetum at home, over 45% of people can still speak Indonesian and over 12% of people speak Mambai related languages at home with many speaking other dialects.

Language and religion have an interesting relationship in Timor. Catholicism became important in Timor Leste because of the role it played in liberating Timor from Indonesian occupation. The Catholic Church started preaching their services in Tetum (a language used only in Timor), and became known locally as “the language of the baptised”. The 2004 census found the population to be 923,198. Of that number, 715,285 people identified as Catholic. There are however, many religious groups including; Protestants (16,616), Muslims (2,455), Buddhists (484), Hindus (191) and 5883 that follow “traditional religions”. Over 180,000

34 Direcção Nacional de Estatística, *Timor-Leste: Population by type of residence and sex according to age groups*, http://www.dne.mof.gov.tl/census/tables/national/population/table1_1.htm
people have left the religious belief area blank. This shows the existence of religion-based political cleavages in Timorese society.

Rokkan’s model emphasises the power of the centre whilst trying to bring in social extremities. It is important to show the existence of regional economic differences and geographical differences in services and infrastructure. Big geographic cleavages exist in Timor Leste when you compare the centre (Dili) to rural areas (the rest of Timor Leste). In Dili 87.7% of urban households have running electricity compared to 18.9% of rural areas. Additionally, 91% of people living in Dili have access to running water or protected water sources, whereas almost 42.9% of people in rural areas only have to access water from unprotected wells, springs, lakes and rivers. This geographical service inequality exacerbates conflict that arises between geographically-based political cleavages.

With the outbreak of independence, a diaspora of the political elite returned home. Whilst Xanana Gusmão returned home after being imprisoned in Indonesia, many of the political elite returned from overseas (or had recently). Many members of the political elite did not experience the Indonesian occupation. They were not forced to learn Bahasa Indonesia to get by and they had not experienced the many years of oppression that the Indonesian occupiers had subjected the locals to. Many elites had not experienced a life where militias were physically abusing and killing people at different times, and they had not lived in a society where Indonesians looked down on them on a daily basis. The elites did not have to operate through Indonesian customs, they had not been inclined to follow Indonesia bureaucratic or social procedures. Many members of FRETILIN who spent time living overseas are seen as out of touch with society because they have not lived the horrid experiences the rest of society was forced to.

This links to the political centre’s ability to include social peripheries. There have been major issues around social inclusion of Indonesian struggle veterans. Many former FALINTIL members had not been incorporated into the new defence force or been given a pension. They believed they were due more respect. Many have united to form the Popular Committee for Defence for the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL). This has become a rebel group that rejects the sovereignty of the National Government. Other rebel groups have formed, including Sagrada Familia and Colimau 2000, which is almost exclusively linked to the districts of Timor west of Dili. These rebel groups have been able to infiltrate and influence geographical cleavages.

Geographically based political cleavages have been seized by rebel groups and this was exacerbated by the 2006 crisis. On the 1st of February 2001, FALINTIL was retired and the FDTL (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Timor-Leste) was established by Xanana Gusmão, by October however, with the dominance of FRETILIN in the state institutions, it was renamed FALINTIL-FDTL (F-FDTL) in an attempt to link the defence force with FALINTIL and its importance within Timorese history. This branding of the defence force as FALINTIL however,
angered some veteran organisations, such as Colimau 2000 and Sagrada Familia. This became a tipping point for these veteran groups to reject the legitimacy of the Government and turned them into rebel groups.

The Government had also not been able to properly demarcate the police and defence force. The jurisdiction of and roles expected of the PNTL (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste) and F-FDTL within Timorese society had become an issue, at times doing the same job. Both state institutions were weak and were soon to implode. There were allegations that the F-FDTL had been discriminatory against people from the western provinces. People from eastern districts have however reported similar discrimination.

There had been so many disagreements within the F-FDTL that on the 9th of January 2006, 159 soldiers signed a petition aiming to end mismanagement and discrimination within the service. After receiving no response, they deserted, gathered more supporters and a month later marched onto the Presidential Palace. After more dialogue that resolved nothing, many disgruntled soldiers left on leave, deciding never to come back. As a result, the Chief of army, Taur Matan Ruak dismissed 594 soldiers. It has since been found that 200 of those soldiers had deserted for different reasons. The defence force however, was imploding. The protesters protested more, with one protest attracted members from the rebel group Colimau 2000. From that point on (April 25), the protests turned violent; they assaulted youths and burnt market stalls owned by easterners whilst making speeches calling for the violent overthrow of the government.

On the 28th of April they entered the government palace, attacked policemen, burned cars and smashed the ground-floor offices. They then headed towards Rai Kotu, passing through Comoro where they fired shots, killing one person and injuring many others. At Rai Kotu they burned down over 100 mostly Eastern owned houses. It was then rumoured that F-FDTL troops loyal to Alkatiri massacred 60 people that night. Protests and violence now consumed the streets, it would have seemed like Timor was close to civil war. PNTL Police Reserve Unit (URP) officers were encouraging violence between eastern and western groups. F-FDTL and PNTL came into direct armed conflict against each other on several occasions. Civilians had

Documents/Countries/COITimorLeste.pdf, 18.
46 Ibid., 22.
48 Ibid., 21.
51 Ibid., 23.
52 Ibid., 25.
53 Ibid., 26.
56 Ibid., 34-36.
also been armed\textsuperscript{57} and many civilians clashed violently based on east-west cleavages.\textsuperscript{58} To resolve this conflict UN intervention was needed.\textsuperscript{59}

Neoliberalism is used by the international institutions (eg. World Bank), who can impose their codes of behaviour onto smaller nations.\textsuperscript{60} Political cleavages within Timor Leste however, have disrupted society to the point where a neoliberal, laissez-faire approach to governance has been problematic. This was exemplified during the events of the 2006 political crisis. In the preceding years to the conflict, the government has developed more consolidative efforts with veterans in order to unite political cleavages and maintain social stability.\textsuperscript{61} These efforts however, have been stymied by legitimacy, and continue to be an ongoing challenge for effective governance.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 35-37.
\textsuperscript{60} Noel Castree, “From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolations, confusions, and necessary illusions,” \textit{Environment and Planning} 38 (2006), 4.
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Challenges to concepts from the chivalry thesis: Judiciary sentence practices on Indigenous women and white women defendants processed in Queensland’s Supreme Courts and District Courts

Marisela Velazquez
James Cook University

While the chivalry thesis is a dated method to interpret lenient treatment for women defendants, its concepts of gender and racial bias continue to be debated. In particular how the construction of femininity, generally embedded social beliefs about women’s role in society, impact treatment. While judges are governed by legal training and sentencing guidelines, I argue that their attitudes about Indigenous women and white women (which are based on socially structured personal experiences) impact the sentence treatment of women. Further, given that Indigenous women and white women have similar troubled life histories, I especially argue that their offending circumstances are the crucial factor influencing judges.

The present paper links concepts from the chivalry thesis to examine the role that gender has on sentence remarks made by judges and council during sentence court matters in Queensland’s Supreme Courts and District Courts. This paper uses the focal concerns perspective as a framework for the sentencing discourse analysis of understanding whether women, and what types of women, are treated leniently. Findings challenge the chivalry thesis that lenient treatment excludes Indigenous women and white women whose serious offending cases are processed at the Supreme Courts and District Courts.

Keywords: judiciary attitudes; women; chivalry thesis; feminist criminology; Indigenous

Introduction

A court has regard to many factors when determining the sentence for an offence (Ashworth 2010). Aggravating and mitigating factors are especially crucial when assessing the culpability of a defendant. These influence sentencing with aggravating factors warranting a higher penalty while mitigating factors warrant a lower penalty for the same offence. The present paper links concepts from the chivalry thesis with courtroom observations to examine the role that gender has on sentence remarks made by judges and submissions from council during sentence court matters in the Supreme Courts and District Courts. In particular I focus on the mitigating factors identified and the impact that these have on the sentence outcome of Indigenous and white women defendants. This paper uses the focal concerns perspective (Steffensmeier et al 1998),
which is used to explain sentencing disparities based on race, as a framework for the sentencing discourse analysis of understanding whether women, and what types of women, are treated leniently in the criminal justice system. According to the focal concerns perspective, judge's sentencing decisions reflect three key focal concerns. The first focal concern, blameworthiness, refers to judges' assessment of the offenders' culpability and the extent of harm that the crime caused. Second is community protection, or risk, whereby judges evaluate the risk that offenders pose to the community. The third focal concern is practical constraints and consequences, which involves judges weighing the practical issues before imposing sanctions including social costs of punishment and community and political outlooks which may impact the courts' societal standing. My findings challenge the chivalry thesis, which suggests women are afforded leniency within the criminal justice system. While judges are governed by legal training and sentencing guidelines, I argue that their attitudes about Indigenous women and white women (which are based on socially structured personal experiences) impact the sentence treatment of Indigenous women and white women. In particular, because Indigenous women and white women in the higher courts have similar troubled life histories, I argue that their offending circumstances are the crucial factor influencing judges. My findings do not suggest any race-based differences in sentencing treatment. While judges impose sentences in accordance to the order for offending involvement, their use of discretion and judiciary powers benefits both Indigenous women and white women defendants.

The focus of this paper is on serious offending including possession and trafficking of illicit drugs, violent offences involving acts intended to cause injury and assault, and fraud because these are the most common offences for women defendants that come before the Supreme Courts and District courts (ABS 2013). These offenses are also some of the main causes that both Indigenous and white women go to prison (ABS 2013; 2007).

The paper starts by laying the theoretical groundwork with a discussion on the social construction of gender. This is followed by observations where I witnessed things happening to women regardless of their race, alongside other things that were specific to Indigenous women and things exclusive to white women defendants. Remarks by offence are presented to illustrate how offending circumstances are justified by legal practitioners as shown in Table I. Based on the chivalry thesis which maintains that women secure lenient treatment across the criminal justice system because of gendered explanations (Pollak 1950), I link concepts including level of offending, socioeconomic status, and gender stereotypes to its applicability to Indigenous and white women defendants. The purpose of linking concepts from the chivalry thesis to Indigenous women and white women is to analyse whether judges treat one group of women more leniently over the other based on race.

Social Construction of Gender
The construction of gender is created by socially expected norms and behaviours that are based on a person's genitalia (Lorber 1994). While gendered roles change, traditionally for men these are imposed roles of masculinity like possessing a dominant and protective demeanour. Whereas for women, standards of femininity include roles within the home as wives and caregivers to children and behaving in passive and subordinate manners. Particularly for women involved in criminal activity, based on concepts from the chivalry thesis, gendered roles of femininity are perpetuated and reinforced in the criminal justice system by legal practitioners:

“One of the outstanding concomitants of the existing inequality between the sexes is chivalry and the general protective attitude of man toward woman. This attitude exists on the part of the male victim of crime as well as on the part of the officers of the law, who are still largely male in our society. Men hate to accuse women and thus indirectly to send them to their punishment,
police officers dislike to arrest them, district attorneys to prosecute them, judges and juries to find them guilty, and so on” (Pollak 1950: 151).

This notion of chivalrous treatment for women starts with the belief that women possess traits of weakness, passiveness, inferiority, naivety, and obedience toward a patriarchal society where their roles are that of mother, daughter, and wife (Pollak 1950). It is then carried on by beliefs that women need to be safeguarded and watched over, so therefore protection is symbolised and reinforced through lenient treatment. Although the chivalry thesis is criticised for being an outdated principle based on socially expected gendered explanations and ideologies that women are of inferior status (Heidenson 1985), its main feature, that women are afforded leniency within the criminal justice system, continues to be a predominant explanation for the different treatment in sentencing outcomes based on gender. Thus, criteria about the chivalry thesis particularly relevant to this paper is that leniency is not guaranteed for all women because their race and ethnicity, lower socioeconomic status, and poor demeanour could single them out.

Methodology

I carried out qualitative observations in courtrooms to analyse how gender is constructed in this environment, and the role, if any, that the demeanour and behaviour of Indigenous women and white women in a courtroom has on their sentence treatment. Detailed field notes were taken following each observation and field notebooks were analysed through thematic coding.

I observed a total of 68 cases between July 2014 and July 2015. The observations took place in the District Courts and Supreme Courts from Townsville and Cairns in North Queensland. Observations were carried out during sentence matters as this is when sentence remarks and submissions are made. Other matters observed involved applications, mentions, jury selections, and trials to further analyse how femininity is constructed for Indigenous and white women appearing throughout court matters.

In this paper, I present qualitative details in the form of tables as illustrated in Table I showing information about the submissions from council and summary remarks from judges during sentence matters. I then match mitigating factors with remarks to interpret the way in which offending circumstances are justified by legal practitioners and to analyse the different ways femininity is constructed. These comparisons are based on my interpretations from courtroom observations. This includes my interpretations about how the offending circumstances are used to justify mitigating factors.

Common Experiences for Women Defendants

Courtroom observations reveal that regardless of race, women defendants whose cases are processed in District Courts and Supreme Courts share similarities related to their life histories. Table I shows that characteristics including primary care for dependent children, poor mental health and substance abuse are mitigating factors collectively used by council and judges when discussing the offending circumstances of Indigenous women and white women defendants. The most common attributions to poor mental health used to describe women’s offending circumstances include breakdown of marriage, financial issues, re-victimization from domestic violence, housing instability, and childhood victimization especially sexual abuse. The circumstances around the abuse of illicit drugs are mentioned as a response to alleviate stress, depression, and anxiety from similar connected experiences of re-victimization from relationships, loss of a child, and childhood trauma. Another characteristic shared by Indigenous women and white women defendants concerns their troubled upbringing which involves childhood victimization witnessing domestic violence, drug use, and poor mental health. Thus, Indigeneity is not necessarily treated differently in the cases that I observed. However, there was a difference related to women’s substance abuse; Indigenous women engage in alcohol abuse while white women consume illicit drugs like...
cannabis and methamphetamine. This does not have an impact on the sentences they receive, however, as a whole, similar mitigating factors are used by council so that the punishment is tailored to each women’s individual complex lives, “your honour, I ask that you structure the sentence so deterrence is met…that suits background, particular to client’s background” (council representing an Indigenous woman convicted of assault). Further, women defendants, regardless of race, share similar life histories; this is consistent with the literature concerning the pathways and characteristics of women’s offending (Bartels 2010; Corston 2007).

**Table 1: Offending circumstances about Indigenous women and white women convicted on violent, drug, and fraud offences at the District Courts and Supreme Courts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mitigating factors</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Fraud</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The physical and mental health of the defendant leading up to the offence</td>
<td>“My client is a deeply troubled alcoholic” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“Consumed cannabis to relieve anxiety and stress…report from counselling shows that her daughter overdosed at 25 and this impacted her life” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“You were also impaired by your health and the attendant pressures to that (i.e. meets criteria for medical diagnosis, was discharged, has medical certificate)” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Spike in seriousness of offences due to drug use…drug addiction is the ultimate factor, detriment” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“Diagnosed with anxiety, takes prescription medication…from the psychologists’ report she was suffering from depression, anxiety, and stress” (Council submissions)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Anxiety, physically poor health” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
<td>“Never touched substances prior to meeting husband. She eventually became addicted to ice. This helped her cope with the stress of marriage” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The misfortunes of the defendant leading up to the offence</td>
<td>“Incredible abuse and violence, disgusting and degrading way he treated you” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
<td>“I particularly take into account that you’ve had a difficult life” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
<td>“These (i.e. offending) were acts of desperation” (Council’s submissions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“They (children) confirm he was very violent toward you and the children, he was very alcoholic. He made serious threats to kill you” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
<td>“You’ve had a lifetime background which probably made you vulnerable to your offending” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sad background” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
<td>“Your personal circumstances are more compelling, how you became involved in your offending” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
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</table>
Another experience shared by women regardless of race involves the way judges verbally approach women. Court procedures are explained by some judges in lay language as an attempt to have a dialogue and involve the defendant in court processes. For example in one case involving an Indigenous woman convicted of burglary, a detailed explanation was provided to her case as her sentence date was postponed. The judge asked her, “Do you understand what is going to happen?”, after having explained to the defendant that she was going back to custody and returning to court for her upcoming sentence date. In another case involving a white woman, the judge explained, “if you engage in any crime during the next 12 months you will be in breach of your sentence and will be fined five hundred dollars”. Contrary to public beliefs that judges are out of touch with ordinary people (Mackenzie et al 2012; Hutton 2005), as well as Indigenous peoples’ communities and general way of life (Coe 1980), my observations show that while, when addressing other legal practitioners judges speak in legal language foreign to audience members, jury members, and defendants, some judges address defendants in lay language specifically so that defendants are aware of their own case procedures and outcomes.

Racial Differences in the Courts
My observations show racial differences for women defendants appearing in court. Observations specifically about Indigenous women involve their place of residence. Indigenous women are far more likely than white women to reside in remote locations like Palm Island, Weipa, Thursday Island, and Cooktown and could have their court matters processed via teleconference. Another difference is that the legal assistance for Indigenous women is from Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Legal Service (Qld) Ltd which is generally made up from white legal practitioners. Consistent with government statistics (ABS 2013), my observations show that Indigenous women mostly come before the District Courts and Supreme Courts for violent offences involving acts intended to cause injury and assault. White women also appear for violent offences but are more likely to appear in the higher courts for fraud and drug offences involving possession of a dangerous drug and drug trafficking. Possible causes for these differential offenses include Indigenous women's alcohol dependence and involvement in confrontations that escalate to physical force and white women's abuse of illicit drugs and acting in a lesser role to a male partner's drug trafficking activity.

The total number of women's cases that I observed is relative to women's contact with the higher courts. Only two per cent of women's cases are dealt with at the Supreme Courts and

### Table: Mitigating factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mitigating factors</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Fraud</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependents</td>
<td>“Has a young child from a previous relationship” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“Defendant has two children from previous relationships and three more with current husband” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“She is a mother, has a daughter” (Council’s submissions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Became a mother at 14, is the single caregiver. Then had the second birth of a son at 19” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“No financial support for kids once divorce occurred” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“Has young children ages 7 and 10” (Council’s submissions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offending based on need rather than greed</td>
<td>“Homelessness is certainly an issue with my client” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“Grew cannabis to meet financial needs” (Council’s submissions)</td>
<td>“Found yourself under significant financial pressure” (Judge’s sentence remarks)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
District Courts (ABS 2013). I observed that 12 cases involved white women compared to 7 cases about Indigenous women. While Indigenous women are overrepresented based on population proportions (ABS 2012), there are still more white women going through the court system.

One particular observation about white women convicted of drug and fraud offences is that they have employment skills, often in administrative and assistant jobs. This is unusual, given that much of the research on characteristics of women offenders reports their general lack of skills, unemployment, and low education attainment (Corston 2007). A further observation about white women convicted of drug trafficking offences is that they are usually assisting, or guided by, men. The women that I observed in the higher courts that appear for drug trafficking offences are led by men:

“She is acting as husband’s assistant in a sense”
(Judge’s remarks about white woman defendant convicted on trafficking methamphetamine and cannabis. She was directly involved in 221 sales to pay off husbands drug debt, argued as ‘street level’ by her legal team. Received a custody sentence with a shift from parole to suspended sentence.)

“was foolishly advised....by a man (into growing cannabis for commercial purposes)”
(Council submissions about white woman defendant convicted on production of cannabis. A small scale production, unsophisticated operation of 867 grams of cannabis. Received a fine.)

The remarks above by legal practitioners are consistent with the literature on judicial attitudes that women can be coerced, predominantly by a male partner, into taking part but that they tend to have a lesser role in the criminal offense (Gelsthorpe & Loucks 1997). This is also relative to the social construction of femininity where women act in submissive roles and men in dominant figures.

Chivalry thesis applicability
My observations challenge concepts from the chivalry thesis that favourable treatment is limited to non-serious offending, upper social class, and femininity. All cases about Indigenous and white women defendants that I witnessed are deemed as serious ‘indictable’ because their criminal activity involving armed robbery and fraud is processed in the District Courts while drug and violent offences are handled in the Supreme Courts. Both groups of women defendants generally meet criteria for low income status as evidence by their being on CentreLink benefits. I witnessed only two women currently employed, both white women. Regardless, there were no obvious differences in the sentences women received or in their treatment by the judges.

Based on the chivalry thesis, favourable treatment is handed to women defendants with families like those who have children and are married. Again, however, my research shows that women’s marital status has no impact on their sentence treatment. With the exception of one white women defendant whose husband was in the audience for support, I witnessed both Indigenous women and white women generally either unmarried, with children from different partners, or raising children as a single parent. My observations then show that the relationship status of women defendants processed in the District Courts and Supreme Courts does not impact upon how judges sentence Indigenous women and white women.

Dress attire and body language are other factors that I witnessed to also be irrelevant to sentence treatment. Indigenous women generally wore t-shirts, shorts, and thongs while white women tend to appear in collared blouses, cardigans, and closed toe shoes, but again there were no obvious differences in how these women were treated. Thus, despite my expectations, demeanour and appearance have no impact on the way women are sentenced.
Crying is other behaviour that I observed that also does not influence sentence treatment. Research about judicial attitudes indicates that women tend to cry during court matters and that this could lower their penalty based on representations of remorseful behaviour (Gelsthorpe & Loucks 1997). While I witnessed white women defendants appearing teary-eyed throughout court processes, they did not receive a lower penalty based on this behaviour or favourable treatment over Indigenous women. Although crying is associated to femininity (Furia 2010), my observations show that this behaviour has no impact in how judges sentence women.

This study provides a glimpse into the under-researched area of courtroom observations about Indigenous women and white women defendants processed in the District Courts and Supreme Courts. Concepts from the chivalry thesis including level of offending, socioeconomic status, and gender stereotypes were linked to its applicability to Indigenous women and white women. I was surprised by my findings especially given the historical facts detailing disparities in treatment across criminal justice systems between white women and ethnic and Black women (Heidensohn 1985; Chesney-Lind 1978). While I expected differential treatment because research shows Indigenous people being treated more harshly (Snowball & Weatherburn 2007), other research supports the positive discrimination hypothesis where disparities in sentencing favour Indigenous women (Bond & Jeffries 2010). I found no patterns in how judges sentence women – not based on race, nor crime, nor social constructs of gender like women’s appearance and relationship status. While judges’ attitudes about Indigenous women and white women may influence their sentence decision-making process, my courtroom observations findings show that they are “governed more by their legal training and legal socialization than by their socially structured personal experiences” (Steffensmeir & Hebert 1999: 1187).

My observations challenge concepts from the chivalry thesis that favourable treatment is based on race, low level or ‘traditionally’ female offending, and femininity. Race did not disadvantage Indigenous women, and white women were also not treated more lenient over their Indigenous women counterpart. Despite different offending patterns, neither group of women was treated more favourably based on race; there were no raced-based differences in the way judges sentenced. Further, most women that I witnessed were either unmarried, with children from different partners, or raising children as a single parent and their relationship status did not impact how judges sentence Indigenous women and white women. Instead, I argue that the offending circumstances of Indigenous women and white women are the crucial factor influencing judges’ sentence practices.

The study provides insight about the pathways and characteristics for women involved in crime as well as the racial differences for Indigenous women and white women defendants processed in the Supreme Courts and District Courts. This study highlights the necessity for more research examining the offending circumstances of women given that some characteristics are shared between Indigenous women and white women. Thus, it is imperative to “understand the ways in which the social construction of gender shapes both the incidence of law breaking and the response of the criminal justice system to it” (White & Habibis 2005). One way to analyse how the courts respond toward women involved in crime is through qualitative research that analyses judges’ attitudes about women as well as how and why the intersections of race and gender influence their sentence practices.

References


Neoliberalism and Contemporary Challenges to the Exhumation of Mass Graves

Natalia Maystorovich Chulio
University of Sydney, Volunteer at The Association for the Recuperation of Historic Memory

Abstract
Neoliberalism as a political and economic ideology has pervaded all aspects of social life in modern western economies. Its impact has been wide ranging on social lives of political subjects. This is evident in the wake of the global financial crisis and its impact on the investigation of enforced disappearance in Spain through the implementation of austerity measures to combat rising debt. Given the exhumation of clandestine graves is not a profit generating industry it relies upon financial assistance from governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and private donors. This has been the experience of groups such as the Association for the Recuperation of Historic Memory (hereafter, ARMH), who over the last two and a half years have relied on donations from international groups to maintain their restricted operations. In this paper I ask: If the hegemonic economic rationalization globally has been that of neoliberalism how can human rights be realized in the exhumation of clandestine graves?

Key Words: Exhumation, mass graves, human rights, neoliberalism

According to David Harvey (2007) neoliberalism is a ‘theory of political economic practices proposing that human well being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets and free trade’ (pp.22). This theory holds that through minimal state sanctioned institutional frameworks such as the judiciary to secure obligations and rights, the market will provide all necessary goods and services in a free market economy and that state intervention should be kept to a minimum to prevent distortion and bias (Harvey, 2007: 22-23). However, this presupposes that the market will provide that which the state fails to provide to its citizenry, failing to acknowledge that the market makes decisions based on economic benefit and profit. I follow a Keynesian approach calling for state intervention, especially in the realm of human rights. Given there is no profit to be made in the investigation and exhumation of clandestine graves it would hold that private markets and industry would not have motives to provide such assistance to victims. If the hegemonic economic rationalization globally has been that of neoliberalism how can human rights be realized in the modern era?

Harvey (2007) claims that neoliberalism has ‘become hegemonic as a mode of discourse and has pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it has become incorporated into the common sense way we interpret, live in, and understand the
world’ (p.23). This may be seen in the prevalence of austerity policies following the global financial crisis. The dominant mode of dealing with the failure of the free market due to global financial deregulation was for governments to leave the free market to provide a solution. Ironically it was the free financial market, which placed the global economy in such a perilous position, and now governments in Europe including Spain would reduce government spending in the hope that the private sector would pick up the slack. This has seen the shrinking of economies such as Greece and Spain with increased unemployment, homelessness, erosion of labour rights and the spread inequality amongst its populations. In the foreword to Amnesty International 2009 Annual Report Irene Khan states that it ‘…is also clear that not only have governments abdicated economic and financial regulation to market forces, they have failed abysmally to protect human rights, lives and livelihoods. Billions of people are suffering from insecurity, injustice and indignity’ (Khan, 2009: 6). This may be seen as a call to ‘Keynesian economic…interventions to get production going in times of crisis’ as the state is viewed as the best recourse to protect the vulnerable members of society (Fraser et. al., 2013: 39). The actions of the European governments is what Stephen Gill refers to as ‘new constitutionalism’ whereby the global governance structure seeks to divorce economic policy from accountability to political constituents on the rationale that they are required to respond the market.

The expectation that the market would provide for growth in the economy in place of the state was erroneous as the market will only act on its own interests while the state is supposed to act in the interests of its constituents or citizenry according to democratic ideals. While a vast number of individuals have been lifted from poverty through economic growth, as the recent global financial crisis highlights many have been left behind. From a sociological perspective the international normative and legal order held within International Law, ‘appear to bear little relation to what occurs in everyday life within nation-states, but these treaties often provide the social context for political and social action’ (Sjoberg et al. 2001: 13). The Spanish government while having signed and ratified the Convention on Enforced Disappearance (2006), continues to fail in their obligations to victims. This is highlighted by the fact that the Working Group on Enforced Disappearance continues to investigate cases in Spain. Given the cost of human rights can often be deemed too high, many disregard the importance of rights. As Khan (2009) points out:

Human rights were too often relegated to the backseat as the juggernaut of unregulated globalization swept the world into a frenzy of growth in recent years. The consequences are clear: growing inequality, deprivation, marginalization and insecurity; voices of people protesting suppressed with audacity and impunity; and those responsible for the abuses – governments, big business and international financial institutions – largely unrepentant and unaccountable (p.7). What is evident in the current global economic climate is that governments, big business and international financial institutions have been extending the inequality gap in most western democracies. This inequality has social impacts, including the ability for victims to access their ‘right to know’in relation to their missing relatives.

The poor and vulnerable have slowly lost their symbolic capital, as discourses label them as living beyond their means or lazy. There has been a similar situation in Spain in relation to the labelling of the victims of the Spanish Civil War and Francoist dictatorship, as vengeful and undeserving victims. These labels inhibit the cultural capital such groups may obtain in order to further their cause. Since austerity was introduced in Spain, government funding to assist the relatives of the missing to investigate and exhume clandestine graves has ceased. Dominant discourses relating to the exhumation of graves in the wake of the global financial crisis have claimed that it is an unnecessary expense that cannot be warranted while the state attempts to recover economically. On this basis, the Spanish government has ceased all funding to NGOs such as the ARMH. This has financially left the victims in the sidelines and dependent on the
good will of national and international donors for the investigation and location of clandestine graves almost 80 years after the deaths of their relatives.

In some instances victims have been forced to dip into their personal savings as they seek to access their right to know. For example Ascension Mendieta at the age of 89 has been searching for her father's grave in Guadalajara. To date the authorities refuse to allow her to excavate and exhume the site of the grave. In order to provide testimony before a court of law she has had to travel to Argentina at her own expense. This is due to the nature of the Spanish judiciary which to date claims that no investigation can be undertaken given all crimes of this nature have been amnestied through the Amnesty Law 1977. This law is one of the greatest impediments to a victims ‘right to know’ in the Spanish case.

Given the lack of financial recompense available in the exhumation of mass graves, associations such as ARMH have been forced to reduce their operations substantially over the past two and a half years. The creation of the neoliberal system has entailed much destruction not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers but also to individual rights and liberty (Harvey, 2007: 23).

Given the cost of locating a mass grave, exhuming and identifying the individual remains can be quite expensive. For this reason state funding is required to assist citizens in accessing their right to know. Additionally from a moral standpoint given the state sanctioned these deaths the state has an obligation to resolve this matter for once and for all. As has been observed in similar cases, states do not necessarily guarantee rights and obligations in relation to human rights and civil liberties. According to Amnesty International 2009 Annual Report their investigation ‘reveals a world where, time-and-again, states pick and choose the rights they are willing to uphold, and those they would rather suppress (p.7). This has been evident in the case of the Spanish state in cases of enforced disappearance, whereby the judiciary holds other governments to account but not their own. An example of this is the charging of the Chilean dictator Pinochet by the Spanish Supreme Court on the basis of universal jurisdiction, however to date no case has successfully tried the Franco regime. While an attempt was made by Judge Baltasar Garzón in 2008 to investigate crimes committed by Franco, the judge was charged with exceeding his judicial authority and the case is slowly being closed.

Exhumations have been conducted in Spain over the last 15 years, by civil society lead associations, not by the Spanish government. Despite the longevity of the movement, it is not uncommon to observe the state administration continued attempts to hamper these efforts. Despite being enshrined in international treaties signed and ratified by Spain. Additionally it fails to provide an avenue for victims to access their rights, established in domestic legislation such as the Law of Historic Memory (2007). While the Law of Historic Memory provides various rights including financial and non-financial assistance for the location of the missing, it fails to institute a single body with authority. This creates a highly bureaucratic and convoluted system for victims to traverse in order to achieve the aim of exhumation. Commonly various institutional and legal authorities may claim jurisdiction for the purpose of blocking victims access to their rights as has occurred in Cataluña and Andalucía. Conversely there have been instances where these very institution and legal authorities claim not to hold authority, which can in turn hinder the exhumation of a grave.

Previous to the change in government the Spanish state provided approximately 45-60,000 Euros annually to NGOs assisting victims through the exhumation of mass graves. While this did not cover all aspects of exhumation, given the costs involved, ARMH managed to conduct many exhumations aiding various victims to relocate their loved ones. Funding commenced in 2007 and continued until 2011, this funding provided for approximately 10 exhumations annually. The table below highlights how imperative state funding was to the continued access to exhumations by these victims. Additionally it is interesting to note that the reduction in exhumations prior to
the ceasing of funding may be attributed to increasing complications associated with possibility of locating mass graves. For example in 2008, an elderly townsman would attend the grave and say it is under your feet. Over time these people with the knowledge have slowly been passing away, with changes to the landscape and the passage of time it is clearly becoming more difficult to locate these gravesites. For example we attended a location known as the valley of the dead, various townspeople told us of different locations in the field as to the burial site. Despite this the table clearly shows that in 2013 and 2014 very few opportunities to exhume occurred on the basis state based funding scheme not being available. In 2014, the three exhumations conducted were made possible by a Norwegian syndicate who donated 7,000 Euros to the association. Socially the impact of exhumations for victims, relatives and society more generally is that of healing. It is not uncommon to hear a relative say ‘now I can die in peace’ after the exhumation has been conducted.

Exhumations Conducted and the Number of Victims Recovered by ARMH from 2000 – 2015 (30th July)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. Exhumations</th>
<th>No. Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The case of Cataluña is very interesting because although strongly Republican during the civil war and successive left wing governments since, it has been difficult to obtain permission to conduct exhumations in this autonomous community of Spain (Gassiot Ballbé & Wolfe Steadman 2008). The Law for the Localisation and Identification of the Spanish Civil War Disappeared (Ley 10/2009) 1, stipulates who and how exhumations are to be conducted in Cataluña. The law establishes requirements for exhumations that are virtually impossible for groups such as ARMH to achieve due to budgetary constraints. For example the requirement for all relevant specialist to be on site during exhumation at all times. The association does not have a forensic anthropologist on hand due to the cost associated with this particular expertise. These specialists on occasion may donate their time to the association, however, it is around their schedules and this does not always fit with the needs of exhumation. Given there is no direct involvement by

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1 Ley 10/2009 (Ley 10/2009 - BOE 186) sobre la localización e identificación de las personas desparecidas durante la Guerra Civil (for The Localisation and Identification of those Disappeared Persons from the Civil War)
the United Nations and the state refuses to fund the exhumation, funds are not available to pay for specialists.

The effect of the law has been a political project to complicate the exhumation of mass graves, with their political agenda set to the memorialisation of memory in Cataluña. On this basis to date ARMH has never successfully conducted an exhumation in Cataluña and have little hope of doing so. The governing body known as ‘Memorial Democràtic’, was formed on 31 October 2007, they hold the authority to decide whether or not to allow exhumations to be conducted. The Generalitat de Cataluña generously financed the Memorial Democratic. What is made clear by the table is that with all the funds made readily available for historic memory purposes in Cataluña, most if not all the mass graves could have been funded with this money. For example between 2010 and 2014 an allocation of over 10.5 million Euros was made available for various projects. This body appears to have a different perspective on reconciliation and believes that the building of monuments serves victims in a more constructive manner to that of exhumation. The ‘Memorial Democràtic’ wants to identify mass gravesites, however, they feel that memorialisation as opposed to exhumation as the best avenue for reconciliation.

**Funding of the Memorial Democràtic by Catalan Government from 2007 – 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
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<td>1,415,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,575,000</td>
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</table>

In an interview with the vice president of ARMH he said that they had worked all over Spain, except for in Cataluña. He said:

Cataluña has their own program for historical memory, which is called ‘Memorial Democràtic’ and they say that no one is exhumed there. The leftist party that governs says that they put monuments, spaces for memory, I don’t know…but they don’t exhume.

However based on my fieldwork experience in Escobar de Campos it is clear that only by exhumation can you really know the graves exist and who is buried there. Another distinctive aspect of the search for gravesites in Cataluña is that, while associations and universities on behalf of the families have initiated excavations, typically the government has controlled all aspects without any familial support or presence. Often this has been attributed by those in the field as being for the purpose of proving the fallibility of exhumation and identification of the remains recovered. In a study conducted by Gassiot Ballbé and Wolfe Steadman (2008) they found that in 2004 the Catalan Government requested the Institute of Legal Medicine to conduct an exhumation of a site in Prats de Llucanes. They found that the exhumation was not made public and claimed that identification was not possible in large groups. Given in this instance they had seven soldiers and a civilian and the identification:

…was not based on biological or genetic attributes but that he...lacked military attire…the Catalan government used the results to assert that opening the graves is unnecessary since identifications are unlikely (p.437).

Similarly the association has made similar claims about the Catalan government’s failure to include the families. In an interview with Marco he said ‘Like we say, Cataluña has conducted two exhumations and neither has been at the request of the families’. Meanwhile, ARMH would prefer exhumations to be initiated and motivated by families who want to recover their dead
and not as a politically motivated exercise. This is an acknowledgement of the families ‘right to know’, which is enshrined in international law. In the case of Cataluña they activities appear to be centred around making political statements without acknowledging the needs of the relatives. This highlights the extent to which the government can be ‘ambivalent or even obtrusive’ in the movement to exhume mass graves in Spain (Gassiot Ballbé and Wolfe Steadman, 2008: 436). Thereby one might conclude that the prevention of exhumation in this sense is part of a wider political agenda.

The experience of family members seeking permission from the Memorial Democratic in Cataluña to exhume their disappeared relative indicates that rejection can be for quite pragmatic bureaucratic reasons. René reported to be that he was given a series of reasons when he requested to exhume the mass grave of his great-grandfather. Initially their rejection was justified on the grounds that the relatives of those buried in mass graves in Cataluña were not interested in exhuming their dead.

I was speaking with a woman who told me that in Cataluña the families don’t want to conduct exhumations.

René challenged her and asked how she could speak on behalf of all the families, when a majority of the families wished to exhume. The problem that this raises is one of the institutional dishonesty, through their ambivalent actions they hope to avoid dealing with irate families by placing the blame for not exhuming back on the relatives of the victims. When René then revealed that he was an archaeologist with ARMH and that he intended to make an official request to conduct an exhumation on behalf of the association. The official’s tune changed completely. She let him know that the problem was not really the opposition of the families, however, concerns were of the snowball effect that might be produced by the exhumation of the grave in Girona.

Then she told me, alright look it’s just that there is going to be a problem, if you want to open the grave at the cemetery of Girona, later they will want to open the one in Barcelona and Tarragona.

René further expressed that the only issue they had with the exhumation was that they did not want to conduct others. For him this was a failure of the government to act on their responsibility to assist relatives to recuperate their dead. René expressed surprise that they could refuse to conduct exhumations, however, were content to place monuments in those locations. From my own experience the folly of such actions were clear, imagine if we had have placed a monument in Escobar de Campos after nine days we had no idea where the grave was.

The Memorial Democratic in Cataluña has responded to the management of historical memory by distancing itself from the victims. The interview highlights how the Catalan government has utilized ritualized recognition of the dead by creating sites of memory in the place of exhumation, which perhaps is more arduous, costly and time consuming, however, would provide families with a sense of closure, especially those close relations still alive. While the argument of the fiscal responsibility does not appear to be a major concern in this instance given the inversion of funds, it is clear that the motivation is a political one. Similar to this the Spanish government has not cut spending in all areas, in 2013 the Spanish government allocated 300,000 Euros for the purpose of renovating the crumbling Francoist monument, The Valley of the Fallen. My argument is that while nations claim to be following a neoliberal politico-economic policy, this argument is used to prevent closer examination of their political ideology.

What is clear is that neoliberalism provides governments with a readily available explanation for their inaction as they claim fiscal responsibility. It is in this sense that neoliberalism continues to challenge human rights discourses. Through economic rationality arguments and fear mongering the public is won over. The recent example of the treatment of Greece highlights the willingness
of the global population to accept that the Greek people must take responsibility for their overspending and repay the debt. It highlights the fact that the public more generally is not well informed given it is not the debt of the people but that of the financial institutions. Perhaps the danger to human rights in the neoliberal ideology is that people more generally don’t understand what it means and what challenges it brings to their worlds. With no economic benefits to be found in the exhumation of mass graves, it is clear that this activity is one based upon ethical and moral arguments. The social implications of exhumation provide healing and closure to victims nearly 80 years after the incident occurred. However, if this right can no be realised due to a failure of the state in its obligations to victims, they remain in a state of limbo.

Bibliography


Material mediations: Nonhuman agency in *New Zealand Herald* representations of Auckland’s volcanoes, 2000-2012

Natalie Mathews

University of Auckland

**ABSTRACT**

Auckland city is built on over 50 volcanoes. Here, I draw on Lorimer’s model of “nonhuman charisma” to highlight the agency of the physical volcanoes within their representation in *The New Zealand Herald*, 2000-2012. This model offers materialist, more-than-human insights into the prominence and appeal of nonhuman entities. I detail its application to Auckland’s volcanoes and illustrate how “ecological” and “aesthetic” charisma in particular can be used to understand some features of the volcanoes’ presentation, including rhetorical strategies arguing for volcanic preservation. Nonhuman charisma can also be seen to influence the emotive prominence of Maungakiekie/One Tree hill as a symbol for Māori-Pākeha relations in the early 21st century, and the celebratory invocation of imagined disaster even in articles aimed at risk mitigation.

Keywords: media, materiality, charisma, Auckland, embodiment, landscape

Sociologists have increasingly placed emphasis on the agency of the nonhuman and more-than-human within human activity. This is part of a broader “material turn” within social theory (Shove 2010), with manifestations including attention to ontology (Roberts 2012), affect (Wetherell 2012), and more-than-representational accounts of places, processes and experience (e.g. Carolan 2008; Thrift 2008). Within this, the “old news” of representation has often been bypassed or dialectically contrasted with the complexity, “life” and dynamism of the more-than-representational (Castree & MacMillan 2004; Wetherell 2012). Here, I suggest that engagements with nonhuman agency are useful in unpicking news practices concerning Auckland’s volcanoes within *The New Zealand Herald*, a daily national newspaper with a focus on the city, between 2000 and 2012. Auckland is built on over 50 volcanoes that vary considerably in size, shape and location: from lagoons and recessed explosion craters to prominent scoria cones. Many maunga (mountains) have been recently returned to indigenous ownership, although were publically owned during the period of analysis. I explain how Jaime Lorimer’s “nonhuman charisma” can be used to unpack the uneven affective potency of Auckland’s volcanoes that drives elements of their...
Herald presentation. I then briefly illustrate selected manifestations of this, organised in relation to key themes within their representation. Nonhuman charisma can be seen to underlie some rhetorical strategies used to argue for volcanic preservation. It can be understood as influencing the repeated return to Maungakiekie/One Tree Hill as an “iconic” focus for discussion of relations between indigenous Māori and Pākehā (non-Māori New Zealanders, usually referring to New Zealanders of European descent). It is also present in the persistence of evocatively imagined disaster when discussing Auckland’s volcanoes as volcanic entities.

Theoretical background
Analysis is backgrounded by an understanding of *The New Zealand Herald* as a site of ongoing meaning negotiation. The assumed reader (Fairclough 1989) has a spatiality that has traditionally focused on the central city, the symbolic unifier of a city and locus for business activity (Parisi & Holcomb 1994). In Auckland this is further concentrated by the convergent geography of the area and its transport lines. The assumed reader can be therefore expected to have pre-existing familiarity with many physical elements of this area, part of the “common stock of knowledge” (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts 1978: 55) that journalists expect many readers to share. Representation here is seldom an attempt at mimesis (see Castree & MacMillan 2004), but is one practice among others in the context of ongoing engagement. Yet this familiarity, and these engagements, are not simply intellectual. Rather, the volcanoes form part of an affective world in which Auckland residents are already embroiled. Jaime Lorimer’s typology of “nonhuman charisma” can be used to unpack the volcanoes’ differing affective potency. Contrasting Weber’s (1978) “charismatic authority”, nonhuman charisma comes from a materialist, more-than-human perspective and focuses on the agency of nonhuman entities. It can be used to identify properties that make an entity stand out to human perception (Lorimer 2009: 324), most frequently in the form of appeal.

Nonhuman charisma is comprised of three components. The first of these, “ecological charisma”, relates to ethological correspondences between human and nonhumans that increase the chance of their engagement. It also comprises of “jizz”, or those properties of an entity that make it immediately recognisable. Because these sensory affordances are the product of physical interrelations, regardless of attributed meaning (Gibson 1979), ecological charisma is the foundation for other types of charisma. The second and third types are subsumed under “affective charisma”. “Aesthetic charisma” refers to immediate judgments as to the appeal of the nonhuman. Examples include the near-universal “cuddly charisma” of animals reminiscent of human children, and a common preference for animals that share similarities with humans, inviting anthropomorphism. The third, corporeal charisma, refers to associations developed over a period of interaction. Notably, the temporal nature of this distinction avoids the common pitfall (Wetherell 2012) of attempting to categorise an affective response as “natural” or “cultural”: responses may be immediate but culturally specific.

When applied to Auckland’s volcanoes, the afforded contact of “ecological charisma” can be related to the volcanoes’ form, size, and spatial distribution. Large and central scoria cones are favoured: even large explosion craters, such as Lake Pupuke, are seldom perceptible from a distance. Larger volcanoes are visually imposing at close range and also likely to be visually encountered from further afield. Similarly, relatively distant volcanoes such as Maungatapetake, while sometimes sizable, are “out of mind” for many within urban Auckland and have borne the brunt of recent decades’ extensive quarrying (Hayward, Murdoch, & Maitland 2011). Those volcanoes with semiotic prominence are usually spatially and visually proximate to the central city. Such differences in visual encounter have been augmented since the 1970s through protection of “regionally significant views” to prominent cones (Auckland Regional Authority Planning Division 1976). These views are predominantly from centrally-converging arterial routes.
Beyond this, the aesthetic charisma of some volcanic cones is also seen in their potential resonance with the human body (cf. Bloch 1998). As illustrated below, this can facilitate anthropomorphic identification. Such resonance notably includes a defined and imaginable moment of geological origin/“birth”. Unlike massive landforms such as the Waitākere Ranges, Auckland’s volcanic cones are also usually readily identifiable discrete entities or small clusters. This is analogous to individuals or small family groups that are favoured units within Western societies, and resonates with a common preference for animals exhibiting “bounded individuality” as opposed to unsettling mass tendencies (Lorimer 2007).

Methods
A focus on these comparatively “charismatic” volcanoes is borne out in analysis of Herald articles from 2000 to 2012 inclusive. A digital keyword search within the Herald archives from this period yielded a primary corpus of over 400 articles “about” or with over 150 words concerning the volcanoes, individually and as a group. This excluded articles concerning issues that were unusually specific to one volcano, such as debate surrounding baches (small holiday homes) on Rangitoto Island. These, and more brief mentions of the volcanoes, were nonetheless digitally retained and used to background analysis. Analysis was informed by Ethnographic Content Analysis (e.g. Altheide 2004; Altheide & Shneider 2013), where a corpus is treated as akin to a “culture”. A variety of methods are then potentially used to explore meaning within this. Particular use was also made of “articulation”, inspired by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; see also Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999), as a kinaesthetic metaphor to conceptualise the “work” done within any given piece of text. Here, meaning is understood as relational and altered through moves of alignment and distinction. Such attempted articulation can cross modalities: physical objects can be linked to or distinguished from ideas, people, political movements and so forth. Notably, affective relationships are also negotiated in text (Wetherell 2012). Articles were readily sorted thematically into relatively discrete categories, and the three most significant broad categories guide discussion below: the volcanoes as threatened, as tied to contemporary Māori, and as primarily volcanological. Particular attention is paid to the presentation of volcanoes as threatened as rhetorical tactics used to do this parallel the active mobilisation of animal nonhuman charisma (Lorimer 2007).

Volcanic advocacy
A number of articles were what I call “advocate articles”, arguing for particular visions of volcanic preservation. Several rhetorical tactics within these could be understood as drawing their efficacy from, and negotiating, relationships between the assumed audience and the material volcanoes. Notably, over 70 articles relating to volcanic preservation can be attributed to opinion columnist Brian Rudman. As Wahl-Jorgensen (2004) notes, while regular news articles must wear a veneer of objectivity (eg. Fairclough 1995), opinion columnists are able to write in their own idiosyncratic “voice” and make explicit arguments. Rudman launched a concentrated “campaign” for volcanic protection beginning in 2001 with the threatened encroachment of State Highway 20 on the northern slopes of Puketāpapa/Mount Roskill, also called Pukewiwi. As part of this, more charismatic, familiar volcanic cones were frequently articulated with less prominent volcanoes. This was seen in the opening of the SH20 “campaign”, a comparison between concerns over cattle damage on central Maungawhau/Mt Eden and apparent willingness to dramatically alter the more distant, “working class” Puketāpapa (Rudman 2001). While this may be viewed as a logical argument for consistency, it was also an articulation resonant with the use of “flagship animals” to foster sympathy for a more complex cause (Lorimer 2007). Such equivalences utilise a contagion of concern where the reflected affective glow of charismatic cones extends the argument beyond the purely conceptual and into the personal.
Advocate articles further repeatedly exploited the volcanoes’ pre-existing anthropomorphic resonance with human bodies, that is, their affective charisma. Milton (2002) argues for the importance of attributed “personhood” in granting an entity moral status. Advocate text relating to the protection of Auckland’s volcanoes often utilised strong, anthropomorphic language that facilitated this. Examples within the SH20 campaign included “butchery”, “amputation” and the signing of a “death warrant”, while the proposed vertical retaining wall was “disfiguring”, a “slash across the face” of the cone. “Rape” was used ten times in the articles studied, “scar” or its variants fifteen. Such invocation infuses the campaign with visceral affective concern, exploiting and underscoring the similarities between the material volcanoes and the bodies of readers themselves.

Māori-Pākeha relations
The materiality of charisma can also be used to help conceptualise the way that discussion of Māori-Pākeha relations within this period repeatedly returned to focus upon Maungakiekie/One Tree Hill. This maunga has particular significance to many Māori (Paterson 2009). However, as is typical of mainstream media within New Zealand (e.g. Rankine et al. 2007) early coverage often seemed to assume a Pākeha audience, suggesting other influences behind this focus. Within the Herald itself, the site’s significance was discussed in terms of its “iconic” status. However, this term is used promiscuously and often simply as intuitive description (Kearns & Collins 2000). Contrastingly, the language of nonhuman charisma provides specific terminology to discuss components of this maunga’s physical, and potentially its semiotic, prominence. In particular, Maungakiekie is high in ecological charisma: large and central, with protected views from arterial motorways. It uniquely sports an obelisk, accompanied in the decades up to 2000 by a distinctive radiata pine. This ecological accessibility and “jizz” (Lorimer 2007) make Maungakiekie instantly recognisable, a notable and familiar presence on the skyline.

This charismatic prominence was utilised by Mike Smith in 1994 through a chainsaw attack on the “lone pine”. This was to protest the proposed sale of state-owned assets and plans to swiftly settle all Treaty claims out of a drastically limited “fiscal envelope” (Kearns & Collins 2000). The pine survived but was attacked by others in 1999, and ultimately felled late 2000. In over a decade following, numerous significant issues and events were repeatedly brought back to Maungakiekie and distilled into the question of replacing this absent tree. This included the historic formation of iwi collective Ngā Mana Whenua o Tāmaki Makaurau, and criticism of the previous Treaty settlement process that impacted on nationwide procedure (Waitangi Tribunal 2007). Such distillation was facilitated by the charismatic prominence of this summit. This enabled it to be readily and emotively articulated with city identity: a symbol of Auckland and potential location for desired symbolic reconciliation. This familiar background presence can further be understood as itself fostering affective concern through repeated engagement (Tuan 1974), adding emotional salience to protests and subsequent occurrences.

The imagination of disaster
The framework of charisma can further be used to understand the fascination with fiery disaster that underlay scientific, civil defence, and touristic presentation of Auckland’s volcanoes as explicitly volcanic. Touristic articles readily exploited the “imagination of disaster” (Sontag, 2006 [1976]) to add interest to these sites, often focusing on large and distinctive craters as anchors for this imagination. Remarkably, this affective imaginary was also used to spice articles working to contain volcanic disaster: those raising civil defence awareness and presenting research concerning volcanic danger. This persistent imagination can be understood as drawing on a culturally specific “sublime” aesthetic that long predates contemporary discourses of “risk” containment (Beck 1992). This aesthetic is also material: founded on a recognition of human bodily frailty in the face of overwhelming natural forces, enjoyed when the actual danger is minimal (Clark 2011). Volcanic imaginary was fuelled by ready representation of volcanic destruction through cinematic
prosthesis (Sigurdsson 2000), drawing on the charismatic fascination of fire itself (Bachelard 1964). Contemporary enjoyment of sublime thrill was readily articulated, through imagination, to volcanoes that appear distinctively different from more benign “natures”. Yet it was also underpinned by their material quietude: 80km of lithosphere, or hundreds of years, seeming to separate Aucklanders from actual bodily danger.

Conclusion
As illustrated above, “nonhuman charisma” provides tools to explore the affective potency of Auckland’s volcanoes. Such potency is seen to underlie and give emotive resonance to the volcanoes’ presentation within The New Zealand Herald. While this exploration may be considered ad hoc, it nonetheless highlights a number of concrete mechanisms. These include ecological correspondence that can be related to form and spatiality, jizz, and attention to anthropomorphic resonance. This provides a specific language to situate what may otherwise be an intuitive recognition of appeal within a materialist framework, aligning it with theoretical concerns that are increasingly prominent within the social sciences. This analysis also highlights nonhuman agency within mediated representation. Affective agency can be invoked in rhetorical arguments, as in for volcanic protection; it provides an emotive impetus and focus for discussion, such as Maungakiekie with regard to Māori-Pākehā relations; and can add an exciting “spice” to presentation, as may be paradoxically seen in the imagination of disaster within articles aimed at risk minimisation.

References


"The Passion to do it": Exposing Academia’s Love Affair with Neoliberalism

Fabian Cannizzo
Monash University

Abstract: The discourses of ‘passionate’ and ‘autonomous’ scholarship through which academics account for their attraction to academe and their motivations responsibilise staff for their fortunes. The popular conception of academic work as ‘passionate’ labour frames academics’ search for stability and meaning within the neoliberal logic of the enterprising, responsible self. Whereas neoliberal universities value academic labour where it can demonstrably contribute to corporate and national strategic objectives, ‘passion’ emerges from within academic speech communities as a means to both produce a common experience of academic labour and normalise an expectation of passionate scholarship. Because it is defined as a personal quality, ‘passion’ individualises the acceptance what is endured in the name of what is desired. Drawing on original qualitative interviews, this paper explores how Australian academics account for their passion for academic work. The exposure of, and reflection upon, the relationship between our ethical self-construction and broader structural circumstances is a promising tool to engage in a cultural critique of precarious employment in academia.

Key Words: Academic Governance; Discourse Analysis; Neoliberalism; Passion; Precarity

Autonomy in the Neoliberal University
The Foucauldian conceptualisation of neoliberalism as a political rationality has advanced sociological understandings of academic labour in recent years. Scholarship sparked from sociological expositions of this political rationality has revealed a diffuse and highly flexible mode of reasoning (Miller and Rose 2008: 80). In Neoliberalism and the Global Restructuring of Knowledge and Education, Steven Ward (2012) outlines the political manoeuvring of higher education into international conversations about the future of global economies. The OECD, Ward claims, has been a prolific tool for encouraging national governments to manage higher education and construct policy papers that would reform higher education globally during the 1980s and 1990s (Ward 2012: 142-143; also see Henry et al. 2001). Through interpreting de-industrialising economies as evidence of the emergence of a new information society, permeated by knowledge-based economies, the discourses that crystallised in OECD forums and reports
suggested that to harness the economic value of knowledge, it might be necessary “to modify or reject the idea that science is a public good”.

The increasing importance of international higher education markets to academic governance has had a lasting impact on the higher education sector in Australia (Lewis 2013). New Managerialism (or New Public Management) has played a key role in legitimising the restructuring of relationships of power and authority within universities. As Jenny Lewis (2013: 3) comments, "The vast majority of higher-education literature since the 1980s has argued that the days of academic oligarchy have been left behind. Increasing marketization, accompanied by stronger state interventions has reduced the autonomy of both universities and the individuals that work within them."

Managerial governance transforms the relationship of academic staff to their labour by governing the direction of research and teaching ‘at a distance’ (Miller and Rose 2008: 34) and often through competitive criteria such as ‘excellence’ and ‘innovation’ (Cannizzo, forthcoming). Through aligning the interests of academic staff with the corporate objectives of university management, institutions elicit a degree of compliance from academic staff, appealing to their individual self-interests (see Bansel and Davies 2010).

Governance of universities through the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) initiative and the Tertiary Education Quality Standards Agency (TEQSA) share between them an interest in both the quality and accountability of academic goods and services, enacting what Cooper and Poletti (2011: 57) have described as a ‘culture of audit’ in Australian universities. This culture trickles down through line management and performance evaluation, placing expectation on the conduct of academic staff. In the UK, an audit culture has pervaded higher education governance since the implementation of the Research Assessment Exercises in 1992, which Docherty (2012: 49) argues have seen academics transformed into ‘human resources in the advancement of government strategy’. Additionally, Sayer claims that the RAE encourages universities to game their assessments towards producing winners through filtering out potential low-scoring research (Sayer 15 December 2014, 2015).

The institutionalisation of external interests over the content and organisation of academia have impacted academic freedom. The ideal of curiosity-driven research is placed in jeopardy within funding allocation systems which shift attention away from what is interesting to what are safe, fundable topics (Lewis 2013: 71). The gaming of academic research funding through initiatives such as the ERA as well as competitive research and teaching grants have serious implications for academic motivation and career expectations. At least in the short term, as Cooper and Poletti (2011: 63) have argued, neoliberal modes of academic government threaten to create a schism between those who can entertain notions of resisting managerial imperatives, and those establishing careers or on the cusp of academia, who struggle to maintain a sense of legitimacy and appeal to performance evaluation criteria to secure their academic identities. Research from the UK by both Kolsaker (2008) and Deem (2004) suggest that the relationship between academic identities and managerial modes of government are far from unidimensional, with Kolsaker (2008: 522) reporting participants in her study re-aligning their professional identities with managerial norms, providing mutual legitimacy for both academics and managerial modes of governance.

What is absent from most past research is an analysis of the cultural dynamics through which ideals about academic labour are formed, reproduced and transformed alongside formal institutional structures (such as bureaucracies and quasi-markets) and neoliberal policies. It is my contention that there are wide-reaching discursive strategies which academics draw upon to explain their relationship to their labour which are individualising, as opposed to the communal
ideals of academic ‘tribes and territories’ (Becher and Trowler 1989) and are perceived as emerging from personal inclinations, as opposed to systematic policy initiatives.

**A Discourse of Passion**

The analysis to follow is compiled from interview data collected in a study of the personal histories, career ambitions and expectations of 29 Australian academic staff between March and July in 2014. As a sample group of the larger Australian population, these staff members were roughly evenly spread across eight Australian universities, three Group of Eight research-intensive universities, two universities who are members of the Australian Technologies Network, and three regionally-based universities. There was a mixture of contract types, though most participants were hired on an ongoing basis, with a third (n=9) on fixed-term research contracts, and they were distributed across career stages, from Early to Late Career. In order to achieve a broad range of views on academic career expectations and ambitions, the project aimed to purposely achieve an even distribution of male and female participants and to recruit participants from across both the social sciences and biological sciences. Participants were invited to participate in face-to-face interviews about academic governance, their career plans and topical issues such as the utility of performance development for academic staff. Participants are referred to through pseudonyms to preserve anonymity.

Through asking participants to account for their entry into academia and their ambitions for the future, my interviews elicited a range of common events, narrative tropes and discursive constructs which academic staff used to describe their experiences. Of particular interest in investigating the effects that neoliberal reforms have on academic labour, I sought to discern how academics speak about their motivations for engaging with academic work. Academics’ narratives of their journey into academia often drew on accounts of the discovery of the ‘intrinsic satisfactions’ (Spurling 2012) that various forms of academic labour offered them. Academics’ desires for engagement with scholarship was often expressed in the familiar language of ‘passion’ and a ‘love’ for academic work. For example, when asked how she would describe working in academia one participant, Jacinta, replied:

> Passion is a word I think of a lot. Passion. You have to have the passion to do it I guess. Passion around your discipline as well. And that helps you drive through all the crappy bits. And [academia is] quite flexible. Certainly after working in the real world and coming into here, the flexibility and independence I have is above and beyond anything that I’ve ever had before and I find that quite empowering I guess. (Jacinta, Lecturer in Social Sciences)

Jacinta’s reflection here is typical of many of the uses of ‘passion’ within my interviews with academics. The claim to be a passionate scholar or desire to experience passionate scholarship across universities and disciplines suggests that the discourse of ‘passion’ may be common parlance within a broad academic ‘speech community’ (Bloor and Bloor 2007: 9). However, for some academics ‘passion’ also carried a moral overtone. When asked what makes a successful social scientist, one Professor commented:

> For young starting poor bastards going into the field, you've got to love what you do. You've got to have a passion for it. If you're bored shitless by what you're doing you'll never be any good at it. So you've really got to love it. And you've got to have something that is always intellectually demanding. If it's something that you can do flying on the seat of your pants, then it's not worth doing. It's got to be hard. It's got to be really hard, but they've got to be intellectual problems that you think you can solve and that you think you know how to at least address. […] I think that's crucial. (Brett, Professor in Social Sciences)

Passion is a central concept for understanding how academics present their relationship with their labour amongst peer groups. There are four key features which distinguish the use of ‘passion’ as a discourse about academic work.
Firstly, of the staff I spoke to who described their relationship with their work in terms of a deep love or passion, most drew upon a common narrative trope of discovery. This discovery does not allude to the foundation of new knowledge within a disciplinary area, but rather a discovery about the self as a subject of its desires. For example, one participant recounts her journey into the biological sciences:

I had originally wanted to be a vet and I actually got accepted into a vet program at [a university] in my second year in Science but by then I realised that I didn’t just want to be doing basic vet stuff. Instead of just wanting to use other people’s knowledge, I wanted to make knowledge. When I was looking at animals and understanding the physiology and animal communities, I liked parasites because while all the big animals were cute, they kept going extinct. Parasites speciate and they wipe out whole human populations and animal populations and we can’t beat them. I mean, look around at what’s happening to malaria. To me, they were the quintessential Aussie battler or the little guy and I always go for the little guy. (Whitney, Senior Lecturer in Biological Sciences)

The discovery that Whitney recounts is the discovery of desire, of not wanting to do ‘basic vet stuff’, and of coming to understand a truth about herself. The trope of discovery personalises our interactions with what are otherwise highly impersonal methods of thinking – the scientific method, critique, or other formal reasoning.

A second feature of the discourse of passion is its referential flexibility. Passion does not refer to a specific signified phenomenon, but rather acts as an empty shell which may encase a range of objects towards which passion is directed. Participants expressed passionate attachment to a range of academic activities, including ‘teaching’, ‘research’, disciplinary practices and modes of investigation, the idea of critiquing social institutions, and helping disadvantaged or ill individuals through their academic practice. The act of declaring passionate attachment to an aspect of academic work plays an important role here in legitimising academics’ specialisation into disciplines and roles within the academic enterprise.

Thirdly, the claim to be passionate warrants authentication itself: that is, in our interviews, staff members often attempted to offer rationalisations and justifications for their passionate attachment. These explanations of passion were framed as cognitive, rational responses by the individual to their self-management with an awareness of their inner desires. For example, one participant, describing his passion for his research work, stated:

I like to be involved in academic things and I like to be involved in research because research is fun. It’s the best thing about being an academic. If you don’t want to do research, become a high school teacher. That’s it at the end of the day. An academic should be doing a bit of research. It’s like a Marxian alienation thing: if you’re not doing the research I think you’re alienated from what you’re doing. I’m not experiencing alienation because I’m doing my research and I love doing my research. (Thomas, Professor in the Social Sciences)

Thomas expresses an ethical dimension to the discourse of passion when he states that he loves research and that he is therefore doing his research. Furthermore, Thomas implies that the labour he enjoys is vital to the work of an academic and authenticates his claim to wanting to be something other than ‘a high school teacher’, which implies no interest in research. The authentication of passion also can also act to legitimate one’s being as an academic and attest to an appropriate mode of relating to one’s work.

A final feature of the claim to be passionate is that it is often accompanied by the claim that the passionate academic experiences academic work as part of a broader understanding of themselves – as a lifestyle. As one participant claimed:

I guess I figured out pretty early that I wanted to do academic work and for me that is as much research as it is about teaching. I know academics prioritise these things differently, but for me teaching is a very central part of this kind of lifestyle. And it is a lifestyle. It’s not nine to five
Vincent expresses an expectation of the ‘passionate’ academic here: that they should not only expect to integrate their work time into non-standard hours, but also may be driven towards this ‘lifestyle’. By claiming to be passionate about some aspect of academic work, academic staff subjectivate themselves within a discourse of passion, both leveraging ‘passion’ to fulfil a function within conversation and also positioning themselves as rational and thoughtful selves in relation to their choice to pursue a career in academia.

A Market for Passionate Subjectivities?
When contextualised within our present Australian and international higher education markets, the passionate academic interfaces the individual choices of staff members with potentially precarious employment conditions. As a successful individual, who has recognised their internal motivations (for research, critique, teaching, etcetera) and negotiated the academic environment in order to find a role which enables their passion, academics normalise individualising accounts of their successes. The subject of the passionate academic is parallel here to Miller and Rose’s (2008: 195) account of the ‘enterprising self’: a self-managing individual who is ‘striving to improve the ‘quality of life’ for themselves and their families through the choices that they make within the marketplace of life’. Accounting for the successful communion of staff members and their work roles in terms of individual choice overlooks the limited resources which enable or constrain the achievement of passionate devotion to academic work. Reporting on a survey of casual Australian academics, May et al. (2013: 18-19) claim that casually-employed academics often see their employment status as a temporary stage from which they hope to transition into an ongoing contract. Despite being a minority preference, casual academic work now shapes the opportunities available to a growing percentage of the university workforce (Bexley, Arkoudis and James 2013; Ryan et al. 2013). The assumption that ‘passionate’ academics seek to integrate their work and non-work lives, devoting unpaid time in pursuit of one’s passion, disadvantages casually-employed staff.

The discourse of passion exposed here enables the subjectivation of academic staff members within conversations with peers and – through expectations of reciprocity – acts to legitimise the passionate academic as an entrepreneur of their selves. The degree to which the discourse of passion has become normalised within academic speech communities suggests a strong willingness to account for not only meritocratic achievement, but also for the satisfaction and frustrations that are experienced within the structures of academia. For an academic sector increasingly characterised by precarious and non-preferential employment contracts, the continued championing of an individualistic, enterprising image of the passionate academic may act to further silence less privileged academic workers as ungrateful or worse – passionless.

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Hodder Education.


Serious games & GamerGate: The myth of an online egalitarian utopia

Laura McClintock

James Cook University

Online socialisation is ubiquitous in daily life. This socialisation has the potential to reproduce or challenge offline inequalities. Gender inequality is one facet of offline socialisation that is transferred online. Using the recent GamerGate phenomenon, this paper examines online gender inequality, harassment, and agency through a feminist lens. GamerGate emerged online through blogs, with social media such as twitter providing evidence that dominant, aggressive male privilege manifests online, while simultaneously providing women the space to exercise agency and collectively resist. This paper explores GamerGate in relation to wider gender inequality and harassment online as well as the importance of online social interactions for feminist activism and collective identity. GamerGate showcases male dominance online and the ways women employ feminism to collectively resist harassment and support each other in the face of inequality.

Keywords: Feminism, GamerGate, Digital Anthropology, Gender Inequality

Gender inequality exists in many arenas of life and as our lives move increasingly online, so does this inequality. The virtual world is very much a part of our world and should not be thought of as separate to everyday life (van Deursen, van Dijk, & ten Klooster, 2015). The ubiquity of the Internet has made significant changes to everyday lives and sociality (Armentor-Cota, 2011). Although cyberspace inspired futuristic ideals of egalitarianism, this has proven not to be the case (Postmes & Spears, 2002). The vast nature of the Internet has the possibility to expand current knowledge and broaden discussions to include equal representation in online media, however this potential has not been realised (Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, Martínez, & López, 2014). Women continue to be underrepresented across many forms of media. The Internet continues to perpetuate stereotypes of women, despite their commanding presence online (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2014; van Deursen et al., 2015). Gender inequality is present in not only the representations of women online, but media perceptions, characters and stereotypes, as well as direct harassment and abuse (Ševčíková & Daneback, 2014; van Deursen et al., 2015; Wagner et al., 2015). This paper explores gender inequality online through the example of GamerGate, and discusses feminist collective agency in response to online harassment.
Recent online discussions about the prevalence of misogyny in the video gaming world, prompted by GamerGate, highlight unequal power relations online. GamerGate began in August 2014 when female independent video game developer, Zoe Quinn, launched a new game. She was publicly slandered by an ex-boyfriend who accused Quinn of exchanging sex with games journalist Nathan Grayson for a good review (Iverson, 2014). This accusation encouraged other male gamers to attack Quinn for her view that females should be better represented in video games. Vicious threats spread to the social networking site Twitter, and male gamers attacked Quinn with misogynistic slurs using anonymous and pseudonymous accounts. Quinn was attacked through a variety of online forums and social media sites including Twitter, 4Chan and Reddit (Nott, 2014). The threats escalated and Quinn was forced to leave her home under police protection when her street address was leaked and male gamers online threatened to rape her (Gleeson, 2014; Iverson, 2014; Nott, 2014).

Soon after Quinn began to receive threats online, she was publicly supported by Anita Sarkeesian, a female gamer, popular culture critic, blogger, and feminist. Sarkeesian published a YouTube video as the third instalment of her web series “Tropes vs. Women in Video Games” which discusses the rarity of female protagonists in games. The harassment then focused on Sarkeesian and her feminist perspective of gaming culture, which she has voiced openly since starting the blog ‘Feminist Frequency’ in 2009 (Sarkeesian, 2015). Sarkeesian actively uses her blog, social media, and offline activism through attending protests and hosting lectures to resist patriarchal opinions in video game culture (Nott, 2014). Women supporting Sarkeesian and Quinn resisted the misogyny present in GamerGate on Twitter in an attempt to reclaim video games as a safe space for women. This is a direct example of female gamers and feminists exercising collective agency online to resist the oppressive force of the patriarchy.

Agency and Serious Games
Agency theory can help understand both forms of oppression and resistance. Agency can be understood as both agency as resistance and agency as power (Ortner, 2006). Agency theory is useful in understanding gender inequalities in relation to the ways in which people and groups display their resistance to online harassment. Male hegemony operates from a position of power but is never total; there will always be resistance that exists outside of the dominant power structure (Ortner, 1989). Societies and cultures are not static and inequalities can be challenged (Ortner, 1989, p. 46). Ortner’s (2006) serious games theory is useful in understanding agency as cultural projects, or games, and how playing the game might reproduce or transform inequalities. Projects that were enacted by women in support of Quinn and Sarkeesian helped to transform the gender inequalities present in online gaming culture and resist male dominance (Nott, 2014).

No Girls Allowed: Gender Inequality Online
Social categories such as gender organise people into certain identities and behaviours, which creates inequality. From a young age boys are conditioned to enjoy video games and although girls are not necessarily discouraged, gaming is still perceived as a masculine pursuit (Williams, Consalvo, Caplan, & Yee, 2009). This perception is in fact no longer true, as 40-43% of all gamers identify as female (Eden, Maloney, & Bowman, 2010; Williams et al., 2009). Further evidence states that the largest demographic of gamers are adult women (Romano, 2014). In spite of girls’ large presence in gaming culture, gender inequality remains. Across various online pursuits it is clear that technology is still perceived to be a men’s only club.

Participation online can be an indicator of existing inequalities offline. In offline socialisation men tend to dominate conversations and can exercise this dominance by talking over the top of women (Armentor-Cota, 2011). These patterns translate online where men practice hegemonic masculinity through jokes and insults about women thereby controlling online communication.
and reinforcing gender inequality (Armentor-Cota, 2011; Tilly, 2001). Online male dominance mirrors offline communication where males can speak authoritatively, sometimes limiting the input of their female peers (Bostock & Lizhi, 2010). Male dominance is expressed in online chat rooms through an autonomous writing style that consists of directive, confident and reactive statements (Baron, 2004; Postmes & Spears, 2002). Although these defamations are regularly met with resistance, initial optimism about egalitarian socialisation online has conceded to the reciprocation of offline gender inequalities as evidenced by the aggressively patriarchal dominance of the GamerGate online harassment (Baron, 2004; Ortner, 2006).

Opportunity hoarding is one element of unequal relations, which is evident online through the marginalisation of women and dominance of men (Tilly, 2001). Opportunity hoarding occurs when a dominant group controls the use of a resource, for example online communications, and prevents the lesser group from participating or contributing equally (Tilly, 2001). This does not require a conscious effort by men who are the dominant group, but it means the women who are restricted must actively resist this dominance and fight for their stake in opportunities online. GamerGate highlights how men hoard access to video games and online communication media, by dominating conversations and using threats to silence and exclude women. Ortner (2006) studied Grimm's' fairy tales and argues that women are punished for exercising their agency as protagonists. Similarly women enacting agency and showing support for Sarkeesian and Quinn on Twitter were also punished for exercising their agency. In response to women pursuing collective agency online men reacted from their position of power and dominated the opinions of women in order to preserve some masculine notion of video gaming culture. The asymmetrical relationship between men and women ensured that whilst women enacted agency, there were ramifications for their actions.

**Consequences of Online Anonymity**

One major shift social media affords is the possibility of anonymity or pseudonymity. This can influence gender fluidity and allow people to invert asymmetrical relations (Armentor-Cota, 2011). Pseudonyms are used online to compartmentalise identity and shift attention away from or towards a facet of identity. By gender swapping (male to female or female to male) online, people are able to invert their social position and experiment with identity. Armentor-Cota (2011) found that women frequently gender swapped their identity online to avoid harassment from men. This could be an effort to establish equality and invert their lesser social position as women. Where women are seen to gender swap and use pseudonyms to avoid harassment, men use these same tactics to harass women (Bodle, 2013). The Internet has allowed people to socialise anonymously more easily than ever before and this anonymity has been linked to online harassment (Bodle, 2013). The threats made to women during GamerGate were mainly from men using anonymous or pseudonymous accounts, which allowed them to remain private and in control. In contrast, men exploited women's identities online and used their position of power to leak women's personal information, robbing women of their anonymity and power (Tilly, 2001).

The opportunity for anonymity online can encourage people to believe there are fewer offline consequences for their actions. Pseudonymous and anonymous accounts allow people to participate online without any attachment to their offline, identifiable self which leads to depersonalisation (Postmes & Spears, 2002). Depersonalisation occurs online when anonymous identities reproduce stereotypic behaviour and reinforce existing inequalities (Williams et al., 2009). Lack of accountability can foster criminal behaviour online, as well as instances of deceptive self-presentation (Guadagno, Okdie, & Kruse, 2012; Larsson, Svensson, & de Kaminski, 2012). In contrast, Bodle (2013) argues that anonymity and pseudonymity encourage honesty, which can be a positive attribute of online communication. At the same time this suggests that online harassment and abuse is an honest representation of peoples’ motives and feelings.
Gender inequality online is linked to instances of anonymity and pseudonymity where commenters harassed and insulted women, threatening to release their personal information (van der Nagel & Frith, 2015). Defamation lawsuits are slowly helping to shape an online world where there is no legal protection for anonymous defendants (Bodle, 2013). Certain cases have set a precedent for online communication laws which could see the Internet being more heavily monitored in the name of protection and online communication more restricted (Bodle, 2013). The structure of online anonymity and multifaceted identity presentation may change due to legal reforms, but there is disagreement over whether this will encourage civility or not.

These legal changes have the potential to negatively affect those who use online anonymity for positive reasons. In opposition to the argument that anonymous online socialisation reproduces inequality, many argue that there are also outstanding benefits (Armentor-Cota, 2011; Bodle, 2013; van der Nagel & Frith, 2015). There is evidence that marginalised groups use online communities to discreetly discuss their identity, for example, people who wish to explore their sexuality but cannot be open and honest offline for fear of persecution (Bodle, 2013). Also professionals such as teachers might be interested in having both a public online profile and a private one (van der Nagel & Frith, 2015). The advantages of anonymous identities here lie in their invisibility, and confidentiality which encourages users to be honest and seek out information without judgement (Nimrod, 2012).

Hashtags and Harassment
The GamerGate hashtag acted as a uniting force: for males’ misogynistic attacks on females; and for women who enacted their agency in order to resist male dominance and harassment on Twitter (Ortner, 2006; Saggese, 2015). The misogyny of gaming culture online is made public through GamerGate and the ensuing events. Women like Sarkeesian, who publicly voiced their support for equal representation in video games, were harassed online. Another female video game developer, Brianna Wu, tweeted about GamerGate, supporting Quinn and Sarkeesian’s feminist perspectives and was also sent rape and death threats (Nott, 2014). Journalist for The Guardian, Jenn Frank, published an article about the events of GamerGate and was harassed so severely she chose to resign from her position (Backe, 2014). These women are representative of the many more who actively resisted misogyny online. Quinn, Sarkeesian, Wu, Frank, and the countless other women who enjoy video games should be allowed as much a claim in the production and consumption of gaming as any other fan (Backe, 2014). The few males who tweeted support for Quinn, most of whom are celebrities or famous public figures, did not receive harassment to the same scale as any of the women associated with GamerGate. William Gibson, an author, and Joss Whedon, a director, came to the defence of women on Twitter but were not harassed for their views (Backe, 2014). This provides compelling evidence of the misogyny of male gamers who were willing to viciously attack any woman who believed that gaming should be a safe space, but would barely pay attention to men who advocated for the same idea (Backe, 2014; Nott, 2014).

GamerGate drew international attention to the misogyny present in gaming culture, trending on Twitter and Facebook, and being written about by gamers and feminists alike. It also managed to pervade news channels and popular culture. A recent (2015) episode of the television show ‘Law & Order’ called ‘Intimidation Game’ paralleled the GamerGate phenomenon to advocate against misogyny in gaming culture and showcase the extremism of the threats made to women online (Rosenberg, 2015). The episode follows a female video game developer, like Quinn, who was harassed online. The narrative privileges her perspective and highlights the lack of legislation in relation to online forms of socialisation (Rosenberg, 2015). The attention in mainstream media has shed light on feminist issues such as equal representation in video gaming and put the misogyny present in the backlash against Sarkeesian and Quinn on display.
In October 2014 the GamerGate phenomenon reached a peak when Sarkeesian was forced to leave her house under police protection and cancel a speaking event at Utah State University. This was the result of anonymous and pseudonymous accounts on Twitter that promised to attend the event and stage the largest school shooting in American history, threatening to kill her and the entire audience (Gleeson, 2014; Iverson, 2014; Nott, 2014). These male gamers displayed an extreme position of misogyny and potential physical violence, which starkly contrasts Sarkeesian’s and Quinn’s position of advocating for diverse female representation in video games. Male gamers not only leaked personal information of women who supported a feminist perspective on gaming but also accused women online of destroying gaming culture and not being “real gamers” (Iverson, 2014). This highlights another issue of a perceived ‘purity’ in gaming which has lead male gamers to believe they have the right and responsibility to protect games from female input. On the 28th of May 2015 Twitter erupted into another series of misogynistic attacks against women in gaming (Wilson, 2015). EA Games launched the latest instalment of their popular soccer video game, FIFA 16, with the option to have women players for the first time and the Guardian published an article, which they posted to Twitter (The Guardian, 2015). This tweet attracted attention from male gamers who claimed the introduction of female avatars had ruined the game, blaming feminists for what they saw as an unwelcome intrusion into their world. Male gamers refused to relinquish any of their power within the gaming community and instead renounced the game, re-establishing their dominance.

**Serious Games**

In the wake of GamerGate, female gamers are fighting back for their rightful stake in the production and consumption of video games. Serious games theory can be applied to gaming culture where female gamers exercise agency to resist traditional, patriarchal notions of gaming (Ortner, 2006). Nott (2014) reflects on an important point of the misogyny present in online gaming:

> Gaming culture, where women are consistently degraded and pitted against one another for legitimacy or men's attention, is no different to how women are treated in society as a whole (Nott, 2014, p. 1).

Examples of women playing serious games include the use of talks, interviews and other public avenues to promote education around gaming culture and showcase women in gaming. Web series, like Sarkeesian’s, are another popular method of using online media outlets to attract attention to women’s input in gaming culture. At Forbes’ “Under 30 Summit”, Monika Lewinsky spoke about online misogyny and instances of slander, nominating herself “patient zero”, and advocating for women to fight back against harassment through the media (Carver, 2014). Online avenues such as blogs and social media are important for building solidarity between female gamers and organising resistance against attacks like those carried out in the name of GamerGate. As women currently represent just under half of the video gaming community, the traditional identities and practices of gamers are being questioned (Nott, 2014). Although video games are still predominantly created by men for male consumers, female creators, like Quinn and Wu, are using online means to achieve their goals and make themselves known in the face of everyday harassment (Zhang, 2013).

Gaming culture has created a toxic ideology where female harassment is expected and male gamers believe that feminists are trying to take video games away from them (Carver, 2014). In reality, women are enacting agency to carve out a safe space in a community where they are constantly abused by men (Tilly, 2001). Women’s resistance to the harassment during GamerGate consisted mainly of tweeting online support and blogging. Within the culture of video gaming women’s desires to enact such projects stem from structural inequalities and male dominance both online and offline (Ortner, 2006).
It is clear that gender inequalities and biases exist online as they do offline. This is linked to an ability to use the Internet anonymously or under a pseudonym, and a general feeling of freedom and social distance that comes with computer mediated communication. When people use the Internet anonymously without fear of offline consequences, they reproduce existing inequalities (Tilly, 2001). In the case of GamerGate, anonymous identities were used to exploit and threaten women, resulting in online and offline consequences. GamerGate is a site in the serious game that pits the dominant hegemonic patriarchy against feminist collective agency (Ortner, 2006; Tilly, 2001). Female gamers used their collective agency to enact resistance on Twitter, hosting lectures to educate others, publishing blogs and web series, and appearing in mainstream media to speak publicly about the issue, in order to reclaim women’s space in gaming culture.

References


The Neoliberal Climate Change Policy of Australia – A critical review from the Marxist Perspective

Kamleshwer Lohana
Assistant Professor
Mehran University Institute of Science, Technology and Development (MUISTD)
Mehran University of Engineering and Technology (MUET), Pakistan
Kamleshwer@gmail.com or kamleshwer.lohana@my.jcu.edu.au

Abstract
Climate change is a global problem and which needs a long term solution in those industrialised countries which are directly or indirectly producing increasing carbon emissions. In Australia, the ‘Climate Change’ policy remains undecided due to a lack of objective government decision-making. This essay will argue that successive Australian federal governments have been influenced by mining and related corporations to implement neoliberal economic policy that opposes climate change legislation. A process that serves their capitalist interests. This has resulted in environmental harm and social welfare issues for Australian society. The development of this public policy will be viewed through a Marxist, instrumentalist theoretical perspective, to identify and analyse implications of its implementation in Australia. This essay introduces evidence of ‘climate capitalism’ which will be critiqued using through Marxist concepts of ‘articulation of modes of production’, as well as considering the relationship between the human being and the planet Earth. This analysis will show that the capitalist economy is exploiting the natural resources and accumulating wealth.

Introduction
Under the Kyoto protocol and the United Nations framework convention on Climate Change, Australia has legal international binding to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gasses (unconditionally by at least 5.5% below 1990 levels by 2020 (Seis, 2005). Like the United States, Australia is a country producing carbon emission at massive level and known for the biggest mining industry operations of the world (Seis, 2005). In this regard, in a parliamentary publication, Kompo-Harms and Sanyal (2011) indicated that Australia was the first in the world to establish a carbon Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). The Climate change policy in Australia has remained inconsistent as a political issue and lacks objective decision making. During the last two decades, both leading parties of Australia (Labor and Liberal) have produced varied stances on climate change at different times (Kompo-Harms & Sanyal, 2011). Moreover, According to Kompo-Harms and Sanyal (2011) climate change policies and the decisions made to control it,
caused two federal political leaders (Malcolm Turnbull in 2009 and Kevin Rudd in 2010) to lose their positions.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the problematic implementation issues around climate change policy in Australia and to investigate how ‘Climate Capitalism’ is causing an increase in the number of environmental and social issues. A review of literature was conducted using the databases such as Google scholar, informit, Jstor and Proquest. Searches were conducted using the keywords: Climate change Policy of Australia, Neoliberalism, Marxism, Mining companies of Australia. The search was limited to the period [insert time frame of your search, e.g. 2005 – 2015?] Over twenty academic and grey literature resources were found to support this analysis. One Search James Cook Library catalogue was also used. These include: four journal articles, three media items, five books, a book review and five government, non-government organisation websites and two news reports referred for this desktop research. A Marxist perspective was adopted to show that how the capitalist economy has affected Australian natural resources and its population.

The reason behind such a major political change was the mass pressure of the capitalist class on government through a mass media campaign by the mining industrial group (Readfearn, 2011). This group influenced the decision makers not to enforce such climate change policies or a policy instrument like Carbon Tax. This group also wanted to maximize profit and wanted to avoid paying taxes to the government and it was successful in bringing the government into negotiation on these matters under the new prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard. The influence of the neoliberal and capitalist economy is an absolute exhibition of capitalist power (bourgeoisie class) putting millions of dollars into media campaigns (Readfearn, 2011), to influence the government by lobbying against decision-makers in order to achieve self-interest and maintain conditions favourable for the accumulation of capital. This strategy helped the mining industries’ capitalist group to develop dominance in the political and social spheres. The basis of the anti-tax campaigns organised by the mining industries capitalist class is to gain maximum profit without paying any tax to the state. According to Kompo-Harms and Sanyal, (2011) the mining companies (BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Xstrata) succeeded in making secret deals with, and influenced, decision makers to renegotiate the Resources Super Profits Tax (RSPT) with Prime Minster Julia Gillard in 2010.

Increase in Inequalities in Australian Society through Tax Exemption
The revised version of the tax is known as The Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT). This government decision can be framed for analysis within the Marxist instrumentalist theoretical perspective where Australian states are perceived as instruments of the capitalist class (Marx & Engels, 2008).

Both of the above mentioned taxes are a type of resource tax, collected by the state in the form of ‘economic rent’ on account of the use of the by mining companies, for which they are unwilling to pay, thus influencing the leadership. Several economists: David Ricardo, Johann von Thünen and Karl Marx, developed and emphasized the concept of economic rent in relation to the state (Kompo-Harms and Sanyal, 2011). The Marxist differential ground rent can be applied and interpreted as Passant (2012) argued that mining companies have a high capital investment which Marx described as a resource rent. Passant (2012) referred to Marx in volume II of ‘Capital’ and explained that taxing (MRRT) economic rent gives the state control, regulates monopoly and facilitates redistribution of wealth and the over-accumulation of capital in the oligopolistic mining sector. In other words, such tax on mining will prevent over-accumulation, competition and financial inequality in society. However, such a tax is strongly opposed and avoided by mining sector organisations, enriching the capitalist elites. For example, the CEO of Hancock Prospecting Private Limited, Australia, Gina Rinehart tripled her wealth in one year
(Murphy, 2012). Similarly, other mining industrialists, adopt the same capitalist, neoliberal, economic mode of capital production, and utilise tax exemptions to accumulate wealth. This tax money is actually public money owed to the nation and is supposed to be spent on welfare projects for the citizens of Australia. However, with tax exemptions, the Australian nation is deprived of funding for welfare. The result of this will be an increase in social inequality.

A Repeal bill: Threat to Climate Change Policy
Implementation of the Carbon tax brought positive results in a range of countries. In a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the United States Regional Energy Policy (USREP) evidence proves that by introducing the carbon tax starting at USD 20 per ton in 2013 and increasing by 4% every year will help in reducing carbon emissions to 14% below 2006 level by 2020 (Rausch & Reilly, 2012). In developed countries, there is evidence of effective results of carbon tax implementation. According to the Pacific Institute of Climate Solution (PICS) Insights (2013) the Canadian provinces, Quebec and British Columbia, collected tax raising two hundred million dollars per year for climate change and welfare project initiatives. From the PICS Insights (2013) the inference is that in order to reduce carbon emissions, it is better to put a direct cost on the carbon emissions which results in lesser consumption of fuel in a range of industries and businesses. PICS Insights (2013) argue two key benefits will be achieved: fuel consumption efficiency and tax revenue which can be used for different welfare purposes. Such practices were also successful in Finland and Great Britain. In Australia, a carbon tax has been implemented since 2012, each ton of carbon dioxide produced is charged AUD 23 to target the three hundred largest emitters (PICS Insights, 2013). If this policy is not opposed and the carbon tax repeal is not successful at the Senate level, there will be an immense positive impact for the public sphere in social welfare system. According to climate change policy in Australia this carbon tax will be shifted to a cap-and-trade system (PICS Insights, 2013). The collected revenue will be used to decrease other taxes and increase expenditure on social welfare. Currently, the climate change policy is threatened by a Repeal bill (which will affect the Carbon Price Mechanism and the MRRT implementation) passed by the present Prime Minister of Australia in the House of Representatives, which is under consideration in the Senate (Wawryk, 2014). The present position of this policy is controversial, and according to Wawryk (2014) the fate of the repeal legislation will depend on the Senate's decision which again indicates how capitalist economies exert pressure to influence opposition against important decisions of climate change policy.

Domination of Capital Class at the cost of Social Welfare
The State’s role in regulation and control of policies is pivotal, in the support of the capitalist class, due to mutual economic advantage. One of the ways to control carbon emissions is to regulate them through Climate Change policies which include a carbon tax and Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS). Andrew, Kaidonis and Andrew (2010) pointed out that the carbon tax instrument brings the state to a central position with its regulations, in finding a solution for climate change by encouraging the reduction in carbon emission (Beeson & McDonald, 2013). Ultimately, this can be a source of government revenue, to be utilized in the public sphere. However, according to Beeson and McDonald (2013), the collective pressure of the capitalists and the mining companies’ alliance, created through the heavily funded anti-tax campaign resulted in Kevin Rudd having to surrender his Prime-Ministership in 2010. In other words, capitalist neoliberal forces dominated the leadership decision-making. In the time of Prime Minister Howard’s leadership, climate change policy remained monopolized by carbon polluters (Beeson & McDonald, 2013). The former Coalition Government leader, Tony Abbott, a strong supporter of the fossil-fuel subsidy, was repealing the climate policy at the end of his tenure. As Prime Minister he also supported the mining industry, by abolishing the Climate Commission.
As Wawryk (2014) noted, the recent decision of the coalition government to also abolish key authority organizations such as: the Climate Change Authority, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) and the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), communicates the message of a non-responsible attitude towards the problems created by climate change (Wawryk, 2014). This all suggests that political actors are influenced by capitalist economies (Beeson & McDonald, 2013). Theoretically, this indicates that the capitalist class dominates. Applying a Marxist perspective then it can be concluded that owners of the mining industries are representatives of the capitalist class dominate state institutions and exert influence over state policy makers and implementers, to achieve their individual purpose of accumulation of wealth at the cost of social welfare.

Commodification of Natural Resources: An Unsustainable Way
The Climate change issue has worsened, due to the growth of a capitalist economy. Wittneben, Okereke, Banerjee, and Levy (cited in Böhm, Misoczky, & Moog 2012), argue unlimited growth capitalism is largely responsible for the environmental crisis facing the world. The evidence shows that the capitalist class has developed and adopted the mechanism to address the environmental issues, however, Wittneben, Okereke, Banerjee, and Levy (cited in Böhm, Misoczky, & Moog 2012) argued that capitalist industries create new carbon markets and a political economy by commodifying natural resources in an unsustainable way. This creates profit for the capitalist but produces inequities in society. Baer (2012) concurs that human beings and natural resources are exploited in an organised way by capitalism. Such capitalism is termed ‘Climate Capitalism’ and it is causing an increase in the number of environmental and social issues.

Capitalism increases production by exploiting natural resources, this results in environmental problems, such as toxic waste and carbon emissions which disturb the equilibrium of the natural carbon cycle. It is evident that when more mining (of coal and other natural resources) is undertaken on a very large scale and exported to the world, there will be higher levels of carbon emissions that pollute the environment. The policy for control of the pollution caused, comes under the Kyoto protocol, as described in the first paragraph. Marx stated “everything is pregnant with its contrary” and “all that is solid melts into air” indicating every issue has its positive and negative side (Berman, 1988, p.36; Bellamy cited in Angus, 2008). This means that un-absorbable substances in the soil will pollute air and harm the society that absorbs them. Foster and Clark (2009) also quoted Marx’s statement that ‘nature and humans are not sources of wealth but the human is father of material wealth and the earth is its mother’. These authors also used the metaphor of capitalism as a vampire that sucks the blood from the planet Earth (Foster & Clark, 2009). This indicates that the exploitation of natural resources for the sake of the accumulation of capital, causes an increase in the degradation of the soil and an environmental impact. In the case of the creation of greenhouse gases, it is coal and petroleum products that impact on the environment including native flora and fauna. Video images of the results of open cut mining upon the surface of the land can be likened to the face of a human being who has just died from small pox. If this practice is increased in the world, there will not be any liveable space for future generations. According to Foster and Clark (2009) for the sake of the future of society, Marx encouraged the ideals of sustainability in the use of natural resources. Additionally, in this regard, Baer (2012) emphasised social equity and environmental sustainability. Furthermore, for a viable relationship between human being and the earth, the needs of present and future generations must be regulated rationally (Foster & Clark, 2009).

Creation of Carbon Market through New Technology
According to Lohmann (cited in Böhm, Misoczky & Moog, 2012) this creation of a carbon market is ineffective and flawed and produces negative economic and social outcomes. In other words, miners and capitalist elites will encourage capitalist accumulation through the production
of new ecosystem services and environmental goods. Such accumulation of wealth is not in accordance with regards to Marxist perspective. An example is an eco-friendly fuel, ethanol produced from large volumes of maize and corn using green technology which produces no carbon emissions. However, it is production that has caused an extraordinary increase in the cost of food prices which resulted in food security issues for the world (link TV, 2007). This increase in food prices was also reported by the UN regarding the use of bio-fuels (link TV, 2007). This is another route of the ‘penetration of Capitalism’ through ‘green fuel which is an alternative to fossil fuel. Such ways of running a profit making business and creating food insecurity can be related to the Marxist concept of ‘articulation of modes of production’. In this regard, Marx (cited in Berman, 1988), argued that in a capitalist economy, the bourgeoisie continuously revolutionize the instruments of production and consequently influence interactions in society. This indicates that modern changes of technology are utilised for profit maximization only, irrespective of how society may suffer as a result of these profits.

**Capitalist and Politicians - Class Origins**

Decision making and decision makers are influenced by the capitalist class. This class system signifies the Marxist theory of State through which both capitalists and State government representatives have the same social status in society (Haywood, 2002). For example; a mining billionaire like Gina Rinehart invited MPs and took them in her private plane to India to attend a three day marriage event of an Indian businessman’s son. This news coverage included public opinion about how much influence a Ms Rinehart has and how close to her State representatives are influenced by her. This is a feature of the Marxist concept of State where capitalists and politicians share the same class in society (Haywood, 2002). After this event, government representatives (Julie Bishop Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party and Nationals Senate leader Barnaby Joyce) justified their visit as being immensely important for Australian business networking and future investments (Murphy, 2011). This connection is also confirmed by the fact that the Australian Coal Association (ACA) is a major donor to the Labor and Liberal political parties in Australia (Baer, 2014). Again this agrees with the Marxist State conceptual model, where the capitalist class and state representatives are interdependent. State representatives are obligated to a capitalist mining billionaire because the state’s business interests are in common with her own. Miliband (cited in Twynhan, 2008) confirms that leaders of business and leading bureaucrats have close contact and that State officials facilitate capital accumulation for the capitalist class. In return, they get political support for their political party, personal networking and opportunity for mutual economic growth for the state. State representatives believe that state economic growth is one of the ways in which the country can prosper. However, by supporting the capitalist class they are creating a range of issues in the society including: giving space to the mining industry to regulate, to trade in a free market and repealing the Carbon tax.

A range of factors which limits the government’s role and create inequalities in the society. Firstly, an exorbitant amount of money will increase the accumulation of wealth of the capitalist class and decrease the resources for government to spend on public welfare. Secondly, mining without considering the Kyoto emission levels, will create national and global problems. Thirdly, the State’s instrumental role in supporting capitalism, limits its proper role of Government for society and will result in capitalist forces dictating the agenda of political choices in the future. In other words, as Marx states the government becomes, “but a committee for managing common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” (cited in Twynhan, 2008). Additionally, it will create social inequality, as well as, establish global ‘Climate Capitalism’ which will harm all the communities of the world. Williams (2013) argues that there is an immense need for a new political vision that supports deep socio-cultural change to create social justice for human lives.
Conclusion
The Climate change policy has remained inconsistent in Australia due to indecisive decision making. This essay has argued that during different eras of governments, the neoliberal-capitalist economy of Australia has remained successful in preventing the government from implementing the climate change policy for their economic gain. This attitude of Australia’s elite capitalist class has caused environmental harm, as well as, created issues of social welfare inequality in Australian society. This public policy issue was viewed through a Marxist perspective, which identified policy implementation problems as well as portrayed the State’s role, capitalist class dominations and tactics for avoiding the ‘Carbon Tax’. This essay also described ‘climate capitalism’ and presented recently scholarly work based on empirical evidence. Marxist views regarding the relationship between human beings and the Earth were also considered. The evidence reveals an exploitative capitalist economy which has endangered nature by pursuing the accumulation of wealth, creating climate issues, social inequalities and decreasing the already limited social welfare for the Australian population. Overcoming this dilemma requires a new political vision.

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Dr Lou Wilson passed away suddenly on 28 August 2015 before he could present this paper. Here is a tribute from his colleague Michael McGreevy at this link.

Understanding the economic vitality of the civic commons through complex systems theory

Michael McGreevy & Lou Wilson

The University of South Australia

Abstract

This paper discusses the fractals of the city, its subsystems, in particular its regional, district and neighbourhood activity centres that form the metropolis with reference to complex systems theory. The metropolis draws its dynamism from the individual neighbourhoods that form its districts, and the districts that form its regions that ultimately accumulate to form the city. While all metropolitan areas can be understood as complex adaptive systems, many urban subsystems constructed in the post-World War II period are not. It will be argued that only the traditional “commons” has the principles required to be defined as complex.

Keywords: Complex adaptive systems, metropolis, the Neighbourhood and civic commons

Introduction

The introduction of chaos theory, and subsequently third wave complex systems theories in the 1970s and 1980s represented a paradigm shift in the natural and physical sciences. However, in the social sciences, particularly urban planning and geography, it represented a scientific methodology in support of what they had long inductively observed, that the city was complex, multilayered, self-organised and not readily understood by way of reductive formulas. The city was obviously organic, in no way machine-like; it was evolving and impossible to predict, and small changes often resulted in unforeseen consequences (Johnson 2004).

Barros & Sobriera (2008), Childs (2012), Barry & Marshall (2012) Haken (2012), Hall (1995), Hillier (2008) and others have argued, that cities and their regions, districts, slums and neighbourhoods are self-evidently complex adaptive systems and have attempted to more fully understand cites and their dynamics in this light. Portugali (2011, p. 97) claims that complexity theory has become in a couple of decades ‘an established interdisciplinary research domain engaging urban geographers, planners, urban designers, regional scientists, mathematicians, physicists and others’.

A major principle of complex adaptive systems is that they are scalar and hierarchical (Mitchell 2009). Hierarchy in complex adaptive systems refers to each system being made up of a mosaic of other complex adaptive subsystems that are in turn made up of other complex adaptive
subsystems. In this way, cities should not be analysed as a single system but rather a mosaic of complex adaptive systems each interrelated and overlapping without as well as within (Hillier 2008; Martin 2012). It is the strength and dynamism of the individual neighbourhoods that form its districts, and the districts that form its regions that ultimately accumulate to form the metropolitan city. Therefore, the accumulated activity of neighbourhoods and districts shape the city rather than the other way around. This is a major theoretical shift in the way the metropolis is understood and analysed.

While all metropolitan areas are complex adaptive systems, many urban subsystems constructed since WWII are not. They are, instead either chaotic or controlled by mechanical order. This paper for analyses three styles of metropolitan activity centre, the arterial strip, the shopping mall or hypermarket and the traditional civic or neighbourhood commons (high streets, downtowns, town centres etc.) as complex adaptive systems. We argue that only the traditional civic or neighbourhood commons has the principles required to be defined as complex.

Complexity theory and the city
The urban complex adaptive system might be understood as an agglomeration of abiotic elements in the form of infrastructure and buildings and diverse biotic elements in the form of businesses, institutions, civic, social, cultural and political organisations and people drawn together within space and time. The abiotic elements provide the space and connections that bind the diverse elements into the integrated whole that is the city, town, village, society or economy in which relationships, routines, decisions and knowledge emerges. However, civic ecosystems, while similar, differ from natural ecosystems in that biotic agents within the former are thinking, learning entities able to adapt and change quickly. Civic complex adaptive systems may begin as ad hoc, top-down creations of human agency but eventually evolve a dynamic of their own through self-organisation driven by bottom-up decision making.

As a fractal of the greater city, the civic or neighbourhood commons is what is referred to in biology as a heterotrophic ecosystem, dependent upon external flows of energy and materials, but individually able to metabolise them in different ways. It is the energy of the pedestrian formed crowds; moving, sitting, standing, observing and playing, that provides life in public places and delivers the exogenously derived nutrients into the system that can then be cycled and recycled to evolve its richness, diversity and mass. However, in the postmodern city, not all constituent districts and neighbourhoods are fractal complex adaptive systems, as post-war urban development has largely provided either chaos or order in newly added fractals.

Chaos in the metropolis manifests itself in the form of the arterial strip. The strip provides lines of often diverse but discrete agents attached to the greater city by the road network and mass marketing, but it is detached from the local and the energy of pedestrian activity by poor or non-existent pedestrian connections, distance, intentional ugliness, and legibility aimed at speeding motorists. Without the design and connectivity needed for the energy supply of pedestrian activity, the strip is unable to provide opportunities for relationships and synergies to form. In reference to Gehl’s (2010) three types of urban activities, the strip is unable by design to build social and resultant activity in, around, between and upon the necessary activities that proliferate along them. Consequently, the strip can only be a linear place, unable by design to create something greater than the sum of its individual parts.
Order, on the other hand, comes in the form of the shopping centre in all its various forms. The shopping centre purposely isolates itself from potential relationships by creating places of controlled and reduced diversity, single ownership, synergy within and dynnergy without (Kowinski 2002; Mitchell 2006). The ultimate form of order is that of the hypermarket, which isolates most of what needs to be bought on a daily, weekly or even monthly basis within a single premise away from potential relationships and synergies.

As distinct from the hypermarket, the shopping mall uses primary attractors and choreographed pedestrian movement as a means to generate opportunities for secondary uses. However, it does so, not by the principles found in a complex adaptive system, but rather via the engineered system of the machine (Goss 1993). Within the machine for shopping, there is no place for the spontaneity and self-organisation or bottom-up regulation on the edge-of-chaos. The allocation of space, locations, mix, aesthetics and design is driven by top-down command and control devised by experts, implemented by standards and bureaucratic processes (Mitchell 2006; Voyce 2003). Therefore, while a shopping centre can be large, diverse and complicated, the absence of bottom-up organisation and self-regulation means they can never be complex as ‘complexity occurs only in systems that are self-organising’ (Page 2011, p. 84).

Between the chaos of the strip and the order of the shopping mall lies the pre-war town, village, parade or high street civic or neighbourhood commons (Childs 2004). While many of these commons had their beginnings in top-down control exercised by government and developers, over time the top-down forces move on and systems evolve a dynamic of their own, turning the loosely connected and ad hoc into complexity over space and time.

The civic and neighbourhood commons is self-organising and regulated by the multiple decision making of many agents, either as business owners, landlords or institutions, all of whom were connected and bound to one another via multiple relationships enabled and fostered by the public spaces that lay between them. As complex adaptive systems, the traditional neighbourhood and civic commons, like their natural ecosystem cousins, are manifest in evolved relationships, reverberating catalytic loops, synergies and symbiosis, and are alive with a dynamic tension fuelled by competition, cooperation and possibilities offering constant opportunities for serendipity, happenstance and niche exploitation, which in turn drives adaption, change and dynamic evolution.

Without an overarching hand to create order, as found in the mall or hypermarket, complex adaptive systems are characterised by messy departures from the rational, efficient, ideal or perfect. On the other hand, in the shopping centre, controlling the whole based upon notions of perfectibility, rationality and/or efficiency are the modus operandi, which ultimately stifles creativity and dynamism as it eliminates the incongruity, messiness and edge-of-chaos that the capacity of individual agents to respond to opportunities relies upon. The inevitable consequence of a drive for perfection in the mall or hypermarket, is stasis and standardisation.
Metabolising energy in the commons

It is hence the very messiness of the commons that gives it energy. In nature, the key to efficiency is complexity and the ability of niche species to recycle the nutrients created by dominant species. Moreover, complexity leads to still further diversity, which in turn leads to still greater complexity, a virtuous cycle that eventually slows with maturity, but never stops (Mitchell 2009). Much of what is provided by specialist stores or businesses within a commons, could be provided more efficiently. A vending machine for example can provide a perfectly adequate coffee or drink. However, the cafe, like the elaborate flower attracting the bee, sells coffee in a highly inefficient and extravagant manner in order to entice customers by providing experiences beyond the simply instrumental. Similarly, like the flower, the allure of the cafe becomes a contributor to the small, diverse, idiosyncratic pleasures of place that benefit all, not just those who are the immediate targets of the display.

While cities and districts within cities can never be, nor would it be desirable for them to be, self-sufficient to the level of natural complex adaptive systems such as the rainforests, they have the ability to use the cycling of energy as a means to add diversity, mass, complexity and richness by metabolising inputs of energy. Unlike complex adaptive systems in nature, the dynamism of dispersed decision making by diverse agents is also fundamental to the growth of abiotic elements within the commons. Multiple ownership of land and premises within the commons means numbers grow incrementally by the small-scale decisions of micro agents without overall planning or top direction. While this leads to disorder in the form of occasional oversupply and boom-bust cycles, it keeps the system expanding and continually provides space for new biotic agents to enter (Harvey 2010; O’Flaherty 2005). This is in stark contrast to growth within the shopping centre where growth comes by top down fiat driven by an imperative to maintain optimum rental returns (Mitchell 2006; Voyce 2003).

Money as the nutrient of the commons

It is vital to the long-term viability and health of neighbourhood or civic any commons that pedestrians not only use it but they also distribute the nutrient of money to agents within the system in the process. Therefore, the success of the commons is determined not just by drawing pedestrians into the system for specific purposes or necessary activities, but also by then cycling them through the system as whole and subsequently drawing greater amounts of nutrients from them as a result. Complexity reduces the flow of what is referred to in retail theory as ‘escape expenditure’ or earnings spent by local residents outside of their neighbourhood or districts. It also slows down the metabolism of nutrients locally by providing a greater quantity and diversity of agents and consumption options within the neighbourhood.

A further means of retaining nutrients within a system come via the non-linear dynamics associated with complex adaptive systems of slowing the metabolism of energy via the cycling of nutrients. In the case of the commons, the cycling of nutrients comes from ensuring that more of the money that flows into the cash registers of agents within the system recirculates and finds its way into other cash registers within the system. This alternative understanding of urban economics regards the strength of an economy lying not in its ability to tap into exogenous inputs, but rather in the proliferation and diversification of endogenous focussed networks of production, distribution and exchange (see Beinhocker 2006; Fleming & Goetz 2011; Jacobs 1970; Romer 1994).

One of the principles of complex adaptive systems is that they require no overarching understanding of the whole by its various agents. In the natural ecosystem, each agent operates with their own wellbeing at the fore. They cooperate and compete by virtue of self-interest with no regard to the health of the ecosystem as a whole, which in nature has no advocate (Dawkins 2009; Mitchell 2006). However, human social systems have the added phenomenon of altruism,
as well as the means to retain codified, historical knowledge and often concern for the wellbeing of other agents and the system as a whole, which produce further levels of complexity.

Another difference between the non-human agents within an ecosystem and human actors in the complex commons is that the survival of the latter is not bound to genetic reproduction. Survival for most human agents within the social and economic systems rests upon an immediate ability to earn an income reasonably commensurate with the effort, capital and labour invested.

While the evolving system itself provides the necessary incentives for adaption, the process of adaption for individual human agents within the system comes via continuous and incremental processes of trial and error experimentation. The process begins with discovery and learning from a variety of sources, including the past, books, journals, travel, word of mouth and the internet. Then, coupled with experience and knowledge of place, this learning can be reapplied, mimicked, adjusted and incrementally transformed into innovation via trial and error experimentation.

Trial and error is the dynamic behind innovation and creativity amongst individual agents and, when accumulated, across the system as a whole. Change via dispersed small-scale decision making has great benefits for the system as a whole, as it involves the application of insight, creativity and ideas instantaneously and directly without mediation or reference to antecedent work. It does not require interim viability, it can be adjusted quickly and easily, can be given time and space to succeed or fail, and proceed with relatively small investments of time and capital.

Agents within the demanding environment of complex adaptive systems constantly make poor choices, therefore, new entrants and some established agents periodically fall victim to the winnowing process created by these demands (Mitchell 2009; Page 2011). This is, of course, a negative for the agents concerned. However, it is not a negative to the system as a whole, and can ultimately be a positive as it prevents run away diversity, builds complexity and provides regular opportunities for new entrants. It is also part of the learning process, as embedded agents are able to learn from both their own errors and the errors of others.

The irony of the complex adaptive system is that the competitive forces within the system, which make life tense and difficult for individual agents, are a source of strength to the system as a whole. In an economic system, such as the commons, it makes innovation and creativity a survival technique and an intrinsic value. The result is a system dynamic driven by the constant application of the cognitive power of a multiplicity of agents in pursuit of fresh opportunities and access to niche flows of nutrients. Agents in such systems are by necessity sensitive to their environments and able to respond to them in subtle ways.

While the machine like shopping mall or hypermarket requires ordered parts to carry out its vital functions, the complex adaptive simply provides opportunities. Creativity can take leaps in new directions when agents are autonomous, free to experiment, learn from elsewhere and adapt ideas quickly and easily to local circumstances. Once complexity evolves within a system, the continued seeking out and exploitation of opportunities become routine and probable, leaving few stones unturned in the quest (Holland 1997; Mitchell 2009; Page 2011). This freedom stands in stark contrast to the rigid control imposed upon agents within the mechanistic system of the shopping centre, where opportunities may be recognised, but there is an absence of autonomous bottom-up forces able to quickly and easily act upon them (Coleman 2006; Dennis et al. 2005; Voyce 2003).

In a complex adaptive system, a long tail of diverse highly specialised and often brittle niche agents dominate numerically and spatially. Their redundancy and inherent fragility means they come and go with routine regularity, often contribute little to overall turnover and typically do so with observable levels of resource and spatial inefficiency, disorder and messiness. Consequently,
within the mall or the hypermarket they are viewed as risky and unnecessary, and are purposefully avoided in standard retail mixes (Brown 1992; Reimers & Clulow 2000).

However, the redundant and the niche are imperative to the well-being and resilience of complex adaptive systems as their commitment to survival is a powerful system dynamic. Collectively they also provide much of the commons’ strength, diversity, richness and interestingness. Many fail, many endure for some time in a marginal state, while others manage over time to build incrementally a more robust position within the system. They also constitute a reservoir of alternatives, or phenotypic trait variations, which enable systems to adapt and respond to exogenously derived disturbances. Over time, the once marginal and fragile can eke out a more solid position and replace declining or obsolete agents that once held key positions in the system (Holland 1995; Page 2011).

The vulnerability of complex adaptive systems

No agent within any system mechanical or organic is atomic. Agents, therefore, cannot be abstracted from the system without repercussions for other agents or the system as a whole. The repercussions of a loss vary enormously depending upon the position the agent has in the cycling process of the system. In particular, the loss of key agents can irreparably damage the system as a whole.

The mechanical system of the mall has proven to be the highly susceptible to the loss of major anchors. Typically, this has occurred when a newer and larger mall or hypermarket is built within or near their catchment. In the USA, where this is a common occurrence, the result has been the quite rapid decline and almost inevitable closure of the older centre (Levy & Weitz 2007, Mitchell 2006).

In the complex adaptive system, each agent is supported by multiple and diverse synergetic relationships. What is more, the continual loss and replacement of the small or redundant is a routine dynamic of any complex system. While redundant agents help provide a vital reservoir of alternatives in the face of periodic upheavals and loss of key agents. Consequently, complex adaptive systems are in their nature robust and resilient in the face of incremental change and periodic challenges and have an innate ability to ride out upheavals and difficult circumstances even though they can be permanently altered by them (Arthur 2009; Loreau 2000; Page 2011).

The complex commons has proven adept at writing of economic downturns, technological change, evolving tastes and consumption patterns over decades or centuries. While they have proven resilient in the short term to the speculative over expansion of abiotic elements within, and actually benefitted from them over the long term, they have proven far more vulnerable in cases where cataclysmic investment and monumental change have produced new systems and/or diverted supplies of energy and nutrients elsewhere. Primarily this has occurred when key agents are decanted outside the centre into competing shopping centres (Kowinski 2002; Mitchell 2006).

The opening of competing activity centres rarely results in an instant abandonment. Instead it progresses as a cascading decline (Irwin & Clarke 2006; Romer 1994; Shuman 2007). In small enterprises, fixed costs are far greater than running costs, and such a decrease in turnover can move the solid to fragile and the fragile from marginal profitability to loss. What begins as a ripple of closures of the most fragile slowly morphs into contagious closure as thresholds are reached and each closure bites into the bottom-line of those remaining, and critical levels of diversity are lost. As diversity declines, the attractiveness of the centre as a whole declines and patrons are diverted to alternatives, leading to less and less energy and nutrients coming into the system. The decline often begins slowly but accelerates as the flows of energy and synergies that
built the system evaporate. Ultimately, the system is left with significantly less diversity, richness and complexity.

However, unlike in the shopping mall, closure and abandonment are not an inevitable outcome. The resilience of a complex system means that while it is left in a situation far less than its historical best, it at least has the potential to re-evolve diversity and complexity given the time and connected space to do so. For this reason the twenty-first century has been far kinder to the precinct than superseded shopping centres. Many precincts have been able to re-evolve after years of decline as gentrified retail, restaurant or cafe strips catering to the new middle class, ethnoscapes or specialist centres (Amin 2010; Zukin 2010).

**Conclusion: The advantages of the complex commons**

Any place which is able, as a matter of routine, to generate a whole greater than the sum of its parts via relationships and synergies, is preferable to those that are unable to do so or do it in a restricted manner. The complex adaptive system is a more efficient metaboliser of exogenously derived inputs into mass through diversity, networked complexity and synergies.

Agents within a complex adaptive system are by necessity constantly interacting within the system, receiving signals and adjusting to them, as survival within a niche requires being open to new ideas and seeking them out (Johnson 2004; Loreau 2004; Page 2011). They can respond to opportunities and impending change in subtle and idiosyncratic ways that cut across categories in attempts to add what Jacobs (1970) described as new work to old. This produces an endogenous dynamic through the persistent actions of individual agents searching for and finding opportunities to cycle and recycle exogenous inputs of energy and nutrients, producing enhanced levels of diversity, complexity, richness and mass from similar inflows into the system.

The dispersed, bottom-up decision making of micro-agents constantly required to learn, experiment, innovate and search for fresh opportunities in order to survive or flourish means the complex commons is constantly in a state of flux. This makes learning, experimentation, innovation and creativity inherent values of complex systems. As such, the complex commons is a more dynamic environment able to evolve and sustain more mass and activity than either order or chaos.

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Fatherhood in the 21st Century: Who are the fathers who combine long work hours and caring for children?

Laetitia Coles, Belinda Hewitt & Bill Martin

The Institute for Social Science Research, The University of Queensland

Abstract: How fathers resolve tensions around being a “breadwinner” and an “involved father” when they work long hours has not yet been adequately researched. Using 13 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey, we identify 3166 partnered heterosexual fathers (n=14,745 person observations) who work full time. We compare fathers who combine long hours in paid work with long hours caring for children, with three other groups of fathers: 1) those who work regular full time hours and spend relatively long hours with children; 2) those who work long hours and spend fewer hours with children; and 3) those who work regular full time hours and spend fewer hours with children. We compare these fathers across demographic, social, and work factors that may be associated with time in work and care. We find younger fathers who have younger children, and those who see childcare as a pleasurable activity, are more likely to combine longer work hours with more time with children. We find working from home and working in the private sector are associated with long hours in paid work, whereas occupation prestige and wife’s or partner’s level of education are associated with time spent with children.

Introduction

Maintaining a position of “breadwinner” within the family remains core to the definition of fatherhood (Kaufman and Uhlenberg, 2000; Lamb, 1987), despite recent academic and popular discourses expanding to include the “involved father” ideal (Kaufman and Uhlenberg, 2000; Pleck, 2010). In Australia, 90 per cent of heterosexual couple families with at least one child under 15 years of age include a father who is employed, and of these fathers, 92 per cent work full time (ABS, 2012; see also Baxter, Gray, Alexander, Strazdins, and Bittman 2007). In 2004, fathers in Australia worked an average of 47 hours each week (Baxter, Gray, Alexander, Strazdins, and Bittman, 2007), and between 1992 and 2006 fathers’ time in paid employment increased by ten hours per week (Craig and Mullan, 2012). At the same time, fathers increased the hours they spent caring for children from 10 to 12.7 hours a week (Craig and Mullan, 2012). Although care has not increased by as many hours as paid work, research from the US (Bianchi, 2006), the UK (Sullivan, Billari, and Altintas, 2014), and Scandinavian countries (Brandth and Kvande, 2001; Haas, Duvander, and Chronholm, 2012) show similar trends of fathers increasing their time in both work and care. However, little research has studied fathers who combine long hours of
paid work with caring for children to understand how they resolve competing breadwinner and involved father ideologies. This paper addresses this research gap.

Background theory and literature
Holter (2007) analysed survey and interview data from men across European and theorised that fathers who spend fewer hours in paid work and more time caring for children (relative to other fathers) was because of one of two reasons. Firstly, to adhere to an involved father ideology, or secondly, in response to specific personal circumstances – such as their or their partner’s employment – which require them to work fewer hours and spend more time with children, relative to other fathers (Holter, 2007). We apply this theory to the Australian context and develop a two-part framework that helps explain variations in fathers’ work and care practices by looking at: 1) the extent that parental identity is associated with fathers’ involvement in work and care, and 2) the impact of family and work-related circumstances on fathers’ time in work and care.

The first part of this framework incorporates identity theory. Research suggests that fathers devote time to work or care according to whether they identify with the “breadwinner” or “involved father” roles (Gaunt and Scott, 2014; Marsiglio, 1993) and whether they feel positively towards, or fulfilled by, parenting (Adamsons, 2013). Some studies suggest that a higher socioeconomic background is associated with intensive parenting norms and an involved father identity, and thereby comparatively more time with children (Ba, 2014; Gracia, 2014).

The second part of this framework incorporates a time availability perspective as a whole-of-household approach, and suggests personal and family circumstances are associated with fathers’ time in paid work and caring for children. Fathers of infants typically spend more time with children because of the increased demands of physical and routine care (Baxter et al., 2007; Gracia, 2014) or may take on more active child care duties in response to mothers’ employment (Baxter, 2012; Raley, Bianchi, and Wang, 2012). In contrast, fathers may spend less time with children in response to long hours of paid work (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson, 2000; Craig and Mullan, 2011).

Circumstances within the workplace itself may also be associated with the time fathers spend with children. For example, although some fathers may have access to flexible work arrangements, research suggests few fathers use these arrangements to care for children due to wage reduction, career penalties, and stigmatisation in the workplace (Coltrane, Miller, DeHaan, and Stewart, 2013; Rudman and Mescher, 2013). However, some international studies suggest fathers are more likely to use flexibility to care for children when they work in the public sector and in female-dominated occupations wherein negative consequences are less prevalent (Bygren and Duvander, 2006; Lappegård, 2012).

Other studies suggest fathers in higher status occupations are less involved with children than fathers in lower status jobs that have clearer start and finish times and enable fathers to arrive home and spend time with younger children (O’Brien, 2005; Pleck, 1997). In contrast, Ba (2014) notes although higher status occupations are more likely to be associated with long work hours, they are also more likely to have autonomous work patterns and flexible work arrangements, which may help facilitate time with children.

Research Question
The overarching question asks: What personal, family, and workplace characteristics are associated with fathers who work long hours and engage in long hours caring for children each week?

Data
To answer the above question, we used 13 waves of the Household, Income, and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, 2001 to 2014. We selected full time employed,
heterosexual partnered fathers of children under 15. After dealing with missing data across all explanatory variables, our final analytic sample comprised 3,166 individual fathers (n=14,745 person observations).

**Dependent variable**
The dependent variable is a typology constructed from two questions in HILDA that asked fathers how much time they spend each week 1) in paid employment, and 2) actively caring for children. Caring for children is defined in the HILDA survey as “playing with your children, helping them with personal care, teaching, coaching or actively supervising them, or getting them to child care, school and other activities”. This definition encompasses activities that fathers typically engage in with children from birth to 15 years. The typology comprises four groups of fathers and are defined as fathers who spent: 1) 45+ hours in work and 20+ hours with children; 2) 35-44 hours in work and 20+ hours with children; 3) 45+ hours of work and 0-19 hours with children, and; 4) 35-44 hours in work and 0-19 hours with children.

**Table 1 “Descriptive statistics: work hours and hours with children typology”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1 = 20+ hours with children, 45+ hours work</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 = 20+ hours with children, 35-44 hours work</td>
<td>1,624</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3 = 0-19 hours with children, 45+ hours work</td>
<td>6,780</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 4 = 0-19 hours with children, 35-44 hours work</td>
<td>4,763</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,745</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Independent variables**
The independent variables include demographic, family, work characteristics and a measure of fathers’ own subjective experience of fatherhood (see Table 1). The first set of independent variables include fathers’ age, marital status, and age and number of children in the household. Fathers’ age was centred around the mean and treated as a continuous variable. Marital status is a dummy variable (0 = married, 1 = cohabiting). We constructed four count variables for age of children, which are number of children aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-11, and 12-16.

The second set of independent variables relates to fathers’ work circumstances: employment status, occupational gender composition, occupational sector and size, whether fathers work from home, and their satisfaction with work hours and workplace flexibility. Employment status is constructed as a dummy variable (0 = employee, 1 = employer/self-employed). Occupation gender composition is constructed as a categorical variable: 1 = works in a male-dominated occupation (>70 per cent male employees), 2 = works in a female-dominated occupation (>70 per cent female employees), and 3 = works in neither male- nor female-dominated occupation (see ABS, 2015). We included five occupation sector and size categories: 1 = Public; 2 = Small private (<20 employees) and self-employed; 3 = Medium private (20-199 employees); 4 = Large private (200+ employees); 5 = Not-for-profit (NFP). Fathers’ work from home status is measured as a dummy variable (0 = does not work from home, 1 = does some work from home), and satisfaction with both workplace flexibility and hours worked are measured as a Likert scale (0 = totally dissatisfied, 10 = totally satisfied).

The third set of variables looks at fathers’ socioeconomic position: fathers’ education, income, and Australian Socioeconomic Index 2006 (AUSEI06) score. Education is measured as: 1 = Bachelor degree or higher; 2 = Certificate/Diploma or equivalent; 3 = High school or below. Fathers’ income is measured as a continuous variable (raw income scores adjusted by dividing
by 10,000). Finally, AUSEI06 measures occupation prestige and is measured as a continuous variable from 1 to 100 (higher scores denote higher occupation prestige).

The fourth set of independent variables includes mothers’ work-related characteristics: hours spent in paid employment, level of education, and income. Hours in employment are measured as a continuous variable from 0 (0 hours = not in the labour force). Level of education and income are measured as per fathers’.

Lastly, we include a variable asking whether fathers agree taking care of their child(ren) is more work than pleasure, and is a Likert scale whereby 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree.

Table 2 “Descriptive statistics”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean/percentage</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (centered)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>16-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Cohabitng/De Facto</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Married</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Australia</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 English-speaking country</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Non-English-speaking country</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children in household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 0-1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 2-4</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 5-11</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 12-16</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Employee</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Employer, Self-employed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation gender composition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Male-dominated occupation</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Female-dominated occupation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Neither male- nor female-dominated occupation</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector and size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Public sector</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Small private (&lt;20 employees) and self-employed</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Medium private (20-199 employees)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Large private (200+ employees)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Not-for-profit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the flexibility available to balance work and non-work commitments</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0=dissatisfied, 10=satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with hours worked</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0=dissatisfied, 10=satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bachelor degree or higher</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Certificate/Trade/Diploma or equivalent</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean/per cent</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 High school or below</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($10,000)</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>0-86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSEI06</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work from home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Does not work from home</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Does some work from home</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/partner – paid work hours</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.97</td>
<td>0-118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/partner – level of education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bachelor degree or higher</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Certificate/Trade/Diploma or equivalent</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 High school or below</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/partner income ($10,000)</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0-86.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking care of children – more work than pleasure (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>14,745</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Methods

Given the dependent variable has four categories we run a multinomial logistic model. Because the data is longitudinal we account for clustering at the individual level, and estimate a generalised structural equation model with random effects. We run a full model incorporating all variables. With this approach we examine which characteristics are associated with fathers in each group. Fathers who engage in at least 45 hours engage with work 20 or more hours with children are the reference group.

Results

Descriptive results (table 2) show of the fathers who spend 20 or more hours with children each week, 11 per cent work at least 45 hours and 11 per cent work 35-44 hours each week. Of the fathers who spend 0-19 hours each week with children, 46 per cent work at least 45 hours each week, and 32 per cent work 35-44 hours each week.

Table 3 Results (Base group: 20+ hours with children, 45+ hours work)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>20 + hours with children, 35-44 hours work (Coef/Robust standard error)</th>
<th>0-19 hours with children, 45+ hours work (Coef/Robust standard error)</th>
<th>0-19 hours with children, 35-44 hours work (Coef/Robust standard error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (centered)</td>
<td>0.030**</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitng (ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.373*</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children in household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 0-1</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.737***</td>
<td>-0.642***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 2-4</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.630***</td>
<td>-0.618***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td>20 + hours with children, 35-44 hours work</td>
<td>0-19 hours with children, 45+ hours work</td>
<td>0-19 hours with children, 35-44 hours work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 5-11</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>-0.128*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 12-16</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>0.514***</td>
<td>0.366***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee (ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer/Business owner</td>
<td>-0.605**</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>-0.456*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation gender composition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male-dominated occupations (ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female-dominated occupations</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.261</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither male- nor female-</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector and size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector (ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small private (&lt;20) + self-emp</td>
<td>-0.910***</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>-0.819***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium private (20-199)</td>
<td>-0.756***</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>-0.626***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large private (200+)</td>
<td>-0.675**</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>-0.545**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not-for-profit (NFP)</td>
<td>-0.852**</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-0.828**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work from home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not work from home (ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does some work from home</td>
<td>-1.003***</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.808***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with level of flexibility at work (0=not satisfied 7=very satisfied)</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with no. of hours work each week (0=not satisfied 7=very satisfied)</td>
<td>0.308***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.327***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers’ education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor or higher (ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade/certificate/diploma</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
<td>-0.207</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12 or below</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($10,000)</td>
<td>-0.099***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.095***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 presents the results from the analysis. Holding all other variables constant, as age increases above the mean, the likelihood fathers work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children each week decreases compared with all other groups of fathers. Amongst fathers who spend at least 20 hours with children each week, married fathers are less likely to work 35-44 hours compared with fathers who work at least 45 hours each week. Finally, irrespective of work hours, fathers with more children aged 0-1 or 2-4 living in the household are more likely to spend at least 20 hours with children each week. In contrast, more children in the household aged 12-16 increases the likelihood fathers will spend 0-19 hours with children compared with fathers who spend at least 20 hours with children and work at least 45 hours each week.

In relation to fathers’ work circumstances, being an employer or self-employed decreases the likelihood of working 35-44 hours compared with fathers who work at least 45 hours each week, irrespective of time spent with children. In addition, compared with fathers who work in male-dominated occupations, fathers who work in occupations with a more equal gender distribution are less likely to work 35-44 hours and spend 0-19 hours with children than fathers who work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children each week. Further, compared with fathers who work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children each week, fathers in small, medium and large private businesses, and fathers in NFP organisations, are less likely than fathers in the public sector to work 35-44 hours. A similar pattern is found for fathers who do some work from home, whereby they are less likely to work 35-44 hours each week (irrespective of hours with children) when compared with fathers who work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children. Satisfaction with flexibility, however, is not significant. Rather, fathers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>20+ hours with children, 35-44 hours work</th>
<th>0-19 hours with children, 45+ hours work</th>
<th>0-19 hours with children, 35-44 hours work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUSEI06 (occupation prestige)</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners’ work hours</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners’ level of education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor or higher (ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade/certificate/diploma</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.294*</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12 or below</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners’ income ($10,000)</td>
<td>0.057**</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.051**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending time with children is more work than pleasure (0=disagree 7=agree)</td>
<td>0.079*</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.186***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>2.745***</td>
<td>1.658***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across-individual variation constant</td>
<td>2.685***</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
who work 35-44 hours each week are more likely to feel satisfied with their work hours when compared with fathers who work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children.

In relation to fathers’ socioeconomic position, as incomes increase, fathers are significantly less likely to work 35-44 hours each week compared with fathers who work at least 45 hours, irrespective of time spent with children. However, an increase in occupational prestige (AUSEI06) is associated with a decreased likelihood of working at least 45 hours and spending less than 20 hours each week with children, compared with fathers who do at least 45 hours of work and spend at least 20 hours with children each week.

Unexpectedly, however, mothers’ work hours are not associated with fathers’ time spent in paid work or childcare. Results suggest, however, as mothers’ income increases, fathers are more likely to work 35-44 hours per week (irrespective of hours with children) when compared with fathers who work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children. In relation to mothers’ education, however, having a Trade, Certificate, or Diploma (compared to Bachelor degree or higher) is associated with an increased likelihood of fathers working at least 45 hours and spending 0-19 hours with children each week, compared with fathers who also work at least 45 hours yet spend at least 20 hours with children.

Finally, fathers who work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children each week are significantly less likely to view childcare as more work than pleasure than all other groups of fathers.

Discussion
This paper investigated personal, demographic, family, and work characteristics that differentiate four groups of fathers who have children aged under 15, as outlined above. Firstly, according to the results of the analysis, very few characteristics explain differences between fathers who work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children each week when compared to other fathers.

This research does suggest, however, that younger fathers are more likely to work at least 45 hours and spend at least 20 hours with children each week. Overall, younger men may be at a stage in their career where they typically work longer hours (Dermott, 2006), suggesting they may identify with a breadwinner or intensive worker ideal (Gaunt and Scott, 2014). However, the results show that fathers who engage in long hours of paid work and childcare are also more likely to see childcare as more of a pleasure than a chore. This suggests that fathers’ own subjective experience of parenting is also associated with time in paid work and caring for children. Perhaps one way in which young fathers may reconcile the apparent competing demands of a culture of long work hours and being the breadwinner, with an increasing cultural expectation of being an involved father, may be to maintain longer hours in work and care. This also suggests that existing theories are inadequate for explaining how fathers combine long work hours and caring for children, an issue that is highlighted by other authors (see Craig and Mullan, 2011; and Barnett and Hyde, 2001).

According to our research, family characteristics are primarily associated with childcare hours, irrespective of work hours. In addition to being younger, fathers who work long hours and engage in longer hours with children each week are more likely to have younger children (aged 0-4 years) when compared to fathers who also work long hours but who do less childcare. While some research in Australia (Baxter et al., 2007) and the US (Yeung, Sandberg, Davis-Kean, and Hofferth, 2001) show fathers decrease their time in paid work immediately after the birth of a baby, our results suggest this is not sustained after the immediate post-partum period when fathers return to their regular hours of paid work. Fathers of infants may be at a stage in their career where long work hours are required for career progression, and infants also require intensive
amounts of parenting, despite number of hours spent in paid work (Biggart and O’Brien 2010). This is reflected in our results, whereby fathers of infants are more likely to spend more time with very young children (aged 0-4 years) than fathers of older children (aged 12-16 years). Although previous research has shown that the types of child-related care fathers provide differ according to their child’s age (Yeung et al., 2001), our results suggest that the age of their child(ren) is also significantly associated with the total time fathers spend in work and care.

This study also suggests that fathers’ work characteristics are primarily associated with work hours, irrespective of hours spent caring for children. Unsurprisingly, higher-earning fathers are less likely to work fewer hours. However, mothers’ time in paid work was not associated with fathers’ time in work and care, although mothers’ income was positively associated with fathers working fewer hours. This suggests mothers may work to supplement the family income when fathers work fewer hours and earn a lower income, but that these fathers do not necessarily spend more time with children in response to mothers’ time in paid work (Craig and Mullan, 2011).

Working longer hours each week is associated with working in environments that are traditionally associated with longer work hours (Bygren and Duvander, 2006): being self-employed or an employer, and working in the private sector (irrespective of employer size). Our findings further suggest that fathers do not typically use flexible work to facilitate extensive amounts of time with children, but rather to facilitate long hours of paid work. This aligns with previous US research showing that flexible work arrangements are typically taken by mothers to combine work and care, whereas there is a cultural expectation that men will work very long hours, irrespective of whether or not they are a father (Vandello, Hettinger, Bosson, and Siddiqi, 2013).

Finally, our results differentiate between two groups of fathers who work long full time hours: those who spend less than 20 hours actively caring for children and those who spend 20 hours or more caring for children. Fathers who combine long hours of work and care have higher levels of occupational prestige and have wives who have a bachelor degree or higher, compared to fathers who also work long hours but who spend fewer hours with children. Previous research suggests this may be because families with high levels of parental education and associated prestige are more likely to demonstrate intensive parenting norms through longer hours in childcare irrespective of work hours (Shirani, Henwood, and Coltart, 2011).

**Conclusion**

While we don’t find a lot to differentiate fathers, this study highlights the importance of incorporating fathers’ own subjective experiences of parenting in research that seeks to understand more about how families combine work and caring for children. Furthermore, the results suggest that fathers today are not only either ‘breadwinners’ or ‘carers’; rather, fathers seek to accommodate both roles, to varying degrees, and at various times over the life course. This study therefore demonstrates the need for developing theories and frameworks that more adequately help us understand father involvement in both work and care.

Further, this study suggests that fathers’ flexible work arrangements are not necessarily associated with longer hours caring for children (see also Baxter, 2011). Despite this, previous research has shown that restrictive work practices can make it extremely difficult for fathers who do, or who want to, spend more time with children (Berdhal and Moon, 2013). For this reason, further research also needs to better understand how workplace and government policy, together with subjective personal experiences, are associated with the time that fathers spend in work and care. Doing so may assist governments and workplaces develop policies that help pave the way for fathers to continue to increase their time with children, which ultimately hold numerous benefits for families.
Notes
1 The AUSEI06 is a measure of socioeconomic position and takes into account occupation, typical income, and education level of individuals in that occupation in order to provide a scaled number or index. The scale is measured from 1 to 100, whereby higher scores denote occupations that have a higher socioeconomic position or prestige.

References


Longitudinal research using archival sources: A case study of deserted wives in rural New South Wales, 1900–1914

Eileen Clark

Abstract

Longitudinal research is valuable for examining patterns of change over time but it presents several difficulties. Archival sources are publically available records that offer a way of doing longitudinal research without time delays. In this paper, I describe popular archival records that are accessible on line and use them to explore outcomes for 24 families in one NSW town seeking support following spousal desertion. The techniques were similar to the constant comparative method used in grounded theory, with each piece of data compared with other pieces to build up a ‘theory’ of each family. At least one record was found for every family, and records for four individuals spanned over 60 years. In some cases, records contained a wealth of detail. It was possible to deduce probable long-term outcomes for the 24 couples. Three couples remained together until the death of one spouse, five couples divorced and/or remarried and nine couples appeared to separate without divorcing. The outcome for seven couples was not clear. The study shows that, with appropriate research questions, archival sources can be used for longitudinal sociological research.

Keywords: archives, constant comparative method, deserted wives, historical sociology, longitudinal research

Much of sociologists’ research is short term; we administer surveys or interview people and then wonder what eventually happened to our participants. Longitudinal research is one way to address this but it has considerable logistical problems. In this paper, I describe an approach to longitudinal research that uses publically available archival sources, illustrated by a study of deserted wives in rural New South Wales.¹

Longitudinal research has been defined as emphasising the study of change using at least three repeated observations (Ployhart and Vandenberg 2010). It is ideal for studying topics such as organisational change or human development, and for establishing causality over time (Campbell et al. 2011; Matton et al. 2007; Ployhart and Vandenberg 2010). However, researchers wanting to use longitudinal methods must overcome several difficulties. The most often cited problem
is that of attrition and the risk of bias in subsequent findings (Ployhart and Vandenberg 2010; Ployhart and Ward 2011). The extended time needed makes longitudinal research resource intensive and expensive (Campbell et al. 2011), often requiring multiple funding applications over time to sustain a project (Matton et al. 2007). The delay in obtaining results is a barrier to the rapid publication expected today (Matton et al. 2007), while editors and reviewers are not always familiar with longitudinal methods (Ployhart and Ward 2011). There is also an ethical aspect in longitudinal studies of vulnerable groups such as domestic violence victims, with the need to ensure participants' safety and security over time (Campbell et al. 2011; Mychasiuk and Benzies 2012).

Archival sources
Archival sources offer one way to overcome some problems of longitudinal research. They are publicly available (subject to privacy legislation) and can offer rich insights into many aspects of life at the national, state and local level. They can be accessed in person at national and state repositories of archives, in local collections and, increasingly, online. Once considered the domain of historians and genealogists, their use is limited only by the research questions asked and the methods used to interrogate the data. Topics range from the micro level, such as Mishra’s study of deviant women in colonial Fiji (Mishra 2013), to the macro level, including studies of babies born to destitute mothers in Melbourne (Mccalman et al. 2007; Morley et al. 2006), fertility of Tasmanian convicts (Kippen et al. 2011), and resilience of soldiers who fought in World War 1 (Founders & Survivors Chainletter 2014).

There are several benefits of using archival sources. They may contain a wealth of detail and potentially give researchers the ability to follow persons or events over many years using data that are immediately accessible. It is a relatively low-cost way of doing research, with the principal expenses being cost of travel to repositories and payment for use of online resources. Disadvantages, particularly when using small local collections, include the difficulty in finding which records are available and where, and establishing whether all relevant records have been retained, which can impede quantitative studies and limit generalisability. Decisions about retention of records often reflect institutional or personal priorities, together with issues of power and gatekeeping. Researchers always need to consider whether the non-retention of records has resulted in the concealment or distortion of particular viewpoints or events that may give rise to biased or partial findings. Similarly, information may be presented in ways that conceal shortcomings or exaggerate good points, particularly in documents such as eulogies.

The use of archival sources also presents the challenge of names. The ethical demands of anonymity and confidentiality mean that researchers usually conceal participants’ identities from an early stage by code numbers or pseudonyms. In archival research, it is essential to retain participants’ names until the research is complete, and when reporting findings researchers must decide whether the use of names is appropriate.

Names and personal details pose difficulties for another reason. It is only since the advent of computerisation that consistent spelling of names has occurred. When coupled with low literacy skills this means that people can be hard to trace in records. Furthermore, in some circumstances people may have tried to conceal their real names by using aliases (Mccalman et al. 2007).

Despite these difficulties, archival sources contain a rich variety of materials for researchers, as I will illustrate now in the case study.

Case study: background
Grimshaw (1983) claims that in Australia’s first 100 years, the preponderance of men, isolation and the ‘frontier’ ethos shaped family relations. They magnified existing patriarchal norms that
governed behaviours within marriage. Men were expected to provide for their wives while women were to tend the home and use their moral superiority to civilise their menfolk (Bradbury 2005; Summers 1975). However, the introduction of the *Deserted Wives and Children Act* in 1840 showed that these norms were sometimes ignored. The Act was designed to ensure that men provided financial support for their wives and children, including those in established *de facto* unions and exnuptial children. Its title was a misnomer because physical separation was not necessary. However, in rural areas the economic depression of the 1890s exacerbated the extent of marital separation caused by the itinerant nature of rural work such as mining, shearing and droving (Finlay 1999; Twomey 1999). Those seeking support applied to a magistrate and appeared in Courts of Petty Sessions to argue their cases, although not all applications proceeded to hearing. Husbands/fathers were summoned to appear, with both parties presenting evidence and calling witnesses. Men who failed to appear, or who defaulted on payments, could be arrested and gaoled. Hearings under the Act were held in many country towns and case papers provide names of parents, some children, witnesses, evidence and outcomes.

The aim of the research was to use archival sources to investigate long-term outcomes for those involved in support applications. In particular, I wanted to follow each parent from marriage to death, where necessary using information about children to verify parents’ findings.

**Materials and methods**

The Riverina Regional Archives in Wagga Wagga holds case papers of hearings under the Act for several towns in southern NSW. One small town was selected and all applications by deserted wives and children (but excluding exnuptial cases) from 1900 to 1914 were included. Details of families were extracted from case papers and matched with information derived from online archival databases, using techniques similar to the constant comparative method used in grounded theory, with each piece of data compared with other pieces to build up a ‘theory’ of the family (Denscombe 2014; McCann and Clark 2003). Information was entered in a spreadsheet and an audit trail and journaling were used to record decisions.

The following archival sources were used in the study:

1. *NSW registration indexes of births, deaths and marriages*. These cover events since the introduction of civil registration in 1856. Under privacy legislation, there is no access to records for births after 1914, marriages after 1964 and deaths after 1984. Similar records exist in all states and territories, with free access everywhere except to data from Victoria.

2. *The NSW Divorce Case Papers Index, 1873–1930*. This lists plaintiffs, respondents and co-respondents. Access is free.

3. *Commonwealth and State electoral rolls*. Adult citizens must register to vote and electoral rolls contain names, addresses and occupations. The National Archives in Canberra has complete rolls since Federation on microfiche, while state archives and libraries hold rolls of local significance. Some rolls are also accessible through subscription databases (see below).

4. *Enlistment papers*. Enlistment papers for the 1914–1918 Australian Imperial Force show applicants’ names, ages and places of birth, and name, relationship and address for their next-of-kin. They also include details of military service and any subsequent correspondence. Online access is free through the National Archives of Australia ‘Discovering Anzacs’ website.

5. *Trove digitised newspapers*. The National Library of Australia has a free searchable online database of Australian newspapers from the early 1800s to 1954. It includes many small local newspapers reporting the minutiae of daily life.
6. Subscription databases. The databases Ancestry and Find My Past contain numerous digitised records from national, state and other archives, searchable by name. Access is by payment of an annual fee or though some libraries.

Findings
There were case papers for 24 families. Two applications were ‘signed’ with a cross, indicating the women were functionally illiterate. The stated period of desertion ranged from one week to six years but was usually less than one year. This suggests that wives were uncertain about when their support had ceased and court officials used nominal dates for cases to proceed.

Ten cases were withdrawn before hearing, possibly suggesting women used the process to make husbands accept their responsibilities, or to trace spouses. Of the remaining 14, payment orders were made in all but one case (discussed below). The evidence presented at hearings varied greatly in amount and detail, and was not always corroborated. In two cases, women gave evidence of their husbands’ violence towards them and one spoke of her husband’s drinking. Three husbands thought their wives had committed adultery, while another complained that his wife did not keep the house clean or have meals ready on time. One man stated that he had left home to try to find work, while another who was working away from home sent a letter in impeccable handwriting offering to walk 100 miles (160 km) in 48 hours in the middle of summer to defend the case.

In the searches of archives, at least one record was found for every couple named in the case papers. There were marriage records for 20 of the 23 couples who claimed to be married (there was one de facto marriage) and birth records for 108 children. A few of these were children of previous marriages of one parent, while it is probable that other children were born after the 1914 cut-off for access to records. Death records were found for 32 of 48 parents.

In some cases, it was possible to track parents for a considerable time. The longest period of records from marriage to death was 66 years while for three other people the records spanned more than 60 years. In contrast, no records were found after the date of the desertion application/hearing for one couple or their children, three women and five men. There may be several reasons for this, including emigration or change of name, and the difficulty of correctly identifying commonly occurring names in archives.

From the archival records, it is possible to deduce probable long-term outcomes for the 24 couples. Three couples remained together until the death of one spouse, five couples divorced and/or remarried while nine couples appeared to separate without divorcing. The outcome for seven couples is not known. The following vignettes illustrate the nature of evidence that is available in archives. They were chosen because of the breadth and depth of material they contain.

Family 1. The couple were married in Victoria in 1892 (Ancestry) and had four daughters (NSW birth index). The wife lodged three applications for support between 1900 and 1903 alleging desertion and violence while her husband suggested she had been unfaithful and that she refused to live with him (case papers). The magistrate dismissed the case, giving no reasons for his decision. At different times between 1903 and 1915, the four daughters were each deemed neglected and sent to the Parramatta Industrial School in Sydney. In the 1903 admission record, the father was stated to have deserted and the mother was called respectable but at the 1910 admission, the mother was described as a prostitute and the daughter aged 15 as having a venereal disease. In these records, the mother was noted as moving between various NSW towns (Ancestry). In 1915, the father died in the study town (NSW death index) but no further records were found for the mother or three of the daughters.

Family 2. The couple were married in 1893 (NSW marriage index) and had six children (NSW birth index) at the time of the desertion hearing in 1903, which was reported in the local
newspaper (Trove). The wife claimed her husband failed to support her, while he claimed that she went with other men. The court made a payment order against the father (case papers). In 1904, police found the two eldest sons begging and charged them with having no lawful means of support, and they were sent to a reformatory in Sydney. The admission records described their father as a hard-working man who was separated from his wife, an idle woman of indifferent character (Ancestry). Between 1905 and 1914, the wife gave birth to six more children with no father named (NSW birth index). In 1906, the husband divorced his wife, naming a co-respondent (NSW divorce index). Electoral records show that the woman and her ex-husband lived in separate houses in the study town until their deaths in 1944 and 1955 (NSW death index). The local newspaper published an obituary for the woman, describing her as a wife and mother and making no mention of the divorce (Trove).

Family 3. The couple married in 1885 (NSW marriage index) and had ten children (NSW birth index). In 1914, the wife applied for and received support for the two youngest children (case papers). In 1915, one son enlisted for Army service, naming his mother as next-of-kin and giving an address for her in Melbourne; however, the Army appeared to prefer male next-of-kin and added the father’s address in NSW. The son noted this and wrote that his mother was next-of-kin. The son was killed in action and his file contained numerous letters between the Army and both parents, each of whom claimed to be next-of-kin and entitled to the son’s effects (enlistment papers). In 1917, the wife obtained a divorce, citing cruelty and desertion. The case was heard in Sydney and it was reported in a newspaper far from where the couple had lived (Trove). Electoral records show the wife living in Melbourne until 1949, but no death or remarriage records were found. The husband died in the study town in 1927 (NSW death index) and in his Will he left his estate to his children and brother (Find My Past).

Family 4. In 1908, the wife lodged and then withdrew an application for support, signing the form with her mark. The family surname made searching difficult and only records that also contained the man’s unusual middle name were considered. No marriage record was found, and the couple appeared to have no children. In 1909, electoral rolls showed them living together in northern Victoria, and in 1912 the wife died in an adjacent part of NSW (NSW death index). In 1916, the man’s son enlisted, giving his father as next-of-kin with an address in southern NSW, and stating his mother was dead (enlistment papers). Birth records showed that the son had been born to the man in a previous marriage (NSW birth index). The son was killed in action and his file contained a note stating his father’s address was now c/- the Master in Lunacy, Sydney, because the father was in an institution for the mentally ill (enlistment papers). The father died in 1931 (NSW death index) and a coroner’s inquest found he was killed by another inmate of the institution (Ancestry).

Conclusions
It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the findings about desertion in detail, but it would seem that the Act had some success in ensuring fathers supported their families. Ten cases were withdrawn before hearing, and payment orders made in 13 cases. Although five husbands defaulted (not discussed here) the fact that eight complied suggests that the Act was partially effective in reducing poverty and dependence on charity. Magistrates did not provide reasons for their judgements and hence it was not possible to know why one application was refused.

The case study shows that archival records can be used for longitudinal research, allowing researchers to follow people for long periods in some instances. Use of the constant comparative method allowed matching of records across different sources, providing confirmation that the correct persons had been identified. The use of consistent procedures and an audit trail of decision making reduced the risk of errors.
Despite prolonged searching, it was not always possible to identify a particular person in records, especially when the family name was a common one. This is a limitation when using archival records for longitudinal research. One way to minimise its effect is to view full certificates for births, deaths and marriages rather than relying on online indexes (McCalman et al. 2008). Another limitation is the difficulty of identifying couples in de facto relationships. Australian census records are de-identified and electoral rolls are arranged alphabetically so it is not possible to identify people living in de facto relationships in households.

The study could be extended by using a wider range of archival sources in Australia and overseas, including those not available on line, and this may enable more people to be traced. The challenge in using archival sources for longitudinal research is to identify appropriate research questions that can be explored with the sources that are available.

**Funding**

This research received no grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. The author declares no conflict of interest.

**Notes**

1. Data used in this paper were collected as part of the requirements for a Postgraduate Diploma in Genealogical Studies, University of Strathclyde.

2. I have chosen not to provide citations that would identify the people involved or the study location. These are available on request.

**References**

**Archival sources**


**Other sources**


How Does Women’s Empowerment Affect Fertility Preference? A Cross-Country Study of Southeast Asia

Ly Phan
University of Sydney

Abstract
How women’s empowerment affects fertility and fertility related decisions has been the focus of demographic research and gender studies. In this study, three women’s empowerment factors including women’s labor force participation, women’s education and household decision-making, are examined to determine if they have significant effects on fertility preference in four Southeast Asian countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste. Results from regression models show that women’s empowerment has significant effects on women’s fertility preference, which is measured by the ideal number of children. Education shows the most uniform effect in lowering the ideal number of children across all four countries. Female labour force participation shows mixed effects on the ideal number of children in each country. The results suggest that female labour force participation has a balancing effect on women’s fertility preference: the involvement of women into the labor market raises fertility preference in the country with lowest current fertility level, and lowers it in country with highest fertility level. Household decision-making also has mixed effects on fertility preference, but overall higher level of household decision-making is associated with lower fertility preference. This study has found that women’s empowerment is one of the key determinants in fertility preference in the four Southeast Asian countries studied.

Keywords: Women’s empowerment, fertility preference, demographic, Southeast Asia, female labour force participation, female education, female household decision-making.

Introduction
Previous studies have suggested that fertility preference, i.e. the ideal number of children that the couple want, is closely related to actual fertility (Freedman, Hermalin et al. 1975, Bongaarts 2001), therefore it is useful to explain the social norms of childbearing and the difference in fertility behaviours. Changes in fertility behaviours may be attributed by different aspects of women’s empowerment. At the individual level, women’s participation in paid employment is associated with lower actual fertility and lower fertility preference (Mason 1987, Jejeebhoy 1995, Rindfuss and Brewster 1996, Kabeer 2001, Kabeer 2005). Previous studies have found
that a higher level of women’s household decision-making is associated with lower fertility preference (Afifi 2007, Shoaib, Saeed et al. 2012, Upadhyay and Karasek 2012). And an increase in women’s level of education has been universally found to be associated with lower fertility preference (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Bongaarts 2003, Larsen and Hollos 2003).

In my previous research I have identified three factors which are the components of women’s empowerment in four Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste; they are women’s participation in the labour force, women’s education and women’s involvement in household decision-making (Phan 2015).

The women’s labour force participation factor is dominated by four indicators which take into account the engagement of the woman in the cash economy through types of employment (if she works for herself, family members or someone else) and types of payment that she receives; her occupation; her continuity of employment throughout the year (full time or part time); and her earnings compared to her husband’s earning. The education factor is dominated by two indicators, women’s literacy and women’s level of completed education. The household decision-making factor is dominated by three indicators: decisions related to health (issues when seeking medical help), decisions related to household spending (who controls how to spend the money) and decisions related to visiting relatives. Although some studies suggest that women’s use of contraception is one of the women’s empowerment factors, it did not show up as a consistently identifiable factor in my analysis using principal axis factoring.

This study examines how women’s empowerment factors including female labour force participation, female household decision-making and female education affect women’s fertility preference in Southeast Asia. It is expected that an increase in the scores of all three women’s empowerment factors mentioned earlier is associated with lower ideal number of children.

Data and Methods
Data used in this analysis were collected through the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in four countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste. The surveys have large and nationally representative samples and detailed questions on the demographic background, fertility preferences and birth histories of all eligible women aged 15-49. The samples include 6,496 women in Cambodia, 24,479 in Indonesia, 7,113 in Philippines, and 3,598 in Timor-Leste. The DHS have questions on the respondents’ desire to have another child, desired length of time before having another child, and ideal number of children, ideal number of sons and daughters. It is standard in all DHS questionnaires from all countries. Fertility preference can be measured by different aspects of a woman’s behaviour, such as her ideal number of children and her preference for specific sex of her children. In this study fertility preference is operationalized based on the women’s ideal number of children.

The effects of women’s empowerment on the ideal number of children are examined after controlling for background variables. Three types of regression including Ordinary Least Squared (OLS), Poisson and ordered logit are used since each has significant benefits: OLS regression makes it easy to interpret results which gives initial impressions on how the variables behave, Poisson regression is appropriate for thinking about the ideal number of children as if it were a count outcome dependent variable, and ordered logit regression is appropriate for ordered outcomes. In total, 6 regression models are run for each country.

Results
In addition to three women’s empowerment factors, women’s background characteristics are controlled for in the regression models on the ideal number of children by including a set of control variables on women’s age, residence, religion, the number of children ever born (CEB),
and her husband’s characteristics including education and occupation. Descriptive statistics of the study samples can be found in Table 2 in the Appendix.)

Table 1 shows a summary of the coefficients and their significance in the regression models of 4 countries. The plus or minus signs indicate the directions of the effects, while the asterisks indicate if the effect is statistically significant. (Detailed results with coefficients from three types of regression models for 4 countries can be found in the Appendix.)

Table 1: Summary of the effects of control variables on the ideal number of children (4 countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Timor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>- (*)²</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>+ (*)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>+ (*)²</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>- (-)¹(*)²</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence (Urban)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (major) Islam</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>n/a n/a</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*CEB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>- (-)¹(*)²</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband Occupation (Agriculture)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband does not work</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- (*)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband works in non-manual jobs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband works in manual jobs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation factor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+ (**)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>- (*)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education factor</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>- (**)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH decision-making factor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>- (**)¹(*)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: significant at p-value <0.05
**: significant at p-value <0.01
¹: OLS regression model
²: Ordered logit regression model
n/a: Religion variable is not available in Indonesia data

Table 1 shows that most of the control variables of the women's characteristics which include age, urban residence, religion, current number of children ever born are statistically significant across all four countries. It is important to take into account the husband's characteristics while studying the ideal number of children as the decision about children is usually a joint decision of both husband and wife. Interestingly, husbands' background characteristics do not seem to be influential in fertility preference; the effect of control variables on the types of husbands' occupation are not consistent across the four countries, and husband's education shows absolutely no significant effects in any country. Some studies on fertility in developing countries such as Tanzania and Indonesia suggest that wives' education rather than husbands' education is a significant factor in the couple's fertility (Larsen and Hollos 2003; Breierova and Duflo 2004); this study also implies that husband's education is not at all significant to wives' ideal number of children, in all four countries. Nonetheless, husband's characteristic in terms of occupation shows effects on their wives' ideal number of children. Some types of husband's
jobs are shown to have effects on their wife's ideal number of children, such as agricultural jobs in Indonesia and manual jobs in Philippines.

Even though the literature has found the effect of religion to be a significant factor on fertility preference (Morgan, Stash et al. 2002, Heaton 2011), the fact that the DHS Indonesia 2012 questionnaire does not include questions on religion, thus this variable is omitted from the regression models.

The effects of urban residence on fertility preference have been consistently found in this study, as expected from the literature (Duncan 1965, Cochrane 1983, Singh and Casterline 1985, Author 2014). Regression results from this analysis of four countries suggest that urban residence is associated with a lower ideal number of children, which means that women living in urban areas favour a lower ideal number of children than women living in rural areas.

The number of children ever born also consistently shows positive effects in all countries across six regression models. Women who currently have higher numbers of children ever born would favour higher ideal numbers of children.

Results from this study suggest that labour force participation, one of the most important factors of women's empowerment, tends to be associated with higher ideal number of children in Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines and lower ideal number of children in Timor-Leste. However, the effect is only statistically significant in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. Specifically, in Indonesia, higher scores of labor force factor, i.e. the more involved the woman in paid employment, increases the odds of favoring one number higher in the ideal number of children by 8.3%. Opposite trend is found in Timor-Leste, it decreases the odds of favoring one number higher of ideal number of children by 5.9%. Theories of demographic transitions consider female labour force participation at the beginning of the industrialization process one of the causes for actual fertility and fertility preference to decline (Mason 1987, Jejeebhoy 1995, Rindfuss and Brewster 1996, Kabeer 2001, Kabeer 2005). Yet, in Indonesia there is a positive relationship of female labour force participation and the ideal number of children. Indonesia is also the country where the current average CEB and the average ideal number of children are at the lowest compared to the other three countries (2.30 and 2.69 respectively). Similar tendencies are observed in Cambodia and Philippines, however, the coefficients are not statistically significant in these countries. The positive relationship may imply that participating in paid employment means that women can financially afford childcare and childrearing, which results in the higher ideal number of children. Childcare in Indonesia at preschool ages largely depends on nannies and extended family members but formal education for schoolchildren costs money and only elementary education is free, thus it is quite a financial commitment for Indonesian parents to bring up children. That may be the reason why women who have higher scores in labour force participation express higher ideal number of children than those who have lower scores for labour force participation.

On the contrary, in Timor-Leste, where the current average CEB (3.83) and the average ideal number of children (5.41) are the highest among four countries of study, the labour force participation factor is statistically associated with a lower ideal number of children. This relationship is more in line with previous literature on the fertility transitions in countries at the beginning of the industrialization process, which suggests the incompatibility between work and family, so that children are considered costs instead of benefits are the major causes for couples to prefer lower number of children (Caldwell 1982, Mason 1987, Bradley 1995).

This leads to an interesting observation of the opposite direction of the relationship between labour force participation factor and the ideal number of children in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The involvement of women into the labour market seems to be associated with higher ideal
number of children in the country with lowest number of children ever-born (Indonesia), and lower ideal number of children in the country with highest number of children ever-born (Timor-Leste). These results imply that female labour force participation may have a balancing effect on the ideal number of children. At country level, female labour force participation has been long cited as one of the determinants in the decline of women’s fertility since the beginning of the industrialization process. More recent studies have shifted to the idea that female labour force participation also has positive effects in countries with low fertility levels, which keeps them around the replacement level and not to further decline to the very-low fertility levels. In a review of developed countries with low fertility levels, McDonald (2000) proposes that gender equality, or in his words - “gender equity”, (at both family and public domains) is the key to keep fertility level at a balance level, i.e. it decreases fertility in high-fertility societies, and increases fertility in low-fertility societies to keep them from falling to very-low-fertility levels. Similarly, other studies have found a positive relationship between female labour force participation and the total fertility rates at country level in developed countries in recent years (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Rindfuss, Guzzo et al. 2003, Billari and Kohler 2004, Myrskylä, Kohler et al. 2009). This study shows that female labour force participation at individual level exhibits similar effects on women’s fertility preference in these four developing countries in Southeast Asia. My analysis has found support for the notion that women’s empowerment factors at individual level, specifically through female labour force participation, seems to balance out the ideal number of children: it is associated with lower ideal number of children in country where women have high average number of children ever born; and in opposition it is associated with higher ideal number of children in country where women have low average number of children ever born. This finding suggests that the mechanism through which gender equality keeps fertility levels at neither too high nor too low levels may be through the involvement of women into the labour force.

Education has a universal negative effect on the ideal number of children in all four countries. The effect is statistically significant in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Philippines but not in Timor-Leste, where there is a tendency that higher score in education factor is associated with lower ideal number of children though the relationship is not statistically significant. Findings from this study of four Southeast Asian countries are consistent to the large body of literature suggesting that education is associated with lower fertility and fertility preference (Cochrane 1983, Dixon-Mueller 1993, Bongaarts 2003), and also similar to results found in other developing countries such as Turkey (Gore 2010), Taiwan (Lee 2009) and Tanzania (Larsen and Hollos 2003).

The relationship between household decision-making factor and the ideal number of children is only negatively significant in Indonesia, which indicates that women with higher level of household decision-making prefer lower ideal numbers of children. Household decision-making factor measures different aspects of the women’s family life, such as: who makes decisions related to her health, decisions related to spending and decisions related to visiting relatives. A similar result was found in Guinea, in a study of four Sub-Saharan countries on women’s empowerment and ideal family size (Upadhyay and Karasek 2012). Out of the four countries studied, Indonesia is generally considered more conservative under the influence of Islam, especially in ideas about gender and family. This finding suggests that household decision-making is only associated with lower ideal number of children in societies where most women still have limited power in the family and only very few have better level of household decision-making power. It may not make much of a difference to the ideal number of children in societies where the majority of women already have a considerable level of autonomy in the household.
Conclusion
In conclusion, all of the three women's empowerment factors show significant effects on women's fertility preference measured by the ideal number of children. Background characteristics such as age, urban residence, religion and the current number of children ever born of the women have significant effects on her fertility preference. Interestingly, husband's characteristics such as education and occupation have no or very little effect on their wife's fertility preference.

Previous studies have found that aspects of women's empowerment play a role in the decline of women's fertility in developing countries. The results from this study suggest that women's empowerment, which includes labour force participation, education and household decision-making, have significant effects on women's ideal number of children in the four Southeast Asian countries studied.

Nevertheless, the relationship between women's empowerment and fertility preference is not a simple linear negative one. It varies depending on the context of the country. Except for education, which appears to have the most consistent negative relationship with fertility preference, two other factors - female labour force participation and household decision-making - show diverging relationships with fertility preference. Thus female labour force participation may have a balancing effect, which is associated with lower individual fertility preference in high fertility countries and higher individual fertility preference in low fertility countries. In other words, it may be a factor that keeps fertility at a balanced level. Recent trends in upward fertility which are associated with gender equality have been found in some European countries; however, there have not been any studies that look into developing countries with declining fertility levels. Future studies can investigate the effect of female labour force participation in reversing fertility decline at low and very-low fertility countries in Asia-Pacific.

Household decision-making also behaves differently to expectation; it is expected to be universally associated with lower fertility preference, yet, it is only significant in Indonesia. There may be some distinctive characteristic of Indonesia that makes it stands out, or it could be measurement issue, for example, the kind of decisions made in the household in other three countries are different to those in Indonesia, thus not as well measured. Future study could look into household decision-making as a potential research direction in the research body on women's empowerment and fertility preference.

References


## Appendix

### Table 2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean(SD)/ Percent (SD)</td>
<td>Mean(SD)/ Percent (SD)</td>
<td>Mean(SD)/ Percent (SD)</td>
<td>Mean(SD)/ Percent (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>31.29 (8.05)</td>
<td>32.98 (7.86)</td>
<td>32.75 (8.06)</td>
<td>30.42 (7.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residence (%)</td>
<td>36.01 (.48)</td>
<td>47.91 (.49)</td>
<td>45.53 (.49)</td>
<td>30.71 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>97.08 (.16)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>1.78 (.13)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.37 (.22)</td>
<td>.21 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>0.51 (.07)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>86.62 (.34)</td>
<td>99.57 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.61 (.07)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>8.09 (.27)</td>
<td>.21 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal number of children</td>
<td>3.21 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.69 (1.14)</td>
<td>3.09 (1.45)</td>
<td>5.41 (1.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>2.54 (1.79)</td>
<td>2.30 (1.54)</td>
<td>3.01 (2.15)</td>
<td>3.83 (2.46)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband’s education (years)</td>
<td>7.12 (4.18)</td>
<td>9.35 (4.05)</td>
<td>9.18 (3.89)</td>
<td>8.09 (4.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s occupation (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>41.78 (.49)</td>
<td>25.04 (.43)</td>
<td>28.23 (.45)</td>
<td>43.67 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not work</td>
<td>0.49 (.07)</td>
<td>.93 (.09)</td>
<td>1.47 (.12)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual job</td>
<td>31.78 (.46)</td>
<td>35.32 (.47)</td>
<td>26.98 (.44)</td>
<td>47.58 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual job</td>
<td>25.91 (.43)</td>
<td>38.65 (.48)</td>
<td>43.29 (.49)</td>
<td>8.38 (.27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Factor score in Labour force participation</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor score in Education</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor score in HH decision making</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cases*</td>
<td>18,753</td>
<td>45,607</td>
<td>13,594</td>
<td>13,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target sample by design**</td>
<td>6,637</td>
<td>27,225</td>
<td>7,217</td>
<td>3,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing***</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2,746</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final eligible N</td>
<td>6,496</td>
<td>24,479</td>
<td>7,113</td>
<td>3,598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total cases*: Total number of surveyed women, aged 15-49
**Target sample by design**: women aged 15-49, currently married, currently working or worked in the past 12 months, earn cash or cash and kind, sexually active and fecund.
***Missing***: Number of cases missing data on at least one variable
Table 3: Regression of the ideal number of children on women’s empowerment factors – Cambodia 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>OLS M1</th>
<th>Poisson M2</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds M3)</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds M4)</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds M5)</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds M6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.923</td>
<td>2.930</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.941*</td>
<td>.938*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.001*</td>
<td>1.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence (ref.=rural)</td>
<td>-.058*</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.884*</td>
<td>.902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (ref.=Buddhism)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>.386**</td>
<td>.370**</td>
<td>.113*</td>
<td>.108*</td>
<td>1.860**</td>
<td>1.801**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>1.032</td>
<td>1.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.267</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>1.565</td>
<td>1.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>.245**</td>
<td>.236**</td>
<td>.080**</td>
<td>.120**</td>
<td>1.804**</td>
<td>1.780**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*CEB</td>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education (years)</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>.997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband’s occupation (ref.=agriculture)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband does not work</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>-.232</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>.773</td>
<td>.750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband works in non-manual job</td>
<td>-.072*</td>
<td>-.065</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>.898</td>
<td>.906</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband works in manual job</td>
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<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.011</td>
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<td>.926</td>
<td>.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation factor score</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.007</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education factor score</td>
<td>.046**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td></td>
<td>.917**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH decision making factor score</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td></td>
<td>.004</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6,496</td>
<td>6,496</td>
<td>6,496</td>
<td>6,496</td>
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<td>6,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared/Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2Log Likelihood</td>
<td>21444.516</td>
<td>21441.142</td>
<td>17331.01</td>
<td>17319.597</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*: p-value <0.05  
**: p-value <0.01
Table 4: Regression of the ideal number of children on women's empowerment factors – Indonesia - 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Poisson</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds ratio)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>M3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.355</td>
<td>2.315</td>
<td>.874</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.022**</td>
<td>.021*</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-.001**</td>
<td>-.001**</td>
<td>-.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence (ref.=rural) CEB</td>
<td>-.141**</td>
<td>-.123**</td>
<td>-.052**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*CEB</td>
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<td>.007**</td>
<td>.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband's education (years)</td>
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<td>.003</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s occupation (ref.=agriculture)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband does not work</td>
<td>-.167*</td>
<td>-.148*</td>
<td>-.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband works in non- manual job</td>
<td>-.073**</td>
<td>-.056**</td>
<td>-.024*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband works in manual job</td>
<td>-.139**</td>
<td>-.121**</td>
<td>-.050**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation factor score</td>
<td>.042**</td>
<td>.015**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education factor score</td>
<td>-.053**</td>
<td>-.020**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH decision making factor score</td>
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<td>-.010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>24,479</td>
<td>24,479</td>
<td>24,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared/Pseudo R squared</td>
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<td>.134</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
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<td>-2Log Likelihood</td>
<td>78068.028</td>
<td>78040.120</td>
<td>60393.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p-value <0.05
**: p-value <0.01
Table 5: Regression of the ideal number of children on women's empowerment factors – Philippines 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>OLS M.1</th>
<th>Poisson M.2</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds ratio) M.3</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds ratio) M.4</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds ratio) M.5</th>
<th>Ordered Logit (Odds ratio) M.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
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<td>1.490</td>
<td>.635</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.042*</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1.059*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
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<td>-.000</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence -.102** (ref. = rural)</td>
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<td>-.036*</td>
<td>-.035*</td>
<td>.846**</td>
<td>.854**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>.020</td>
<td>1.121</td>
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<td>Iglesia Ni Kristo</td>
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<td>-.053</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>.867</td>
<td>.873</td>
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<td>.025</td>
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<td>1.162</td>
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<td>.477**</td>
<td>11.074**</td>
<td>10.596**</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.247</td>
<td>-.301</td>
<td>.284</td>
<td>.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>.063</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>1.117</td>
<td>1.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.303**</td>
<td>.122**</td>
<td>.119**</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-.001**</td>
<td>.991**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.002</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.987</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.018</td>
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<td>.932</td>
<td>.951</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.039*</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.872**</td>
<td></td>
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<td>R-squared/ R-squared</td>
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*: p-value < 0.05  
**: p-value < 0.01
Table 6: Regression of the ideal number of children on women's empowerment factors – Timor-Leste 2010

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<th>Variables</th>
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<td>CEB</td>
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*: p-value <0.05  
**: p-value <0.01
Working Mothers in Neoliberal Times

Leanne Stevenson

The University of Sydney

Abstract: Paid employment and motherhood have for so long appeared in everyday life as grounded in different logics. Here, the working mother presents an ideal juncture to explore the social and political order of neoliberalism. While state responses to mothers in the labour market have been uneven at best, the tendency has been to further privatise social goods, transferring responsibilities onto families as consumers. Moreover, shifting ideals around the meaning of paid employment and “the good mother” have intensified the work any mother must do to succeed in the social order, calling forth new subjectivities that re-instate class privileges. This paper will address these challenges, and further, explicate the relationship between contemporary motherhood and the market that are obscured by the reconfiguration of neoliberal policies and mentalities.

Perhaps one of the most straightforward sociological claims of the changes faced by western societies in the post 1970s era is that women have entered the labour market en masse. This claim needs clarification. Women have always worked; especially the working class, the unmarried, and women in occupations deemed suitable for female labour. The ‘change’ has been for married women, or more specifically for middle-class women, to return to the labour market after bearing children. Many of the now removed institutional barriers enabling women’s participation in the labour market can be attributed to the Australian women’s movement. However, this movement was followed shortly by a series of transformations in the labour market, including the expansion of immaterial labour, the demise of the family wage and the decentralisation of wage arbitration. Significantly, working mothers are over-represented in part-time work and so potentially more exposed to the inequalities resulting from these transformations. This paper gathers together theoretical literature to explore some of the contemporary challenges that working mothers encounter. The governance of working mothers, the re-articulation of the citizen-worker and the structural disadvantages of the labour market illustrate the uneven ground of neoliberalism in Australia. Furthermore, emergent ideologies of motherhood sit alongside contesting discourses with longer histories. These emerging ideals engender an intensification of motherhood, emotionally, and particularly economically and aesthetically. Working mothers are then rhetorically invited to balance these conflicts of work and life; however, the construction of this balance is only approximated with the privileges of social class. These conflicts are borne alone by individual mothers; this paper argues that motherhood and employment are tied
together in a way that mutually re-stabilises the model of mothers as primary carers through
the re-privatisation of responsibility within the family, while facilitating the neoliberal agenda of
transforming the labour market and engendering new subjectivities of the ideal mother-worker.

The governance of paid work
The history of the governance of middle-class motherhood was for much of the 20th century
firmly grounded in ideologies of maternalism, and bolstered institutionally through the family
wage. Maternalism was a central plank of first-wave feminism, and the activities white mothers
undertook in child rearing was recognised and supported by the welfare state as being in service
of the nation (Lake, 1999; Blaxland, 2010:131). In the post 1970s era, mothers moving into
paid employment have proved problematic for governments, and approaches have not been
underpinned by any set of coherent principles regarding family policies, taxation or industrial
relations. Consecutive Governments, on both sides of politics, have invested and disinvested
in supporting mothers in paid employment, even while promulgating the deregulation of the
labour market, equipping it with the capacity to make use of the labour. An instance of these
incongruities was demonstrated recently when the Federal Government switched footing on
Paid Parental Leave. Within two years, the Government moved from inciting ‘women of calibre’
(Aston & Swan, 2013) to reproduce, to accusing working mothers of ‘double-dipping’ workplace
entitlements and the federally funded scheme to “rort” the system (Borello, 2015).

Social policies with the potential to support child-rearing and employment arrangements, such
as childcare, health and education are increasingly marketised and privatised, shifting protecting
of citizens from the market to exposing them more fully to it. The lack of affordable early
childcare is the greatest barrier for mothers in the labour market, and the state response has been
to provide tightly targeted provision to compensate poorer households to purchase services in the
semi-private market (Spies-Butcher, 2014:193). Similarly, health and education have developed
as policy domains characterised by inequity, essentially providing two-tiered services; one tier
subsidising private providers, the other increasingly residualised and forced to compete for
funding (Connell, 2015:103). Through state marketisation, citizens are discursively redeployed
as consumers who make ‘choices’ to purchase services that apparently offer higher quality or
status than state-run services. For the middle class, the state works by ‘acting at a distance’ (Rose,
1999:10), producing subjects who are able to mobilise their privileges and make particular choices
regarding family and employment. These choices, in the context of this argument, are also bound
up with parenting “correctly”; they are deeply embedded in the moral order of neoliberalism.

While there may well be public resistance to brazen privatisation, discourses of the citizen-as-consumer are increasingly expanding into previously protected spaces of everyday life, becoming, as Hall and O’Shea (2013:11) argue, a new kind of (neoliberal) common-sense’. The ability to make correct choices in the market is appealed to as an intrinsic quality, a virtue of entrepreneurialism. Such invocation obscures that ‘choice’ itself is a resource that is acquired by particular subjects whose lifestyle conforms to the normative order of neoliberalism (Leite, 2013:19). Over the last ten years, cuts to income support for lone parents and low-income families have actively sought to coerce women into paid employment through workfare programs when children are of school age, despite this being the period when all mothers tend to be underemployed (Blaxland, 2010; ABS, 2015). While workfare for low-income mothers has not been as aggressive as witnessed in the United States or the United Kingdom, such paternalistic measures are consistent within neoliberal policy reforms; for failed subjects at the bottom of the social order punitive approaches are taken to re-dress not only their labour market behaviour, but also their psychological shortcomings (Marston & McDonald, 2008:257-8). For lone or low-income mothers, this policy focus on their behaviours and psychological failings is nothing new,
however, such activation purports the narrowing scope of citizenship for mothers; whereby ‘the primary, if not the only obligation… is to be in paid employment’ (Yeatman, 2000:160).

Moreover, neoliberalism has reformulated the meaning of paid work; labouring in the market is no longer the means to the end, the process of labouring is the end in itself. Within this, a new citizen emerges, replacing the ‘contentment’ (Rose, 1999:113) model envisaged by the Keynesian welfare state that elaborated the duty to work within the schema of particular legal, civil and social rights and protections. Rose (1999:115-7) contends that through employment management, the new citizen-worker ‘self-actualises’. By deriving satisfaction through the alignment of their personal motivations and the business values of competition, innovation and flexibility, they become an entrepreneurial self (Rose, 1999:117). Undoubtedly, self-actualisation through employment is not an experience available in many occupations. However, Rose’s (1999:119) proposition articulates the relationship between capitalist accumulation and the techniques of governing the ‘productive subject’. Discourses that reinforce that not only should people be employed, but should feel a certain way about employment, effectively narrow what is considered a contribution to society (Young, 2002:57). While it may be idealistic to speak of meaningful or satisfying work for everyone, such an ideal can be used to critique jobs that are ‘socially wasteful, (and) even directly harmful in their effects’ (Young, 2002:48; see also Graeber, 2013). As Young (2002) and others (Graeber, 2013) argue, these shifts in how paid employment is constructed are particularly consequential for individuals with responsibilities as carers for children, the elderly or the disabled.

One of the more striking features of the Australian labour market is the prevalence of part-time employment for mothers and of full-time or longer hours for fathers, compared to their childfree counterparts (ABS, 2015). Since the 1980s, workplace restructuring has resulted in a ‘divide between core full-time hours-intensive positions and peripheral part-time and casual positions’ (van Gellecum et al, 2008:59). The historical horizontal segregation of the labour market in Australia continues to be deeply gendered for parents with dependents; men dominate in managerial and technician roles, and trades; women in community and personal services, clerical and administrative, and sales roles (ABS, 2015). The fact that most of these occupations performed by mothers in the labour market are the most subject to deregulation and decentralisation that has been integral to restructuring is only part of their make-up under neoliberalism (McDowell, 1991). The expansion of many of these occupations are also the response of neoliberalism to the entrance of women into the labour market, which erases ‘the dividing line between the transaction of labour in the market place and the transaction of services in the self’ (Cooper, 2014:32; see also Hochschild, 2003). Moreover, the power relations of employment are also obscured through privatisation, as individual contracts de-politicise the hierarchical social structure (Weeks, 2011:4). While employment is not made easy for mothers while their caring responsibilities are greatest, there are also cultural factors that shape the part-time participation rate of mothers.

The intensive ‘good mother’ and neoliberal femininities
In Australia, mothers were once assigned to reproduce the colonial nation; now they are called to reproduce a particular subject fit for the social order of neoliberalism. Recent research on ‘the good mother’ elaborates how the dominant ideology of motherhood is reinforced within social institutions and arrangements and shapes and is shaped by the pressures that mothers reflexively place on their mothering practices (Goodwin & Huppatz, 2010:2). The good mother is a social figure (Tyler, 2008:18); a figuration neither fixed nor stable, she is constantly modified within different cultural and historical settings (Goodwin & Huppatz, 2010:1). Nonetheless, the characteristics of the good mother, her child-rearing expertise, her endless love, patience and empathy, constitute the regulatory boundaries for all mothers (Goodwin & Huppatz, 2010:1).
One predominant mode of the good mother appears in the phenomenon of intensive mothering, ‘that correct child rearing requires not only large amounts of money but also professional-level skills and copious amounts of physical, moral, mental, and emotional energy on the part of the individual mother’ (Hays, 1996:4). Hochschild (2003:38) argues that this intensive ideological investment in motherhood is a response to the cultural and moral anxieties engendered by the encroaching market rationalities of neoliberalism that have thinned out wider social relations; Hays (1996:177) further argues that intensive mothering is an active resistance to these anxieties. Recent analysis has demonstrated that discourses of intensive parenting are extending to fathers and is no longer sharply marked by class distinctions (Craig et al, 2014:569). However, there is something more than responsiveness to children being articulated in the phenomenon of intensive mothering, it also perceives the needs of children through the lens of consumption and competition. In this way, the practicalities of intensive mothering require circumstances and material resources that are only available to particular subjects; motherhood continues to be a ‘class act’ (Fox, 2006:232). Added to this, mothers are also required to reproduce a “well-adjusted” self in the child (Lawler, 2000:56-7). Part of this project is future-oriented; producing particular subjectivities in children now will ensure they have the attributes that will later make them successful in the neoliberal labour market and therefore the social order (Weeks, 2011:7; Connell, 2008:185).

Neoliberalism is also re-signifying femininity in the cultural domain, such that it has sparked debate over the appropriation of feminism into the capitalist order (McRobbie, 2009; McRobbie, 2013; Fraser, 2013; Rottenberg, 2014). In this exchange, young women are positioned as empowered through the rhetoric of choice and freedom, albeit choices and freedoms that are hollowed out of their emancipatory promise through the de-politicising function of radical individualism (McRobbie, 2013:127; see also Brown, 2005). Contemporary motherhood is not exempt from these impulses; and new maternal identities and practices are emerging (Tyler, 2011:22). Lucrative markets have formed capitalising on maternal fashion, beauty and exercise regimes, and are consolidated in the image of the ‘yummy mummy’ (Goodwin & Huppatz, 2010:70; Nash, 2012:169; Tyler & Baraitser, 2013:7). As McRobbie (2013:130) and others (Goodwin & Huppatz, 2010; Tyler, 2011) argue, this celebrated and highly public version of the maternal ‘is inextricably tied up with expansive norms of respectable middle-class life’ which ‘sets new horizons for… status on the basis of aspirational lifestyle’. The intensive self-governance that is required to fulfill such cultural and aesthetic aspirations, to reproduce a self that is capable of being legitimated through consumption, is simply not achievable for many mothers. So while there may be a time-conflict here between employment and motherhood for the middle-class, there is also arguably an overlap between the kinds of status attributed to particular forms of employment and to particular figurations of the good mother.

Regardless of class, the notion of ‘the good mother’ is being reformulated by maternal attachment to the labour market; it is not uncommon to hear that mothers who work are ‘good’ for the economy; fostering their own self-regard and satisfaction; and more recently, that maternal employment ameliorates gender inequalities in the next generation (McGinn et al, 2015). However, the cultural norms of motherhood and employment are underpinned by ideologies and values structured in tension, such that working mothers are ‘interpellated simultaneously in contradictory ways’ and ‘become split subjects’ (Fraser, 2013). Women as workers and carers are encouraged to manage these contradictions through the policy rhetoric of work/life balance. Given the prevalence of part-time maternal employment, participating this way in the labour market is evidently perceived as best facilitating the balance between care and employment.

Balance for whom?
Work/life balance policies are the outcome of two related interests, government and employers (Eikhof et al, 2007:328). The concern for government is not quality of life for workers, simply that workers continue to reproduce new lives; for employers it is that they can arrange sufficient conditions to draw and keep employees attached to their businesses (Eikhof, 2007:328). Further, the work/life balance only pertains to paid employment and caring for dependents, it generally does not extend to childfree men and women in the labour market. As Connell (2005:378) elucidates, ‘the radical impulse… for justice… gender equality… and for the fuller life made possible for everyone’ is cleaved from the promise it invokes. Finally, and reiterating a theme already developed in this paper; who is the subject discursively produced in work/life balance rhetoric? The resources necessary for mothers to approximate a balance between employment and child rearing are manifold; a partner employed full-time, education, job security, a sympathetic employer, formal and informal childcare support, and the list goes on. For many middle class women the combination of employment and care is not only conceived of as achievable, but also an achievement of the modern woman (Vair, 2013). For many more mothers in Australia, a work/life balance under neoliberalism is closer to Berlant’s (2011) articulation of ‘cruel optimism’.

This paper has engaged with arguments that the conditions of the labour market lock women with caring responsibilities out of full-time work, or conversely, that women themselves choose to balance their commitments through part-time work. They are both accurate from different perspectives; however, from another perspective, that none of this should be conceived of as antagonistic. Since the wages for housework campaign and domestic labour debates of the 1970s (and continuing with research on social reproduction), the relationship and value of unpaid domestic labour and care from the standpoint of capital is made clear (Sandford, 2011). Providing shelter, food, and care for family members is the basic maintenance of daily life (Laslett & Brenner, 1989:382). Such work directly benefits the capitalist system by assuming private responsibility for the readying of workers for their labour to be appropriated as surplus by capitalists, while also reproducing the future labour force (see Dalla Costa and James, 1973; Federici, 1975). The wage relation between the family and the market is concealed by the discursive depoliticisation of the family; the family appears naturalised and bound by intimacy and reciprocity (Weeks, 2011:121). As Luxton (2006:26) argues, the duality of labour and work, of production and reproduction, ‘fails to understand the family as both a set of economic relations and part of the economic workings of society’. Post-industrial shifts in production and the labour market, changes in gender relations, and the relocation of social reproduction have unsettled the straightforward dualism of men’s relationship to production and women’s relationship to reproduction (Adkins, 2008). Despite these challenges, women in Australia are still the primary workers of unpaid domestic labour; mothers on average spend half as much time in the labour market than fathers, more than twice as much time on childcare, and almost twice as much time doing domestic work, purchasing goods and services, and doing voluntary work and care (ABS, 2015).

Neoliberal economics and neoliberal governmentality occupy a contested space in the Australian social imaginary, sitting alongside a range of discourses that restrict or enable the adaption of neoliberalism as a local variant, creating a hybrid composition as it does in other wealthy Anglophone countries. While mothers are increasingly drawn into the labour market, intensive mothering reestablishes women as primary carers of children. Rather than perpetuating the argument that these demands between childcare, housework and paid employment are irreconcilable, or less helpful, reconcilable only in a way that further entrenches women as primary carers and part-time employees, a critical understanding is needed of how these activities mutually reinforce the processes of establishing the normative order of neoliberalism. The intensification of mothering coincides with the interests of a state seeking to re-privatise social reproduction. The rhetoric of flexibility in employment permits mothers to participate in the labour market by their own choosing, in a labour market that is increasingly inclined towards casualisation and precarity.
That paid employment is displacing other means of being socially intelligible is the challenge that neoliberalism animates in the lives of contemporary mothers in Australia.

**Bibliography**


What influences young Australians’ plans and desires for family formation?

Michelle Rose
School of Social Sciences, Monash University

Abstract

While most young people aspire to have children, trends in Australian indicate that people are taking longer to have their first child, and ultimately having fewer children. There are a number of possible explanations for these changes, including changing social norms regarding marriage and family life, decreasing religiosity, and rising numbers of people enrolled in higher education and having career aspirations. The Social Futures and Life Pathways (‘Our Lives’) project is a longitudinal study that tests such theories by examining developing fertility aspirations between adolescence and early adulthood. Using survey data on a large cohort of young Queenslanders (n=2205; aged 19-20 years), this study investigated differences in young people’s level of fertility desire, ideal family size and expected timeframe for having children. This study showed that traditional beliefs continue to be a significant predictor of fertility for young people in Australia. It also highlighted a disjuncture between aspirations and plans; a greater importance placed on attaining a university degree, the more likely respondents were to desire to have children, including a higher number of children. However this coincided with uncertainty when assigning a specific timeframe for having children. Further research is suggested to assess these relationships by way of longitudinal analysis.

Key words: fertility, family formation, youth, fertility desires, fertility aspirations

Introduction

This paper examines how young Australians’ emerging values and aspirations in early adulthood shape their fertility intentions. Australian fertility rates having been under replacement level since 1976 and most recently stood at 1.88 births per woman in 2013 (ABS 2014). Much is already understood about the impacts of below replacement level fertility in Australia, including potential economic repercussions, changes to Australia’s population composition, and related demands health infrastructure and social welfare (Drago, Sawyer, Sheffler, et al. 2011; Morgan & Taylor 2006). As such, this paper is more specifically concerned how these changing fertility trends feature in the emerging life pathways of younger Australians.
Young peoples’ fertility intentions

Predicting fertility outcomes

Fertility intentions are understood to strongly predict fertility outcomes (Barber 2001). However, many studies examining this relationship employ measures of fertility intentions, such as overall desire to have children or ideal family size, which overlook the temporal dimension of an individual’s plans to have children (Hayford 2009; Heard & Arunachalam 2015; Kaufman 2000). This is problematic because fertility intentions are often characterised by uncertainty with respect to life choices in other areas, such as partnering, education and career, and unclear or incompatible timeframes for meeting goals in these areas can help explain decisions to postpone fertility, particularly amongst young women (Hayford 2009). An individual’s timeframe for having children is more uncertain and potentially more likely to be influenced by life choices and goals. To address this, this paper will investigate and compare the influences on several dimensions of young people’s fertility intentions, including their desire to have children, their ideal number of children, and their expected timeframes for having children.

Traditional institutions and gender role attitudes

Religious affiliation is often associated with traditional beliefs and attitudes, particularly in approaches towards family and fertility (Newman & Hugo 2006). However, the number of people in Australia with religious affiliation is lessening, and is grounds to investigate whether religion is still important for explaining differences in young people’s fertility intentions. A study by Newman and Hugo (2006) investigated the relationship between fertility and religion, finding that religious influence appeared to positively influence fertility. This was explained by the idea that religious groups encourage a more traditional family model, and therefore encourage women to behave as a ‘mother’ rather than as an individual. A study by Lisa Pearce (2002), investigating the influence of religion at a young age on childbearing attitudes and preferences as they transition into adulthood found that young adults whose parents were religiously affiliated were more likely to oppose voluntary childlessness and to want larger families for themselves. These studies are consistent with ABS statistics indicating that religion influences fertility intentions on a number of levels, including religiosity increasing the likelihood to have children rather than be childless, have children at a younger age and have larger family sizes (ABS 2013). This paper will investigate the relationship between religion and fertility intentions to understand whether religion remains a significant influence on fertility intentions for young Australians.

The deinstitutionalisation of marriage, described as a weakening of social norms that define people’s behaviours in social institutions, is in many ways reflected in Australian partnerships and families (Cherlin 2004). It can be argued that contemporary marriages and partnerships allow for more flexibility within the gendered roles which where once defined, such as women were the caretakers and men the ‘breadwinner’, as well as no longer necessarily following an expected format of being married prior to have children (Cherlin 2004; Traikovski 2007). A study by Kaufman (2000) found that gender role attitudes, meaning traditional or egalitarian concepts of female and male roles within in the family, for women who had more contemporary views on family, were less likely to have a child and more likely to complete this intention than their traditional counterparts. However, men with egalitarian attitudes were more likely to intend to have children compared to men with traditional attitudes. Kaufman (2000) argues that this difference may be due to of different ideas about egalitarianism. Women may still expect significant changes in their life after having children, as even with a supportive partner they will be required to take time off work or reduce their work outside of the household in order to balance home and career responsibilities. Males on the other hand may see their role with raising children to be secondary to the main caregiver and therefore supported and not as significantly influencing their other commitments (Beck & Beck Gernsheim 2002; Kaufman 2000; Newman
Kaufman's (2000) study highlights that gender role attitudes are a significant indicator of fertility intentions. However, as this study was based on American data collected in 1987/1988 and 1992/1994, it may not be representative of a younger cohort in contemporary society in Australia. This paper will expand on past research by investigating the relationship between attitudes towards gendered roles and fertility intentions.

Education and career aspirations

Past research has indicated that education is a significant influence on fertility intention outcomes (Franklin & Tueno 2004; Heard 2011). Education is now considered an important part of transitioning into adulthood for young people, giving them a chance to increase their career prospects while also going through a time of personal development, exploring options in career pathways, partnering and housing (Arnett 2000). Becker (1981) had previously hypothesised that increased female independence arising from education and employment would cause a reduction in marriage rates. While this has not been found to be the case, it has been found that educational attainment and career ambitions do delay marriage and having children (Heard 2011). In Australia female university graduates have fewer children than women non-graduates (Franklin & Tueno 2004). However, Bryson, Strazzari and Brown (1999) found that women do desire marriage and children, regardless of their educational attainment. Young people may therefore be intending to have children, but in their planning must allocate a more flexible timeframe for when this may occur due uncertainty about when they will finish their years of education.

There has also been recent Australian research highlighting the types of jobs people are employed in having an impact on fertility. Heard and Arunachalam's (2015) study on fertility, using secondary data from the Australian Census of Population and Housing from 2011, in part looked at fields of occupations and the relationship with cohort fertility rates. The relationship between occupation and CFR follows the pattern that women in more highly skilled occupations have fewer children. Heard and Arunachalam state that occupation has the most influence over fertility among women with no post-school qualifications, whereas it makes little difference for women with post-school qualifications at any level. This is consistent with ABS statistics indicating that the higher level of education, which is generally linked to higher skilled occupations, often have higher rates of childlessness or have fewer children than those with lower level qualifications (ABS 2008; Franklin & Tueno 2008). The above research suggests that aspiring to skilled occupations, in which many require longer time in education, may delay or postpone fertility. There has however, been limited research examining the association between work and fertility plans amongst young Australians'.

The present study and research questions

The younger age groups in Australia has received less comprehensive research in the field of family formation despite the unique opportunities associated with the study of youth in this context. While there are many theories and research conducted as to what influences fertility intentions, there is limited research on young people's fertility intentions and how this is influenced by their aspirations for other life goals. Therefore, this research will aim to fill these gaps by investigating the following research questions in the Australia context:

Research questions:

1. How do young Australians’ traditional or egalitarian beliefs, including religiosity and gendered attitudes towards marital roles, influence fertility intentions?
2. How do young Australians’ educational and occupational aspirations influence fertility intentions?
Method

Overview of the Our Lives Project
The Social Future and Life Pathways (“Our Lives”) project is a longitudinal cohort study of young people in Queensland, Australia. The study began in 2006 when participants were in their first year of secondary school (aged 12-13 years). The initial Our Lives cohort consisted of 7,031 students from 213 schools across Queensland, and had a response rate of 55% for schools and 34% for students within those schools. This was largely representative of all school sectors and geographic regions across Queensland. Follow-up surveys are conducted every 2-3 years, with the most recent wave occurring in 2013, two years after participants had finished high school (Wave 4: aged 19-20 years). The Wave 4 survey was conducted online or via Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). Unless otherwise specified the data for these analyses are taken from this most recent survey wave.

After excluding 54 respondents due to missing data, the analytic sample for this paper contains 2,205 respondents from Wave 4. As with Australian studies of a comparable cohort (e.g. LSAY – see Rothman, 2009) female respondents have become overrepresented in the longitudinal sample after successive waves. Controlling for gender and socioeconomic variables likely to influence sample attrition should help to minimise the impact of attrition bias in the analyses.

Measures

| Table 1. Frequency distributions for analytic variable |
|-------------|------------|-------------|
| Variable                                           | N       | Respondent % |
| All respondents                                    | 2205    |              |
| Dependent variables                                |         |              |
| Fertility timing expectations                      |         |              |
| Sometime in the future (ref.)                      | 966     | 44%          |
| Within 5 years                                     | 243     | 11%          |
| 5+ years                                           | 890     | 40%          |
| Unsure/Don’t know                                  | 107     | 5%           |
| Desire to have children (1-10)                     |         |              |
| Low desire                                         | 322     | 15%          |
| Medium desire                                      | 547     | 25%          |
| High desire                                        | 1315    | 60%          |
| Ideal family size                                  |         |              |
| 2 children or less (ref.)                          | 1130    | 57%          |
| 3 or more children                                 | 858     | 43%          |
| Control variables                                  |         |              |
| Gender                                             |         |              |
| Male (ref.)                                        | 833     | 38%          |
| Female                                             | 1372    | 62%          |
| Parental education                                 |         |              |
| Bachelor's or higher (ref.)                        | 1045    | 50%          |
| Less than year 12                                   | 232     | 11%          |
| Year 12                                            | 237     | 11%          |
| Vocational                                         | 505     | 24%          |
Dependent variables

Three aspects of young people’s fertility intentions are considered in this paper; (1) desire to have children, (2) ideal number of children and (3) fertility timing expectations. Participants were asked “On a scale of 1 to 10, how strongly do you feel about having children?”, which could be answered on a scale 1=“Definitely do not want children”, to 10=“Definitely do want children”. These were coded into three groups: 1-4=“Low desire”; 5-7=“Moderate desire”; 8-10=“High desire”. Participants were also asked “What would you consider an ideal number of children to have?” Responses were coded into two groups, 2 children or lower and 3 children or more, considering 2 children to be the normative expectation (ABS 2013). Lastly, participants were asked “When, if ever, do you think these things might happen?: Have children”. Four timeframe options are included in the analysis: 1=“Never”; 2=“Sometime in the future”; 3=“5+ years”; and 4=“Within 5 years”.

Control variables

The control variables in the analysis were gender, parental education, work/study status, participant birth country and sexual orientation. To address a high number of missing or “Don’t know” responses, the parental education measure is based on the highest level of educational attainment for either parent, using data from either Waves 2 or 3 depending on its availability. For analysis these were recoded to 1=“Less than Year 12, 2=“Year 12”, 3=“Vocational”, 4=“Bachelor’s or higher”, 5=“Don’t know / Missing”. The work/study status variable determined what participants were undertaking in their average week, with four possible measures, 1=“Working and studying”, 2=“Only studying”, 3=“Only” working, 4=“Not working or studying”. Participants birth country asked what country they were born in, 1=“Australia”, 2=“Other”. Participants were also asked what they identified their sexual orientation as, to which they self-classified. This was coded to show 1=“Heterosexual or straight”, 2=“Gay, lesbian, bisexual or other”.

Intervening variables

The intervenning variables used for this paper included religion, Gendered Attitudes Towards Marital Roles (GATMR) scale, educational aspirations and career aspirations. The religion variable asked participants how important religion was in their lives, to which they could respond on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1=“Not at all important” to 10=“Most important thing in my life”. The GATMR scale (Hoffman & Kloska 1995) is a scale made up of 6 questions that each ask about gender roles within marriage. Responses were given from 1 to 5, with 1=“Strongly disagree”, 2=“Disagree”, 3=“Neither agree nor disagree”, 4=“Agree” or 5=“Strongly agree”. These responses were summed, creating one variable with scores from 6 to 30. Lower scores show greater disagreement and more egalitarian attitudes, whereas a high score shows greater agreement.
and more traditional views. The educational aspirations variable was recoded to 4 responses from the original 5, 1="Not important", 2="Somewhat important", 3="Important", 4="Very important". The career aspirations variable asked participants what their ideal job type would be. There were 11 options over a range of fields. These were recoded into 4 options 1="Managers", 2="Professionals", 3="Working class", 4="Unsure".

Results

Desire to have children

Table 2. Ordered logistic regression results for fertility desire (1=Low (1-4); 2=Moderate (5-7); 3=High (8-10))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>se</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender

Male (ref.)

Female

1.5*** 0.1
1.6*** 0.2
1.5*** 0.1
1.5*** 0.1

Parental education

Bachelor's or higher (ref.)

Less than year 12

1.0 0.1
1.0 0.1
1.0 0.2
1.0 0.2

Year 12

1.1 0.2
1.1 0.2
1.1 0.2
1.1 0.2

Vocational

1.3' 0.1
1.3' 0.1
1.3' 0.1
1.3' 0.1

Don't know/missing

1.0 0.2
1.0 0.2
1.0 0.2
1.0 0.2

Sexual orientation

Heterosexual (ref.)

Other

0.3*** 0.0
0.4*** 0.1
0.3*** 0.0
0.4*** 0.1

Work/Study status (wave 4)

Both working and studying (ref.)

Only studying

0.9 0.1
0.9 0.1
0.9 0.1
0.9 0.1

Only working

0.9 0.1
0.8 0.1
1.0 0.1
1.0 0.1

Neither working nor studying

1.2 0.3
1.1 0.3
1.4 0.3
1.3 0.3

Country of birth

Australia (ref.)

Overseas

0.9 0.1
0.8 0.1
0.9 0.1
0.8 0.1

Religiosity (1-10)

1.1*** 0.0
1.1*** 0.0
1.1*** 0.0
1.1*** 0.0

GATMR scale (7-30)

1.0" 0.0
1.0" 0.0
1.0" 0.0
1.0" 0.0

Importance of Uni degree

Important (ref.)

Not important

Somewhat important

0.9 0.1
0.8 0.1
0.7 0.1
0.1

Very important

1.3' 0.1
1.4' 0.2

Future job aspiration

Professional (ref.)

Managerial
Ordered logistic regression was used to analyse the fertility desire variable. A step wise approach was used, however result did not differ throughout the stages, so only the final model, model 4, which includes the entire model is presented here. Table 2 displays the results for the ordered logistic regression. The pseudo $R^2$ value in model 4 indicates that this model accounts 5 percent of the overall variation in fertility desire.

Several variables were significantly correlated with fertility desire. Of the demographic controls, gender, sexual orientation and parental education were significantly correlated with a respondent’s level of desire to have children. Compared to males, female respondents were 50 percent more likely to display a one level increase in desire to have children. Compared to heterosexual participants, those with an ‘Other’ sexual orientation were 60 percent less likely to display a one level increase in desire to have children. Respondents whose parents’ highest level of education was vocational were 30 percent likelier than those with tertiary educated parents to display higher fertility desire. Respondents’ religiosity, gendered attitudes towards marital roles, and attitudes towards university were also associated with their fertility desire. For religion, every 1-point increase in religiosity was correlated with a 10 percent increase in the likelihood of increased desire to have children. Similarly, for every 1-point increase on the GATMR scale there was a small but significant increase in the odds of higher fertility desire. Compared to those who considered a university degree important, participants who considered a university degree very important were 40 percent more likely to display increased fertility desire.

**Ideal family size**

Table 3 displays the results for the logistic regression model analysing the preference for ideal family size (with “1” indicating a preference for a family size above the normative expectation of 2 children). The pseudo $R^2$ value indicates that this analysis accounts for 5 percent of the overall variation in ideal family size. Firstly, gender was significantly correlated with ideal family size. Female respondents were 90 percent more likely than males to prefer a larger than normal family size. Religiosity was also significantly correlated with family size preferences. Every one point increase in religiosity, was correlated with a 10 percent increase in the likelihood of preferring 3 or more children. Lastly, compared to those who considered a university degree important, participants who considered a university degree very important were 40 percent more likely to want 3 or more children.

Table 3. Logistic regression results for ideal family size (preference for 2 children or less vs. preference for 3 or more children)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.9***</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s or higher (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than year 12</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exponentiated coefficients

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
A multinomial logistic regression approach was used to analyse fertility timeframe expectations. Table 4 displays the results for the multinominal regression. The pseudo $R^2$ value for this analysis indicated that it accounts for 6.5 percent of the overall variation in fertility timing expectations. Amongst the demographic controls, gender and parental education displayed strongest associations with fertility timing. Compared to males, females were 3.4 times more likely to say they expected children “Within 5 years” instead of “Sometime in the future”. They were also 40 percent more likely than males to expect children in “5 or more years” instead of “Sometime in the future”. Meanwhile, respondents without tertiary-educated parents were significantly more likely to expect children “Within 5 years” instead of “Sometime in the future”. This association grew the most pronounced for respondents whose parent’s highest reported education level was less than year 12. Sexual orientation was also significantly correlated with fertility timing expectations. Participants who identified as ‘Other’ (e.g. gay/lesbian/bisexual or unsure) were 2.2 times more likely than heterosexual participants to report never expecting children, and half as likely to report expecting children in “5 or more years” instead of “Sometime in the future”. Compared to respondents who were both studying and working, those who were neither working nor studying...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 12</th>
<th>0.8</th>
<th>0.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/missing</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual orientation</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work/Study status (wave 4)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both working and studying (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only studying</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only working</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither working nor studying</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (1-10)</td>
<td>1.1**</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATMR scale (7-30)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Uni degree</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>1.4**</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future job aspiration</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>1959.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exponentiated coefficients

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
were 2.2 times more likely to expect to children “Within 5 years” instead of “Sometime in the future”. Participants born overseas, rather than in Australia, were 60 percent less likely to expect to have children “Within 5 years” instead of “Sometime in the future”.

For the intervening variables a number of relationships arose. Firstly, every one point increase in religiosity was correlated with a 10 percent decrease in the odds of being in the “Never” category rather than the “Sometime in the future” category. Displaying higher scores on the GATMR scale (e.g. holding more traditional values towards gendered marital roles) was correlated with more immediate fertility timeframe expectations. For every one-point increase on the GATMR scale, there was a 10 percent increase in the odds expecting children “Within 5 years” instead of “Sometime in the future”. Participants who considered attending university “Not important” rather than “Important” were 80 percent more likely to expect children “Within 5 years” instead of “Sometime in the future”. Respondents’ future job aspirations were associated with fertility timeframes in two ways. Compared to those who aspired to professional occupations, participants who were unsure of their job aspirations were 40 percent less likely to expect children in “5 years or more” rather than “Sometime in the future”. Secondly, for participants who aspired to managerial work rather than professional work, there was a 90 percent increase of odds of being in the “Within 5 years” category instead of the “Sometime in the future” category.

Table 4. Multinomial regression results for fertility timing expectations (Reference category: “Sometime in the future”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>5+ years</th>
<th>Within 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s or higher (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than year 12</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/missing</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual orientation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Heterosexual (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.2**</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work/Study status (wave 4)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both working and studying (ref.)</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only studying</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only working</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither working nor studying</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (1-10)</td>
<td>0.9**</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATMR scale (7-30)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Uni degree</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Important (ref.)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper I have investigated young Queenslanders’ fertility intentions on three levels and to what extent these are influenced by religiosity, gendered attitudes towards marital roles, and educational and career aspirations. I did so while accounting for demographic characteristics, including gender, parental education, sexual orientation and country of birth.

Research question 1 dealt with the relationship between traditional or egalitarian beliefs and fertility intentions. Based on previous research, I expected that having more traditional beliefs, including higher importance placed on religion and traditional beliefs about gendered roles within marriage, would be associated with increased desire to have children, larger desired family size and more immediate timeframes in mind for having children. Supporting these expectations it was found that higher religiosity and traditional beliefs about gendered attitudes towards marital roles, were associated with all aspects of fertility intentions. Traditional beliefs were associated with a higher likelihood of having strong desire to have children, want a larger family size, have a more immediate timeframe in mind for having children and less likely to never want children. While not all of these aspects were covered by both ‘belief’ variables, these results show a pattern that, if intentions are realised, would result in higher fertility rates for those with more traditional beliefs (ABS 2013; Newman & Hugo 2006; Pearce 2002). Clearly, although the number of people who are religious in Australia has declined over time, the fertility intentions of those who are religious strongly reproduce traditional beliefs and structures of family.

The aim of research question 2 was to investigate the relationship between fertility intentions and education and career aspirations. It was expected that participants who considered university very important and aspired to higher skills job types, would have less certain timeframes in mind for having children and smaller ideal family sizes. However they would have similar strength of desire to have children. Results were not consistent with these expectations. Firstly, participants who considered a university degree very important rather than important were a lot more likely to display increased fertility desire and also more likely to want 3 or more children. These results contrast Australian fertility trends which indicate that Australian women graduates tend to have fewer children then non graduates, but may indicate an inconsistency with young peoples’ aspirations concerning education and family formation, and what their eventual fertility outcomes may be later in life (Franklin & Tueno 2004). It is however consistent that these results indicated that education can delay childbearing, compared to those who do not consider university degrees to be important. Consistent with past research was the likelihood to have more immediate fertility intention timeframes if participants aspired to managerial work rather than professional work. While also much less likely to have a specific timeframe in mind when unsure of job type aspirations. It could be argued that the types of jobs not requiring years of study, may be entered into at an earlier time in their lives, and therefore offer more immediate opportunities to have children, particularly if considering the workforce as an entry into adulthood for young people (Arnett 2000).

This research has aimed to explain differences in young people’s fertility intentions on three levels; fertility desires, ideal family size and fertility intention timeframes, by accounting for
their religiosity, egalitarianism regarding gendered marital roles, and their educational and occupational aspirations. In conclusion, this study highlights that traditional beliefs continue to be a significant predictor of fertility for young people in Australia. This study also highlighted a disjuncture between aspirations and plans, with fertility intentions potentially conflicting with education and career aspirations, and young people displaying uncertainty in long term planning. Future research will investigate these findings further using longitudinal data, to investigate how and why fertility intentions may change for young people throughout their adolescence and entry into adulthood.

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Neoliberalism and the international gender-development agenda: Escaping lyrical metaphorical seduction in the Solomon Islands

Michelle Dyer

James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia. 4810

Abstract

Neoliberal economic rationalizations promote gender equality and women's empowerment as instrumental to economic development and social justice. Women are simultaneously portrayed as victims and saviours, not only for themselves but for their families, societies and the environment. These neoliberal interpretations of gender equality and action are decontextualized and largely blame culture and social norms for underdevelopment without challenging structural causes of poverty and oppression. However, such formulations are attractive because they are morally uplifting and offer visions of hope and triumph. Using empirical evidence from a logging dispute in a Solomon Islands village, I examine how framing women's action in this incident as women's resistance fulfils neoliberal visions of women's role in sustainable development but fails to capture the reality of gender relations. I touch briefly on a construction of agency in neoliberal discourse about women's empowerment that is based on individual free will and structurally dislocated. I argue that escaping seductive lyrical metaphors is necessary for an understanding of gender relations grounded in indigenous epistemologies and an expanded conceptualisation of agency.

Keywords: Gender, Neoliberalism, Development, Solomon Islands, Agency

The gender agenda and neoliberalism

Discourse in the international sustainable development paradigm constructs women as perennial victims that are culturally, socially and physically disadvantaged in natural resource management issues. Women’s interests are often essentialised and aligned with a life giving nature which is being destroyed by men and modernity (capitalist culture) (Bannerjee & Bell 2007: 140). “Women” as a discrete category, with a unified position in developing countries, is further reified by a globally situated position of disadvantage which constructs “traditional” cultures as partly to blame for a lack of “development” and as a cause of women's oppression (Crewe & Harrison 1998).
The “gender agenda” has its roots in feminist aims to transform unequal power relations. The success of feminists in promoting this agenda and in gaining ground in development circles can be traced through the 1970s “women in development” agenda, the 1980s “women and development”, the 1990s “gender and development” and the current policy of “gender mainstreaming”. While it is indisputable that the gender agenda has come to prominence, it is questionable whether original feminist aims of transforming unequal power relations have survived absorption into development institutions and government bureaucracies – their “domestication” (Cornwall 2007b: 69). Cornwall (2007b: 70) claims that “gender” gained power in development discourse when “it began to take the shape of an acceptable euphemism that softened ‘harder’ talk about rights and power”. Murdock’s (2003: 147) ethnographic account of the institutionalization of the feminist agenda in Colombia found that the discourse of gender had moved beyond feminist goals, namely seeking social transformation of unequal power relations, before those goals had been reached. Thus, in the process of becoming institutionalized, the term gender has become depoliticized and uncoupled from a feminist agenda seeking structural social change.

Cornwall (2007b: 70) claims that gender is one of the many terms in development discourse that has gone from being a “buzzword” to a “fuzzword”. Buzzwords are characterised by their “vague and euphemistic qualities”. Buzzwords are terms and concepts put to work in ways that undermine their conceptual historical goals (for some examples see: Hickel & Khan 2012; Hickel 2014; Rist 2010; Cornwall et al. 2008; Cornwall 2007a; b; Murdock 2003; Smyth 2007). Buzzwords become fuzzwords when they conceal ideological differences (Cornwall 2007a: 481). A good example is the ‘gender as smart economics’ approach employed by international financial institutions and multinational corporations that ultimately further neoliberal economic goals while posing as measures to address gender inequality (Chant & Sweetman 2012; Sweetman 2012: 395; Hickel 2014).

**Women will save the world: A neoliberal fantasy where gender equity meets sustainable development**

International discourses of sustainable development claim a special place for women, who are simultaneously portrayed as “virtuous victims” (Sweetman 2012: 402) “development accelerators” (UNESCO 2012: 1) and saviors of the environment (Foster 2011: 137). The World Bank (2011: xiv) says; “Gender equality is at the heart of development. It's the right development objective, and it's smart economic policy”. While the capability approach and the human development index seek to measure human development by more than economic terms, a “women as smart economics” approach provides economic rationale for gender equality and is explicitly instrumental. This approach seeks to make available to women equality of access to resources in the manner of the “rational economic man” albeit in the form of a (good) “womanly” version: a woman whose increased earnings and access to resources will benefit families and thus societies as a whole as she reinvests her earnings in the wellbeing of others (Prugl 2015: 619).

Women’s agency in this discourse is located as an exercise of free will at the individual level (Wilson 2008: 83). This conceptualisation of agency relies on a construction of the ‘good woman’ – altruistic and hardworking, whose priority is to care for her children and extended family, even at the cost of her own health and certainly at the sacrifice of her leisure time or spending on personal consumption (Wilson 2008: 87). Thus, while women are framed as victims, they are also promoted as agents of change working for sustainable development. Wilson (2008: 87) argues that the ‘efficiency’ discourse around women in development, in the absence of structural analysis, implies that efficiency and altruism are uniquely feminine qualities which fit into “new, specifically neoliberal constructions of the ‘good’ woman”. This production of gender identities works ultimately in the service of neoliberal economic goals, legitimising interventions to mobilise women’s ‘productive capacity’ in the formal economy (Prugl 2015; Foster 2011).
Multinational corporation Nike promotes this strategy in their Girl Effect project. They assert that “investing in girls has the potential to save the world”. The Girl Effect project claims that it is “about leveraging the unique potential of adolescent girls to end poverty for themselves, their families, their communities, their countries and the world” (Nike Foundation 2015). In such rhetoric, the onus of action shifts onto women and girls to not only lift themselves out of poverty, but to end poverty for everyone else as well (Hickel 2014). Women and girls are scripted to be changing the world from within oppressive structural contexts (Chant & Sweetman 2012: 525). Promoting the empowerment of women in this way may be seen as a neoliberal version of feminism (Prugl 2015: 619).

Ahikire (2008: 29) describes how gender mainstreaming has resulted in a vicious watering down of the feminist underpinnings of the gender and development knowledge base. I argue here that employing morally uplifting metaphors of women's empowerment contributes to this erosion by obscuring contextual nuance and actual gender relations. In 2013, while resident in a village in the Solomon Islands, I witnessed an incident where a group of women and a large mob of children stood in front of logging machinery, refusing to let it progress into the forest. In the context of men's domination of the logging industry in the Solomon Islands, which I describe in more detail below, it is tempting to frame this incident as women's resistance – women, as a group, as environmental champions. Nike, masters of marketing, realise with their Girl Effect project that a narrative of women and girls rising up to take back power, save the environment and improve their lives is inspiring and uplifting. However, closer examination of gender relations in the ethnographic incident I describe reveals that the women's action was part of a coordinated strategy by those people with primary land rights, men and women, opposed to the logging project.

By taking this approach I seek to ground the concepts of gender and agency in ‘lived relations’ (McNay 2004). I follow McNay (2004: 4), who uses the concept of agency to mediate “the interconnections between cultural and economic forces, identity formations and social structures”. In this way the ethnographic incident I describe, rather than representing an expression of struggle between essentialised gender categories - women aligned with nature and sustainability against men assigned dominance and capitalist culture - remains socially and culturally embedded (Kandiyoti 1998: 146).

(Escaping) seduction by lyrical metaphor in the Solomon Islands
In 2013 I was resident in a village on Kolombangara Island for 7 months for the purposes of PhD research into gender relations at the intersection of natural resource management and development. During the time of my residence in the village, an acrimonious dispute erupted over a proposed large scale logging project by a foreign company. The village community split over the dispute, with close kin positioned on either side of the argument, which sometimes flared into violent confrontation. The history of large scale logging in the Solomon Islands is rife with similar stories. I briefly describe the context of logging in the Solomon Islands, the metaphors that I was tempted to employ in analysing the dispute, and why eventually I decided that they had to be rejected.

Since the 1980s, large scale logging by foreign companies on customary owned land has been the largest single export industry and a major source of national income in the Solomon Islands (Gay 2009; Porter & Allen 2015). This logging regime has been notable for high levels of corruption, unequal distribution of benefits and worst environmental practice (For some examples see Barlow, 1997; Bennett, 2000; Frazer, 1997; Gay, 2009; Hviding, & Bayliss-Smith, 2000; Kabutaulaka, 2000, 2006; URS Sustainable Development, 2006). In the scholarly literature, villagers are often presented as victims of unethical foreign logging companies, their own corrupt politicians and greedy chiefs or kinsmen.
Women are hardly visible in this narrative as anything other than victims. Male actors dominate, be they the foreign logging companies, the corrupt politicians and the chiefs, elders or others involved in business negotiations and land disputes (Kabutaulaka 2000). Solomon Islands is a patriarchal society – men have greater access to important resources as well as greater institutional access to power and privilege (Bannerjee & Bell 2007: 10; Porter & Allen 2015: 1). The sexual division of labor in Solomon’s society is distinctive. Forestry and big business generally are considered men’s work. The history of logging in the Solomon islands has seen power and financial benefit concentrated in the hands of powerful educated men, often politicians, with minimal benefit to others (Porter & Allen 2015; Bennett 2000).

The opportunity for lyrical metaphorical analysis of gender relations abounds in the Solomon Islands context, and much of Melanesia. For example, rules of pollution dictate that men bathe upstream and women bathe downstream. It is possible to construct a narrative rich in oppositional binaries, with metaphors of women downstream in issues around natural resource management – physically, socially and culturally. For example, Kolombangara Island is named for its abundance of water. Kolo means water and bangara means chief or king or god; Kolombangara is the king of water, masculine in this aspect. Seen from the provincial capital of Gizo across the Blackett Strait 16 kilometres away, people claim the island profile looks like woman lying down. They note her long hair streaming behind her, the point of her nose, forehead and chin, the mounds of her breasts, a round belly and the length of her legs. So Kolombangara is referred to as “the sleeping woman”, feminine in this aspect.

Villages on Kolombangara are mostly located on the coastal plains, and logging activity usually takes place upstream on forested mountain slopes. Village water supplies are almost always downstream of logging activity. Despite an abundance of water, many villages on Kolombangara Island do not have piped water supply and villagers must carry water to the village from the river or carry things to the river from the village. In many cases, water supply infrastructure has been destroyed by logging activity, or watersheds and river buffer zones have not been respected by logging companies, resulting in siltation of rivers and decreased and/or dirty water supply. Washing dishes and clothes and carrying drinking and cooking water is predominantly women’s work. Thus the upstream activity of logging impacts disproportionately on women’s activities downstream.

In my village of residence, I witnessed many months of contentious meetings about the advisability and viability of the large scale logging project coming to the forest above the village. This village had experienced a large scale logging project before, and many in the village were opposed to the current proposed project due to their previous experience, from which they claimed they had received minimal financial benefit and a degraded forest. Others supported the proposed project for a variety of reasons, many to do with the possibility of gaining access to resources and financial benefit that they might not otherwise be in a position to gain (see Dyer forthcoming for more detail). The project had the backing of powerful political figures in Honiara (Solomon Times 2013), and despite opposition the logging company barge eventually arrived loaded with machinery. Police from Gizo and “security” men employed by the logging company from a neighbouring village were in attendance when the logging barge arrived in the village, as were both the anti and pro logging villagers.

The only people to overtly challenge the barge landing were three older women from the land owning group, who verbally harangued the logging company staff unloading machinery. Until this point, women’s public opposition to logging had been barely visible. Meetings about logging were dominated by men, both in terms of attendance and contributions to the meeting. Meetings of elders and tribal leaders were exclusively male. High level business negotiations took place...
mostly in Honiara and did not include any women. Thus, physically and metaphorically, women appeared downstream - exercising minimal influence in decision making over natural resource management and able to register opposition only at a physical level.

After the machinery arrived in the village, the logging company began clearing a road to gain access to the stand of forest to be logged. After several days of operation, a group of men opposed to the logging confronted the logging machinery and men working with the logging company. A minor scuffle broke out with allegations that the anti-logging faction threw rocks at the logging machinery. The following morning, police from Gizo arrived in the village and roused the men involved from their beds, handcuffing them and escorting them to the jail cells at the Gizo police station. The men spent the day in the cells, were charged with intimidation (a charge that was subsequently dropped), and were released in the evening.

After this event the village landowners opposed to the logging met and formulated a new strategy. They decided that the women should physically oppose the logging machinery while the men would lie hidden in bushes nearby. Thus, when the machinery started back up the road and crossed the river (a point of contention and heightened emotion due to the subsequent dirtying of the village water supply), the same three older women who had confronted the machinery when it landed, followed by a large mob of children, gathered in front of the machines. The women did not throw rocks or attack the machines in any way, although one of the women leapt up into a machine, from which the operator rapidly fled. Ultimately the machinery stopped its progression into the forest and returned to the logging camp.

Without knowledge of the background events leading up to this action by the women, it is possible to construct this story as one of women defending the forest and their water supply with their own bodies as a last resort. It was, in fact, the power of the women's embodied morality which made their action effective (Pollard 2000: 9-10). Social norms dictate that the women cannot be manhandled by the male “security” employed by the logging company (who were mostly their relatives from the neighbouring village). This would contravene cultural norms around physical contact between men and women – which is highly restricted in public even between husbands and wives and is mostly taboo between adult men and women related in various ways. The men waiting hidden in the bushes would be justified, culturally, in retaliating violently if their women's moral bodily sanctity was challenged.

However, the women who opposed the machinery were not just any or all of the women in the village. They were senior women with primary land rights from the customary land holding group matriline, resident matrilocally (land rights in this village are inherited matrilineally). They were not “women” defending the forest, they were people defending their land rights using a culturally specific strategy that deliberately invoked sites of power located in gendered bodies.

This background ethnographic information situates the women's action in the context of their land rights and the cultural norms that locate the women's power in a construction of gendered bodies. Without such detail it is possible to frame this incident in rousing metaphors that portray women as environmental defenders; the sleeping woman of Kolombangara awakens! However, employing such lyrical metaphors “(re)produce[s] constructions of distinct and coherent, binarised gender categories, namely man and woman, based on the dichotomised schema of culture and nature respectively” (Foster 2011: 136).

Such discourses, evident in sustainable development rhetoric, echo colonial discourses in which colonized women appear “in the context of their perceived need to be ‘rescued’ from ‘their’ men and/or ‘backward’ societies” (Wilson 2008: 84). I attempt here to ground women’s agency in lived gender relations which reveal women's action as embedded in social and cultural gender relations (McNay 2004: 175).
This perspectival shift represents an inversion of the usual knowledge pyramid on three related counts. Firstly, it does not privilege a particular group as the norm (Mohanty 1984: 334), in this case avoiding constructions of what is developed based on socially evolutionist hierarchies and neoliberal ideology of the individual (Hickel & Khan 2012). Secondly, and encompassed by a construction of the “norm”, it rethinks a notion of what gender equality is and how it can be achieved that is not explicitly western. Lastly, it moves beyond a study of women as a discursively constructed category to a study of gender – the interrelations between men and women and their centrality to social organisation (Moore 1988: 6; Cornwall 2003: 1337). This is an essential move in order to bring contextual specificity and to avoid assuming men and women as already constituted subjects in a culturally flattened arena of social relations (Mohanty 1984: 340).

Conclusion
Solomon Islands is a patriarchal society. High rates of violence against women and disparities in income and education levels between men and women give good cause for working for women’s empowerment. However I argue that one must escape the buzz and fuzz of neoliberal development discourse that creates a simultaneously victimized and superwoman caricature.

Starting with an expanded conceptualisation of women’s agency, socially and culturally constituted, allows the space for an examination of gender relations, rather than discursively created and separated gender categories. Hopefully such analytical nuance can inform development strategies that are grounded in indigenous epistemologies, rather than simply problematizing culture. While such approaches perhaps provide less tempting lyrical metaphors, they can work to resist explicitly instrumental neoliberal narratives.

References


Misidentification of men within the human trafficking discourse

Polina Smiragina

Sydney University

This research addresses social issues such as suppression, oppression, gender discrimination and gender inequality towards male victims of Human Trafficking who have been exploited for different purposes and by different means; who in accordance with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children fall under the definition of victims of human trafficking but are facing discriminatory conduct on the part of the law enforcement, assistance and aid organizations and, thus, may not/do not have access to support services. This paper identifies a gap in existing research as well as in the aid sector and demonstrates that male trafficking constitutes a considerable part of the human trafficking flow. This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the trafficking literature from the perspective of male victims as well as explains some instances of misidentification of male victims of human trafficking on the basis of the concept of masculinity and the hierarchy of victimhood theory.

Introduction

This paper forms a part of an independent research project on the invisibility of male victims of human trafficking, which will form the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. This research has recently been presented within the framework of the Slavery Past, Present and Future project (Inter-Disciplinary.net). Holding to the advocacy/participatory worldview, this research addresses important social issues, namely suppression, oppression, gender discrimination and gender inequality towards a group of people (male victims of Human Trafficking) who have been exploited for different purposes and by different means; who in accordance with the Trafficking Protocol fall under the definition of victims of human trafficking; but are facing discriminatory conduct on the part of the law enforcement, assistance and aid organizations as well as donors; and, thus, may not have access to support services, specialized rehabilitation centres, shelters, aid programs and corresponding institutions. This research is intertwined with a social change agenda and focuses on the needs of a marginalized group of individuals (male victims of human trafficking).

The overall aim of this research is to identify the causes and consequences of the invisibility of male victims of human trafficking by doing a thorough analysis of male trafficking discourses on the basis of concepts of masculinity, victimhood and victimization. This study will address
the types of exploitation men are subjected to, programs and policies designed specifically at assisting men and boys who have become victims of human trafficking, the assistance provided to male victims of human trafficking and how the international criminal justice system responds to male trafficking. This paper, however, will provide a literature review of studies that look at male trafficking and try to explain the misidentification of men through the hierarchy of victimhood theory and the concept of masculinity. Through this I attempt to substantiate that male trafficking constitutes a considerable part of the human trafficking flow and that human trafficking is much more complex and multidimensional than commonly acknowledged.

Misidentification
The human trafficking discourse has been on the human rights agenda for quite some time. This has culminated in progressive research, which then initiated the development and implementation of policies, instruments and projects aimed at addressing harms that accompany violations to individual rights. This has also led to the formation of mechanisms and institutions aimed at assisting the victims of human trafficking. The first and main universal instrument that attends to all aspects of trafficking in persons today is the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (The Trafficking Protocol, 2000), which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Protocol was adopted on November 15, 2000 and came into force on December 25, 2003. The Trafficking Protocol was adopted with the aim to prevent trafficking, punish the traffickers and protect the trafficked.

Even though the protocol was developed as a tool, which in an ideal world should prevent all possible forms of human trafficking and protect all possible victims, some sections of the protocol were designed in ways that contradict this assumption. Namely, the protocol emphasizes assistance to women and children and neglects men. One of the factors that has stirred my interest is its association with trafficking of women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The way in which the human trafficking discourse was put together has created the pervasive assumption that the definition of human trafficking is synonymous with sexual exploitation of women and girls. This assumption has fuelled the way that many anti-trafficking actors address the issue; and has become a hindrance to identification and assistance to victims of other forms of exploitation and of different genders.

There is an indirect implication in the Trafficking Protocol that men are secondary addressers when it comes to assistance and protection of victims of human trafficking. This indirect implication is seen first and foremost in the name of the protocol, where it is directly implied that this protocol is to protect, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children; and then throughout the protocol where women and children are highlighted as especially vulnerable. The following sections of the protocol identify women and children as a group that requires special consideration. Men are not indicated in the protocol as a potentially vulnerable group to human trafficking. In fact, the words man, men and male do not appear in the Protocol at any point. The only way of seeing that possible male victims are also addressed in the protocol is through the words human and person(s). These terms are not defined through gender. Human is equated with the term mankind and one of the meanings of person is the bodily form of a human being or an individual character (Webster, online, date accessed: 06/02/15). Thus, it is evident that men are not disregarded in the Protocol, they are simply not given special consideration. Men as well as women are subjected to forms of exploitation that constitute human trafficking. However, today’s programs that are aimed at assisting male victims of human trafficking are either invisible or do not exist, whereas many human rights organizations have made assistance and aid programs available to female victims.
An interesting example of this would be my work at a Non-profit Organisation in Moscow dealing with migration related issues, which has led to this research.

When I began working I was involved in a project that aimed to assist migrants in distress in Russia to return to their home country. My role was to assist as an interpreter during the primary interviews and to take the project beneficiaries through certain steps of local official migration processes. Most beneficiaries that I worked with were adult men.

My first case was a middle-aged man from a country in Sub-Saharan Africa. I was not present at the initial interview, thus do not know for certain what was officially stated in his application form. But on our way to the Federal Migration Services office I found out that back home a stranger promised him that he would get a job in Moscow as a salesperson selling cocoa imported from Africa. The stranger seemed nice and promised to organize the visa and tickets, so the beneficiary borrowed some money from his friends and relatives. Upon arrival in Moscow he was supposed to be met by his employer at the airport, but there was no one there. So he stood waiting for hours in a foreign country with barely any money in his pocket, no ticket back home, no work permit and no knowledge of the local language. He felt tricked, deceived, deluded and alone. He then explained that somehow he managed to find compatriots, who leased him a bed, and in place of payment he worked for them as a leaflet distributor in the Moscow city centre.

He tried to earn the amount he was initially planning to earn for almost a year, but understood that this was not possible. He overstayed his visa and realized that he needed to find a way to get back home. Eventually he came to the organization in question.

The beneficiary was provided with assistance and safely returned to his home country, but as I later understood, it may have been more beneficial and helpful to provide assistance within the framework of a different project. According to the Trafficking Protocol trafficking in persons “shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” According to the UNODC human trafficking is a notion that comprises of three factors: activity, means and purpose (UNODC 2013), then in the case described above the activity was that the victim was recruited and transported; the means was fraud, deception and the abuse of a position of vulnerability; and the purpose, in this case, is a bit tricky to identify. If the two parts of the story were linked, if the man that had prepared the transportation had intentionally sent the victim to the recipient (the man who had provided lodging in return for work), then the purpose was exploitation of labour. Bearing in mind that no investigation on this case as a trafficking incident has been done, we cannot know that the transportation and receipt were linked. Nonetheless, the second part of the story – the unpaid labour in lieu of non-payment for the lodging (debt) can be seen as debt bondage, which is one of the conditions under which a trafficked victim can be exploited. Furthermore, “human trafficking can include but does not require movement” (TIP 2014). Therefore, bearing in mind all of the above, the beneficiary fits the human trafficking profile. It is important to note that this is not the only case of misidentification, but this story raises a lot of questions with regard to the investigation, the identification, the definition and the understanding of human trafficking and human trafficking victims. The issue of misidentification can be a result of different factors: it can be due to the local identification tools, local legislation, the aims of a specific program, misapprehension of what constitutes human trafficking, victim's denial of deception or exploitation committed against him, victim's rejection to receive assistance and many more.
Male Victims of Human Trafficking

Existing studies that refer to the male trafficking phenomenon usually focus on physical labour exploitation. Although male trafficking is not restricted to the exploitation of manual labour, this section will predominantly focus on labour exploitation as most scholars who look at exploitation of men within the human trafficking discourse provide evidence of their exploitation in the following fields: construction work, agriculture, factories, mines and fisheries. However, some examples of male sex trafficking will also be provided in this section. The reference to women and girls in human trafficking literature still prevails over that of men; and literature that concentrates on male trafficking exclusively is still very limited. This demonstrates a gap in research, which needs to be addressed.

Shelley’s (2010) Asian trafficking case study gives an example of adult men and young children being forced into slave labour in illegal mines and brick factories. Exploitation of adult men in this particular field is not novel. Several other scholars have focused on the exploitation of men specifically in brick kilns (Gupta 2003, Ercelawn and Nauman 2004, Aronowitz 2009). This type of exploitation of men is distinctive to the Asian region. Aronowitz (2009) affirms that there is an occurrence of male trafficking for the purpose of forced labour practices in brick kilns in China. In Brazil foreign victims tend to also be exploited in factories, whereas local male victims of internal trafficking are usually exploited in agricultural labour (Aronowitz 2009). Cullen-DuPont (2009) gives a broader picture of the different types of labour trafficking that men can become part of. Specifically fields, factories as well as trafficking of men and boys in the fishing industries (Cullen Du-Pont 2009). The latter is very typical in the following areas: the Black Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Andaman Sea, and the Gulf of Thailand; as well as on many other waters (Aronowitz 2009, Cullen Du-Pont 2009). In a case study offered by Cullen-DuPont it is argued that adult male victims may be of various age groups. For example male victims between the ages of 18 and 50 were found on a Russian fishing boat in the Sea of Japan. Male victims of the same age group were identified in the Balkans (Copic and Simeunovic-Patic 2012). Moreover, according to Copic et al. (2012) the majority of trafficked male victims in the Western Balkans are adults, which contradicts the common perception that male victims of human trafficking are usually children.

The above-mentioned types of labour exploitation are a frequent occurrence in academic works that illustrate different types of male trafficking. However, several scholars have revealed cases of male sex trafficking in different parts of the world. Consequently, such cases have been disclosed in Germany (Christophe Gille in Shelley 2010) and Russia (Surtees, IOM, 2008b) for example. However, sex trafficking of men is very rarely identified and male victims are seldom assisted (Surtees 2008). This could be due to several reasons. As human trafficking is mainly associated with women being trafficked for prostitution, in some countries the ‘identification tools’ are designed to identify the victims that fit the latter profile. Furthermore, according to scholars that have focused on male sexual exploitation, it is very difficult for a sexually assaulted man to (1) admit to himself that he has been assaulted and (2) to seek assistance from someone (Donnelly and Kenyon 1996, Monk-Turner and Light 2010, Bullock and Beckson 2011). This results from a man’s ascribed role within a society. A semiotic approach defines masculinity through symbolic differences, contrasting ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ and neglecting the level of personality. Meaning, that masculinity is defined as ‘not-femininity’ (Connell 1995). Taking this statement into consideration, it is feasible to assume that men, whose characteristics or actions do not correspond to what the society has identified to be masculine, would be considered as non-masculine. This can be one of the reasons to a man’s denial of deception or exploitation and rejection to receive assistance.
Nicola Piper (2005) points out the necessity of a gendered analysis within research on human trafficking. Piper affirms that men are usually treated as smuggled labour migrants, whereas the trafficking classification usually falls on women and children. Referring to Carling, Piper (2005) states that in gender research there is a tendency to assume that human trafficking studies usually centre upon women and very rarely on the two genders with regard to each other. This is reflected in various empirical case studies where male respondents are hardly ever included. Moreover, according to Rosenberg (2010), male victims are not identified as victims; rather they are seen as irregular migrants and are deported without an investigation of their case.

Rosenberg holds the opinion that even if men appear to be in the same situation as women who are identified as trafficked victims, men will never be considered as such because “the profile of trafficked persons is based on known victims” (2010: v) – meaning the types of victims that have already been identified. Women trafficked for prostitution have to date been seen as the main, if not only (by some anti-trafficking actors) profile of victims of human trafficking. Hence, there exists an assumption that trafficking is “of women for the purpose of prostitution, and therefore that is the profile which authorities look for when they look for trafficking” (Rosenberg 2010: v). Consequently, some scholars today tend to restrict trafficking to sexual exploitation of women. For example recent case studies related to human trafficking in Russia have predominantly focused on sex trafficking and women (Finckenauer 2001, Stoecker 2005, Tverdova 2011). However, the most frequent form of human trafficking in Russia is labour exploitation, where men constitute the majority (Levchenko 2009). Furthermore, looking at cases of sex trafficking, the Trafficking in Persons report (TIP 2014) claims that in certain Middle Eastern countries sex trafficking is more common among boys than girls. Statements like these affirm the importance of looking at human trafficking from a local perspective, rather than fitting every case into one global internationally perceived definition. Moreover, while it is evident that trafficking of women is more frequent than that of men, if we look at the 2012 International Labour Organization Estimate of Forced Labour (2012), which estimates that 20.9 million people today are victims of forced labour (sexual and labour exploitation), then women and girls constitute 55%, and men and boys 45% of the overall forced labour flow worldwide.

Rebecca Surtees (2008a, 2008b) states that regardless of the fact that there is profound evidence in many world regions that men too are victims of exploitation and are violated “in ways that constitute human trafficking” (Surtees 2008b: 16) the consideration of trafficking in males is far less common. Piper (2005) states that men are seldom considered as “potential victims of socio-economic pressures and structures leading to their being trafficked” (Piper 2005: 217). McEvoy, K & McConnachio (2012) have a theory about the hierarchy of victimhood, which suggests, “The ‘innocent’ victim is placed at the apex of a hierarchy of victimhood and becomes a symbol around which contested notions of past violence and suffering are constructed and reproduced.” Within the human trafficking discourse female victims are ‘innocent’ because they evoke more sympathy from the society due to the role they play as vulnerable and deserving of protection. Their ‘innocence’ is also triggered by the Trafficking Protocol, which highlights women as potential victims and disregards men. Consequently, men are placed at the bottom of this hierarchy as a masculine man is considered to be less likely harmed than a woman, is better able to shield himself from violence, is strong and always in control (Connell 1995, Groth and Burgess 1980, Smith et al 1988), which suggests that a man is less likely to be exploited.

Rebecca Surtees (2008b) argues that within the human trafficking discourse and practice, assumptions about gender, migration and vulnerability are emphasized in a way that female migrants that are subjected to exploitation are frequently seen as trafficked, whereas it is very common that male migrants who face the same kind of exploitation, violation and abuse are pictured as irregular migrants.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to explain the misidentification of men through the hierarchy of victimhood theory and the concept of masculinity. It has exposed human trafficking literature that focuses on men within the broader human trafficking discourse and revealed the scope of literature that centres exclusively on the male trafficking phenomenon. Although literature on male trafficking is very limited this paper shows that male trafficking exists and the extent of the involvement of men within the human trafficking discourse is much more complex and multidimensional than commonly acknowledged. To date male trafficking remains neglected in terms of assistance and aid, which impedes male victims of human trafficking from receiving the essential medical help, psychological and physical rehabilitation, in some cases reintegration and prevention of re-trafficking and secondary victimization. This study aims to advance an agenda for change to, in the long run, improve the lives of male victims of human trafficking by highlighting the instance of male trafficking as a genuine challenge to contemporary society.

Bibliography


Emotions in practice: Reflections on the importance of the nonni in the construction and transmission of ethnic identity

Simone Marino
School of Communication, International Studies and Languages, University of South Australia

Abstract
The present paper reflects on fieldnotes undertaken as part of a long-term study on the construction and transmission of ethnic identity among families of Italian ancestry in Australia. It seeks specifically to shed light on the “domestic space” of Italian-Australian grandparents’ homes, where the “sense of place” and belonging appear to be embodied through the sharing of cultural practices and the development of strong emotional attachments. It is proposed that the nonni’s place is a key locus, a generator of ethnic identity for younger (mainly third generation) family members, where an idealisation of Italian-ness appears to take place. Practices and emotions experienced at the grandparents’ homes appear to be marked, embodied, and adapted into a personalised interpretation of ethnic identity by the younger family members. Moreover, the grandparents’ personal belongings (photographs, mementoes, object d’art, musical instruments) appear to play a complementary role in nurturing the grandchildren’s identity. Such mementoes can be seen to authenticate the grandparent’s Italian-ness through their symbolic and cultural capital.

Keywords: emotions, practice, ethnic identity, cultural capital

Introduction
Despite significant achievements reached by previous studies on Italians in Australia, there is little literature on Calabrians and even fewer examples that investigate the construction and transmission of ethnic identity. Recently Rose (2005) and O’Connor and Rose (2008) have examined the historical settlement of migrants from the Calabrian town of Caulonia. Additionally, Misiti (1994), in his study of Calabrian migration to Australia, predicted the imminent demise or dispersal of Calabrian culture. The main factors at risk were the Calabrian language and the sense of identity of the second generation who claimed to have an Australian identity (Misiti 1994). The
The present study contributes to literature on the migration experience of third generation ‘Calabrian-Australians’. From a perspective which mainly highlights the relationship between domestic space and ethnicity, the paper attempts to bridge persistent dichotomies (metahistorically existed in the humanistic sciences), such as objectivity and subjectivity, body and mind, structure and agency, and invites to an in depth reflexivity which considers both the relevance of practice together with the positionality of the social actors, in order to build holism.

As has been recently noted, despite the large number of qualitative studies of migrants’ life experiences, the emotional dimensions, and a particular reflexivity on the continuities and discontinuities emerging from individuals’ emotional experiences and dynamics remains relatively understudied (Boccagni and Baldassar 2014). Other socio-anthropological exceptions which investigate the emotional dimensions include Levitt & Glick Schiller (2004); Bondi et al. (2007); Svasek & Skrbis (2007); Svasek 2010, Marinelli & Ricatti (2013); Vanni (2013); Noble (2004); Ahmed (2004); Zembylas (2012); Turner and Stets (2005); Boiger & Mesquita 2012; Smith et al. (2009). According to Noble (2004), the analysis of migrants’ experiences is often framed within the dominant logic of practice (Bourdieu 1987; Fussell 1992), structured by relations of economic and social power. Such studies tend to minimise or totally ignore the relevance of emotional factors while focussing on the reproductive aspects and continuity of social life.

In a recent Special Issue of Emotion, Space and Society, Boccagni and Baldassar (2014) draw attention to the importance of the study of emotions in furthering our understanding of the ‘migrant experience’. They go on to suggest that the migration process is characterised by important transformations along the migrant’s life course involving the transmission, reproduction and the evolution of emotions in relation to belonging, identity and ‘home’. The present paper takes its lead from this proposition by providing critical reflections on the role of the nonni [grandparents] in the construction and transmission of ethnic identity in a diasporic context. The reflections are based on fieldwork undertaken over a two-year period from 2012 to 2014 among members of the “Italian community” of Adelaide. Participant observation and interviews in the domestic field, allowed the researchers to reflect on participants’ narratives and observe a variety of situations and cultural practices. An interpretive anthropological approach provided insights into the linguistic and cultural capital and the subjective interpretations of 14 Australian families originating from Calabria, Italy. Such interpretive approaches rely on anthropologists’ imaginative insight into cultures and emphasise the emic perspective, highlighting subjective understandings and its meanings (Geertz 1994).

The paper starts from a critical consideration of the role of practice in understanding migrants’ ethnic identity and its transmission to subsequent generations. The authors take the view that the ‘practice’ should be juxtaposed with the emotional dispositions of migrants, in order to achieve a thick description and a more holistic understanding of their ethnic identities. This is based on the positive evaluations that younger Italian Australian participants have of the practices experienced since childhood at their nonni’s homes and the ensuing strong emotional attachments associated with the grandparents’ world.

**Nonni’s world**

It is evident that the nonni play a fundamental role in the construction of the participants’ ethnic identity. Firstly, the nonni’s house and all that is encapsulated within such space (practices in loco, personal belongings, stories and associated memories) appear to contribute to the development of a specifically “Italian” sense of place. This is what Bourdieu (1990) referred to as a state of doxa, a state of unquestioning attachment for a field. It became apparent from our observations among

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2 By positionality, I intend the perceived social actor’s ethnic positions of “being in the world”. This is an ontological matter which concerns the struggle for individuals to locate and affirm what De Martino (1977) called their *presenza*, in terms of ethnic presence, and the way such *presenza* is perceived by themselves and others.
the participants that the third generation have spent a great deal of time at their grandparent’s homes and many of them have been brought up by them. In this world, they have experienced the cultural practices that the grandparents have brought from their homelands (the annual ritual of making the tomato sauce and sausages, playing Italian cards with nonni, removing the “evil eye”). Like their parents, the third generation also have grown up immersed in their grandparents’ stories of the “old world” and experiences of migration. They have also grown up surrounded by the nonni’s personal belongings, objects d’art, mementoes that come to represent “Italian culture” in the eyes of the grandchildren. The following examples are typical.

Such experiences can be either mundane or “exotic”. For example, Rocco (who was given his grandfather’s name) remembers how happy he was when his nonno presented him with the shirt of an iconic football player for his 10th birthday, claiming he has followed the Italian fc ever since, becoming a supporter of the Juventus football club. Caterina (who has her grandmother’s name) spends every afternoon with her nonna and is present when her nonna “removes the evil eye” from the “cursed” paesani (fellow countrymen and women). All the participants in the present study talked about their “happy memories” at nonni’s and indicated they had developed strong emotional attachments to their grandparents’ worlds during their formative years. Often such ethnically derived practises and emotions are not present in their own parents’ homes. The grandparents’ world, on the other hand, is a social field where ethnic differentiation is embodied into their early world as children and is maintained into adulthood. A certain “ethnic being” (Noble 2004) is internalised in the form of emotions within their grandparents’ domestic world which becomes a powerful catalyser of the young persons’ ethnic identity.

**Transnational objects**

Grandparents’ personal belongings also appear to play a complementary but nonetheless crucial role in nurturing grandchildren’s ethnic identity. This happens specifically when there is a strong emotional attachment with the nonno passed away, and when the object has symbolic meanings for the grandchildren. It seems that when an object is passed on from nonno to nipote [grandparent to grandchild], individuals develop a deep sense of empathy towards their nonni and their ethnicity. This is evident in the following extract of Anthony’s cabinet.

**Anthony’s display cabinet**

There is a display cabinet in Anthony’s bedroom that appears to be a microcosm of his Calabrian family. There is a photographic enlargement showing him at his nonni’s Australian house, in Seaton, in which a very young Anthony is playing the organettu (concertina/squeezebox) with nonno. Next to the photo there is the original Paolo Soprano, the concertina nonno Antonio brought with him when, at the age of 20, he migrated to Australia. Anthony says his nonno played tarantella on the nave [ship] Roma every day for 40 days, to ward off the fear of being at sea. Having come from Siderno Superiore he was not used to sea travel. Nonno’s concertina was handed down to him when he was a child, and it is treasured by Anthony who says:

> Check this out, mate, this is a Paolo Soprano, nonnu gave it to me as a gift for my First Communion. He left Calabria with a suitcase and this organetto, that’s all. What a man, mate. I haven’t got my nonno anymore, but I have this organetto which is his. Nonno gave me a lot, he always said to me that “family is everything”, “be proud and honest”. Nonno taught me how to play tarantella calabrisci [Calabrian tarantella]. He used to sing lots of songs, like “the servant and Christ”, nu servu e nu Cristu, that was my favourite song. I loved when nonno sang: “cu

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3 By “ethnic being”, following an Heideggerian line, I intend an ontological presence which transcends the situational nature and dynamics of self and other categorisations of ethnic identity. Such “ethnic being” could be seen as a philosophical ethnic habitus, or the De Martinian presenza, something which is accumulated, internalised and concerns the individual’s presence of “being in the history” (i.e. da-sein of Heidegger).
voli giustiziâ [he who wants justice] ehmm don’t wait for it, but just go for it”, you know? He
told me the meaning of that song that is: don’t expect others to do something for you, just try
do it yourself and take justice into your own hands. That’s the real Italian attitude, which is fair
enough. If you wait or complain, you don’t actually live your life. Nonno was cool and wise
[Seaton, SA. Saturday 12nd June 2014]

Borrowing from Vanni’s (2013) concept, Anthony’s concertina can be thought of as an oggetto
spaesato (transnational object out of place and time). The display cabinet positioned in his bedroom
and replete with his grandfather’s mementoes is imbued with symbolic meaning. Indeed, the
emotional attachments Anthony displays towards his nonno and his memory approaches the level
of reverence (if not veneration). In this case, the oggetti spaesati, are strong cognitive and affective
markers of identity that, in the idiom of Talcott Parsons (1975), have a cathetic character that is
invested with emotional energy.

Idealisation of culture

The grandparents’ homes seem to be a locus where an idealisation of Italian-ness takes place.
For example, a number of everyday moments experienced at nonni’s place, such as watering
the tomatoes or feeding the chicken with nonno, or eating nonna’s food, are emotionally and
symbolically charged and to an extent idealised as “Italian” by the younger participants in a
way that was not typical of the second generation. The following example extracted from the
fieldnotes is illustrative:

Pasquale is Anthony’s father. He confides that he has never enjoyed, and therefore never fully learned,
how to make satizzi (sausages) in spite of the fact that he has being making them with his father since
he himself was a boy. The real expert is his son, who has nonno Antonio’s same touch. Pasquale says:

“You know, every bloody June we got to make the satizzi […] I don’t have any good memory
about that. I remember one day, at school, my classmates teased me because they said I stank of
pig. Bastards. When making the satizzi, dad was very harsh with me. He used to scold me, in
front of the others every time I made a mistake. I wasn’t any good at it. I still remember lots of
carci ‘nto culu [kicks up the arse] dad used to give me for every mistake. Whereas Anthony is good
at it and for him it’s fun. He has got my dad’s same touch”.

The subjectivity of the practice and the emotional attachments evident in Anthony loving memory
and idolisation of his grandfather is not present to the same extent in Pasquale’s experience who
was ridiculed by his schoolmates and scolded by his father.

The idealisation can therefore be seen to be the result of the combined practical experience
with the grandparents who are seen as objective models of “Italian” ethnicity par excellence and
the emotions which are attached to such experiences by the third generation. For example,
Anthony constructed his idea of the way Italians deal with injustice as a result of the song he used
to hear his nonno singing. He epitomised nonno’s folkloric song in one sentence: “taking justice
into your own hands, is a real Italian attitude”. In short, the experiences at nonni’s loci appears to
have contributed to a number of incidents, which have been idealised as axiomatic of an Italian
identity in Australia. Clearly, the extent to which such cultural identity is idealised originates
also from exogenous fields, in primis those of the dominant society (i.e. the way “Italians” are
currently “institutionally” seen) and participants’ institutio positionality.

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4 Anthony attempts to speak Calabrian.
5 The folkloric song is actually called, Lamento di un servo ad un Cristo crocifisso [the lament of a
           servant to the crucified Christ], it was composed by Leonardo Vigo, 1857 (circa), probably before the unifi-
           cation of Italy. It tells of the condition of poor Calabrian peasants living in a remote villages with no justice.
           The servant, tired of the continuous humiliations and abuses from his landowner (who does not pay him),
           prays to the image of the crucified Christ, asking him for justice. Jesus replies by saying to take the law into
           his own hands, get a stick and bare his teeth.
6 The third generation, compared to their parents, has more “sovereignty” to choose and negotiate
Reflections on ethnic identity: from practice to subjectivity

In order to interpret participants' understanding of ethnic identity, we must bridge the theoretical gap between practice and subjectivity. The link appears to be provided by the strong emotional attachments that the participants invest in the cultural practices experienced mainly at their nonni's place, such as dancing tarantella, playing cards, helping nonno in the garden or cooking pasta and pruppetti [meatballs] with nonna.

Following the Bourdieusian line, in practice, the reproduction of certain practices related to the counduite de vie of the grandparents may have generated an ethnic habitus among the young participants who have spent a significant amount of time with their nonni. Once the practice is embodied (within the body or mind of those who “know how to do” certain valued things), individuals “learn” how to behave within that field, what needs to be said, what not. And when their habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it finds itself “as a fish in water”. In other words, social actors, by internalizing specific practices, generate and reproduce certain durable dispositions of the social world they are the product.

However, the feeling of being “a fish in the water” (at one’s parents’ or grandparents’ place), does not necessarily coincide with ethnic identity per se. One can feel comfortable at one’s migrant parents’ (or grandparents’) house, but might express antipathy towards one’s background. And vice versa: one can manifest ethnic identity without possessing any embodied habitus. Therefore, ethnic identity is not necessarily linked to the individual's practice and habitus’. Rather, in order to understand participants’ ethnic identity, the theory of practice is fundamental only if juxtaposed with their subjectivity and emotional life experiences. Such synergy appears to be the condicio sine qua non with which to interpret the complexity and dynamic nature of ethnic identity.

By taking into account both the objectivity of practice and the subjectivity of the emotional dimension of experience one can perhaps understand why some third generation “Italian-Australians” assume an “Italian” identity that is often more pronounced than their parents’ and why they “cannot wait” to go with nonno to pick the olives, or make the tomato sauce, or sausages or wine.

While acknowledging the Bourdieusian distinction between the vis insita, that is, the force inscribed in objective structures, and the lex insita, which is the principle regulating the social worlds (Bourdieu 1987)”, the authors are of the view that the ‘feel for the game’ can only be understood in terms of the emotional attachments which subjects invest in their lived experience.

their ethnic identity. The relationship with the “Italian culture” is characterised by more freedom and less conflict compared to the second generation. This seems to be the result of the way Italian culture and its migrants are currently perceived in Australia.

Clearly, also second-generation have an ‘ethnic habitus’ which differs to the first and third generation as a result of the different cultural capital accumulated (i.e., inter alia knowledge and experiences). However, in the diasporic field, it would be simplistic to interpret the different emotional attachments to one’s culture only as a result of differences in ‘ethnic habitus’. Although an ‘ethnic habitus’ encapsulates certain elements which are common and shared across generational lines, ethnic identity appears to be likely a matter of individuals’ positionality.
References


Global Talent on the Move: Multiple Migrations of Self-Initiated Expatriates in Asia

Nana Oishi
The University of Melbourne

Abstract
In recent years, global economic restructuring has accelerated the movements of skilled workers. A growing number of multinational corporations (MNCs) are transferring more employees across national borders, and are also recruiting more locally-hired foreigners, to meet technical and managerial needs in the countries where they operate. Various neoliberal reforms in higher education across the world have also been encouraging young professionals and academics to move across national borders. The number of these “self-initiated expatriates (SIEs)” has been rising across the world. Although many governments welcome SIEs, many of them do not settle in one place but move across multiple countries over time at their own initiative. What factors discourage SIEs from settling in their first destination, or conversely, what motivates them to move on to the next? Based on fieldwork in three global cities in Asia (Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore), this paper analyses various socio-economic, institutional and cultural factors behind the multiple migrations of SIEs.

Keywords: migration, globalization, self-initiated expatriates, global talent, Asia

Introduction
Global economic restructuring processes have accelerated the movements of skilled workers. A growing number of corporations are transferring more employees across national borders to meet technical and managerial needs in the countries where they operate. One survey shows that 70% of multinational corporations (MNCs) expect their staff to take up short-term positions overseas (Hays 2015). At the same time, the expansions of transnational businesses have been accompanied by the growing local recruitment of skilled workers to meet specific demands. It is becoming increasingly common for companies to hire skilled workers who are available locally or foreigners who are willing to move to a specific country where their skills are needed. According to Jennings and Best (2015), 44% of MNCs in Asia and the Pacific have hired foreigners to work locally. Management scholars call these foreigners “self-initiated expatriates (SIEs)” and differentiate them from traditional “organizational expatriates (OEs)” (Lee 2005; Biemann and Andresen 2010; Doherty, et al. 2011; Froese and Pelokorpi 2013). SIEs now constitute
a growing proportion of skilled migrants around Asia and throughout the world (Al Ariss and Crowley-Henry 2013).

The existing academic literature on class theory often describes MNCs and global professionals as a “transnational capital class” (TCC), “transnational bourgeoisie,” and a “global ruling class” that dominate the global economy (Robinson and Harris 2000; Harris 2001; Robinson 2004). However, while global professionals such as OEs receive lucrative financial packages and can exert power in transnational business operations, not all expatriates enjoy such privileges. SIEs often receive lower salaries from their employers and have fewer privileges than OEs (Biemann & Andresen 2010), and can be underemployed despite their high educational qualifications (Lee 2005, Saunders 2012).

SIEs have become more prominent among the ranks of skilled migrants for several reasons. First, the acceleration of neoliberal capitalism has affected MNCs’ human resource strategies, pressuring them to recruit more locally to cut labour costs. The so-called “local hire” is a much cheaper option than transferring employees to an overseas branch office since it includes no lucrative packages or coverage for transportation costs (Miller 2010). There has also been a growing demand for workers who are inter-culturally flexible and who possess more differentiated skill sets (Cao et al. 2012). This has led to the expansion of the labour market for low-cost international professionals worldwide, particularly in today’s growth-hub Asian economies. An increasing number of them are skilled migrants who are willing to take such “local positions” in other countries.

The driving forces behind the hypermobility of skilled migrants are not limited to changes in the corporate hiring practices. The neoliberal globalization of higher education has also produced a pool of mobile SIEs. Partly for financial reasons, most universities have sought large numbers of international student enrolments. In Australia, international students contribute 17% of university revenues, and are thus seen as a valuable university income source (Hare 2015). Despite being portrayed as “potential skilled migrants” in policy discourses (Hawthorne 2008), after graduation, international students often face difficulties in finding employment in the countries where they have studied due to their lack of permanent residency status and personal connections. In Australia, international students’ employment rate upon graduation is significantly lower than that of locals, with the exception of those in medicine, dentistry and pharmacy. In the fields of business, accounting and engineering, the employment rate of international students is approximately 40%, about half that of local students (Hawthorne 2014). Many of these students are forced to return home or take up employment elsewhere as SIEs. This is the case even for those who receive postgraduate research degrees. Due to the limited number of full-time teaching and/or research positions available in higher education institutions, many former international students must consider applying for positions in other countries. International migration has increasingly become the cultural norm in academia (Bauder 2012).

As the global restructuring of labour markets accelerates and various neoliberal reforms in higher education continue to supply greater numbers of international students to the skilled workforce, the number of SIEs moving across multiple national borders will also rise in both the corporate and academic worlds. Yet very little is known about SIEs and their modes of decision-making regarding multiple migrations. What factors prevent them from settling in their first destination country and motivate them to move on? How do they envisage the progression of their long-term careers? Although an increasing number of studies has been conducted on SIEs in recent years (Lee 2005; Biemann and Andresen 2010; Doherty, et al. 2011; Froese and Peltokorpi 2013), SIEs’ mobility patterns and causal factors have yet to receive adequate scholarly attention.
This paper attempts to address this knowledge gap by examining the multiple migrations of SIEs in three global cities in Asia—Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore. In particular, it highlights socio-economic, institutional and cultural factors that lead SIEs to engage in multiple migrations. It also analyses SIEs’ views on their transnational careers and their decision-making processes regarding expatriation and settlement, including the decision not to acquire permanent residency in their first destination.

Data and Methodology
This research draws on 45 qualitative interviews with SIEs in three global cities in Asia (18 Tokyo, 12 Hong Kong and 15 Singapore) who have moved across multiple borders. All respondents were identified via snowball sampling, and interviewed for about an hour between 2011 and 2013. The occupations of the respondents included investment bankers, management consultants, engineers, scholars and researchers. The profile of the respondents is as follows: 27 males (60%) and 18 females (40%), with the average age of 37 years. In terms of citizenship, 40% held citizenship in Asian countries, followed by North America (24%), Europe (20%) and others (16%). Six respondents (13%) possessed multiple citizenships.

Self-Initiated Expatriates (SIEs) and Multiple Migrations in Asia
(1) The Initial Migration Path
Confirming the previous research findings on one-time SIEs (Doherty 2013), the first segment of migration for these respondents often involved personal ties, such as family members, relatives or friends. In cases where there were no family ties, many SIEs developed an interest in the culture and the people through visits or studies. A dual national of the U.S. and Mexico stayed in Japan for a few weeks when he was an undergraduate student, and then decided to work there upon graduation. He remembered his decision as follows:

[When he visited Japan for the first time] I was very interested in the culture and country. Toward the end of my graduate school, I could work in the US, but I could also work in Japan. Japan sounded more interesting. It was not going to affect my career because Japan was doing a pretty advanced stuff…semi-conductor. So I decided to work there as an engineer.

Other respondents decided to take their first job in a certain country solely because of the attractiveness of the employment opportunities there. Even in academia, active recruitment initiatives by Asian universities encouraged such decisions. Three of my respondents were contacted by universities in Hong Kong while they were still writing their Ph.D. dissertations in North America. Given the appealing nature of the positions and the relative tightness of the academic market in North America at that time, they decided to take the offers.

(2) Moving Onward: Multiple Migrations of SIEs
Despite their initial excitement about the first destination country, not all SIEs settle down there. My respondents in this instance decided to move on to other countries for various reasons. This section examines the socioeconomic and institutional factors behind those decisions.

Work-Life Balance and Long-Term Career Prospects
In Japan, the working environment was one of the major factors that pushed highly skilled migrants out of the country. Indeed, Japan is ranked one of the lowest for work-life balance among all the industrialised countries (OECD 2015). Many SIEs felt frustrated that they could not spend enough time with their families and friends. Even single professionals felt inclined to leave the country. A 24-year old British IT professional, commented as follows:

I love Tokyo, but the working hours are too long. One day I want a family. But I can’t imagine myself being a father and working long hours…So unfortunately, Japan is not the place for me.
A senior American engineer, agreed and emphasized that high salary was not his priority, but quality of life was, since “a good quality of life would improve my work product as well.” Most respondents answered that quality of life for them and their family was the most important factor for deciding where they would live. Even in Singapore, SIEs who used to work in North America and Europe found the work environment to be rather hectic. Maria, an Indonesian marketer who had studied and worked in the U.S. said her current job in Singapore was forcing her to work more than 8 hours a day. She called it the “Asian style.” Indeed, Asia is known for longer working hours than those required in Western countries. In Hong Kong, working 9-10 hours a day is not unusual either (SMPC 2015). One scholar who moved from Japan to Hong Kong reported that the work pressures in Hong Kong were much greater than those in Japan.

Another primary reason for SIEs to decide to leave Japan was limited career opportunities available to foreigners. Although Japanese companies declare there is equal treatment for both locals and foreigners, the promotion exams are mostly conducted in the Japanese language only, and SIEs feel disadvantaged in terms of their long-term career. A Canadian engineer left for Singapore because of the dim prospects he sensed that he had for a successful long-term career in Japan:

In a typical Japanese company, you have a seniority-based promotion system. At some point you get promoted to a group leader, and then to a section chief, and you move up. As a foreigner, how does it work? The system is not clear.

The lack of foreigners in management and the lack of role models in the workplace have discouraged SIEs from pursuing their career in Japan.

Family Issues

Even when SIEs are satisfied with their career and work environment, their family situation can force them to return home or move on to a different country. Children's education is a particularly important concern. Global professionals who have travelled and been exposed to different cultures have a strong desire to bring their children up in a multicultural environment. A scholar who was educated in the Netherlands and New Zealand decided to leave Japan because he and his wife wanted to educate their children in English and in a more multicultural school, so that they would have more career choices in the future. International schools existed, but were not an option due to their high tuition fees. Spouse career opportunities were also crucial in the couple's decision-making. A Canadian scholar moved from Hong Kong to Tokyo for his wife's career. On the other hand, another scholar who worked in Singapore and Japan, decided to move back to Canada partially because his wife's employment opportunities in both countries were too limited.

Institutional Factors

For their first decision to work overseas, most SIEs mostly focus on employment, not institutional factors or government policies. That is because they are not fully aware of the implications of these factors and/or cannot imagine how those factors could affect their lives. As they spend more time in the destination country, however, certain institutional factors do emerge as issues, sometimes serious enough to push SIEs to other countries.

A social security system is one of those issues. A 34-year old software engineer from Hong Kong was entitled to apply for a permanent residency in Japan after working there for 10 years. With a good career record and a graduate degree from a top European university, his application would have been easily accepted. However, he decided not to apply and leave the country partly because he realised that he would lose a large portion of his pension contributions to the Japanese pension fund unless he committed to retiring in Japan. Since he was not sure about where he
wanted to retire, he decided to move back to Hong Kong to avoid a huge financial loss. Another respondent, an American professor who had worked in Japan for many years, was entitled to receive full pension benefits. However, he decided to immigrate to New Zealand partly because he wished to continue working as a scholar. The absence of mandatory retirement was one of the appealing factors for him.

Other institutional factor that affected my respondents was the tax system. A wealthy American corporate executive moved from Tokyo to Hong Kong because foreigners who lived in Japan for more than 5 years have to report their overseas assets to the Japanese government and pay a high tax on them. Since he had assets in several countries, he decided to move to Hong Kong where the tax rate is much lower. Indeed, all SIEs that I interviewed in Hong Kong and Singapore cited its low tax rate as one of the important reasons for living there, whether temporarily or permanently. Certain requirements for permanent residency can also deter some skilled migrants from settlement. A Canadian engineer working in Singapore met the conditions to apply for permanent residency. Nevertheless, he decided not to apply and moved to Hong Kong instead. He explained his reasoning as follows:

We were about to apply [for permanent residency], but then we had a new baby. And the baby turned out to be a boy. And that actually became one of the reasons why we did not [apply for PR]. If I become a PR, he has to go to national service.

National service is basically a military service required for all citizens and permanent residents in Singapore once they turn 18. Skilled workers are exempted, but their male children are not. Although the SIE himself had a secure job, and permanent residency could have given him and his family various benefits for housing, education and old age pensions, he did not want his son to serve in the national service.

The Culture of Expatriation

Many respondents pointed to the strong presence of expatriate culture in certain sectors and occupations. Academia is certainly one of them. Given the tight labour market, most academics without tenured jobs are forced to move across many universities that are often beyond national borders. The international university ranking system emphasizes the diversity of faculty members and thus also contributes to the active cross-national recruitment of academics. Even those with tenured positions are increasingly moving across borders. Professionals in finance and IT have also found it easy to find jobs in other countries due to the large demand for those with international experience. In contrast, professionals in sectors requiring local license exams (e.g. law and medicine) find it difficult to move freely across multiple borders. The mobility culture is bound and constrained by these professional specifications as well.

Expatriate cultures are also stronger among the younger generations. An emerging group of “Generation Y” professionals have a strong tendency to seek more excitement and a stimulating work environment (Sheahan 2005). As they consume more diverse cultural products and interact with people having multicultural backgrounds, they do not perceive multiple migrations as anything special. A 24-year old French-Senegalese HR specialist said he was not planning to settle down in any one place. He wanted to keep moving to different countries and regions to build both his career and his experience with diverse cultures.

Lastly, certain countries have developed a stronger expatriate culture than others due to their geographical and/or economic structure. Singaporean respondents argued that the majority of

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1 When he made this decision, it was necessary for workers to make pension contributions for 25 years before they could become eligible to receive benefits. The requirement was changed to 10 years in 2015.
elites in their country would migrate overseas during their lifetimes. One of them pointed to the norm of migrating within a “seven-hour flight radius”:

    Singapore is a very small country, so it is economic necessity to move around. You know the “seven-hour flight radius”? As long as somewhere is within a seven-hour flight radius around Singapore, it is considered ‘near.’ It is very normative [to move within the radius]. Out of my friends, 75% are working overseas.

Many respondents commented about the importance of social networking services, such as Facebook and Twitter, as an important tool supporting multiple migrations. These services constitute basic communication infrastructures which reduce the physical and psychological distance from their “home,” and help them remain connected with their friends in any places they have lived.

**Concluding Remarks**

This paper has described the ways in which various factors have facilitated the multiple migrations of SIEs in Asia. Individual backgrounds (prior exposure to different cultures), social ties and a desire for adventure set their initial paths. However, workplace factors (work environment, cultural diversity and career development opportunities) and institutional factors (tax, health care system and social security benefits) eventually influenced their decision to settle or migrate elsewhere. Certain geographic and economic imperatives also nurtured stronger expatriate cultures and mindsets that are prone to engage in multiple migrations.

Given the growing size and diversity of SIEs, more comprehensive investigations are needed to understand their complex migration patterns as well as the socio-economic implications of their hypermobility. The structural constraints in which SIEs are embedded also merit more scholarly attention. Due to their status as “local hires” who receive no expat package, some SIEs worry about their abilities to finance their children’s education and their own retirement. They can also face career challenges, such as glass ceilings, because of their non-expatriate or foreign citizen status.

While SIEs have been studied mostly by management scholars, more research by sociologists and migration scholars could contribute to a more holistic understanding of this emerging group. Further interdisciplinary studies on SIEs can advance analyses of the complex interplay between state policies, the global labour market and individual autonomy in skilled migration.

**References**


Hybrid Identities And The Role Of Music In Their Formation

Shai Diner
RMIT University

Abstract: Columbia hosts a wide variety of vibrant musical traditions, whose differences have been fostered by the diverse topography, complex political history, and social and cultural traditions. In an increasingly interconnected world, these traditions have come to compete and blend together with influences and inspirations from international musical scenes, that reflect the different levels of global interconnectedness among the different regions of Colombia. This piece explores the results from an ethnographic study, in which observations and interviews were conducted throughout the months of November and December 2014, in various music venues located throughout Melbourne to determine what occurred when Colombian music migrated to Melbourne. This evolved into a study of two expatriate Colombian musicians who are based in Melbourne. The musicians showed that when producing music they utilised their Colombian heritage as well as drawing on Australian culture; creating a hybridised form of music culture. These findings provide an example of the hybridisation of culture and how individuals utilise their past and present environment to inform their cultural identity.

Keywords: imagined community, Colombia, Australia, hybridity, music, migration

Introduction
In an increasingly globalised world where travel and migration have become common, the Colombian community is slowly growing within urban centres around Australia, especially within Melbourne. A transformation of culture has been occurring with more traditional forms of Colombian music being fused with elements from modern Australian culture. This paper analyses how two individuals fuse Colombian and Australian culture creating a reciprocal relationship between identity and music.

Colombia has a diverse culture attributed to its unique history and topography. Food, dress, weaponry, sculpture, art and music are unique to its regions. Music provides a useful demonstration of Colombian culture. Each region utilises different instruments and rhythms, creating a diverse range of genres. Traditional music on the western coast includes curruloa, the contrandanza and the bamboleo. Whilst in the northern cost, La Costa, traditional music encompasses Cumbia, Porro,
Vallenato, Bullerengue. The Bambuco, the pasillo and the guabina are from the Andean region whilst the Joropo and the Galerón are from the Los Llanos (the plains) (Williams & Guerrieri, 1999). Each genre draws on elements from the region’s history, incorporating aspects of culture from local indigenous tribes, African slaves and/or the Spanish (Olivella 1967; Wade 2006). Over the last few decades, artists began to mix traditional Colombian music with modern instruments and music. Porro, is one example, of a folkloric music genre which was been modernised and fused with Jazz (Wade 2006). Fusing different forms of culture together appears to be a trend within Colombian cultural history.

Within the Australian context, ‘Colombian inspired bands’ incorporate different languages, elements, genres and degrees of Colombian and Latin American music. Due to this, each band has created a unique sound, informing the Australian music scene as one of many international influences. Music, as a cultural platform and expression, has the ability to aid in the creation of an individual's identity (Laiho 2009).

Literature Review

An individual, over their lifespan, creates their own habits, behaviours and thoughts, forming their own identity. A person is influenced by external factors: socio economic status, family, religion, location, culture etc. impacting a persons behaviour and identity (Ortner 2006). People often express themselves through their culture: theatre, dance art, music, food and sport; which forms their own cultural identity.

Stuart Hall (1990: 225) defines culture “as belonging to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories”. Our cultural identity draws on our individual experiences as well deeply rooted shared cultural history in which an individual grows up in (Hall 1990). A shared cultural identity affects an individual’s identity, embedding social and cultural norms in to the family unit and the individual. Thus cultural identity is forever evolving and changing.

One form of cultural identity is music, which can have a profound influence on individuals, communities, and countries. Music is an art form, with increasing accessibility, which has the ability to connect to people, influence an individual’s mood, satisfy emotional needs and express oneself (Hargreaves & North, 1999; Laiho, 2009; Merriam, 1964, p 219; North, Hargreaves, & O’Neill, 2000). Music also has the ability to aid in the formation of an individuals identity (Laiho 2009; Hargreaves & North 1999; Larson 1995). Individuals often use the identification of a specific genre of music as a badge and symbol of values in certain social groups, which allows for a person to identify with a community or culture (Hargreaves & North 1999). Therefore, music has a profound effect on an individual’s formation of their cultural identity.

Music, as a cultural expression, transforms like other aspects of culture and is forever evolving and changing to due the inherent nature of culture and influence. Hall (1990), argues that over the course of time and migration, culture will change and adapt to its circumstances, constantly producing different variations of the same culture, a hybrid culture. Hall theorised about postcolonial societies, specifically the Caribbean, and how their cultures are hybrid forms of cultural identity, due to colonization (Hall 1990). This theory is also applicable to Colombia, which has a history of colonization and slave trade. Furthermore, Anderson (2006) argues that the idea of nationhood is ‘imagined’ due to the sense of ‘horizontal comradeship’ between people who have never met. People attribute common history, traits, beliefs and attitudes to the nation, creating an imagined community. Wade (2000) argues that within Colombian history, there have been instances where music has aided in the formation of a Colombian national identity, by drawing on the idea of an imagined community. Colombian nationhood is a mixture of
indigenous, Africans and European cultures (Wade 2000). Although the culture has transformed, Colombian culture is still an authentic form of cultural expression.

To understand the hybridisation of culture within a global context, Kraidy (2005, p.5) provides a useful definition which this article will utilise, “hybridity involves the fusion of two hitherto relatively distinct forms, styles, or identities, cross-cultural contact, which often occurs across national borders as well as across cultural boundaries, is a requisite for hybridity.” This definition allows hybridity to be understood when analyzing cultural migration and the fusion of cultures to create new forms of artistic expression.

To explore how the combining of musical forms can influence the hybridisation of cultural identity, this paper focuses on two individuals, Oscar Jiminez and Henry Pena and their bands, Watussi and Madre Monte, respectively. These individuals provide for an interesting study to investigate how Colombian music has been fused and hybridised within an Australian setting, demonstrating the implications for individual identity.

This paper analyses how these individuals utilise culture and music to form their identity and the importance that music has for individuals in expressing culture. This article argues that in their migration to Australia, their culture and identity has transformed and hybridised, creating a Colombian/ Australian cultural identity, which is represented within their music production providing an avenue for cultural expression. These individuals are both excellent examples of how migration impacts on identity and creates new forms of hybrid cultural identities.

Methodology
This project uses an ethnographic approach to discover how Colombian music has hybridised within an Australian setting. Observations were conducted at various music venues throughout Melbourne, which host Latin American and Colombian inspired bands, throughout November and December in 2014 (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007; Fetterman 2010). Observations were also conducted at the Johnston Street Festival in November (Lüders 2004). Field notes were taken throughout the period capturing researcher impressions of public environments (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, p.141). A series of 4 semi-structured interviews were conducted with musicians in the Latin American / Colombian music scene throughout this period (Hopf 2004; Holstein & Gubrium 1999). The researcher transcribed the interviews (Britten 2006). Patterns and themes that were present throughout the observation and interview data was coded into categories (Fetterman 2010, p.97). The main themes of identity, music and culture are the basis for this study, which is analysing how music has migrated from Colombia to Australia.

Music and Identity
Music has the ability to influence an individual’s formation of identity. Within Oscar and Henrys position as musicians, music has aided their formation of identity in an Australian setting.

Oscar was born in Venezuela to Colombian parents. When Oscar was two years old, his family moved to Barranquilla, Colombia. Oscars childhood was “influenced by a lot of dancing music”. When he was 15 years old and living in Bogota he began to learn various musical instruments. With an interest in rock music he started playing in a Latin Ska band.

Oscar was studying sound engineering at University and was exposed to a variety of Latin music: Latin Jazz, Percussive rhythms, classical, string based and more traditional forms of music. Oscar states: “I think my education in Bogota and music education in Bogota really helped do what I do right now.”

After two and a half years studying in Bogota, Oscar moved to Sydney, Australia where he continued studying sound engineering. He later completed a degree in multi media production. Although he did not plan too, Oscar has now lived in Australia for 14 years. During his time in
Australia, Oscar began his solo music career drawing on traditional Colombian musical elements. People were receptive to his music and “there was a fascination as people had not heard that type of Latin music.” After a period of predominately playing solo Oscar established a Latin / Australian fusion band, Watussi, based in Sydney.

Henry was born in Cali, Colombia, a city in the south west of Colombia. When Henry was a teenager he “was really into heavy metal, really really. I was sort of closed minded about it, it had to be heavy metal.” Referring to traditional forms of Colombian music Henry says, “You listen to it on the radio and stuff, with your parents, but with your friends it was always heavy metal… I used to hate reggae.”

In 2003, 18-year-old Henry completed high school and chose to study music production in Australia. Henry studied in both Sydney and Byron Bay before moving to Melbourne where he discovered a vibrant music scene. Whilst studying music production, Henry was, like Oscar, exposed to an eclectic range of music, opening his mind to new sonic avenues, especially reggae. A year or so after moving to Melbourne, Henry met Mauricio Gomez a fellow Colombian, who was also studying music production. Inspired by their Colombian roots, Henry and Maurcio, formed Madre Monte, a Colombian inspired 9-piece band.

Oscar, as a teenager in Colombia, was ‘swamped’ with Cumbia, Vallenato and various other Afro Colombian beats and so he was drawn to rock as an outlet, which as stated previously, sparked his interest in music. It was only after living abroad that he began to reconnect with his Colombian roots to satisfy his cultural needs. “I feel that it really helped to live here for such a long time, you know, without going to my country because a lot of things I miss from Colombia I access here.” This sentiment becomes even more important and relevant when Oscars expresses his feelings about the relationship between identity, music and culture. “When I identify myself, when I am presenting a project that its me, its going to have that in it, its almost impossible, just because that’s how I feel you know.”

To Henry, “Music in general is like everything.” He views this as the most important part of his day, from the moment he wakes up to the moment he goes to sleep. Which directly links into his passion and love for his band, Madre Monte, playing an integral role in many big decisions in his life.

Madre Monte is Henry’s place to express himself, and when speaking about the band, he finds it very difficult to put into words how much Madre Monte actually means to him. “Colombian music helps me feel connected to Colombia, to home... I feel like every year since I have been and making music, I am becoming more connected to Colombia even though I am living in Australia and at the same time I am becoming more Australian in many ways.”

Each artist expressed their disinterest in more traditional forms of Colombian music until they migrated to their culture. For both Oscar and Henry, their production of music is a way for them to connect to their Colombian roots and to the Colombian and Latin American community in Australia. Music is a way for them of coping with the stressors of living away from their home for so many years. Colombian culture is deeply rooted within each individual and each individual has been influenced by the shared Colombian cultural identity that has been transforming over the centuries. This manifests itself for these individuals in their relationship with music, as active musicians and consumers.

Each artist has drawn upon their Colombian roots to aid in their formation of identity within an Australian context. Their production of music allows them to express their shared cultural history whilst drawing on their current environment; utilizing music to express their Colombian identity. Therefore, music mutually reinforces cultural identity and cultural expression.
Hybridity, Culture & Identity

In Oscar and Henry's migration to Australia and in their positions as musicians, they created a hybridised form of music by fusing various forms of Colombian and Australian cultural elements.

Watussi, is Oscar's Sydney based band with the vision “to create a Latin American sound, that sounded Australian.” They were influenced by Australian rock, funk and reggae, to create something that Australians could relate to, while utilising a South American sound in their music. “Watussi has also been influenced by the fact that we have been touring, playing festivals and performing to Australian audiences.” Oscar goes on to state that as an artist and band, you cannot ignore the audience you are playing to and their interests. The local audience must be able to relate to the music and so Watussi tailors their music to appeal to wider audiences.

Watussi, adhere to their original idea to create both an Australian and a Latin American sound, consistently drawing inspiration from Latin American music. Specifically they draw on Brazilian musical elements, due to the Brazilian community following in Sydney as well as Peruvian musical elements as a result of their tour in Peru, in 2010. The majority of the songs are sung in Spanish. Watussi, produces a sound which can be considered both Latin American and Australian, drawing on both styles equally, creating a hybrid musical identity.

Oscar's solo career presents a very different cultural story to that of Watussi. His solo career has been heavily influenced by Afro Colombian rhythms, such as cumbia, cururuloo and afro beat mix as well as Brazilian rhythms. Similar to his experience with writing music with Watussi, Oscar draws on the many different influences that he has come. Speaking about his solo work Oscar states that, “working as a solo artist (and in that frame, as musician) I was very Colombian.” Another major influence in Oscar's music is his want to “extend (Colombian) traditions to other people, a bridge for Colombians to the rest of the world in the music… So I feel that our music is a very good tool to change people's mind about what Colombian is about.” This is important to Oscar due to the negative perception that Colombians receive based on its recent history and the media's portrayal.

Henry, four years after leaving Colombia, found himself homesick, which saw him listening to all an array of musical genres. Amongst them traditional Colombian music; especially cumbia, ska and reggae and “one day it sorted of click(ed) that they fit together really well, just musically they fit together really well.” With that focus in mind he began to write music for Madre Monte, mixing eclectic forms of music, reflecting his new musical tastes; Colombian traditional music, reggae, ska and rock alongside musical influences from his Melbournian surroundings.

As the years passed, and Madre Monte began producing album after album, they found the cumbia to become inherent in many songs. Looking for new musical forms to draw upon, Henry asked his salsa-loving mum, still living in Cali, about the music scene in his home city. He discovered that due to the migration of people from the Pacific Coast, there was now a vibrant Pacific Coast musical community in Cali, “the pacific music is really really strong in Cali, like massive.” The Afro Colombian community heavily influences Pacific Coast music utilising instruments such as the marimiba, bombo, cununus and guasás (Olivella 1967). Having discovered this new form of vibrant beats and instruments, they began writing new music utilising aspects of the Curruloa and the Pacific Coast music culture. Henry went on to state, “We didn't want to make traditional cumbia, or traditional curruloa, or just pure reggae, we wanted to try and make something different.” Madre Monte, in creating their new album “are trying to make a concept album and to use myths from Australia as well,” drawing on a different element of Australian culture.

In their migration to Australia, each artist has utilised their Colombian heritage in their production of music whilst also drawing on their Australian environment. Both artists have made
a conscious decision in the production of music to incorporate their Colombian culture. Oscar started Watussi with the vision to create a hybrid form of Latin American and Australian music whilst his solo career adheres more strictly to his Colombian roots. Henry and Madre Monte created a hybrid form of cumbia, ska and reggae; drawing mainly on Colombian culture. Each has created a distinct hybridised form of music based on their lived experiences. While these individuals produce very different styles of music, they draw on similar traditional elements of Colombian culture. Although they both utilise music heavily to identify themselves, they, and their bands have created a unique hybrid form of cultural expression and identity.

Conclusion
There are a variety of similarities and differences between Henry and Oscar’s approach and production of music. One of the most significant similarities in their music, is the reason that they draw upon traditional forms of Colombian music: their connection to their Colombian culture and identity. Although neither individual listened to traditional forms of Colombian music when in Colombia, they were both drawn to the music after they migrated to Australia. In this instance, music is used in the formation of their identity in an Australian context. Music has allowed each artist to connect to their home country and culture, drawing on this to aid in identity formation and to express their cultural heritage, allowing for a reciprocal relation to occur between music and identity.

In the production of music, artists draw on a variety of cultural influences. Madre Monte, Watussi and Oscar’s Solo career, are all very different styles of Colombian / Australian cultural expression. These contrastive cases show that there is no single form of cultural expression / identity but that there can be multiple variations. In the production of hybridised cultural identity, these two individuals take divergent paths producing different sounds. Each artist utilises different aspects of traditional forms of Colombian music as well as different Australian styles of music drawing on their own experiences, interests and tastes in music.

References


Neuroethics and ideals of the citizen-subject: A sociological critique of an emerging discipline

Matthew Wade
Australian National University

Though only recently emerging as a sub-discipline in its own right neuroethics has grown rapidly in scope and influence, spurred on by increasing faith in neuroscience that some (breathless) proponents claim ‘may be responsible for a kind of second enlightenment in the twenty-first century’ (Farah, 2010: 8). By inscribing properties of normative ethical thought upon the materiality of the brain neuroethics is undertaking a creeping epistemic colonisation of assessments of the ideal subject that were once firmly within the purview of the social sciences and humanities. Furthermore, neuroethics is being espoused as applicable towards increasingly complex aspects of collective wellbeing, with proposals of ‘moral enhancement’ suggested to alleviate what appear to be intractable problems of manufactured risk. While such hopes are admirable this paper cautions against such a proposed regime, suggesting that these applications of the neurosciences risks rigidly affixing ideals of the ethical citizen-subject in ways detrimental and self-defeating.

Keywords: neuroethics, neuroscience, enhancement, citizenship, subjectivity, risk

Sociology and social theory have a rich history of assiduously tracing and critiquing the production of scientific knowledge, particularly in illuminating the way in which such processes are inextricably and dialectically entwined with orienting frames of our Western rationality (eg. Kuhn, 1962; Foucault, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975; Haraway, 1988; Latour, 1993; Hacking, 2002). More specifically for this paper I am interested in those knowledge claims from the psychology and neurosciences that then fold back onto the subject as injunctions upon their conduct. As Foucault (1998: 255) pithily observed ‘Every psychology is a pedagogy, all decipherment is a therapeutics’, and thus every knowledge claim regarding our constitutions is part of an ongoing relationality in the ‘making up’ of subjects (Hacking, 1985). Processes of coolly and precisely delineating the capacities and bounds of the ethical subject – as I will demonstrate neuroethicists are wont to do – aspire to the generation of ‘human kinds’ to match the law-like properties of ‘natural kinds’ (Hacking, 1985). However, a crucial distinction between the two is that ‘human kinds’ inevitably have ‘intrinsic moral value’ that ‘affects the field of possible intentional actions’ (Hacking, 1985: 367-8). This, argues Ian Hacking (1985: 369), results in a ‘looping effect’,
for ‘to create new ways of classifying people is also to change how we can think of ourselves, to change our sense of self-worth, even how we remember our own past’. Thus there is a constant churn of ‘new causal knowledge to be gained’ and ‘old causal knowledge to be jettisoned’ that works against the definitive affixing of the subject (Hacking, 1985: 369). In this light as social scientists we are obliged to trace the ways in which our ‘historical ontology’ has been brought to bear in various contexts (Foucault, 1984; Hacking, 2002: 1-26), and to ward against any potential overreach of those scholars who hold ‘romantic cravings’ of revealing our ‘universal’ properties (Hacking, 2002: 7)

This task is of vital importance, for it encourages caution towards current knowledge claims and what contingent worldviews may underpin them. Today, such universalising claims often emerge through ‘the notorious tendency of life scientists to support socio-political arguments by transposing their research on flies or mice directly to the realm of human society and culture’ (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013: 12). Moreover, a number of sociological works in recent years have urged us to engage more thoroughly with the cognitive sciences, lest we find ourselves epistemically excluded from endeavours we once led (Cerulo, 2010; DiMaggio; 1997; Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015).

With this in mind, this paper looks to briefly explore some of the claims of the emerging field of neuroethics, particularly those that pertain to the possibility of better realising the ideal citizen-subject through ‘moral enhancement’ enacted at the neurological level. My concern is that this level of ambition in fields where our working knowledge is still so meagre risks foreclosing too many lines of thought relative to the benefits it may bring, and moreover risks rigidly affixing ideals of the ethical citizen-subject in ways that may prove detrimental and self-defeating.

Neuroethics, in its broadest and simplest definition, is the study of (a) how we should conduct research within the neurosciences with regard to ethical, legal, and social implications – thus placing itself firmly amongst bio- and medical ethics more generally – and (b) how neuroscience-based research might productively inform, support, or question the validity of current understandings of morality and ethics (see Roskies 2002; Levy, 2007; Farah, 2010; Buniak, Darragh & Giordano, 2014). It is the latter line of inquiry which is largely the focus of this paper, of how we might better understand and perhaps even neurologically reconfigure ourselves as ethical subjects. Hopes are high for this endeavour, with neuroscientist Martha Farah (2010: 8) suggesting that the field ‘may be responsible for a kind of second enlightenment in the twenty-first century’. Such aspirations demand close attention from the social sciences.

Since the field’s emergence around the turn of the millennium neuroethics has been endorsed as an avenue of productive self-repurposing, a way to ‘make our nervous system our ally’ (Moreno, 2002), thus enabling a ‘degree of freedom’ previously not possible and moreover enhancing our ‘sense of self’ (Churchland, 2002: 43). Arthur Caplan (2002: 98) went even further in endorsing neuroethics and expanding the breadth of its utility by suggesting that the field will enable us to safely ‘move toward optimization of our brains’ and to aid us in considering ‘how we might modify and design ourselves’. The core purpose of this line of neuroethics is to find the neural correlates of ethical thought, and from these insights look to ‘the development of an authentic science of morals’ (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 179). ‘This is predicated upon the assertion that ‘human experience shows every sign of being determined by, and realized in, states of the human brain.’ (Harris, 2010: 8). The brain thus becomes both the start and end point for any inquiry into being, including the very quality of personhood and its accompanying moral status (Racine & Zimmerman, 2012: 140-1). In this vein advocates proclaim that neuroethics goes ‘to the very heart of what it means to be a human being’ (Levy, 2008: 2) and may ‘reveal the structure of our minds and, therefore, of our souls’. Note here how ‘mind’ is implicitly blackboxed into ‘brain’, which then presumes to stand in for whatever we mean by ‘soul’. That ‘mind is what brain
Medical sociologist Caragh Brosnan (2011: 290-3) suggests that neuroethics has asserted its disciplinary status on two main fronts. First is by the already noted appeal to the equivalency of the brain with our very selves, particularly through the transmutation of normative ethical systems and inquiry into a materiality over which current ‘pastors of the soma’ (Rose, 2007: 29) may claim an epistemic privilege. The second front regards the dual oversight roles neuroethics claims are within its purview, that is, not only the privilege of monitoring the ethics of neuroscientific endeavour (in a manner similar to bioethics in general), but also investigating morality as it is believed to realised within the brain, which in turn may have profound implications for how we are constituted as subjects into the future (Roskies, 2002; Illes, 2005; Levy, 2007). The implication, then, is that neuroethics can both supervise its ethical conduct as an empirical and communicative endeavour – which, axiomatically, would require subscription to certain ethical precepts – yet also purport to hold exclusive and unimpeachable authority in potentially debunking some of those very same precepts by pinpointing their varying functionalised aetiology in the brain. The result is a compromised position of regulatory capture that risks ‘chasing its own tail’ (Brosnan, 2011: 292; see also De Vries, 2007; Pickersgill, 2013). Hence the importance of turning a critical sociological eye to neuroethics, for current discourses within the field ‘fail to see the larger context that gave rise to the specialty of bioethics’ and too frequently appear to lack the requisite objective remove and sociological contextualising of the phenomena they wish to investigate (De Vries, 2007: 67).

For now, however, sociologists are largely observing from the outside, conducting a sociology of neuroethics, rather than a sociology in neuroethics (De Vries, 2004; Brosnan, 2011). This general exclusion of sociological insight is concerning given the ambitions of many neuroethicists, who envisage that their work may play a significant role in motivating an important alteration in the way ethics is understood, and in what we come to see as the bearers of moral values’ (Levy, 2007: xi). Seemingly elusive and ineffable aspects of the human condition are steadily being rendered as biomarkers in the brain, mutating from qualities of character and custom to functions of neurological systems deemed either operational or deficient. Construed as such the self becomes open to re-engineering toward that which is desirable through various levers of governmentality. Ambitions are high for such management of the populace by way of neuroethics:

‘If, for instance, it can be shown that some (and only some) of our moral responses are irrational, because driven by raw emotion, then we have a powerful reason for rewriting policy to discount these responses.’ Levy, 2010: xxi

Yet the sting of recent history should remind us to be exceedingly wary of views that would grant authorities the privilege to ‘discount’ certain utterances though appeals to scientific rationales. If not conducted with due caution such ‘discounting’ of ‘irrational’ responses speaks to forms of hubris that may not deftly reveal the underlying strata of selfhood but rather bludgeon pre-existing worldviews into new containers and overlays, perhaps to the detriment of many. Moreover the very understanding that one – as a citizen – may find themselves subjected to having their views processed for the corrupting influence of ‘raw emotion’ is likely to result in knock-on effects difficult to foresee and predict, and thus may negate the very precision such ‘neuro-policy’ seeks to implement.

Still, for many empirical neuroethicists the ‘good’ is something determined and realised at the synaptic level. This claim serves as an Archimedean point upon which to anchor and ultimately evaluate wellbeing, implying an equivalency of (once) elusive qualities now observed in material relationality. When the orienting perspectives of our ethical stances are purportedly revealed as merely rationalised tips of evolutionary icebergs (Greene, 2008: 38) we risk the prospect where...
life itself becomes overdetermined (Ortega & Vidal, 2011: 7), and where ‘biological citizenship’ (Rose & Novas, 2008) entails coralling and cultivating one’s neuronal capital towards pre-ordained ‘virtuous’ ends.

This may generate an epistemic circularity, one that presupposes certain socio-historically contingent worldviews now rendered into ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour, 1986) within the brain. Currently, the brain is typically framed within the modes of operation in Post-Fordist society, where the ‘plasticity’ of one’s neurological makeup is championed for its value-bearing potential (Malabou, 2008; Slaby, 2010; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Ortega, 2011; Thornton; 2011). The brain is increasingly seen as operating within an array of possibilities and potentials to be enacted, adaptable and flexible, and therefore a ‘site of choice, prudence, and responsibility for each individual.’ (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013: 52). Such appeals are often framed within ideals of autonomy and freedom:

“When we make decisions to improve our lives by biological and other manipulations, we express our rationality and express what is fundamentally important about our nature. And if those manipulations improve our capacity to make rational and normative judgements, they further improve what is fundamentally human. Far from being against the human spirit, such improvements express the human spirit.’ Savulescu, 2005: 38

Such appeals ‘infused with futurity’ are found throughout biopolitical discourses, stretching the reach of governmentality into the actuarial management of uncertainty (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013: 14). Within this contemporary precarious milieu some neuro-advocates propose ‘not abandonment of the democracy, but enhancement of the morality of its voters’ (Persson & Savulescu, 2012: 90). Yet this is clearly question-begging, for embedded within these aims are presuppositions of the ‘ideal’ citizen-subject, thereby smuggling conceptions of the self that – while perhaps currently prevailing in the Western world – have been demonstrated by countless sociologists and anthropologists to be anomalous socio-historical entities. Such proposals that purport to better realise our ‘human spirit’ through biological manipulations should therefore be approached cautiously, lest we affix a model of the citizen-subject that may later prove difficult to reconfigure.

Yet nevertheless it appears that some influential advocates of neuro-enhancement have a decidedly fixed view of the ideal citizen; one who is coolly rational and of liberal-democratic persuasion, but also dedicated to a firmly consequentialist view of wellbeing. Such framing of the subject often invokes evocative rhetoric of collective urgency and imperatives to repurpose ourselves in light of our contemporary calamities:

‘To solve problems we have created—such as environmental pollution, over-population, and global warming—human beings may have to enhance their cognitive capacities and perhaps their moral capacities as well.’ Buchanan, 2011: 2

We are thus called upon to adopt a vocation of ‘moral enhancement’ through – amongst other methods – neurological means (Douglas, 2008). Such an endeavour ratchets the Foucauldian ‘conduct of conduct’ into another level, wherein we come to dutifully adopt an ethic of personal ‘neuroascesis’ (Ortega, 2011). In this vein philosopher of mind Thomas Metzinger proposes a ‘consciousness ethics’ whereby rather than delineating ‘good action’ we must step back in the causal chain by first determining ‘a good state of consciousness’ (Metzinger, 2009: 233). Such a potential (self-)regulation of permissible brain states entails a curious new means of governing at a distance (Rose & Miller, 2010). What we are witnessing, observes social theorist Maurizio Meloni (2012: 26) is a ‘revival of biological arguments in the interpretation of what makes us human’. Meloni is actually quite receptive to this possibility, envisioning in the neurologising of ethics a true Cartesian ‘universal method’ that promises a way out of our conflicting perspectives. At times these hopes verge on the fantastical, perhaps dangerously so:
‘My hypothesis is that the prospect of moral principles “firmly grounded” in neurobiology … as well as the promise of bringing to light – via neuroscience – the building blocks of ethics and even politics, have gained attractive force today as they provide a vital solution to two profound intellectual needs of the post-1989 world. On the one hand, neuroscience … has started to work as a substitute of the grand narratives discredited by the shortcomings of the twentieth century … filling the void they have left behind. On the other hand … neuroscience’s project of bringing to light the natural, bare substrate of human faculties, no longer contaminated by cultural and linguistic differences and resistant to the pressures of society and political regimes, seems to offer solid ground, and a safe anchor against the return of many of the traumas of the twentieth century: neuroscience appears to promote a message of universal brotherhood … and, with its emphasis on our natural, hardwired inclination to moral life and empathy, seems to provide a firmer basis for a newly possible ethics.’ Meloni, 2012: 37

These claims are deeply unsettling, and ironic in ways likely not intended. Was not many of ‘the traumas of the twentieth century’ also predicated on the belief of having finally arrived at an objective measure of the ideal composition of our species? Should we place any trust in an intellectual authority that purports to remove the ‘contamination’ of cultural and linguistic differences in order to reveal the ‘natural, bare substrate’ of our species? How would such an authority quarantine themselves from this supposed contamination in order to objectively delineate the bounds of our humanity? Might any potential ‘looping effects’ be especially volatile in looking to ground a form of universal ethics in the brain? All things considered the suggestion that neuroscience could aid a ‘political project of global sympathy’ (Meloni, 2012: 41) seems recklessly naïve to posit at this time.

Still, found throughout the neuroethical discourse are imperatives claiming that we must be willing to neurologically reconfigure ourselves in order to protect our very way of life in the ‘approaching post-human era’ (Kahane, Savulescu & ter Meulen, 2011). Perhaps most influential in this area has been Oxford bioethicist Julian Savulescu (2005, 2010; Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Savulescu & Sandberg, 2008). With philosopher Ingmar Persson, Savulescu suggests that we are currently ‘unfit for the future’ and thus ‘have a moral obligation to enhance human beings’ (Persson & Savulescu, 2012). Current shortfalls in our capacities as ethical agents, argue Persson and Savulescu, make collective action towards countering manufactured global risk all but impossible, for we simply do not have the necessary capabilities at the neurological level to resolve these issues. Thus, they argue, it ‘is crucial that we be aware of the moral limitations of our nature, and do whatever we can to correct these limitations, by traditional or new scientific means’ (Persson & Savulescu, 2012: 133). A number of justifications are given for this view, mainly deriving from a perceived mismatch between our ‘common sense morality’ and the ‘Ultimate Harm’ that we are now capable of inflicting upon one another thanks to rapid technological development and the sensitive mechanisms of our global interdependence (Persson & Savulescu, 2012: 46, 122-3, 126).

Persson and Savulescu (2012: 103) suggest that ‘it is necessary to widen the horizons of our moral consciousness’, and thus we are essentially framed as failed citizens in our current makeup. Such a proposal is a fascinating and unnerving development, espousing a form of ‘neuro-essentialist’, self-instrumentalising logic whereby we must decide what aspects of our higher ‘humanity’ to embrace and cultivate at molecular levels of causality (Racine, Waldman, Rosenberg & Illes, 2010). Such a vision implies that processes of care of the self may in time disaggregate the subject into neurological functions and causalities that are deemed either ‘operational’ or ‘defective’ in any given context. We are informed that we are plastic, malleable entities, laden with potential, but of course still beholden to and inextricably entangled with our material ‘wetware between the ears’ (Safire, 2002), and hence we must practice a form of care through the enhancement of a molecular assembly that is now ‘persuadable’ (Pruchnic, 2008: 194).
All that we supposedly need then, say the hard materialists of neuroethics, is sufficient knowledge of this malleable substance inside the skull so that ‘descriptive knowledge of the brain will inform us on what we should do’ (Schleim, 2014). Altogether this amounts to a form of reconstituted subjectivity and citizenship; an ethic of purposefully (but also subversively) modifying the purpose-maker themselves in ways adhering to overarching ideological dictates that presume to know their own ends. An idol that carves itself. Tangled up in this process are the contingencies of ‘recurrent histories’ (Canguilhem, 1988) and ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1988) of how the subject is conceptualised and may be best realised. If governing of the neoliberal subject is ‘to act upon action’ (Rose, 1999) in ways that do not constrain agency and ‘freedom’ but rather governs through such aspirational labours (Rose, 1996, 1999) by aligning individual volitions with societal imperatives, then how will the citizen-subject be constituted in a time where ethics of self-governance compels a virtue of hyper-reflexivity, of urging subjects to labour upon the subconscious mechanisms of their ‘freedom’?

In such a stupendously complex entanglement it is of concern that many current rationales for neuro-enhancement are closely tied to rigidly affixed ends that pre-emptively preclude the possibility that we may not actually know what is most conducive to our wellbeing. Further to this is the potentially disquieting irony that in attempting to maximise our capacities to uphold broadly liberal democratic principles we would take action that subverts those very same principles by intervening upon ourselves in a state-driven program of ‘moral perfectionism’ (Sparrow, 2014). Those of us resistant may consequently find ourselves wedged in defending a classical humanism that has become similarly banal and rigid beyond saving, and so equally stuck in notions of our ‘essential’ and thus ‘inalienable’ qualities that obtain less and less but require ever more upkeep to uphold (Braidotti, 2013).

To conclude, it is difficult to envision how a widespread regime of moral modification at the neurological level does not risk generating looping effects difficult to foresee. Harris (2011: 104) similarly observes that a ‘fundamental problem’ in current debates around moral enhancement is that ‘the sorts of traits or dispositions that seem to lead to wickedness or immorality are also the very same ones required not only for virtue but for any sort of moral life at all’. Such proposals of moral enhancement thus advocate an unsettling circumventing of the ethical subject in one sense but with added personal responsibility in another, for we may find ourselves practicing a self-care ethic of hyper-reflexivity whereby our conscious selves induce propensities to ‘good’ action at the neurological level. The result is that whatever we mean by ‘ethics’ risks becoming fixed and rigid in the material, and so subverts and forecloses potentialities of subjectivity we may later need to draw upon in coping with rapid societal change. We should exercise due caution against proposals that threaten to reduce the space where an affirming sense of our being can be exercised.

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Efficiency, productivity and ... fairness: An analysis of the Harper Review into Australia’s competition policy

Patrick O’Keeffe

School of Global, Urban and Social Science, RMIT University

Abstract
In December 2013 the recently elected Australian Government commissioned a review into Australia’s national competition policy. The review panel, chaired by Professor Ian Harper, published their final report in March 2015. This paper provides an analysis of the Harper Review, which has the overarching objective of ensuring that markets work in the interests of consumers (Harper, Anderson, McCluskey and O’Bryan 2015, p.7). The key assumptions which underpin the Harper Review are that competition is the most effective means of achieving efficiency, while a more efficient and productive economy will deliver a range of outcomes for consumers, such as increased choice. Furthermore, this emphasis on efficiency, while placing less importance on market concentration, does not adequately consider the power that can be exercised by corporations with a high market share. This analysis hinges on the belief that “the disciplines of a competitive market” will be sufficient to ensure that corporations do act in such a way that the assumed benefits of competition filter through society (Harper et al. 2015, p.15). This focus crowds out alternate values, while providing limited conceptions of power, equity, and social welfare, within the framework of competition and efficiency.

Keywords: Competition, Competition Policy, Neoliberalism, Consumer Welfare, Harper Review

Introduction
A competitive economy is frequently positioned by politicians from mainstream political parties as essential. However, rather than being envisaged as an end point, competition is viewed as being a key means through which broader objectives of increased efficiency and productivity are attained (Bowen 2014; Abbott 2015; Keating 1994). Through achieving these aims, competition is therefore considered as being an important mechanism through which broad range of outcomes are met, including economic growth (Keating 1994), higher incomes, increased living standards (Howard 1996), more opportunity and employment (Bowen 2014). Furthermore, as leader of the Liberal Party in 1995, while delivering a speech to the Australian Council of Social Services, John Howard asserted that competition is essential in creating a compassionate society (1995, p.1). Harper et al. (2015) view competition as being a key means through which consumer choice, and subsequently, consumer empowerment, is reached. The fundamental belief that
ties these objectives together, is that competition within markets ensures that businesses and service providers will increase their efficiency, with the benefits of these gains being passed on to consumers. In announcing the Harper Review, then Prime Minister Tony Abbott (2013, p.1) stated that “The competition review will examine not only the current laws but the broader competition framework, to increase productivity and efficiency in markets…and raise living standards for all Australians”. This statement appears to imply that redistribution can be achieved through changes to competition policy which seek to increase the level of competition within the Australian economy.

What is efficiency?
While efficiency is often mentioned by Australian politicians in relation to competition policy, a description of what efficiency actually represents is rarely forthcoming. Similarly, the Harper Review refers to efficiency on countless occasions, though does not specify what this means (Harper et al. 2015). Inaugural Australian Consumer and Competition Council Commissioner, Rhonda Smith, stated that “The aim of micro-economic reform (and of competition policy as part of it) is to improve the efficiency with which resources are used, thus contributing to improved living standards” (Smith 1996, p.1). Smith provides a further description, describing efficiency as including technical and production efficiency, dynamic efficiency and allocative efficiency, with the latter explained as ensuring “resources go to where consumers value them most” (Smith 1996, p.1). Orbach (2011, p.141) contends that allocative efficiency is achieved “when the cost of resources used in production is equal to the consumer’s willingness to pay”. Orbach (2011, p.141) equates allocative efficiency with Pareto optimality, in which an allocation of resources benefits one or more people, without leaving another person worse off (Orbach 2011, p.141; Posner 1979, p.488). The Kaldor-Hicks criterion develops upon Pareto optimality though contends that efficient distribution of resources can benefit a person and leave another worse off; yet in this instance the individual that has benefitted through this allocation will have the capacity to compensate those who may have been negatively impacted (Posner 1979, p.491; Coleman 1979, p.514). Using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, some have contended that legal rules – such as competition policy – should not be designed to necessarily benefit all through redistribution, rather, any redistribution should occur through taxation or welfare (Weisbach 2003, p.439; Kaplow and Shavell 1994, pp.667-668). This contention suggests that issues of equity and efficiency can be separated, yet critics suggest that this is incorrect due to the “pervasiveness” of market failure (Stiglitz 1991, pp.40-41; Jolls 1998). As stated by Stiglitz (1991, pp.4-5), from this perspective, “Economists need not concern themselves with value judgments; whatever the government’s distributive objectives, it implements these through initial lump sum taxes and subsidies, and then leaves the market to work for itself”. Additionally, the potential to compensate those that are ‘worse off’ through competition policy which primarily focuses on efficiency, will not necessarily result in the development of taxation and welfare policies which do ensure adequate compensation.

The Kaldor-Hicks criterion appears to have been endorsed by the Productivity Commission (PC) in their analysis of water, with Harper et al. (2015, p.202) referring to a 2011 PC report, ‘Australia’s Urban Water Sector’, which “considered that equity issues are best dealt with outside the urban water sector through, for example, taxation and social security systems”. While efficiency is mentioned extensively throughout the Harper Review, the issue of whether competition policy should aim to deliver equitable outcomes receives relatively little attention. Furthermore, while the Harper Review aims to “make markets work in the long-term interests of consumers” (Harper et al. 2015, p.23), this ambition differs from Tony Abbott’s desire to see competition policy deliver “raised living standards for all”. However, Abbott himself is inconsistent on this issue;
having previously admitted in 2002 that increases in inequality might inevitably result from increased competition (Conley 2004, p.1).

Rise to Prominence of the Chicago School
According to Shughart and McChesney (2010, p.390), antitrust enforcement within the United States prior to the 1980s was based on rhetoric which opposed the development of big companies and prioritised the prevention of market concentration above all else. Subsequently, antitrust policy had developed to focus less “on the interest of consumers in free markets than to the interest of inefficient producers in safe markets” (Bork 1967, p.242, cited in Signorino 2013, p.7). This approach to antitrust changed with the election of the Reagan Administration in 1980, which was influenced by the Chicago School (Shughart and McChesney 2010, p.387; Wood and Anderson 1993, p.7). From the perspective of the Chicago School, the promotion of efficiency is viewed as being more important than reducing market concentration (Bork 1967; Baumol and Ordover 1985, p.247). Though conceding that mergers may undermine competition in some instances, Baumol and Ordover (1985, p.247) argue that on the other hand, mergers which may result in increased efficiencies “make it necessary for other firms in the industry to try harder”. This is a key assumption which underpins the Harper Review.

Efficiency through ‘consumer welfare’
The emphasis of competition policy, within countries such as the United States and Australia has focused on delivering favourable outcomes for consumers (Kirkwood 2012; James Jr et al. 2013, pp.100-101; Murphy 2006, p.32). Understanding what this focus represents is important, as this implies that citizens effectively are consumers, yet this does not disclose the contention that consumer welfare is most effectively enhanced through an emphasis on efficiency (Bork 1967; Baumol and Ordover 1985, p.247). Robert Bork, of the Chicago School, is a key figure in shifting the focus of antitrust towards consumer welfare (Crane 2014; Elzinga 2014; Orbach 2011). This influence is such that consumer welfare, as developed by Bork, is the only goal of US antitrust policy (Orbach 2011, p.133; Crane 2014, p.835). As mentioned by Crane (2014, p.835), Bork’s consumer welfare effectively disguises the underlying emphasis of economic efficiency. According to Bork (1967, 1978), antitrust should be exclusively focused on promoting consumer welfare, which can be achieved through pursuing efficiency. This focus is underpinned by the assumption that an efficient company, regardless of their market power, will supply the market with better products at better prices for consumers (Bork 1967). As stated by Crane (2014, p.835), Bork repositioned antitrust law from being “a constraint on large-scale business power and toward a conception of antitrust law as a mild constraint on a relatively small set of practices that pose a threat to allocative efficiency”. In many ways, this idea of consumer welfare, and the championing of efficiency, excused the development of large corporations within concentrated markets. This approach fundamentally ignores the capacity of corporations with significant market share and influence to exert market power. Furthermore, this also relies heavily upon the assumption that a large company will be an efficient allocator of resources, and through the competition (and potential competition) in that market, will deliver outcomes that benefit consumers. The influence of these ideas is significant, and as demonstrated through the recently published Harper Review, are particularly pertinent with regard to the approach towards competition policy in Australia.

Harper Review into Competition Policy
Announced in 2013 by the newly elected Australian Government under Prime Minister Tony Abbott, the Harper Review is considered as following on from the review conducted by Hilmer, Rayner and Taperell (1993) in the early 1990s. Harper et al. (2015, p.15) provide an outline of their understanding of competition policy, in stating that:
Competition policy, like other arms of government policy, is aimed at securing the welfare of Australians...Properly applied, it can improve the quality and range of goods and services, including social services, available to Australians...the disciplines of a competitive market compel efficiencies in business conduct, which in turn contributes to the productivity and competitiveness of enterprises.

This analysis hinges on the assumption that “the disciplines of a competitive market” will be sufficient to ensure that corporations do act in such a way that the assumed benefits of competition filter through society.

Consumers

The emphasis of the Harper Review is clearly focused on consumers, lending considerably from Bork's notion of consumer welfare as being the fundamental aim of competition policy. According to Harper et al. (2015, p.23), “Our competition policy, laws and institutions serve the national interest best when focused on the long-term interests of consumers”. The use of the term ‘consumers’ is contentious, particularly in the sense that Harper et al (2015) apply their definition of consumers to include a very broad range of activities and people. Importantly, Harper et al. (2015, p.15) extend the understanding of what a “consumer” is, to include those people who are reliant upon social services. To emphasise this point, Harper et al. (2015, p.23) contend that “Consumers in this context are not just retail consumers or households...In the realm of government services, consumers can be patients, welfare recipients, parents of school-age children or users of the national road network”. Furthermore, Harper et al. (2015, p.23) contend that ‘consumers’ can also include businesses. This appears to redefine the role of a citizen within their society. Reducing people to consumers, particularly with regard to government services, fundamentally alters the relationship between the government and the citizenry. Furthermore, Harper et al. (2015, p.20) emphasise that the power of the individual citizen can be enacted through their role as a consumer, and their capacity to exercise choice. This is a very limited conception of power, or empowerment, as Harper et al. (2015) frequently refer to. In addition, with regard to government services, it could be argued that a citizen does – or in the case of privatised public services, did - effectively retain some level of ownership over these services. The power that is exercised through the choices made as a consumer, as opposed to the power that is exercised as an owner, is relatively hollow.

While associating competition and choice, with empowerment Harper et al. (2015, p.20), also equate with the increased freedom of consumers. This is very much in the Chicago School tradition of associating freedom with free markets (Bork 1966; Friedman 1962). Furthermore, Harper et al. (2015, p.27) contend that the lives of those on lower incomes, can be enhanced through increased consumer choice. The application of this terminology, coupled with the narrow conception of what it is to be a citizen, considerably limits the scope for alternate values to be aspired to. Furthermore, the shallow conceptions of equity, empowerment and freedom of Harper et al. (2015) ensure that more rounded considerations of these values may be compromised through this emphasis on efficiency and productivity. Harper et al. (2015) contain such a focus on competition, as the means to increasing living standards, yet do not acknowledge that the resulting improvements in living standards may not be universally enjoyed.

Social Services

The broad definition of a ‘consumer’, by Harper et al. (2015), is significant. The positioning of a citizen as a consumer of social services for example, implies that neoliberal tenets such as efficiency and competition can be applied successfully throughout society. Furthermore, the assertion is that these ideas, which have not been particularly successful in safeguarding the global economy with significant crisis, will deliver beneficial outcomes regardless of the context in which they are applied. With regard to social services, this is evident in the assertion of Harper et al.
(2015, p.24) that consumer choice “encourages governments to adapt their services to better serve our needs”. In this conception of social services delivery by government, Harper et al (2015) consider that competition will force government services to become more efficient and more productive, to remain attractive to consumers of these services. Consumers, in turn, can exercise their power by choosing a different service provider. Whether this approach is appropriate to social services delivery is also highly questionable, with the risk being that this approach significantly undermines the principles upon which social welfare might be based. Furthermore, how the varying purchasing power of these consumers might impact upon their capacity to exercise choice, is not considered. Nevertheless, Harper et al (2015) demonstrate a strong conviction that competition delivers equitable outcomes in society, and would argue that the development of more efficient and productive government services will ultimately result in improved social welfare outcomes. This argument is exemplified in the following statement (Harper et al. 2015, p.34):

[D]eepening and extending competition policy in human services is a priority reform. Lowering barriers to entry can stimulate a diversity of providers, which expands user choice.

While Harper et al. (2015, p.34) acknowledge that in some remote location, competition between services providers may not be possible due to the size of the “market”. In this case, the “well-designed benchmarking of services” is essential in maintaining the quality of services, in cases when competition from the market is not able to have the effect of providing incentives for efficiency and productivity improvements. This suggests that in cases where markets are not competitive, service providers will be required to meet standards that assume the presence of competition. In this sense, even when markets aren’t competitive, mechanisms can be developed to resemble the influence of competition. While Harper et al (2015) contend that government may have to intervene to ensure that competition is maintained, there is a sense throughout this paper that government should remove itself from being a provider of services, to become a manager of competitive markets for those services, with the use of a “light touch” (Harper et al. 2015, p.24). This reflects a neoclassical approach which does emphasise the role of government as intervening to ensure that markets more closely resemble perfect competition (Tsoulfidis and Tsaliki 2015).

Public interest
Within the terms of reference, then Federal Treasurer Joe Hockey (2013) called on the review panel to determine how productivity and efficiency can be attained through “identifying and removing impediments to competition that are not in the long-term interest of consumers or the public interest”. The idea of exactly what the ‘public interest’ represents is not explored in any significant detail throughout the Harper Review. It could be assumed that since the Harper Review (2015, p.32) advocates maintaining the current public interest test outlined in the National Competition Policy, that this reflects the idea of the ‘public interest’, as developed within Hilmer et al. (1993). According to Hilmer et al. (1993), determining whether or not anti-competitive regulations are in the public interest should be based on two grounds – whether market failures are present (considered as being a rare occurrence), or if community values – which are described in vague terms as immutable and constantly changing – are compromised by increased efficiencies. The implicit assumption here is that markets are not likely to fail. The reliance upon free markets is reflected in the contention throughout the Harper Review that competition does deliver choice, which can then provide consumers with beneficial outcomes. However as Harper et al (2015, p.27) contend, “For choice to deliver real benefits, consumers not only need proper access to information, but it must also be in the right form for them to assess it, and they must have the capacity to access it”. This suggests that while the development of competition might lead to increased choices for consumers, without the capacity to access,
and act upon that information, then market failures will result. The “pervasiveness” of imperfect information (Stiglitz 1991, p.17) suggest that markets will be more likely to fail, than otherwise.

Referring to ‘community values’, Hilmer et al (1993, pp.88-89) describe that “there are some situations where competitive market conduct may achieve economic efficiency, but at the cost of other valued social objectives…In both categories, it is also important to recognise that there will usually be a host of policy instruments by which governments can pursue their particular economic or social objectives”. Presumably, these policy instruments are likely to include taxation and welfare, which suggests that Hilmer et al. (2013) were of the view that distribution was best achieved through these means, rather than through legal rules. As Harper et al. (2015) advocate the conception of the ‘public interest’ as outlined by Hilmer et al. (2013), it can be seen that these reviews appear to share a belief in the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency, and therefore are of the view that the issues of efficiency and equity can be separated (Stiglitz 1991, pp.40-41).

Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of the Harper Review, published in 2015 as a review into Australia’s competition policy. The overarching assumption of the Harper Review is that competition results in increased efficiencies, which delivers increased productivity. Bork’s conception of consumer welfare is particularly influential with regard to the Harper Review, which effectively equates efficiency or markets as having a direct relationship to the welfare of consumers. Importantly, the broad definition of what a consumer is, which Harper et al. (2015) extend to include those who rely upon human services, implies that the principles of competition can be extended to all areas of society. This claim that competition should be introduced into human services in particular is highly contentious. Positioning people as consumers of government services, and choice as an expression of power, neglects the power that people exert over publicly owned government services, that were (and in some cases, are) effectively controlled by the citizens that Harper et al (2015) refer to as consumers. The shallow depictions of what equity, power or ‘the public interest’, actually represent, effectively crowd out broader definitions of these values. Furthermore, despite vague notions that markets should work for the benefit of consumers, the Harper Review is not particularly clear on how issues of equity might be achieved through competition policy. Rather, the indication from the Harper Review is that any objectives of equity are best achieved through means such as taxation and welfare provision.

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Neoliberalism: Dominant Narratives And Counter Cases

Elizabeth Humphrys
University of Sydney

Abstract
Most critical scholars posit that the Accord social contract is in competition with, or a buffer against, the roll-out of neoliberalism in Australia. However, the driving force and achievement of the Accord was its agenda of wage cutting and its role in driving the disorganisation of the labour movement — both also key objectives of neoliberal projects. Although corporatism, as a consensual process of political-economic decision making, appears on the surface inconsistent with neoliberalism, it is in fact deeply correlated in the case of Australia. This paper argues that when the Accord is analysed as a process of class rule, and as the form that neoliberalism took, its mechanisms and content are better understood. I use Gramsci’s notion of the integral state to explore the reciprocal interpenetration and buttressing of ‘political society’ and ‘civil society’ (within a state-form) in the Accord era. Subsequently, I argue that the Accord ensured the state could secure the hegemonic project of the capitalist class, through the integration of organised labour into the dominant project.

Introduction
Between 1983 and 1996 Australia instituted a social contract between the political and industrial wings of Australian labour movement. The Statement of Accord by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) Regarding Economic Policy — the ‘Accord’ — profoundly shaped the political economy while deepening the country's longstanding corporatist arrangements. Most authors critical of the neoliberalism of this era posit the social contract as exogenous to the roll-out of neoliberal policy reform. In this view, the Accord is in competition with, or a buffer against, neoliberalism's implementation (Peetz 2013; Spies-Butcher 2012). However, the driving force and achievement of the Accord was its agenda of wage cutting and its role in driving the disorganisation of the labour movement — both also key objectives of neoliberal projects. Although corporatism, as a consensual process of political-economic decision making, appears on the surface inconsistent with neoliberalism, it is in fact deeply correlated in the case of Australia.

When the Accord is analysed as a process of class rule, and as the form through which neoliberal projects took root in Australia, then, the mechanisms and content of both the Accord
and neoliberalism in general are better understood than is presently the case in the scholarly literature. This paper uses Antonio Gramsci’s notion of the integral state to explore the reciprocal interpenetration and buttressing of political society and civil society (within a state-form) in the Accord era. Corporatism is understood as a state strategy to meet the more universal aims of the capitalist state in relation to crisis management. The Accord is a mechanism of corporatist crisis management that sought the restoration of profitability and stable accumulation. The paper argues the Accord ensured the integral state could secure the hegemonic project of the capitalist class, through the integration of organised labour into the dominant project.

**Neoliberalism’s Dominant Narrative**

Neoliberalism is a *state-centred hegemonic political project restructuring capitalist production and social reproduction since the end of the long boom*. Neoliberal projects have diverse forms, and have occurred on various timescales globally (Brenner et al. 2010). Despite the diversity of neoliberal projects, there remains a problematic dominant narrative in the scholarly literature as to how neoliberalism emerged and was implemented. The prevailing account is also reflected in radical and Marxist analysis.

The dominant narrative about vanguard neoliberalism’s advance makes four key claims. First, the origin of neoliberalism is found in the ‘vanguard era’ projects of the late 1970s to mid-1980s: in Chile under Augusto Pinochet, in the New York City Council fiscal crisis, in the United Kingdom (UK) under Margaret Thatcher and in the United States (US) under Ronald Reagan. Second, the geographically-specific experiences of the ‘vanguard era’ represent ‘ideal’ neoliberal types, to which other locations can be compared. Third, social democratic parties were not significant in the vanguard phase, instead implementing neoliberal projects later in a moderated form. And, finally, neoliberalism is a state-led coercive project imposed on labour movements and trade unions, which occupy the role of object or victim of change.

The dominant narrative is present in the widely cited accounts of neoliberalism’s origins in David Harvey’s *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (2005) and Naomi Klein’s *The Shock Doctrine* (2007). Perhaps more surprisingly, the dominant narrative appears in the influential work of critical geographers Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Neil Brenner, who seek to emphasise the geographic diversity of neoliberalism. These authors set out an origin story, similar to Harvey and Klein, as follows:

Pinochet’s Chile represented the first example of neoliberal ‘shock treatment’, while Thatcherism and Reaganism were amongst its defining, vanguard projects. More moderate and muted forms of a neoliberal politics have also been mobilized in traditionally social-democratic or Christian democratic states such as Canada, New Zealand, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Italy. Furthermore, following the debt crisis of the early 1980s, neoliberal programs of restructuring were extended selectively across the global South through the efforts of US-influenced multilateral agencies to subject peripheral and semi-peripheral states to the discipline of capital markets (Peck et al. 2009, p.50).

On this account, neoliberalism begins with Pinochet, Thatcher and Reagan. These instances are followed by, on the one hand, neoliberalism in social democratic states where it appears in a ‘moderate or muted’ form, and on the other, by the transmission of neoliberalism to the Global South. Peck et al., elsewhere state that neoliberal doctrine was deployed to justify the assault on organised labour — emphasising the trade unions as the object and victims of the political project (2009, p.50).

**Against the Dominant Narrative**

In Australia vanguard neoliberalism was not a coercive project of the New Right. Vanguard neoliberalism was implemented by a social democratic government and during a consensual social contract with trade unions. The Accord was the key mechanism through which the labour
Movement was incorporated in the state’s neoliberal priorities in managing capitalism in the midst of crisis. Below I explore some of the ways the Accord played a central role in the construction of neoliberalism, and then discuss the conception of the ‘informal Accord’ — posited by Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn (1999) and Damien Cahill (2008) — as a way to understand the Accord-neoliberal relationship.

Various policy elements of the Accord facilitated the roll-out of neoliberalism in Australia, in a process of simultaneously deepening of corporatism and advancing neoliberalism. Amongst these were real wage suppression, suppression of industrial action, reduction in the power of organised labour, industry reorganisation and deregulation, privatisation of pensions, and the deregulation of industrial relations policy.

**Wage suppression**

Even prior to the election of the ALP Government in March 1983, the Labor Party backtracked on the social contract’s wage indexation agreement. Bob Hawke, later Prime Minister (1983-1991), announced in February that the conservative government’s wages freeze would be extended if the ALP were elected. When in power, the government extended the freeze and later introduced partial indexation. The freeze on indexation contributed directly to significant real wage decline (Beggs 2015). The freeze on wage indexation was contrary to the spirit and letter of the Accord, however, it fitted the priority of the ALP in government — that being to manage the economic crisis through increasing the exploitation of labour. A key difference with other countries that successfully suppressed wages in the neoliberal era (such as the US), was that in Australia this was voluntary wage suppression agreed to and organised by the union movement.

Wage suppression is not unique to neoliberalism, and is a key feature of corporatist arrangements more generally (Panitch 1977). However, wage suppression was a component of the roll-out of vanguard neoliberalism in Australia for two reasons. First, as Harvey posits, the shift in wealth from wages to profits was a key feature of neoliberalism and this process was successfully undertaken in Australia, in part, through the Accord. Paul Keating (1993, p.27) argued that ‘wage restraint was a major factor in lifting the corporate profit share to high levels around 17 percent, after profits had fallen to a low of 12.4 percent’ in the early 1980s. Second, it is well established that ‘the “disorganisation” of working class organisation, in unions and political parties, [is] one of the central objectives of neoliberalism’ (Albo 2009, p.121). The wage suppression that characterised the Accord was possible because of the size and centrally organised nature of the Australian union movement, meaning wage suppression could be implemented uniformly across the working class. Paradoxically, the suppression of wages and related suppression of industrial action were both essential to the disorganisation of labour that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. Wage restraint subdued the industrial power of workers, and shifted the organisational form of that power. Workplace-based organising had cohered the labour movement in the process of struggle in the 1970s, but the Accord cemented a centrally-arbitrated process that diluted and disorganised the power of the labour movement at the rank-and-file level (Bramble 2001).

**Industrial action suppression**

The Accord has also involved voluntary industrial restraint, like corporatism in general (Panitch 1977; 1980). The ALP, ACTU and leading unions policed and suppressed industrial action they saw as outside the Accord’s parameters. Prominent examples of the ALP, ACTU and other unions suppression of industrial action include preventing wage rise action by meatworkers and furniture trades unions in 1983-1985, cooperating with the deregistration of the BLF in 1986, or holding back solidarity for the pilots and others later in the 1980s. Unlike the US, where Reagan brought on a set-piece confrontation with the air controllers’ PATCO union in 1981, as Thatcher did with the miners in 1984-85, the Australian union movement policed its own industrial actions (Briggs
These voluntary efforts to suppress industrial activity contributed to the disorganisation of labour.

**Planning and industry restructuring**

Cooperative industry planning is usually understood as the antithesis to neoliberalism. Again, the experience in Australia challenges this core tenet of the dominant narrative of neoliberalism. The unions were involved in consensual deployment of industry structural adjustment in the interests of capital through their participation in tripartite bodies and industry plans (Kuhn 2005). Resistance to this form of industry restructuring was limited, and challenges within the labour movement were ultimately unsuccessful. Deregulation became official ALP policy from the 1984 federal party conference onwards. The use of industry policy to the detriment of workers and workers' organisation was most pronounced in areas like Wollongong under the steel plan. Worker resistance to the steel plan was defeated by the trade union leadership. Further, as Julianne Schultz (1985) argued, the industry plan for steel was in fact a process to restructure the industry in Wollongong in accordance of the wishes of the major employer BHP — thus 'when [Prime Minister Bob] Hawke spoke of saving the steel industry, it was the salvation of the balance sheet he was talking about, a balance sheet that made no provision for the social impact of the restructuring'.

**Superannuation**

Superannuation, the introduction of a compulsory privatised pension, effectively undermined direct state provision of welfare. Public pensions rates were increased under the ALP government, and remain as a safety net, however, public pensions were supplanted by the privately managed and invested superannuation system as the main source of retirement income. Additionally, rather than superannuation forming a capital fund as some unions hoped — to allow unions to intervene and shape capitalist production in Australia — it produced a key element of financialisation (Rafferty 2011). Financialisation, in this instance, is understood as the absorption of households into financial markets through the speculation of workers retirement incomes (Lapavitsas 2011). Thus, Australian workers were twice hit in regards to the superannuation system: first through reduced real wages as a trade off for a privatised pension; and, second, retirement incomes now face the vicissitudes of financial markets. Of note are the significant losses to workers retirement incomes when financial markets collapsed in 2008 (David 2012).

Like other countries in the vanguard neoliberal period, the traditional labour movement renounced its commitment to full employment. Further, the inflation-first approach to macroeconomic management became more widely accepted, undermining the commitment of labour to wage increases. This occurred alongside the continued rise of technocrats within the labour movement (Scalmer & Irving 1999), and diminished (and in many cases directly suppressed) rank and file organisation (Bramble & Kuhn 2011). Later the Accord partners deregulated wage setting and introduced enterprise bargaining, effectively ending the centralised wage setting system. Implemented at the same time as the Accord were the other neoliberal policies, most particularly: financial deregulation, floating the Australian dollar, privatisation of state assets, corporatisation of government departments, dismantling of tariff protections, and competition policy.

**An informal Accord?**

Some Marxist scholars take exception to attempts to separate the Accord from neoliberal transformation in Australia. These authors argue that the formal social contract also included an informal Accord, which helped facilitate the introduction of neoliberalism (Bramble & Kuhn 1999). The expression 'informal Accord' is used to denote ongoing support given by the unions to the ALP, as a way of highlighting how 'the formal and informal aspects of the Accord
[managed] the neoliberal transformation of state and economy by tying the leadership of the labour movement to this process' (Cahill 2008, p.326).

The concept of the informal accord has the advantage of understanding the wider political context and processes behind the Accord and does not posit the Accord and neoliberalism as exogenous. However, the notion of the informal Accord implies there was something outside the formal agreement, a hidden centre that was essential to the Accord’s role in vanguard neoliberalism. The notion risks diverting attention from the direct way in which the Accord (as a process centred on increasing the rate of exploitation and the suppression of labour organisation) implemented neoliberalism. The Accord was instituted in a set of highly-organised, ongoing, institutionalised, state-centric political relationships with representatives of the political class, state bureaucracy and business elites. The formal aspects of the Accord provided a set of political structures tying the labour movement to the state, and mediated the conduct of trade union officials and the labour movement. Unions have supported ‘their’ ALP governments before and after the Accord, but in no other situation were the stakes involved in maintaining or withdrawing support so high. This is because in no other situation did the unions find themselves tied so directly to the inner workings of government and its political-economic reform program.

**Integral state**

Gramsci’s conception of the integral state can be usefully deployed to reflect the concord at the heart of the corporatist and neoliberal projects. Gramsci’s elaboration of Marx’s basic critique of the state-civil society relationship, describes the correlation between the social and political spheres in modern capitalism as one of the ‘enwrapment’ of civil society by the state. The integral state — ‘conceived of as a dialectical unity of civil society and political society’ (Thomas 2009a, p.29) — ‘presents the image of “political society” as a “container” of civil society, surrounding or enmeshing and fundamentally reshaping it’ (2009b, p.189). The integral state concentrates attention on how sections of civil society become incorporated into processes of political rule on behalf of the dominant class, despite the fundamental separation and antagonism between civil society and the state outlined by Marx in his early writings (1975).

Panitch’s framework for understanding corporatism stresses its nature as a class project. When applied to the Accord, Panitch’s framework highlights the objective of suppression of wages and labour movement dissent in the midst of economic crisis. Understanding the social contract in this way rejects the popular narrative that the Accord was a consensual project in the interest of all classes. Instead, the Accord involved the translation of ‘working class loyalty to its party [and unions] into loyalty to the nation’ and was instead ‘coercion in the name of harmony’ (Panitch 1976, p.247). Yet by also understanding political society as enwrapping civil society, the notion of the integral state can usefully extend Panitch’s analysis. Trade union officials did not act only as ‘representatives’ of the workers but as agents of control over them — enveloped by a political society they had been drawn more closely inside.

The Accord was the high point of efforts at integration of the labour movement in the wake of the end of the long boom, and in the process expedited the advance of neoliberalism in Australia. The Accord process substituted the national interest for the particular interests of the labour movement. It drew organised labour inside the state project, enwrapping its interests with those of the dominant class. Although political responses to the crises and contradictions afflicting Australian society in the 1970s and early 1980s came both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, the latter responses were able to integrate subaltern groups into state imperatives — regardless of the fact those imperatives directly undermined those groups’ social interests.

The state does not simply rule coercively through the parliament, legislature, military and police, but through the process of hegemony — thus the state must be understood, according to
Gramsci, in its ‘full sense: dictatorship + hegemony’ (2011: Q6 §155). The integral state is, in this understanding, ‘a network of social relations for the production of consent, for the integration of the subaltern classes into the expansive project of historical development of the leading social group’ (Thomas 2009: 143). This heuristic helps to delineate the changing relations between the state, political society, and civil society in the Accord era. It was through the Accord process that the neoliberal political project reshaped aspects of civil society, including the economy and the labour movement itself. This was a process of corporatism enabling the advance of neoliberalisation.

Conclusion
The analysis in this paper suggests that the dominant narrative in the scholarly literature as the implementation of neoliberalism, as a project of the New Right imposed on the labour movement, should be augmented to recognise not only the ways that labour tried to resist neoliberalism but also the ways that labour movements and parties were active agents in its construction. Importantly, this leads to a better appreciation of the function of the social contract in the roll out of the neoliberal project in Australia.

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Neoliberalism and racist debt practices in New Zealand: Pasifika peoples as the working poor

Bruce Curtis (Auckland University) and Cate Curtis (University of Waikato)

Abstract: The paper explores the working of racist debt practices in New Zealand that target Pasifika peoples. In this respect, the racist targeting and representation of Pasifika peoples is hegemonic. We argue that Pasifika peoples exemplify the working poor in New Zealand and are for this reason beleaguered and misrepresented. We review the context of Pasifika indebtedness and operationalize the notion of ‘flawed consumers’ as a partial explanation.

Introduction

In Pacific families, in particular, we notice that a number of the mums come in carrying other people’s debt. I don’t think they do it by choice, they have to, there is an expectation and that’s so ingrained that there is no choice …


This paper operationalizes notions of spoilt identity and flawed consumerism that come from Goffman (1963) and Bauman (1998). However, we don’t spend much time on the theoretical underpinnings of flawed consumerism (see Curtis and Curtis, 2015). Our intention in this forum is to summarize and confront racialized debt practices, that target Pasifika peoples as exemplars of the working poor in New Zealand. At the same time, we wish to stress that this is an outsider account of racism and struggle.

A repercussion of increased poverty, inequality and debt over recent decades has been the growth of the debt industry and a rise in the targeting of vulnerable groups. The so-called ‘democratization of credit,’ - increased availability of credit for formerly excluded groups such as racial and ethnic minorities, has further indebted the vulnerable. In particular, ethnic minorities have become further disadvantaged and the number of working poor have increased. The last census figures indicate that alongside the 7% Pasifika, 71% of the population identified with a European ethnicity, 15% with Māori and 12% with Asian (Statistics New Zealand, 2013a). The
Pasifika population is the youngest (by median age), the shortest-lived and the most fertile of the four main ethnic groupings (Curtis and Curtis, 2006).

Pasifika peoples are disproportionately located in Auckland, especially in its most disadvantaged, southern suburbs. Pasifika households are the most likely to have insufficient bedrooms: “43% of Pasifika people live in households requiring an extra bedroom, compared to 23% of Māori and 4% of European households” (Henare et al., 2011, p. 34). Other socioeconomic statistics are equally grim; they include the following. Pasifika peoples have the smallest share of family net worth:

Families containing at least one person of Pacific ethnicity had the lowest overall family net worth of all the ethnic groups analysed. Very few families had a level of family net worth that put them in the top family net worth quintile, and 86 percent of Pacific ethnicity one-parent families were in the bottom quintile (Statistics New Zealand, 2008, p. 13).

Pasifika workers are the:

lowest-paid ethnic group with an average wage last year [2013] of $20.59 an hour, behind Māori on $22.45, Asians on $23.49 and Europeans on $27.08. That wage gap has hardly changed in a decade. Pacific workers averaged 25 per cent below Europeans in 2004 and 24 per cent below Europeans today (Collins, 2014).

However, Pasifika people are not particularly over-represented in the main benefits (income support payments) that are available to the working-age population. In June 2014 they represented around 7.8% of beneficiaries – roughly in line with their population share (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). When income from all sources (e.g. including social welfare benefits) is considered, Pasifika peoples on average receive 65.94% of the total average income compared with the 80.19% that Māori receive and the 107.59% that the average European receives (Statistics New Zealand, 2013b). In other words, they under-claim. They also comprise a relatively small proportion of the work-force: 62% in 2014, while the national rate had risen to 69.6% following a decrease to 67.5% during the recession (Tanielu and Johnson, 2014).

Pasifika families are the most indebted:

For single families, while mortgage debt-asset ratios are broadly comparable (all less than 50 percent), single Māori, Pacific and other families have high non-mortgage debt-asset ratios. The median single Pacific family, in particular, appears to hold twice as much non-mortgage debt as assets. This suggests they have very low or negative net worth… (Families Commission and Retirement Commission, 2008, p.16)

We believe these socio-economic statistics show that the absolute and relative deprivation experienced by Pasifika peoples reflects that endured by the working poor more generally. We believe that Pasifika peoples exemplify the working poor in New Zealand.

The disadvantaged position of Pasifika peoples in New Zealand, and their overwhelming status as working poor, potential members of the precariat, is a manifestation of racism. New Zealand racism is never far removed from colonialism and the alienation of Māori tribal society from their lands by British settlers. Pasifika peoples are migrants too, encouraged to New Zealand in the boom times of the 1950s and 1960s to fill a range of blue-collar jobs. In a limited way Pasifika peoples benefited from the colonial networks of the British Commonwealth, which facilitated migration to New Zealand (Macpherson, 2004). But, Pasifika migration was of the least-favoured kind and proscribed by its occupational and locational boundaries. When the “Long Boom” ended and decades of stagnation morphed into an outright, neoliberal attack on working people in the mid-1980s, Pasifika blue-collar workers were hit perhaps hardest of any ethnic grouping.

In the context of a prolonged attack on the pay and conditions of working people and beneficiaries, it would be hard to imagine racially victimised Pasifika peoples not having recourse
to personal debt. It would doubly racist to make an explanation for indebtedness in terms of Pasifika cultural practices. However, these practices are pertinent. They include three elements:

1. Local and transnational kinship networks: The continued significance of kinship networks is undoubted and informs not just the social life of Pasifika people but also most academic work and policy initiatives. Multigenerational housing is an obvious expression, and overcrowding is its down-side. Kinship networks are frequently transnational, in terms of both migration to New Zealand (Macpherson, 2004) and familial exchanges, but also remittances. An unknown number of Pasifika families send money to their senior male relatives in their original homeland:

They are principally used, at least initially, to repay debts, to finance migration of kin, and to purchase consumer goods including housing. They often reinforce a traditional set of values that emphasizes the prevailing social hierarchy ... Remittances tend to go to senior family members who use them in traditional ways. (Connell and Brown, 2005, pp. 10–11).

2. Dilemmas and features of a gift economy: Kinship networks and remittances overlap with continuing elements of the gift economy, expressed as familial obligations to major events both in New Zealand and their homelands (e.g. community- and family-based celebrations). Debt via kinship and the gift economy can result in some family members (predominantly mothers) holding debt for the benefit of others (e.g. in-laws, male children and husbands).

3. The church as a trope of respectability: The degree to which the Church is a progressive or reactionary force in Pasifika communities is hotly debated and has very potential for racist demagoguery. The Families Commission report Pacific Families and Problem Debt (2012) goes to some trouble to discount tithing as a key source of indebtedness, which in part reflects the role of Church-based groups in providing community support. Our focus moves beyond tithing to a more cultural framing. And, again, we must stress our outsider status. Nevertheless, we regard the relative importance of the Church, in combination with kinship and gifting, as significant in perpetuating a trope of respectability in Pasifika communities. By respectability we mean a heightened aversion to the stigma of flawed consumerism.

In summary, we posit that Pasifika peoples are poor, subject to structural racism and over-represented in terms of being working poor, and that these socioeconomic realities are mediated by a culture (or subculture) of stoicism and respectability.

Racist debt: “Thank you, Instant Finance”
In 2012 advertisements for the loan company, Instant Finance appeared across most media; on television and radio, on billboards and online. They targeted the Pasifika community, emphasising stereotypical/racist portrayals of Pasifika peoples: happy, smiling and naïve; needing easy money for a holiday, a daughter’s wedding or to fix up the old banger of a car. The tag-line “Thank you Instant Finance” was spoken by a motherly Samoan in stereotypically accented migrant English. This advertising was regarded by many as racist. Members of the public made complaints to the Advertising Standards Authority about several loan companies, including at least five against Instant Finance. The minority that were upheld were on the grounds of non-disclosure of required information rather than targeting the vulnerable and poor (Edmunds, 2012).

Recent years have seen the proliferation of companies that offer unsecured loans at high rates, often in a misleading fashion. They include Cash Train, offering a NZD 750 loan for ten days at a cost of NZD 128 – or 365% per annum (http://www.cashtrain.co.nz/). Payday Loans has advertised rates “as low as 1.38 per cent a day” – equivalent to 503% per annum – while stating that “Pay Day Loans can be a great financial tool to help get you through to your pay day – and can even help save you time and money on things such as bank fees or penalties on bills” (http://www.pay-day-loans.net.nz/). Save My Bacon charges an even higher rate of 547.5% per year. This
is explained thus: “this term is an annualised measure that wasn’t devised with Save My Bacon small and urgent loans in mind ... Our loans only have a maximum term of 31 days” (https://www.savemybacon.co.nz/charges). Simple Cash (https://www.simplecash.co.nz) offers a similar explanation, with interest rates of up to 803% per annum.

Although providers of short-term (‘pay-day’) loans argue that annualized rates are misleading, research from the USA found that nearly 70% of such borrowers borrow to meet recurring long-term needs and are therefore unable to pay off the loan within a year. Because approximately half of those who use these loans refinance at least 11 times annually, they end up not only paying several times more than they originally borrowed, but are almost perpetually in debt (Koku & Jagpal, 2015). Such loans are usually used as a last resort, generally occurring when other credit options are exhausted and the search for funds is intense but unsuccessful (Bhutta, Skiba, & Tobacman, 2015; Kuebler, 2012).

Several loan companies in New Zealand target Pasifika people through the images that they use, such as Pasifika families attending a family event. Research by the NZ Families Commission (2012) noted that many of the participants commented on tailored advertising strategies, including advertisements on Pasifika-targeted radio stations in Pacific languages. Many explicitly target people with poor credit histories. For example, the Aqua Cars & Finance advertising and website states: “We provide vehicle finance for almost anyone … Even if you think your credit’s a bit dented – think again! With Aqua car finance, you could still get a loan for the car you need. It’s quick, and it’s easy to put yourself in the driver’s seat!” (http://www.aquacars.co.nz/).

**Pasifika peoples as flawed consumers**

The poor borrow to hide their spoilt identities as consumers... to pass as proper consumers (Goffman, 1963).

[The] poor of a consumer society are socially defined, and self-defined, first and foremost as blemished, defective, faulty and deficient – in other words, inadequate – consumers (Bauman, 1998, p. 38).

Bauman’s work on flawed consumers has evolved into a broader discussion of “liquid fear” – the notion that contemporary capitalism is marked by amorphous fears and anxieties. These fears are reified in hegemonic accounts to obscure the structural contradictions of capitalism; to destroy class solidarity by stigmatising and scapegoating some fraction of the working class; and to foster false consciousness. In this respect, Pasifika people are the perfect “fall guys”. Without racist accounts, indebtedness among Pasifika peoples might be understood in terms that would foster working-class solidarity. The notions that they are working poor, family-centred and respectable just like other working people might in themselves be stereotypes, but they are ones that invite comparison and inclusion. Racist formulations provide the opposite dynamic, simultaneously empowering a form of vulture capitalism which predates precisely on the working poor while inviting explanations that are based on difference and exceptionality.

Possibilities for reducing debt, and the underlying issues of vulnerability and inequality, may be targeted at the macro- and community (and individual) levels. The Families Commission (2012) offers a range of actions that are aimed specifically at Pasifika families, though many are more broadly applicable. These include financial literacy education (also see Reed and Sutton, 2012); social skills training, including budgeting and communication; intensive case management; advocacy with agencies; and engagement with community leaders and churches. Calls for financial literacy training and coordination across services have been common since the global financial crisis, both in New Zealand and internationally (see e.g. Balmer et al., 2006; Fitch et al., 2010). Some other suggestions for managing debt rely very simply on managing psychological factors within families:
A better understanding of the interplay between factors in a family decision-making setting is also required. For example, where in a two-parent family one partner has an internal locus of control and the other an external one, it may be in the family's long-term interests for each to be aware of their tendencies, strengths and weaknesses and to empower the internally focused partner to make decisions about the family's finances. (Legge and Heynes, 2009, p. 40)

However, it seems unlikely that such an approach will assist the increasing numbers who simply have insufficient money about which to make decisions, even if it were possible to ignore or overcome other factors that come into play within families and from their social contexts. Similarly, as noted by Balmer et al. (2006), improving access to financial and budgeting advice may help people to deal with acute financial crises but it will not change the underlying drivers of poverty and social exclusion. Additionally, disadvantaged groups are likely to experience difficulties (further inequalities) in accessing services, serving to further exacerbate their social and economic marginalisation.

Conclusion: combating hegemony
Much of the writing around debt and ways of combating it have focused on reforms, including budgetary advice and access to credit/debt. It is undoubted that such programmes will assist individuals, families and communities. However, they also focus on the symptoms of debt and only marginally engage with its socio-economic, structural causes. While the authors we cite here are careful not to, at worst ameliorative programmes perpetuate a “blame the victim” attitude, and thereby reinforce racist / hegemonic stereotypes. We acknowledge that this is in itself a somewhat typecast critique of reforms (with a small ‘r’). But, the provision of government-sponsored programmes can readily be turned into its opposite: hiding the drivers of debt, and the construction of debtors as a group of careless and/or ignorant individuals. Because of this we shall end with a rallying call: The end to racist debt practices in New Zealand requires an end to neoliberalism, and to hegemonic attacks on Pasifika peoples, and all working peoples!

References


From nation-building to neoliberalism: Agriculture, change and the social imaginary in Australia

Claire Baker

University of New England

Through a brief analysis of Australia’s recent economic and agricultural history this paper looks to uncover a changing social imaginary and proposes the usefulness of an in-depth study to highlight this change. Emphasis is upon the varied and uneven consequences of neoliberalisation and the proposed case study is presented as an explicitly situated example of these localised effects. The context of this study is a post-WWII soldier-settler community centred upon agricultural production in a young capitalist economy transitioning from an imaginary marked by nation-building and deep support for protected and supported agricultural production, through a deepening neoliberal agenda to one characterised by deregulation, global commodity markets and productivist techniques. Two aspects are important. The first is a consideration of neoliberalism understood as a political ideology and the ways in which this informs economic policy and land use, particularly with regard to agricultural production, in a globalising world economy. The second involves an examination of how the change this has engendered influences the lived experiences of individuals impacted by this mode of social and economic organisation. Central to these self-concepts and interpretations of change is the socially and politically endorsed criteria of worth as informed by the dominant social imaginary.

Neoliberalism, globalisation and agricultural production

It is important to establish a definition of neoliberalism and globalisation within this field of enquiry. Brenner and Theodore (2002:350) usefully identify the fundamental tenet of neoliberalism as “a belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development”. This belief serves as an orienting axiom within multiple sites of expression. As indicated by Larner (2000), neoliberalism is a complex phenomenon that extends beyond debates about economics and state intervention. She identifies neoliberalism as operating at the levels of policy framework, ideology and governmentality, and as such neoliberalism represents a complex new form of political-economic governance based on the extension of market relationships. This complexity is similarly identified by Springer (2012) in his taxonomy of neoliberalism as an ideological, hegemonic project; a policy and program; a state form; and as a form of governmentality. These theorisations
of neoliberalism sit among many and point to the multifarious ways in which neoliberalism is both understood and realised. Additionally, there are conceptualisations of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002) that emphasise the process-dependent nature of advanced capitalist initiatives. This processual understanding of neoliberalism is defined by Peck and Tickell (2002) as ‘neoliberalisation’, and further identified by Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010) as being systemically uneven or ‘variegated’ due to the uneven institutional and geo-historical landscapes upon which cumulative impacts of the process of neoliberalisation are felt. For Brenner (2014), neoliberalism is understood as an ongoing and contextually specific process in that it emerges in and through collisions, in specific ways and forms, with inherited regimes and landscapes that had in some way previously protected people from waves of commodification, thus an “ongoing transformation of inherited regulatory formations at all spatial scales” (Brenner et al 2010:183). The increasing dominance of neoliberalism as an ideology informing policy formation around agricultural production is of particular significance when considered as a catalyst of change to existing regulatory and policy frameworks.

There are similar theoretical debates over the meaning and nature of globalisation. Fundamentally it is understood as the “deepening and widening of capitalist social relations” (Larner & Le Heron 2002:755) through an extension and acceleration of multi-dimensional processes that “create, multiply, stretch and intensify worldwide social and economic interdependence and exchanges” (Steger in Woods 2010:266). For Brenner (1999), this doesn’t just involve an accelerated circulation of commodities, people, money and capital through a progressively global space, but also involves a related “production, reconfiguration and transformation of territorial organisation at once on urban-regional, national and supra-national scales” (1999:435). Globalisation thus represents a multi-dimensional and multi-scalar set of processes with complex effects, but in the context of this project the focus will be necessarily narrowed. With particular regard for the rural context, Woods (2010) usefully identifies three broad trends of globalisation processes, namely ‘economic globalisation’, ‘globalisation of mobility’ and ‘cultural globalisation’. For the purposes of this project it is useful to focus on those globalisation processes related to that of economic globalisation, identified by Woods (2010:268) as encompassing the liberalisation of international trade and the promotion of a global marketplace, the development of global commodity and value chains, and the concentration and consolidation of transnational corporations and alliances, amongst others. As a study of a community organised around and through agricultural production, the arena in which globalisation processes are encountered in the context of this project is that of agri-food production and distribution. Given this context, it is useful to consider Bonanno and Cavalcanti’s (2014) use of the term ‘neoliberal globalisation’ as a way of capturing the way in which globalisation brought about the reorganisation of production and consumption of agricultural products with the emergence of global networks, whilst neoliberalism simultaneously provided the theoretical and political tools that legitimised and facilitated the reduced intervention of the state along with the accompanying deregulation of production that privileged corporate interests. The significance of neoliberal globalisation to this project lies in its role as the catalyst for changes in the organisation of agricultural production in Australia.

The Australian context
Australia’s early post-European-settlement economic history was characterised by export-driven economic growth based on the production of wool in the 1830s, the discovery of rich gold deposits in the 1850s, and the deep involvement of colonial government investment in infrastructure (Kenwood 1995:2-3) thus Australia, as a colony, was “founded within and was an integral part of the world economy from the very beginning” (original emphasis, Lloyd 2003:404). Following the supply-side theory of economic development whereby newly settled regions focus on the production of staples for export to the home country (Innis in Altman 2003, 232), Australia’s
relatively small population base and abundance of productive land and other natural resources deeply conditioned the emergence and sustained prominence of agricultural production as an integral part of the economy. This view of economic development, in which both the trade relation with the colonial power and the nature of the staple being produced patterns not just the economic but also the social and political organisation of the developing country (Innis in McNally 1981), can be seen to help explain Australia’s early economic growth and expansion as well as the enduring ideal of agriculture as important to Australia’s identity. Debates over land settlement practises characterised the mid- to late-1800s and were often based upon ideals of a yeomanry social class and agrarian lifestyles, with many Land Acts passed during this period “ostensibly to produce the desired cultural landscapes and social class” (Powell 1998:17). Australia’s early agricultural sector was increasingly characterised by a large number of small, independent businesses (usually the family farm) dispersed over vast geographical areas (Brown & Longworth 1995:132) and up until the early 1900s formed the dominant industry in Australia. The peaceful transition to Federation in 1901 had important implications for the pursuit of economic development (Jackson 1998:10), indeed had, as one of its key objectives, the creation of a common market (Kenwood 1995:1). In the years before World War I in an economy characterised by its reliance on exports, agricultural production diversified away from wool into the production of other agricultural commodities, with further rural diversification attempted after the War via the first soldier settlement and Empire settlement schemes (Kenwood 1995:6). The support for government intervention in the economy, particularly with regard to protectionist policies in the agricultural sector, was pervasive and “superimposed on an economy in which there was already heavy federal and state government involvement in the fields of transport and communications, foreign borrowing and immigration” (Kenwood 1995:228). The disruption of the Great Depression, along with the perceived need for expansion in other industries, saw a change in focus away from the rural sector in the inter-war years (Kenwood 1995:7). However Australia’s early economic development and resulting structure can be seen to be deeply affected by its relation to Britain. The dependency theory of economic development posits Australia as a semi-peripheral country to the dominant core country of Britain, whereby dependency on the core country “does not preclude development in Australia, but constrains it and ensures that it is directed by the interests of the centre countries” (Cochrane in Bryan 1991:292). This idea of a developed but dependent economy explains Australia’s lack of a strong manufacturing base and the focus on producing and trading staple commodities, whereby dependence on Britain conditioned the rate and type of development in Australia (Lawrence 1987:105). Until World War II the main inflow of capital had been loans to federal and State governments and public agencies (Wheelwright 1971:30) and government intervention in the economy was pervasive (Kenwood 1995:228). Thus early political agendas centred upon development of staple commodity production and significant public investment as drivers of growth and nation-building.

It is in this context that the re-commencement of the Returned Soldier Settlement Scheme after World War II was begun, the policy under which the community being studied was established. This scheme was designed “to encourage agricultural development” (State Records NSW) and in addition to the provision of land selection and a ‘reasonable living allowance’ provided by the Commonwealth for the first year of occupation, involved the provision of advances by the States for working capital, making improvements, and purchasing plant and stock, with repayments and interest waived for the first year of occupation of the land except for working capital which was payable immediately (Closer Settlement and Returned Soldiers’ Settlement Branch). The persistence of the family-farm form that this in part represents is an important and enduring characteristic of Australian agriculture. As identified by Lawrence (1987:104), small-scale family farming had been entrenched in the colony from its earliest development, based as it was upon an availability of land that excluded a landlord class (unlike many European societies) and because it
was unattractive to traditional capital penetration due to time-delays inherent in the production process, the need to move capital to the materials which imposed particular costs, and the relative independence of the family farm unit due its flexibility and competitiveness. The enduring belief in small scale production and the idea that small holdings would develop the countryside and stimulate wider economic growth was the basis of the Closer Settlement schemes, including those for returned servicemen, however proved to be insufficient for many farmers, particularly post World War I (Malcom et al 1996:58). This demonstrates the pervasiveness of the belief in small scale farming and its support at a governmental level, particularly as a driver of regional development and nation-building, the politically and socially validated agenda of the time.

The post-World War II years represented a period of relative growth and prosperity. Alongside relatively buoyant farm prices (Lawrence 1987:42), agricultural productivity increased with improvements in mechanisation and new techniques in production (Kenwood 1995:45), in a period marked by productivism and industrialism and strong state protection and organisation (Argent 2011:13). There was significant public investment in rural infrastructure that improved transport and technical innovation and the balance of payments crisis in 1950/51, combined with record wool prices, saw agriculture play a dominant role in the economy (Malcolm et al 1996:59). This justified continued substantial financial assistance to farmers (Kenwood 1995:45), with support taking the form of regulations to protect farmers from competition, subsidies on inputs and outputs, price schemes to raise farmer returns, and special tax concessions and credit arrangements (Malcolm et al 1996:59). Thus the prevalent policy environment was one of deep support for agricultural production and small scale units of production and represented a particular approach to growth.

There were important turning points from the 1970s on. The mineral boom of the 1960s and early 1970s reduced the country’s dependence on agricultural exports for foreign exchange income and a program of rural reconstruction, aimed at rationalising the agricultural sector, was begun (Kenwood 1996:8). The disintegration of the preferential trading partnership with Britain when it entered the European Common Market in 1973 (Kenwood 1995:13) was a further blow to agricultural exports in a world economy characterised by falling demand, rising unemployment and spiralling levels of public and private debt (Firster in Tonts 2000:53). According to Pritchard (2005a:2), from the 1970s to the 1990s the Australian nation-state underwent a “process of ‘agrarian liberalisation’ which sought to construct a mode of ‘neo-liberal agriculture’”, representing a fundamental change to the governance of agriculture. The rural adjustment schemes sought to consolidate debt and assist with farm build-up and farm improvement through subsidised lending, along with financial assistance for farmers who chose to leave the land (Kenwood 1996:55), critically underpinned by a message of ‘get big or get out’ (Malcom et al 1996:59; Lawrence 1987:89). Moving from traditional policies based on economic protectionism and the welfare state, Australia’s set of neo-liberal policies pursued through this period included the deregulation of banking and finance sectors, the floating of the Australian dollar, a reduction in the level of protection for Australian industries, the reduction of business and income tax, and the privatisation of goods and services (Tonts 2000:53). The impact on farming and agriculture was manifold, with changes fostered by these neoliberal settings resulting in significant negative social and environmental outcomes (Lawrence et al 2013:37). As such, the “business of farming is in a state of almost continuous change”, needing to respond to increasing capitalisation and the pressure to achieve economies of scale and efficiencies usually by way of farm amalgamation and a reduction in labour, thus a fundamental (and painful) economic restructuring that has challenged traditional social values (Haslam McKenzie 2000:74). Underpinned by neoliberal and monetarist tendencies, the Australian government’s management of global trading relationships and the ways in which its aggressive free-trade stance transformed the organisation of farm commodity marketing arrangements can be seen as an example of
the impact of globalisation on Australian agriculture (Argent 2011:17). Although it has been challenged by some commentators (see Weller & O’Neill 2014), there is strong agreement that these processes can be attributed to an increasingly neoliberal agenda in Australia (see for example Pritchard 2005a, 2005b; Lawrence et al 2013). Whilst cautious of positing neoliberalism as a monolithic explanatory force, Argent (2014) acknowledges the influence of neoliberal thought upon Australian agricultural and farm policy and strategy. Following Lawrence (1987) and his problematisation of the neo-classical economic orthodoxy responsible for such ‘reforms’ as the deregulation of agricultural markets and the dismantlement of centralised marketing authorities, Tonts, Argent and Plummer (2012:296) call for studies of the “actual processes of change” across longer temporal scales, a call to which this project responds.

Changes in the social imaginary

The community being researched has been deeply marked by the economic and social restructuring brought about by neoliberal and globalising trends and their impact on agricultural production in rural Australia. Whilst having been established under a very different organising logic and orientation to definitions of growth and development, the community being studied sits at the nexus of economic and social outcomes of policy change. In this sense this project seeks to integrate an account “of the shifts in macro and meso contexts associated with neoliberalism with an examination of the impact those shifts had on what is conceived, perceived and experienced at the individual level” (Lefebvre in Hall & Lamont 2013:3). Central to this examination is a consideration of the ways in which the move toward neoliberal discourses has changed the elementary values associated with social life, as it is against these changing standards that individuals measure and understand their position and value, thus deeply affecting these conceptions, perceptions and experiences. This echoes Larner and Walters’ (2004:507) examination of globalisation as both situated and embodied, where globalisation is understood as a new “way of imaging human life… through very specific imaginaries, processes and practices”. Hall and Lamont (2013:4) apply this understanding of a collective imaginary to neoliberalism (incorporating globalisation) by exploring the ways in which such an imaginary provides “overarching narratives that tell people what their society is about, what its past embodies and its future portends, who belongs to it, and what types of behaviour merit social respect”. Whilst not having the space here to give full weight to his theory, the idea of a social imaginary is importantly developed by Castoriadis (1987) in his exploration of social imaginary significations. Similarly, Weber’s (2000 [1905]) account of the rationality and ‘spirit’ of capitalism points to the deeper organising logics and systems of value that underpin economic systems and accompanying modes of social relations. Most important here is a recognition of the normative dimension of the neoliberal imaginary, and the ways in which neoliberalism “inspired changes in the dominant scripts of personhood toward ones more focused on a person’s individuality and productivity” (Greenhouse in Hall & Lamont 2013:5), in a privileging of market criteria for assessing worth (Hall & Lamont 2013:18). In this context, where economic identity is at the forefront of social identity, position and status, it can be seen how “thinking economic identities – worker, consumer, entrepreneur” are socially constructed (Larner & Le Heron 2002:756) and of central importance to ideas of self-identity and meaning. This is at the centre of this project, as changing conceptions of worth and value at a macro level deeply affect how individuals understand and interpret their lived experience. Within a deepening neoliberal imaginary, socio-economic status, intertwined with moral status, “became more central to the matrix through which individuals conceived their self-worth” (Hall & Lamont 2013:5). This study presents a particularly useful window upon the ways in which changes in societal definitions of worth and value, expressed at a policy level, impact upon individuals’ sense of purpose and value by exploring the ways in which these individual’s identity and experience was influenced through their positionality with regard to political priorities. Initially bound to an identity and status as ex-servicemen turned farmers and nation-builders, this study looks to
uncover the ways in which this shifted and changed through a deep recalibration of values to those associated with market performance, productivity and competitiveness.

References


The Twofold Capital Requirement of Educational Success: Social Closure in the International Baccalaureate Diploma in Australia

Quentin Thomas Maire

University of Adelaide, Australia

Abstract
While the universalisation of educational provision in a given country generally leads to an internal diversification of its educational system, the neoliberal policies that have spread across Australia since the 1980s have resulted in the concentration of particular social groups at specific educational sites. Moreover, by encouraging a freer interplay of educational supply and demand, neoliberal reforms have grounded this process of educational segregation in the socio-economic properties of students and their families. Predictably, two specific types of resources have been able to function as capital in the educational system: these are cultural capital and economic capital. I propound that the most profitable educational sites have been encircled by boundaries through admitting quasi-exclusively holders of combined economic and cultural capitals. The twofold endowment in economic and cultural capitals has come to function as a social closure mechanism in Australian education. In order to illustrate my argument, I take the example of the International Baccalaureate Diploma and show how economic capital and cultural capital are twin requirements for accessing this valuable educational site.

Keywords: neoliberal, social closure, economic capital, cultural capital, educational sites

Educational neoliberalisation: the capital determinants of educational closure
The progressive development of academic qualifications as a quasi-necessity for accessing most segments of the job market has made the possession of academic titles a precondition for an ongoing acquisition of economic capital. Simultaneously, neoliberal alterations to the education system have, since the 1980s, ensured the increasing importance of holding economic capital for obtaining valuable credentials in Australia. In this paper, I will use the case of the International Baccalaureate Diploma to support that claim and explain how access to valuable educational locations in the school system has been restricted based on the students’ endowment in economic and cultural capitals.

Neoliberal reforms in Australian education have modified the structure of the school system by engineering its marketisation. Through successive de-zoning policies and market-driven funding
arrangements (Connell, 2015, p. 183), the freer interplay of educational supply and educational demand has been encouraged at the school level, labelled as ‘school competition’ for the production side and ‘school choice’ for the consumer side. This has not only fed an instrumental approach of education, where what matters most is being awarded valuable credentials; it has also worked towards turning credentials into commodities to be sold by schools competing against one another and bought by students (and their families) also competing against one another. A major feature of the neoliberal transformation of the school market has been a mutation in the structure of prices for credentials: both cultural capital and economic capital have now become important currencies for accessing specific educational locations where the acquisition of the most valuable credentials is facilitated. The deregulation brought about by neoliberal restructurings prompted an increase in the cultural and economic price of success-related educational sites (schools, degrees, streams, or subjects), which in turn cast these sites as social closure loci.

The advent of the International Baccalaureate (IB) Diploma in Australian schools in the 1980s can be read as a diversification of available educational offerings at the senior high school level. The regime of choice advocated by neoliberal policies has encouraged choice at the curricular level, where different programs can be offered, in parallel, within a given school. The IB proposes a two-year pre-university curriculum named the ‘Diploma Programme’ (DP) that self-selected schools can implement in exchange for an annual fee. While the diffusion of this alternative curriculum could have taken various routes in Australia, neoliberal reforms have turned the program into a locus of closure permitting the insulated reproduction of educational advantage. Using what Stephen Gould called “the power of treating generalities by particulars” (1996 [1981]: 20), I will use the DP to exemplify the sharpening association of cultural and economic capitals in Australian education.

Previous research on the DP in Australia has established (a) that DP students obtain superior academic results than non-DP students (Cole et al., 2014: 42), (b) the greater university success of DP students (Edwards and Underwood, 2012: 2), (c) their association with prestigious and elite universities (IGI Services, 2011: 14), and (d) their occupationally profitable university choices (IGI Services, 2011: 16). Taken together, these findings make it clear that the DP effectively is one of these success-related locations in the Australian school system, a site statistically promising a fairly safe road to a sustained acquisition of economic capital. But what else is participation in the DP related to? Two sociological studies found that, on average, the socio-economic background of DP students notably exceeds the background of non-DP students (Doherty et al., 2012: 311; Edwards and Underwood, 2012: 2). In Australia, the DP thus seems to be used as a road to occupational success which is unequally accessible to different social groups. In this

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1 A research group from the University of Western Sydney found that in Australia, DP graduates have significantly higher Australian Tertiary Admission Ranks (ATAR) than non-DP graduates (Cole et al., 2014: 42).
2 A case study of 135 DP graduates at a Group of Eight (Go8) university found that DP graduates (a) are more successful in university applications than non-DP graduates, (b) have a higher progression rate through the academic years, and (c) tend to complete their degree faster (Edwards and Underwood, 2012: 2).
3 Almost half of the 202 respondents in an Australian study of DP graduates wished to enrol at one of three universities: University of Queensland, University of Melbourne, or University of Sydney (IGI Services, 2011: 14). Unsurprisingly, these are three of the most elite universities in Australia, as they are members of the Go8, a small group of Ivy-league-type Australian universities which have, historically, materially, and symbolically, dominated the landscape of Australian higher education.
4 The same study found that more than 28 per cent of DP graduates responding aimed at studying courses giving access to the professions, with an additional 15 per cent wanting to study economically-oriented degrees with potentially high economic rewards (e.g. business) (IGI Services, 2011: 16).
paper, I intend to show that the economic and cultural resources necessary to access this enclosed educational site are the instruments through which social closure is realised.

**Some clarifications on capitals and the methods of analysis**

Given that different properties can function as capital, it is possible to identify several species of capital, where “the different forms of capital are specific forms of power” (Bourdieu, 1996 [1989]: 265). The value of a given amount of cultural capital exists only in relation to (a) the total distribution of cultural capital and (b) markets for cultural capital. The same applies to economic properties: they can function as capital only in a relative manner and only on markets for economic capital, where “the determining factor is the individual’s position in the distribution of purchasing power” (Hirsch, 2005 [1976]: 6).

The school system has the potential to function as a market for various species of capital. While species of capital are not limited to the economic and cultural ones, the primacy of these two kinds in a neoliberally-shaped education system makes the twofold analysis of economic and cultural capitals a good theoretical instrument for grasping educational production and consumption in the Australian context.

In order to identify the capital prerequisites of participation in the DP in Australia, I adopted the method of collecting publicly-available data on each school offering the DP as well as on the DP curriculum. School websites now give researchers access to a wide range of precious information worth analysing. Regarding the economic requirements for DP participation, I systematically identified the school sector and the school tuition fees. Apropos the cultural requirements for DP participation, I analysed the structure of the DP curriculum in the context of the other curriculum offerings available to students.

**The economic prerequisite of DP enrolment**

The search engine provided by the IB website shows that there were 63 schools offering the DP in Australia as of March 2015 (International Baccalaureate, 2015a). Out of these, 83 per cent (52 schools) were categorised as private schools. Acknowledging the solid correlation between school sector and socio-economic profile of students in Australia (OECD, 2012: 30), it is likely that schools offering the DP tend to be economically selective. However, doubters might respond that the non-government sector is divided in Australia, and that Catholic schools are often more affordable than corporate schools.

Out of the 61 schools that offered the DP in 2014, 98 per cent of the 50 non-government schools were corporate schools. If corporate schools are effectively associated with higher socio-economic backgrounds, then it is likely that entering the DP generally requires a heavy dose of economic capital. But the sceptics could then retort that even within the corporate sector, the variability in tuition fees is such that one cannot assume economic capital to be a requirement for accessing the DP in Australia. That is a fair point.

To verify, I examined the tuition fees of all 61 DP schools, excluding one because the school closed during the year. This leaves us with a total of 60 schools: 11 government, 1 Catholic, and 48 corporate. While it is expected that the 11 DP schools in the government sector are less economically selective than their non-government counterparts, they remain a peripheral reality in the Australian education landscape. Given that over 80 per cent of the total DP population is

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5 Often referred to as ‘independent schools’ in the Australian literature, Campbell and Proctor (2014: xv) explain how misleading it is to call them ‘independent’ given the large amount of government funding these schools receive. Based on their corporate governance structure, the ‘corporate school’ label is more appropriate.
made of corporate schools, I conducted further analysis of tuition fees in this sector.

The range of tuition fees is, indeed, very broad: while the ‘cheapest’ corporate school cost $7,803 for the 2015 academic year, no less than $35,721 was requested by the most expensive one. Nonetheless, even the most ‘affordable’ corporate schools proposing the DP remain largely out of reach for most families. To gain a better understanding of the economic capital generally needed to access the DP, we studied measures of central tendency of tuition fees. Based on the 48 usable cases, the mean annual tuition was $20,909 and the median stood at $23,576. Including government schools, where tuition fees are considered null, the mean tuition fee for all schools offering the DP stood at $17,022 for a 2015 enrolment.

With 72 per cent (43 cases) of all DP schools demanding more than $10,000 in tuition fees per student in 2015, it is a fact that the DP is, in the majority of cases, a luxury product in Australia. Furthermore, the slope actually gets sharp very quickly as one goes up the tuition scale: 57 per cent of all DP schools expected more than $15,000 per senior school student in 2015, and 47 per cent asked for more than $20,000. At the other end of the scale, it leaves Australia with only 18 per cent of its DP schools with tuition fees under $7,800, all of which are in the government sector.

These figures provide solid evidence that possessing considerable economic capital tends to be a factual requirement for accessing the DP in Australia. If we add the request made by certain schools for a premium DP fee, as well as the DP examination costs that students generally have to pay for, the economic burden of enrolling in the DP is out of reach for most Australians. The DP stands as an educational site enclosed by economic barriers.

The cultural prerequisite of DP enrolment
Cultural capital can be described as the possession of cultural properties considered valuable in a given field. Educationally-relevant cultural capital not only involves proficiency in using the dominant language of the educational system and substantive knowledge in the curriculum subjects; it also encompasses the expectations parents place on the student’s schooling, the importance of educational achievement in the ambitions parents have for their child, or the extent to which they are willing to allocate resources (economic, cultural, or temporal) to help their child obtain the desired educational outcomes.

From a strategic point of view, “one of the most valuable sorts of information constituting inherited cultural capital is practical or theoretical knowledge of the fluctuations of the market in academic qualifications” (Bourdieu, 2010 [1979]: 138), which gives students a sense of the hierarchy of credentials and can then guide their investments. Doherty suggests that the implementation of the DP in parallel to the regular senior high school curriculum reinforces the use families make of strategies for optimising their children’s academic results (Doherty, 2012: 192). Using the same dataset as for the investigation on economic determinants of DP participation, I was able to determine that 82 per cent of DP schools in Australia did implement it alongside the state high school curriculum in 2014. Accordingly, by adding, within the school, a new dimension to the panel of strategies available to students and their families, the social groups most acquainted with the subtle costs and benefits associated with the various positions

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6 Data were collected for the enrolment of an Australian student at the senior secondary level in 2015, excluding registration and application fees.

7 2015 tuition fee information were unavailable for this most expensive school. As a result, I estimated the 2015 fees based on the 2014 rate ($34,020), to which I applied the tuition fee increase that took place between 2013 and 2014 at that school (five per cent). The 2015 estimate is thus $35,721.

8 The exceptions were three selective government schools offering exclusively the DP and asking for $600 in tuition for 2015.
in the hierarchy of educational investments—that is, the groups richest in educationally-relevant cultural capital—hold a decisive advantage in making occupational profits out of the educational system. When one curriculum is objectively associated with greater educational outcomes, such as the DP in Australia, families grasping this implicit hierarchy possess a specific advantage in advantageously choosing the DP.

Yet, it would be insufficient to stop here and ignore the cultural constraints imposed by the DP curriculum itself in relation to the other curricular offerings available. The curriculum contributes to turning families’ economic and cultural properties into educationally-relevant capital, as the curriculum itself embodies specific demands (Teese, 2000: 3-4). If it takes some grasp of the structure of educational hierarchies to choose a good private school for one’s daughter, it takes an even finer perception of the costs and benefits associated with each credential available to the student to choose the best strategy, for a student’s positional success, between the DP and the local high school curriculum. This perception is not only quantitatively different to the capital needed to choose a school: it adds a whole new dimension to educational strategies and requires a cultural capital that is socially very selective.

One can understand the cultural requirements of the DP curriculum only if one studies the other credentials supplied on the senior high school curriculum market in Australia. One possibility for analysing curricular demands is to inspect the subject requirements to qualify for an ATAR for (selective) university entrance. Given that New South Wales and Victoria cover approximately 50 per cent of all schools offering the DP in Australia (30 out of 61 in 2014), I will focus on the local curriculum in these two states: the High School Certificate (HSC) and the Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE).

The curriculum structure is similar for the HSC and the VCE: the minimal number of subjects that a student must take to qualify for an ATAR is four, and the only compulsory subject is English. On the other hand, the curriculum structure of the Diploma Programme requires students to select six subjects. Unlike in the VCE and the HSC, mathematics is a compulsory subject in the DP, on top of which the study of two languages (including English) is also mandatory. If these requirements were not sufficient to prove the stricter cultural selectivity of the DP curriculum, DP students also have to study three additional ‘core components’ which enter into the ATAR calculation as potential bonus points or, if the student obtains two unsatisfactory grades for the Theory of Knowledge and Extended Essay subjects, as a fail for the Diploma Programme overall. This brings DP students to a total of nine compulsory subjects for obtaining an ATAR, against four for their HSC and VCE counterparts. The consequence for the cultural selectivity of the DP is clear: it is predominantly students possessing a large palette of cultural resources who are likely to feel capable of successfully studying the DP. The DP, by the mere structure of its curriculum, tends to select broad-spectrum cultural capital possessors, all-rounder students in command of a diversified educationally-relevant cultural capital.

The twofold dimensions of educational closure in a neoliberal context
This brief analysis explains how a ‘double capital endowment’ is likely to be required for students to enrol in the DP in Australia. It also provides part of the answer to the question of the socio-economically advantaged profile of DP students. For certain educational choices to be possible, cultural and economic capitals are required (Ball, 2003: 199): in the case of the DP, it is because economic and cultural capitals statistically function as objective selection criteria for enrolment that DP students tend to come from families possessing both cultural and economic capitals. This alternative curriculum functions in the manner of a chemical bond contributing to transmuting inherited cultural and economic capitals into (eventual) cultural and economic profits. More broadly, economic and cultural powers have conjointly become crucial for reproducing material advantage over generations through the educational system. While the reproduction of
economic capital has, in most cases, come to require the acquisition of certified cultural capital, simultaneously, the power of economic capital for obtaining sought-after credentials has increased through the neoliberalisation of education systems.

Statistically, this twofold capital requirement for DP access de facto excludes those who possess one species of capital but not the other, not to mention those who lack both. As Ball puts it (2003: 108), the “inter-relationship of different forms of capital is crucial” to understand the structure of the educational system and the protected, privileged, and enclosed sites it hosts. The weight of economic capital needed for accessing the DP is a true specificity of Australia among the big players in DP implementations9. Unlike the US, where it is predominantly cultural capital that conditions access to the DP10, in Australia, cultural capital tends to be inoperative for harvesting ‘DP capital’ without economic inputs. In a situation where both economic and cultural capitals are necessary, the DP is turned into a doubly exclusive educational site.

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9 Even the United Kingdom, which Australian policymakers so often turn to for inspiration, has a lower non-government to government DP schools ratio than Australia: with 81 private schools and 57 public schools, ‘only’ 59 per cent of its DP schools are private, more than 20 points below the Australian share (International Baccalaureate, 2015b).

10 In the United States, barely 12 per cent of schools offering the DP are private schools (108 out of 872) (International Baccalaureate, 2015b).
References
Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the local level: Gugu Badhun Self-Determination

Janine Gertz

College of Arts, Society & Education, James Cook University, Townsville, QLD 4811

Abstract
Following the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by UN General Assembly resolution in 2007, discussion between member states and Indigenous peoples within international policy fora have transitioned to themes of implementation. Member states, international human rights scholars and Indigenous activists have been working to define what domestic implementation of the articles and principles within the Declaration looks like. The published literature and UN reports largely deal with the interaction between a member state and its Indigenous peoples at the federal and regional level and rely heavily on a top-down approach to implementation. Since the adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly, UN member states have grappled with both the operational practicalities and the domestic political will of governments which would see the implementation of the Declaration realised particularly at the local or micro-community level. This paper examines the literature to determine if there are examples of implementing the articles and principles within the Declaration – specifically self-determination at the local level. This literature review provides the argument for a future research project that will attempt to translate the abstract to the practical by documenting a case study to articulate within the context of the Declaration what the principle of ‘self-determination’ means to a local level Aboriginal Nation, the Gugu Badhun.

Keywords: self-determination, nation-building, Indigenous peoples, states, Aboriginal Nation; Indigenous rights.

Introduction
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“The Declaration”) was adopted by the United Nations [UN] General Assembly on 13 September 2007 when the majority of member states voted to support it through resolution (GA Res. 61/75). Since the adoption of the Declaration in 2007, a number of books, journal articles and reports have been published on the topic of the Declaration. International human rights scholars and activists such as Xanthaki (2007), Anaya (2009), Burger (2009), Clavero (2009), Charters (2009), Dorough (2009),
Littlechild (2009), Rodriguez-Pinero (2009), Stavenhagen (2009) and more recently Gunn (2012) and Ornelas (2014) have written about the articles and principles within the Declaration and the next stage in advancing Indigenous human rights – the challenge of implementation. The published literature and UN Reports largely deal with the interaction between a member state and its Indigenous peoples at the federal and regional level and rely heavily on a top-down approach to implementation.

Since the adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly, UN member states have grappled with both the operational practicalities and the domestic political will of governments which would see the implementation of the Declaration realised particularly at the local or micro-community level. In this paper, I engage with the definition of self-determination as it is framed within the Declaration. However, the concept itself is multifaceted, and it is outside the scope of this paper to engage with all of the meanings of self-determination. A future research project will attempt to translate the abstract to the practical by documenting what self-determination means to the Gugu Badhun Nation within the context of the Declaration. The research project will investigate both local level interpretations of self-determination defined by local custom, culture and socio-political context (emic) as well as the etic approaches to describing self-determination which may be considered general or universally true (Morris et al 1999) for Indigenous peoples around the globe.

Complicated by the non-binding nature of the Declaration, application of the articles and principles of the Declaration relies on hierarchical, top-down approach to international law and domestic policy implementation. Without the binding nature of a state-level treaty, the slow movement and progression towards implementation internationally means that Indigenous people must take a more proactive approach in the advancement of their own individual and collective human rights in the true spirit of self-determination, as per Article 3 of the Declaration. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples thus need to take matters into their own hands and undertake a bottom-up approach to implementing the Declaration, as a demonstration of collective agency. This approach is what Ortner (2006, p.147) refers to as the agency of projects, which is "not necessarily about domination and resistance... it is about people having desires that grow out of their own structures of life, including very centrally their own structure of inequality".

An examination of the literature is necessary to determine if there are local or micro-community level examples of implementing the articles and principles within the Declaration, specifically self-determination, in order to support a potential research project which aims to provide both a theoretical framework (etic) and local level case studies (emic) for practical application of self-determination within a discrete Aboriginal Nation.

Self-determination - a right and a principle
The four main principles that underpin the Declaration are (1) self-determination; (2) participation in decision-making, supported by free, prior and informed consent and good faith; (3) respect for and protection of culture; and (4) equality and non-discrimination (AHRC 2010). The principles provide guidance on the practical application of the Articles within the Declaration. The Articles are the ‘what’ of the Declaration, and the Principles are the ‘how’.

‘Self-Determination’, ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘cultural integrity’ are central rights and principles of the Declaration. Article 3 states that “Indigenous Peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations 2008). The very same wording is found in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Further, Article 4 of the Declaration states that “Indigenous Peoples, in exercising their right to
self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.”

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO] says that self-determination is a “…right of a group of peoples to meet the human needs of that group, including the means to preserve that group’s identity and culture” (UNESCO 1999, p.19). Self-determination is a process of choice and decisions that enable Aboriginal people to determine their own futures, growth and development. The use of a generic definition for self-determination is problematic and practical application of the concept of self-determination is used simultaneously as a political concept, label of domestic government policy and a human right within international law. This literature review has primarily researched the application of the concept of self-determination within the framework of the Declaration.

Self-Determination at the International Level
In terms of the Declaration's legal significance in international law, a UN General Assembly resolution by itself does not have a binding effect, unless it can be demonstrated that the Declaration itself, or the individual articles within it reflect existing customary international law (Anaya 2000). A General Assembly resolution via majority vote can, however, provide the impetus for the creation of new customary law. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines international customary law as “…evidence of a general practice accepted as law” (Article 38). Professor James Anaya, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples pointed out that the Declaration's principles of ‘self-determination’, ‘non-discrimination’ and ’cultural integrity’ exist within contemporary international customary law (Anaya 2000).

A search for literature using the Declaration as a framework for describing self-determination at the local level within the CANZUS group (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United States of America [USA]) has provided limited examples. Werther’s (1992) study provides a pre-Declaration analytical and theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of political change and self-determination when indigenous people assert claims of aboriginal status in six different democratic states (Australia, Canada, Greenland, Norway, Sweden and USA). Hawksley and Howson (2011) bring together perspectives of three Maori activists and their push for self-determination that promotes a separateness that to some extent challenges the idea of nation-state unity. Canadian Scholars such as Berlanger (2011) provide a narrative on self-determination and the Declaration in an urban context. Pulitano (2012) examines the relevance of international law in advancing indigenous peoples' struggles for self-determination and cultural flourishing.

Self Determination at the National Level
Australia is a party to seven core international human rights treaties. The right to self-determination is contained in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Attorney General's Department 2015). This right is also contained in Article 3 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration does not create legally binding obligations, but informs the way governments engage with and protect the rights of Indigenous people.

The Australian Human Rights Commission [AHRC] released the ‘Community Guide to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ to assist Government and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities’ engagement and interaction (AHRC 2010). Within the 2011 AHRC Social Justice Report (2011a, p.48) and Native Title Report (2011b, p.14), the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Mick Gooda recommended the "Australian Government work in partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to develop a national strategy to ensure the principles of the [Declaration] are given full effect.” Most recently the combined Social Justice and Native Title Report (AHRC
2014) highlighted that a national implementation strategy is yet to be developed and reiterated the 2011 recommendations that the Australian Government engage with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples on the National Implementation Strategy in order to give effect to the Declaration and its articles and principles.

The Australian Government is yet to progress this AHRC recommendation and could look to the United Nations Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) recently published *Handbook for Parliamentarians* for guidance. The handbook is intended as a practical tool for domestic implementation of the Declaration. It provides a number of checklists and practical examples of how the provisions of the Declaration have been implemented at the national, state and local government levels. The first section of the handbook provides information for Parliamentarians on the concepts of ‘self-determination’ and ‘free, prior and informed consent’ and outlines that it is the Government’s duty to consult and engage with Indigenous Peoples on any legislative or administrative measures that affect them. The second section provides frameworks for Parliamentarians to assess the situation of Indigenous peoples in their state as a benchmarking exercise for effective implementation and provides a number of checklists to analyse government engagement with the Declaration structured around the primary functions of Parliaments (IPU 2014).

The Declaration is not a treaty, and whilst not binding I argue that it should be Australian Government policy demonstrated through the action of endorsement and ongoing participation and interaction at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.). The Law Council of Australia (2010, p.6) agrees with the non-binding status of the Declaration stating that: “…whilst lacking the status of a binding treaty, [it] embodies many human rights principles already protected under international customary and treaty law and sets the minimum standards for State parties’ interaction with the world’s Indigenous peoples”. Peretko (2013) examines the political compatibility of Aboriginal self-determination and Australian Government sovereignty and finds ….

Following the adoption of the Declaration in 2007 by the Australian Government, critical themes of self-determination policy have appeared in literature that reviews the past 40 years of Australian Government policy and approaches to Indigenous self-determination (Davis 2012). Former government minister Gary Johns (2011) and anthropologist Peter Sutton (2009) are very critical of the policy era of self-determination (1970s – 1990s) which followed policy eras of protectionism and assimilation. They suggest that, as a government policy, self-determination for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and assertion of collective human rights failed miserably. Both authors call for a new way forward in Indigenous affairs policy that involves more individualist approaches to policy and program delivery. Critics of this position would argue that the problem was not with self-determination as a policy but rather, it was the program delivery approaches that failed (one or two references?).

Much commentary on the concept of self-determination by Indigenous Australian leaders and academics (Pearson 2001; Berhendt 2002; Anderson 2007) has been written prior to the Declaration’s adoption by the Australian Government and in response to political situations. A number of contributions on this topic have also come from non-indigenous scholars (Martin & Finlayson 1996; Reid, Gunter & Smith 2005). The Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS) published a book, pre-Declaration, with a number of leading scholars (Lois O’Donoghue, Margaret Reynolds, Henry Reynolds, Charles Perkins, Pat Turner, Garth Nettheim, Frank Brennan to name a few) contributing chapters that outline Indigenous and non-Indigenous perspectives on self-determination in the Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander context drawing from regional and national experiences to support their arguments (Fletcher & AIATSIS 1994). None of these examples, however, neatly describe a
discrete Aboriginal Nation’s perspective on participation decision making and exercising control over their local level decision making at a community level using the Declaration as a framework to progress self-determination. Cowan (2013) agrees that there is vast literature covering the development of the draft Declaration, however, there has been comparatively little analysis of what self-determination actually means—for indigenous peoples specifically and for all peoples more generally—now that it is unequivocally recognised in the Declaration.

Self-determination at the local level
The AHRC’s Community Guide (2010) emphasises that self-determination is a central right of the Declaration and that there is no pre-determined definition of what self-determination looks like. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are a diverse group with many different languages and cultures, which inevitably produce different worldviews. The Community Guide provides examples of what self-determination might look like in practice such as a nationally elected representative body or local self-government through community controlled councils. However, no examples were provided from a discrete Aboriginal nation’s perspective in the process of decision making that goes to describe self-determination (UNESCO 1999) as:

1. **Choice** in determining how lives are governed and their own development paths;
2. **Participation** in decisions which affect their lives; and
3. **Control** over their own lives and futures including economic, social and cultural development.

Conclusion
The four main principles that underpin the Declaration: self-determination; participation in decision-making, supported by free, prior and informed consent and good faith; respect for and protection of culture; and equality and non-discrimination (AHRC 2010) provide guidance on the practical application of the Articles within the Declaration. While these principles are understood conceptually within human rights theory, applying them practically at the local level has been a challenge because governments interpret these core principles purely in the context of international law through the state sovereignty lens and Indigenous peoples have not been able to describe or clarify what these core principles mean on a practical level and how government should work with Aboriginal communities to achieve them (Gooda & Kiss 2013). Using the principles (in particular self-determination) as a framework for effective implementation has been identified as a future research project with the Gugu Badhun nation. The gap in current literature supports a research project that will assist in describing what the principles mean at a practical level to the Gugu Badhun Nation’s community development priorities and how governments, other Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Nations, and civil society should engage with the Gugu Badhun Nation. This work will assist in the creation of local-level case studies that can be fed upwards through national and international policy fora.

References


The Indigenous Sector: Social Capital on the Margins of Power

Alexander Page

Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney

Abstract

The potential benefits of social capital theory have been under-utilised in attempts to understand Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-run organisations. This paper explains how social capital theory can be useful to understand the uniquely positioned Indigenous Sector in contemporary Australian settler colonialism. These organisations constitute a position of inter-cultural broker between two authorising environments of community and government, with bonding capital a source of strength for many Indigenous populations. However, they must also negotiate within deeply unequal political structures of the settler-colonial governance environment; a situation which leads to exclusion on the basis of racism. This makes the possibility of maintaining essential bridging and linking social capital with government problematic – continuing following the announcement of the Abbott Coalition Government’s ‘Indigenous Advancement Strategy’. Social capital theory can put the power of networks and relationships for Indigenous community organisations in the analytical spotlight. It provides a way to explore inclusionary and exclusionary power which sees the Sector having to deal with deep power asymmetries while making ‘bridges’ while simultaneously positioning themselves as meso-level, intercultural brokers.

Keywords: Indigenous Sector, organisation, social capital, agency, settler colonial.

The Indigenous Sector practices both service delivery and pushes for political and civil rights through organisational means for many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations across Australia. The estimated 8000-9000 community-run of this sector are evidence of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander civil society. This paper asks how social capital theory can be used to understand the organisations of the Indigenous Sector existing within the Australian polity. To explore this question, this paper defines the Indigenous Sector; outlines social capital theory, extracting a perspective that focuses on power and its contexts for relationships and networking; and finishes with analysis of how three Indigenous community organisations use networks and social capital to their benefit while existing in a largely exclusionary settler colonial governance environment. Settler-colonialism is defined here as when a territory is invaded by outsiders whom create, and stay in operation of policy mechanisms to the detriment of the original indigenous populations’ sovereignty and self-determination. These processes produces pervasive power imbalances between Indigenous peoples and settlers both institutionally and day-to-day in the present. Social capital highlights the inclusionary power for Indigenous community organisations and the people that make up those organisations on a meso- and micro-level through bonding
and collaboration. However, an exclusionary power prevailing from social structures of Australian settler colonialism hinders bridging and linking social capital by organisations, requiring the practice of resistance, agency, and negotiation with the Australian state in accruing resources.

The Indigenous Sector
The Indigenous Sector is made up of community-run organisations mostly funded by government to deliver public services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations. In the self-determination era of the mid-1970s, legislative space was created by the Commonwealth for Indigenous populations to incorporate (Rowse 2005:213). Today, Indigenous community organisations provide services in a wide range of domains including healthcare, legal representation, arts and media, education, housing, land councils, cultural centres, and environmental management. As of 2014, 2536 Indigenous-controlled organisations have registered under the Commonwealth Office of Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, although recent estimates of 8000-9000 organisations have been made (Bauman et al. 2015). The majority of these organisations are not commercial in objective and largely operate on government funding (Holcombe and Sullivan 2013: 494).

The voluntary association model makes up the majority of organisational structures in the Indigenous Sector, whereby governing councils are elected by the constituency they serve. Structural focus on advocacy and community development can be maintained in the intention to create positive social change in Indigenous material wellbeing. Several others are created under statute: while not explicitly part of the third sector, they embody many characteristics of community organisations in existing at independent distance from government (Sullivan 2010:3). Authority within the Sector is also varied, including control over physical resources, employees, “voice” as representatives to government, and authority over who has access to organisational resources (Rowse 2005:217).

The sector also has a particular set of political functions. First, organisations seek to represent their client base through advocacy. They allocate resources on behalf of their constituency, and make claims of government for their needs. Second, they can also be established to provide communal legal entity holding title over property. Third, since the 1970s both Indigenous communities and Australian governments have assessed that some service delivery functions “are best administered through…publicly funded Indigenous organisations” in ways government seemingly cannot (Rowse 2012:102-103). These functions and authorities give the Indigenous Sector a unique political position in the Australian polity.

Distinction of the Indigenous Sector
The Indigenous Sector is a unique institution in the Australian polity. It is not a formal part of the state apparatus, despite a majority of organisations operating within legislative frameworks and supported by government funding. Nor is the sector solely positioned within Australian civil society, despite its advocacy role and overlap with the goals of the mainstream not-for-profit sector (Sullivan 2010:1). They deliver a range of services normally provided by government agencies in other circumstances (Rowse 2012:201). Additionally, they act as the key relationship between mainstream, non-Indigenous Australian governmental institutions and Indigenous citizens (Holcombe and Sullivan 2013:502). Indigenous community-run organisations are distinct because they are manifestations of continued attempts to negotiate and transform the power relations between the settler-colonial state and Indigenous peoples, in providing opportunities for political expression by the small and varying populations of Indigenous Australia (Martin 2003:5). The push for empowerment and social change at the local level, and the ability to govern for one’s own community are key facets of the Indigenous self-determination movement in addressing experiences of continued exclusion by the Australian government. They are how
many Indigenous peoples make themselves visible and heard as citizens, where ‘mainstream’ institutions largely ignore their perspectives (Rowse 2005:210).

Importantly, the Sector presents a distinct challenge to the continuing dominance and exclusion of Indigenous peoples by the settler-colonial apparatus, through manifestations of agency and self-governance in organisational claims for social rights and self-determination. However, the decision to incorporate under legislation is a political one: choosing this may result in greater resources, but increases government auditing and intervention, possibly constraining Indigenous community organisations and their effectiveness. Social capital theory provides one way to explore the benefits and drawbacks of social networks of community-run organisations forced to grapple with this continuing political dynamic.

Social Capital: Power and/through Networking
While much research has been undertaken on Indigenous community organisations since the mid-1970s, the potential benefits of social capital theory have been under-utilised (Walter 2015:71). Social capital directs our attention to social networks as valuable assets in society. With it we can explore how connections between people who cooperate can be used for both mutual advantage and exclusion (Cox 2007:509; Field 2008:14). Social capital is the processes and forms of connection between people, the values and norms which characterise these relationships, and how these “non-monetary forms [of capital] can be important sources of power and influence” for mutual benefit (Portes 1998:2).

Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:119) highlight the benefits of active participation in social networks in their definition of social capital as the “sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. Social capital is combined with an individual or groups economic, symbolic, and cultural capital to create and reproduce social hierarchy in particular fields. Inequality and the exclusion of people from certain privileged groups is due to the creation and reproduction of unequal economic and cultural capital in a given society (Bourdieu: 1986:248). People's positions are dependent upon their ability to mobilise with others through networks to position themselves accordingly (Field 2008:18). Bourdieu’s (1986:249) discussion of power inequity argues social networks are actively created and reproduced for the benefits of their members and the maintenance of power by dominant groups to exclude and retain control.

However, exploring the potential benefit of social capital to marginalised groups can further its theoretical effectiveness. Coleman's (1990) position on social capital is a resource allowing individuals or collectives to use the social structures and networks around them in order for greater action to occur (Coleman 1990:300). The “trustworthiness of the social environment” (Coleman 1988:102), the obligations held between individuals, and the sharing of norms and beliefs characterise the strength of that social capital. Individuals who cooperate provide benefits to the broader social environment in the creation of this public good and this process is amplified for those who are disadvantaged economically or lacking cultural/symbolic capital (Coleman 1988:113). Although, Coleman (1988:108) relies on individualism and classical economics in constructing social capital as inadvertently created for all through the pursuit of rational self-interest, rather than a purposively sought investment by reflective agents. By focusing on social capital through this lens as a 'public good', Coleman is limited in discussing active altruism and cooperative efforts.

Putnam's (2000) definition argues that high levels of civic engagement, through organisation and collective action, foster greater democratic relations and governance. Social capital here is through organisation, and the “trust, norms, and networks” that can be of benefit more broadly
A high level of social capital allows people to work together towards goals, and thus alleviate some of the physical or economic capital associated with such a task done individually. The central theme is “that social networks have value” (Putnam 2000:19); the connections between people and “the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise” can create positive and anti-social outcomes for many. While lacking precision, specialisation is a key attribute of Putnam’s (2000:22-23) contribution. Social capital can vary on a continuum of ‘bonding’ – benefits of people’s immediate networks which reproduces and bolsters specific identities and groups – and ‘bridging’ – how groups reach outside of their immediate networks allowing greater access to more access to people and resources and further reciprocity (Putnam 2000:22-23). ‘Linking’ social capital describes the ability of people to network with formal institutions outside of a community, for greater access to resources (Woolcock 2001:11).

Social capital allows us to critically explore power and the inclusive and exclusionary nature of social networks. It can be useful in understanding how Indigenous community organisations use relationships and networks to deliver services and undertake political advocacy, by highlighting power across various levels of social relations, when contextualised within specific power dynamics and cultural environments. The next section discusses this capacity relative to several Indigenous community run-organisations.

The Indigenous Sector: Social Capital on the Margins of Power

An analysis of Indigenous community organisations via social capital theory creates an illustrative metaphor to explore power and relationships in broader social and political contexts, though must to be challenged on its “ahistorical” (Field 2008:45) presentation. Dismissing historicity risks ethnocentrism when not considered in specific cultural contexts (Brough et al., 2006:398). Minimal research explores social capital and its meanings amongst differing Indigenous populations and community organisations in Australia (Brough and Bond 2009:249). Exploring the “texture” (Brough et al. 2006:397) of social capital relative to Indigenous community organisations and their unique political position is needed to maximise usefulness as a theoretical tool.

Indigenous community organisations are manifestations of agency, created and maintained by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations as culturally specific projects in an attempt to achieve goals and social change (Ortner 2006:144). The Indigenous Sector is constituted by specific individuals and communities on the micro, day-to-day level, many of whom are likely to be from the constituency that the organisation operates for (Sullivan 2010:2). Yet, these organisations intertwine and position themselves within macro political and cultural structures. They exist as “inter-cultural mediators” (Merlan 2005:168) between Indigenous population expectations, wants, and needs on the one hand, and the legitimising through recognition by the state on the other (Page 2015; Sullivan 2010:187). In this middle-ground, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander individuals and populations create and maintain the networks on a meso-level negotiating these two “authorising environments” (Smith 2005:20).

An example of such negotiation is evident in the Yarnteen Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Corporation in Newcastle, New South Wales, which actively mediates between notions of community and family in the region, while also ensuring business stability and adaptive governance structuring (Smith 2008:207-208). Through a range of profitable business ventures, Yarnteen is motivated to achieve economic development for the “complex urban Indigenous community environment” of Newcastle advocating a greater use of the private economic sphere for social change (Smith 2008:216). Yarnteen manages their own structure as one which does not claim to represent all Indigenous peoples in Newcastle, yet maintains its position as an Aboriginal community organisation by focusing on broader community development (Smith 2008:213-215). Having to position the organisation between individual families, and notions of “whole-of-community” used by governments as a measure of “good governance” (Smith 2008:218) means
that existing in this intercultural domain takes a balance of relationships and negotiation of different levels of social networks.

It is essential to further explore the notion that there are “distinctive patterns of Indigenous social capital” (Walter 2015:74) relative to Indigenous identities and worldviews used in and through organisational networks and relationships (Lahn 2012:301). A sense of bonding capital of immediate family and wider Indigenous community which contains “a strong cultural and political meaning” (Brough et al. 2006:404) has been shown to be a vital source of strength due to its supportive and beneficial nature through shared resources: symbolic, economic, cultural, and political (Hunter 2000:36-37).

This can be seen vividly in the direct community action of the Fitzroy Valley women, who successfully challenged the Western Australian government to limit alcohol supply of Fitzroy Crossing to “escape the destructive impact of alcohol” that had caused much trauma for the community for several decades (Oscar and Pedersen 2011:92). A lack of funding from the state government, and an unhelpful relationship between the Fitzroy Crossing hospital and the Valley community led to decisive action being taken founded upon a “depth of cultural and social capital that has survived violent dispossession, decades of colonial oppression and post-colonial large-group settlement” (Oscar and Pedersen 2011:85). It was the creation of the Nindiligarri Cultural Health Service in the 1990s, and later the Fitzroy Valley Alcohol Action Group in 2006, which facilitated multiple organisations and their “senior men and women” to come together and support the Fitzroy Valley women’s campaign for change. This lead to eventual support from the Police Commissioner and changes to sale of alcohol (Oscar and Pedersen 2011:93-95). Both cultural authority and the bonding capital of the Fitzroy Valley women were used as key sources of strength to challenge real world conditions in locally specific ways to achieve social change.

Relationships of reciprocity, shared norms, and trust are greatly beneficial in achieving goals such as in development and maintenance of civil society organisations (Putnam 1993:167). This strong bonding capital which gives organisations strength could also create tensions and constraints in the development of bridging and linking social capital (Brough and Bond 2009:251; Lahn 2012:297; Walter 2015:79-80). The exclusion by outsiders can create tensions for attempts to create new external ties, claims made of those within the group can be excessive, and freedom of individuals may be restricted by strong norms and obligations (Hunter 2000:37). Understanding a broad spectrum of social then would assist with exploring the complexities, both positive and negative, of how Indigenous community organisations form relationships with the state.

Continuing Structures of Settler Colonialism and Exclusion
It is vital that an analysis of networks and relationships of Indigenous Sector is contextualised within its structural environment of the Australian state, in considering enablers and constraints of the various organisations social capital may be. Powerful groups have the ability to limit or damage the social capital of those less powerful, a mechanism which can create further inequities (Field 2008:83) as social capital can bolster groups and exclude others in inequitable hierarchies: ultimately “sociability cuts both ways” (Portes 1998:18).

In the creation and maintenance of social capital, Indigenous Sector organisations contend with the structure of Australian governance as settler-colonial, with exclusion playing a significant role. Despite a continuous engagement with these relations by Indigenous peoples over two centuries, the various apparatuses of the Australian state do not put much faith in Indigenous self-governance or agency (McCallum 2006:609; Veracini 2015:88). The racialization process involved in state identity maintenance processes means that Indigenous peoples’ “race capital” (Walter 2010:47) is largely marginalised, affecting organisation’s ability to develop greater bridging and linking ties.
with government. Existing in this environment means Indigenous organisations must develop reflexive practices to ensure survival and continue creating community benefit.

A key example of this can be seen in the Redfern Aboriginal Medical Service (AMS), established in 1971 in inner-city Sydney. As a result of continuing racism, discrimination, and exclusion of Aboriginal people from mainstream healthcare in Sydney, the Redfern AMS was created to deal with both the everyday health issues of the population, and to respond to these structural conditions (Khoury 2015:472-475). In continuing to exist for over 40 years the Redfern AMS has challenged government accountability and responsibility for delivering appropriate and accessible healthcare in the process (Khoury 2015:478). The governmental response to this success has been varied: from “numerous bureaucratic obstructions that beset the service from its inception” (Khory 2015:476) through to continuingly fractured and under-resourced funding problems. This has required local donations to cover some of the operational costs of Redfern AMS, constraining their ability to achieve outcomes, and making linking capital with governmental bodies essential but strained. This environment puts the Redfern AMS in an “ambiguous duality” (Khoury 2015:488) between succeeding in delivering appropriate and effective healthcare, and complying with government control and attempts to maintain domination. Yet, in surviving and delivering their services the Redfern AMS continues to challenge this process and their right to autonomy in “the improvement of their economic [and] social conditions” as Indigenous peoples (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).

The creation of new bridging social capital by organisations to government institutions constantly affected by power inequity and the inevitable expectations that arise with this state relationship. The bonding capital of Indigenous community organisations which instils a sense of collective, unique identity and strength (Brough et al., 2006:407) as seen in the examples above is devalued by a systemic promotion of whiteness, requiring settler nationalism to survive (Walter 2015:82). Creation of an Aboriginal identity by the state by in formulated policy, fashions an expectation to perform an ‘authentic’ Indigenous character non-threatening to settler sovereignty and domination. If organisations are too politically-focused in representing their constituency to government, and challenge this conception, this can lead to the severing of vital links to government and to economic resources of which many organisations rely for services to one of the most marginalised groups in the country (Povinelli 2002:6). This was seen in the current Attorney General’s attempted cuts to Aboriginal Legal Services nationwide earlier this year (Doran and Yaxley 2015; Perkins and Lee 2015) – due to the direct challenge they make to government accountability, responsibility, and control via the legal system.

This can also be seen in increasing auditing requirements of the sector, damaging the potential benefits of organisations for their constituencies (Dwyer et al. 2009). Thus, when the Abbott Coalition Government implemented its ‘Indigenous Advancement Strategy’ (IAS) in 2014, this was noted as increasing the possibility of essential service delivery closure for many Indigenous populations nationwide (Medhora 2015; Oscar 2014; Viner 2014), and pointed to as directly resulting in closure of several major Aboriginal service providers nationally in 2015– including the Tasmanian Aboriginal Legal Service and the Aboriginal Medical Service Western Sydney. Ultimately, the building of trustworthy, stable, and mutually agreeable relationships with partners outside of the immediate network is going to be challenging for any Indigenous community organisation in this political environment if the benefits of such relationships only occur the state’s terms.
Conclusions and Future Research

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community organisations are constituted by specific Indigenous populations existing in a meso-level, inter-cultural space between community wants, needs, and expectations on the one hand, and state legitimisation and control on the other. A sense of bonding capital, through family, community, and other organisations, can provide a shared sense of resources and reciprocity used to achieve group goals. However, the development of bridging and linking relationships and networks outside of the immediate environment of organisations, particularly with governments for key economic resources, may be more difficult to achieve. As power inequity on the basis of race is deeply embedded within processes of continuing settler colonialism, this means that Indigenous community organisations may be hindered by a largely exclusionary (or conditionally accepting) environment of governance. Building trustworthy, reliable, and stable relationships with governments is going to be a constant struggle for the Indigenous Sector and for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations who seek culturally relevant services and governance mechanisms. The benefits of social capital theory for illuminating networks and relationships of Indigenous community organisations will have much greater value if Indigenous perspectives and understandings of these concepts can be highlighted and explored further relative to specific socio-historical contexts in future research of the Indigenous Sector. Such an approach is essential to highlight the often marginalised voices and the strength of Indigenous resilience to the ramifications of government policy, such as the on-going IAS.

References


Managing Identity After Leaving a New Religious Movement: An Examination of Self-presentation in Ex-members of the Exclusive Brethren

Laura Dyason
Federation University Australia

Abstract: The majority of research about members and ex-members of New Religious Movements has been about people who join these groups by choice. There is only a comparatively small amount of research about individuals known as Second Generation Adults who are born into these groups. Using in-depth interviews with ex-members of the Plymouth Brethren Christian Church (more commonly known as Exclusive Brethren), I examine the experiences of individuals joining mainstream society as adults in the light of Erving Goffman’s work on self presentation and stigma. The findings highlight the difficulty these individuals faced in adapting to their new environment and learning new social roles.

Keywords: Identity, Self Presentation, New Religious Movement, Exclusive Brethren, Plymouth Brethren Christian Church.

Introduction
Much has been written about New Religious Movements (NRMs) and the issues arising from membership or defection from these groups (Coates, 2011; Coates 2012; Wright, 1984). However, while there is a wide variety of research available about people who join such groups by choice, there is only a comparatively small amount of research about individuals sometimes referred to as Second Generation Adults (SGAs) who are born and socialised into these groups (Matthews, 2012). This paper looks at the experiences of SGAs who leave a NRM, specifically how such people negotiate their new environment when they enter mainstream society for the first time.

In order to do this, I examine the experiences of ex-members of a New Religious Movement in the light of Erving Goffman’s work on self presentation (1959) and stigma (1963), which aims to explain daily life and face-to-face interaction.

Background
Research on issues relating to NRMs has covered why certain people might be more likely to join (Barker, 1986; Coates 2010), why they stay with the group (Coates 2012), and why the person who joined might eventually leave (Wright & Piper, 1986). Other research covers some of the issues former members face upon leaving (Coates, 2009; Hookway, 2013; Wright, 1984), and
what support these individuals might need to successfully integrate back into society (Langone, 1996; Boeri, 2002).

Research suggests that due to the high number of people who joined NRMs between the 1950s and the 1980s, there are now a large number of adults who have been born and raised inside these groups (McCabe, Goldberg, Langone and DeVoe, 2007), with an estimated one million children who have been raised in a NRM since 1950 (Kendall, 2011; Bardin 2005). Some of these SGAs are leaving as they reach adulthood (McCabe, Goldberg, Langone and DeVoe, 2007). There is a small but growing body of work which specifically examines these SGAs, who did not make a personal choice to join and have no experience of life before membership. Researchers recognise the issues of this group as being different to those who join a NRM. This research includes an extensive study by Matthews (2012) aimed at helping counsellors treat SGA ex-members appropriately, as well as studies into child rights (Woolley 2005) and safety inside these groups (Kendall 2011). Hookway and Habibis’s (2013) work on young people leaving a strict sectarian group examines the management of identity from a sociological perspective. However, there has been little work done on SGAs and researchers have consistently pointed out the need for further research in this area (Matthews, 2012).

One way to look at the changes and challenges an SGA faces when they leave a NRM is to look at the adjustments they need to make, and the new skills they need to learn to successfully assimilate with mainstream society. In this paper, I examine the interview responses of 10 ex-members of the Plymouth Brethren Christian Church (more commonly known as the Exclusive Brethren), in the light of Erving Goffman’s (1959, 1963) work on impression management in order to gain insights into the issues faced by SGAs transitioning out of a NRM.

One of the themes central to Goffman’s work is how social actors manage impressions of themselves, and the techniques they use in maintaining these images (Goffman, 1959). In Goffman’s theory, the self occurs as a result of the surroundings in which it appears or acts. He extensively discusses both the inner self, and the outer self, the latter being a carefully constructed façade which individuals adjust according to their situation.

Using a dramaturgical analogy describing the processes that people go through in social settings in everyday life as performances, Goffman (1959) claims that in order to carry off a successful performance, the performer must not only display the correct manner and appearance, but conceal that which subtracts from the impression he wishes to convey. In later work (1963) Goffman explores the situation of individuals who are unable to conform to the standards that society considers “normal” and how they manage their “stigma”, which is anything which discredits the presentation and the identity that they are attempting to project. He describes ways which individuals control the circulation of discrediting information about themselves in order to “pass” as an unstigmatized person.

Thus identity, according to Goffman, can be seen as being developed through micro-interactions in daily life, as one adapts their self presentation to the current framework of action in which they find themselves (Jacobsen & Kristiansen, 2015). It is through this lens that I examine the self that is created as a result of being born and raised in a NRM, and the challenges this presents for SGAs who leave to begin a new way of life in mainstream society.

**Method**

The participants in this paper were all former members of a group known as the Exclusive Brethren, an offshoot of the wider Brethren Movement (Tonts, 2001; Wilson, 1967). The origins of the many various groups who identify as Brethren can be traced to the 1820’s when, following a series of concerns, a small group of protestant believers in the Church of Ireland left the Established Church to conduct informal meetings in Dublin. Within a couple of years, the group had come
under the influence of John Nelson Darby, who had been a clergyman in the Anglican Church of Ireland (Piepkorn, 1970). Darby taught and upheld a doctrine of separation from people and influences deemed to be corrupt or evil, which he argued was required to be fully compliant with the teachings set out in the scriptures. Over the years, there have been many schisms resulting largely from this doctrine that separation from persons who do not meet the stringent standards of the group must be formally declared and practiced. A major division in 1848 occurred when strict followers of Darby split off from those who held a less rigid position, forming the first Open and Exclusive Brethren groups. Further schisms have taken place among the Exclusive Brethren, reflecting the seriousness with which the group takes their doctrine (Wilson, 1967; Piepkorn 1970; Tonts, 2001).

Using Roy Wallis’s (1978) classification of New Religious Movements where such groups can be identified as ‘world-rejecting’, ‘world-affirming’ and ‘world-accommodating’, the Brethren would appear to meet the criteria for the ‘world-rejecting’ groups. World rejecting groups, typically believe themselves to be the only holder of the truth, require a high level of commitment from members and require them to follow a high standard of conduct as prescribed by a leader (Coates, 2012; Wallis, 1978). Examples of Brethren practices include not eating or socializing with those who are not members, restricting media and technology unless required for business purposes, attending daily meetings, adhering to a dress code, and either disciplining or shunning members who do not conform to their strictly held beliefs (Tonts, 2001).

As little literature was available on the experiences of SGA former members, a qualitative approach with semi-structured in-depth interviews was chosen to allow collection of rich and detailed information (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) about how the participants had managed the transition from the NRM to mainstream society. All participants engaged in a face-to-face interview using open ended questions focusing on their experiences in social settings before and after leaving the group, lasting on average 90 minutes. Interviews with the participants were transcribed and analyzed with open coding to identify themes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Pseudonyms have been used in this paper to protect the identity of the participants.

As a group which members rarely join or leave, almost all Exclusive Brethren have been members since birth, making them an ideal group from which to recruit participants for a study on SGAs. All participants, except for one elderly man whose family joined when he was 2 years old, had been born members of the group, with most saying that their families had been Brethren for up to five generations. The participants in this study were recruited by combination of purposive and snowball sampling. As a former member of the Exclusive Brethren myself, I initially contacted people I knew who had left the group, asking if anyone would be willing to volunteer, and those who volunteered suggested further participants.

Of the ten participants discussed in this paper, six were male and four were female, ranging in age from 26 to 80 years of age. The most recent leaver had been away from the group for five years, and two had left more than 50 years ago, with the majority having left between eight and sixteen years ago. Seven of the participants had left of their own accord, and three had been excommunicated.

Although a relatively small sample, this is in line with the typical sample size in an in-depth qualitative study. While there are no set guidelines, research texts often consider between five and eight participants sufficient for this type of research (Coates, 2011).

Discussion
In this study, many of the participants reported feeling a need to hide their past as a member of a NRM from new acquaintances, for fear of being misunderstood or stereotyped. They reported that in their formers lives they had felt different to people outside the group, and that while when
they were younger they had not realized the significance of this, with age came the realisation that they were 'weird' or 'unusual'. After leaving, they were anxious to start their new lives outside the NRM with a clean slate.

Goffman’s work on stigma (1963) discusses the discreditable actor who has a past or a ‘secret’ which would cause those around the individual to view him or her in a negative light. This person may attempt to ‘pass’, hoping that the discrediting information will remain concealed. However, while the participants in this study hoped to do this, often this was not possible due to their lack of understanding of social situations and lack of knowledge regarding popular culture which often left them with no option but to disclose information about their pasts to explain why they didn’t understand things that were common knowledge to others, such as information about television shows or how to visit a restaurant. The participants described standing back and withdrawing from conversations, both while group members and later as ex-members, when in social settings in mainstream society. Consider the following example from one of the participants:

I actually found quite a few instances where I was forced to explain what we’d come out of, why we didn’t know about certain things, movies and different things, just certain things that most people would know about that we didn’t know … So, it’s not always easy to be able to hide that, but we certainly try not to let on now. (Brenda)

Here we see how Brenda is forced to reveal information about herself which she feels is discrediting, because her upbringing has not equipped her with the knowledge to play the role of a ‘normal’ person. Jeff, another participant, reported that he also had to make decisions about whether to reveal information about his past to new acquaintances:

Sooner or later it would come up for anyone that I was really letting into my circle, as far as friends would go. Because my previous life had been so all encompassing that there were large parts of life in normal society that I was really quite clueless about. Even down to what groups played what music and what actors acted in what films and anything that involved popular culture, because I hadn’t been involved in any of that and I was really quite clueless about it. So in just very entry level small talk that would go on in social settings with other people, I didn’t even know what was going on. It’s a pretty strange situation to be an adult and not know those things… And so that would very quickly mark me out in a conversation as being different from everybody else. I then had to choose, did I then identify why, or was I just quiet and hope that the thing blew over. (Jeff)

According to Goffman, the individual with information to manage about his stigma has a choice of voluntarily disclosing himself, transforming himself from a discreditable person to a discredited one and this is the choice that Jeff is making here. Another participant, Bill, described experiencing similar challenges after he left the group and compared it to events as a child, when he was still a group member trying to appear normal at school:

You tried to make it less obvious that you were so different. But then you knew as soon as the other kids started talking about what had happened last night on telly, or something like that… or a movie that they had seen, there was no way that you could intelligently enter in to the conversation. So then you tend to be quieter in all areas of conversation when a group is talking about things so it’s less obvious the things that you don’t know about. (Bill)

In this example, we see that in order to manage the impression that his school mates formed about him, Bill adopts a performance of being a quiet child, rather than revealing information that might be discrediting. Jeff also recalled feeling different to outsiders as a child, but felt a sense of community with group members, echoing Goffman’s (1959) concept of a team performing on a stage, with ‘us’ presenting a play to ‘them’: ‘Yes we were very different, and we were meant to be that way. That was how we showed the rest of the world what we stood for.” However, he also realized the ramifications if he failed to support his team by playing his role in the performance:

1 Participant names have been altered to protect their identities.
I can remember being ten, and realizing that if I didn't follow all the rules of being in the Brethren, then I would be excommunicated and then I wouldn't have a family or any of the people that I loved in that community. So that was a scary concept. So I think even at ten years of age I was realizing that there were a lot of things that were out of my control that hinged on either obeying the rules or being excommunicated, and that that could happen to me really as quick as a flash. (Jeff)

In this quote we see that Jeff was not only engaged in impression management with outsiders, but also with his fellow Brethren. Brenda and Bill also reported this realization, and the accompanying fear, highlighting the importance of displaying appropriate behaviours to avoid being 'withdrawn from' by the group, a form of discipline akin to excommunication that would discredit them in the eyes of the Brethren community. Bill makes the following comment while describing how important it was for him to follow rules and measure up in the eyes of the group:

It stops you thinking for yourself, because it's all done for you and you're told don't do this, or this will happen to you if you do this. So, you actually become someone who is just trying to please the people inside the group. However weird and strange that might look from outside, which at the time you don't even think about or care about.

Here Bill is recalling how he performed a role for his fellow group members to retain his membership in the group, his comment echoing many of the participants who described carrying out the roles that were expected of them in the NRM without thinking deeply about them. Many reported that they later struggled when they had to make decisions on their own and attributed it to this.

The participants described a lack of confidence, caused by having to play unfamiliar roles. Older participants, in particular, reported struggling with adapting to the new social settings they found themselves in, explaining that they avoided socializing or attending events because they didn't know how to act. The following examples from Brenda, Meredith and Amanda illustrate this:

One thing I struggle with every day is a lack of confidence. A terrible lack of confidence, a feeling of sort of inadequacy… having been bought up in a tight closed group like that seems to leave its mark and it's just so hard to overcome all the ideas and the way of life completely. (Brenda)

I haven't got confidence. And I think that comes from being the woman that was squashed down [in the group] because women didn't have a strong place. If there was a strong woman in there, it was commented on and they were put back in their box….and that's because she wasn't submissive and that's partly why I think I don't have confidence. (Meredith)

Situations freaked me out more than people. Social situations. In social situations I'm still like that. You ask my friends at work how many times I've put my name down for a social occasion and then not gone. I can't do it. (Amanda)

These participants all attributed their lack of confidence and self-worth to the roles they had learned to play in the group, and reported that they found it difficult to adapt and play new roles, in spite of having left between seven and fifteen years ago.

However, Adrian, who left the group at 19, reported that he was able to adapt to the new role required of him by mirroring the behaviour of those around him. He recalls the realization that he was different, "you became more aware that you existed in a very strange group in society and you were a very odd person compared to what was normal," and started to watch outsiders curiously, watching the way they behaved, and learning how the world outside his group worked. He reported being heavily influenced by outsiders after he left the group, adjusting his behaviors to match theirs, adjusting his presentation to his surroundings.

Not all the experiences the participants reported were negative. Some had fond memories of their time in the group, with one participant stating that she felt that she had 'the best of both
worlds’, describing that she had an upbringing that she credited with having made her a more kind and generous person, and now she also had the freedom to live her life as she pleased. An elderly participant fondly recalled stories of ‘the good old days’ and another was grateful for a firm grounding in reading the scriptures and interpreting their meaning. All participants were firm in stating that they had no interest in returning to the group, in spite of the challenges they all reported facing in their interactions with mainstream society. However, the participants who appreciated some of the more positive aspects of their past were more comfortable with their new friends knowing about their former involvement in the NRM.

Conclusion
Responses from the participants indicate they are aware of the need to project a certain image, both when they were in the group to impress the leaders and other group members, and after leaving, to attempt to hide their past and project an image that would allow them to be seen as acceptable by mainstream society. While the performance they acted out in the group came more naturally to them, learning to successfully act their new role in mainstream society still challenged most of the participants, who were actively managing the information that acquaintances knew about them and their pasts. In negotiating their new environment, most of the participants had struggled with being forced to disclose information that they felt was stigmatizing, when they didn’t understand the correct social protocols for a situation. However, those who had been out of the group longer were more comfortable, and were rarely put in a position where they needed to tell anyone. Goffman’s theories of interaction in everyday life (1959) and his work on stigma (1963) prove to be useful tools in understanding these challenges faced by SGA former members learning to perform new roles in mainstream society.

References


A Religion-based Framework of Risk Governance – The case of the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka

Praveena Rajkobal
Deakin University

The aim of this paper is to examine how Buddhist religious concepts can be used in risk governance. Most approaches to risk governance adopt Western frameworks and are based on scientific, technocratic and economistic paradigms regardless of their contextual appropriateness. Therefore, this paper addresses a significant gap in risk governance literature through its examination of how religious resources can be used to find solutions to the problems encountered in governance. In this regard, the paper looks at how the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, a religion-based grassroots movement in Sri Lanka innovated Buddhist concepts and methods in a socially, economically and politically appropriate way to address some pressing governance challenges it faced in its fifty-year lifespan. This analysis is done by looking at the Movement in four developmental phases from 1958-present where each phase is identified according to a main governance challenge faced by the Movement. The analysis is conducted based on the review of literature for my PhD thesis.

Keywords: risk governance; culture and religion; religion and grassroots movements, the Sarvodaya Movement; sustainable development innovations.

As Huber (1989, p.365, p.369) observes, “Social movements are a phenomenon of modernization” where they arise to respond to the “social question” or the “ecological question” of industrial development. In this regard, the social movement prioritises the social and environmental welfare over the requirement of the industrial system (Huber 1989, p.369). The social movement carries out this role by pressuring the States and the markets to periodically review their performance in terms of their cultural and environmental impacts (Huber 1989).

Arguably, however, there are a few significant reasons why the social movement cannot engage effectively with current processes of environmental governance, which are based mostly on technological and scientific frameworks. From planning to the implementation of a development project, decisions are made through scientific and engineering models, including risk estimations (Fischer, 2000). The scientific and technological orientation of these risk governance paradigms reduces the ability of the social movement to alter worldviews and values in favour of the
environment or the marginalised communities (Rajkobal, 2011, 2014). Furthermore, although Mol (2000) holds that the social movement should develop a collaborative language with the other governance actors who are the State and the private sector, the social movement's attempts to develop a collaborative language can become ineffective due to the largely growth oriented nature of these risk governance paradigm. The governments tend to prioritise economic growth over the concerns related to the environment or the society (Rajkobal, 2014). Further to this, the social movement itself faces difficulty in its early stages for mass mobilisation. Issues represented by grassroots movements are in many cases perceived as Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) arguments (McCormick, 1995). Government policy campaigns and dominant media usually succeed in glossing over the social injustices faced by grassroots communities using the rhetoric of national interests. Often the social movement does not possess the financial wealth to run well organised campaigns or mass mobilisation programs to raise a mass against such injustices.

In this paper, through looking at the case study of the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, I will demonstrate how religious resources can be used to find solutions to these prevalent problems the social movement encounters in governance. Gardner (2002, pp.11-12) maintains that religions can have five potential powers to create a constructive form of engaged religion in the society-environment relationship. These are, the capacity to shape cosmologies (worldviews); moral authority; a large base of adherents; significant material resources; and the community-building capacity. The Sarvodaya Movement is a living example of a social movement which created this engaged form of religion using Buddhist concepts. I will provide an analysis of the work of the Movement in relation to four phases of its significant developments, which are:

- Phase 1: 1958-1967 – **Initial collaboration** with rural communities to combat their social and economic marginalisation.

My categorisation of the Movement into four phases of development is inspired by Bond's (2004, pp.7-42) work yet is different. In this research I suggest four phases of the Movement, from 1958 - to the present (2015) focused primarily on changes in its priorities and model of governance.

**Method**

The argument of this paper that religion can be used to create an innovative religion-based framework of environmental risk governance is based on an in-depth review and an analysis of literature on various relevant areas. These are, the history of the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement and the Movement's development over a period of fifty years; the Sri Lankan political, economic and social developments during these fifty years; and the literature on environmental and social risk governance. The analysis is done by looking at the Movement in four developmental phases from 1958-present where each phase is identified according to a main risk governance challenge faced by the Movement.

**Phase 1: 1958-1967 – Initial collaboration with rural communities to combat their social and economic marginalisation.**

Phase 1 of the Sarvodaya Movement comprises the Movement’s initial collaboration with rural societies. This phase is important to understand how religious concepts could be used to alter worldviews at the individual and community level. The main aim of the Movement was to create right methods and incentives to encourage rural community participation in governance through
altering their values. Religion played a central role in the local culture. Therefore, the Movement drew upon the communities’ religious values to alter worldviews at the individual, as well as at the community level, to motivate social action to address the risks faced by these societies. Sri Lankan Theravada Buddhism played a main role in this regard. Ariyaratne used the Buddhist concepts of the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path to motivate rural social engagement through an underlying framework of spirituality.

The first Noble Truth – the existence of suffering – was translated in the village development context as the prevailing underdeveloped conditions of the village. Underdevelopment prompted the social and economic hardships faced by the community. The second Noble Truth – the origin of suffering – was interpreted as the conditions that cause inaction in the local community, be it the problems found in the social fabric such as the disintegration of various groups, a lack of social capital, or the prevalence of negative individual qualities such as jealousy, selfishness and a lack of interest in others. The Third Noble Truth - the cessation of suffering - was realised as the villagers developed an awareness that the potential to overcome the risks lies within themselves. The Fourth Noble Truth – the path to the cessation of suffering was the creation of the right methods that could help to overcome village under-development. (Macy, 1983). (See Table 1).

Table 1: The Socially engaged form of the Buddhist Four Noble Truths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Four Noble Truths</th>
<th>The Socially Engaged Form of the Four Noble Truths</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The existence of suffering</td>
<td>Contemplating on the prevailing under-developed conditions of the village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The origin of suffering</td>
<td>Individual traits (jealousy and selfishness) that affect the wider social fabric to create social disintegration therefore a lack of social capital and social cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cessation of suffering</td>
<td>Beginning to be aware of the mind’s potential to overcome undesirable traits that create individual and community suffering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path leading to the cessation</td>
<td>Cultivating mindfulness and detachment from excessive desires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of suffering</td>
<td>Cultivating loving kindness towards others and initiate action towards better and holistic governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s table based on Macy (1983, pp. 36-37).

Arguably, the Four Noble Truths affected reforms at the individual level, while another concept called the Noble Eightfold Path addressed changes at the societal level (see Table 2). Right understanding and Right Intention were realised when the community understood the nature of interdependence and co-existence between them and the others. Right Speech consisted of the characteristics of honesty and compassion. Right Action, Right Livelihood, and Right Effort meant conducting collaborative work for village development. Right Mindfulness was staying open to the needs of the village and Right Concentration was seeing this holistic picture of village development (Macy, 1983, pp.37-38).
Table 2: The Socially engaged form of the Noble Eightfold Path

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Noble Eightfold Path</th>
<th>The Socially Engaged Form of the Noble Eightfold Path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right Understanding</td>
<td>To realise the dependence between the self and the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Intention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Speech</td>
<td>For honesty and compassion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Action</td>
<td>Living in harmony with others and the nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Livelihood</td>
<td>Establishing common values for coexistence and collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Effort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Mindfulness</td>
<td>To stay open to the needs of the village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Concentration</td>
<td>To transcend self to see the holistic picture of development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s diagram based on Based on Macy (1983, pp.37-38).

According to Macy (1983), contemplating on the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path in its socially engaged form as advocated by the Movement prompts a process of ‘awakening’ firstly at the individual level, followed by the household level, community level, national level and ultimately, at the global level. Hence, awakening simply meant the awareness that arises within an individual that social change starts at the individual level, which then flows to the community. Once the individual is awakened to the fact that they should work together to achieve progress for their village, they came together in what is called shramadana (donation of labour). Donation of labour or shramadana was used as a method by the Movement to create physical infrastructure of development, including sources of potable water, houses, latrines, roads, community halls and temples. The installation of these infrastructure addressed many risk issues faced by the village community such as water scarcity and health hazards. Further the availability of community halls and temples provided spaces for information sharing, planning and bonding towards risk mitigation.

This phase of the Sarvodaya Movement is therefore exemplary of how the Movement used spiritual values to assist environmental and social risk governance in rural Sri Lankan communities, working mostly at the community level. Towards the end of this phase, in 1966, the Movement initiated a hundred village development scheme. Twenty two Districts in Sri Lanka were selected and from each District an average number of five villages were picked to be developed as Sarvodaya Villages (Sarvodaya, 2014). The Sarvodaya Movement expanded its operations with outstanding success in the 1960s and reached its second Phase in the late 1960s. By 1968, the development framework of the Movement attracted international attention due to its success. Hence the Movement started receiving external funding for their work from international donors. The government also became interested in collaborating with the Movement for national development. These developments led to the Phase 2 of the Movement.

Phase 2: 1968- 1982 – Becoming a Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) and expanding collaboration beyond rural communities.

The second phase of the Movement, from 1968 to 1982, is the period in which the Sarvodaya Movement evolved as a large Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) (Bond, 2004). In this phase, the Movement extended its collaborative networks beyond rural communities to cooperate with the government in government-led national development programs. Further to this, the Movement also received funding from many international developmental organisations. Therefore this phase of the Movement is important in understanding how religious concepts could be used to create networks of collaboration with various other actors – at the local level
with individuals and the communities; at the national level with the government; and globally with international donors.

The Sarvodaya Movement, using a spiritual ideal, established common values for development with these various actors. Values are the central guiding principles that underlie each actor’s behaviour (Barr, 2008). Values of the Sarvodaya Movement were spirituality, equality, simplicity and the dialogue with the grassroots aimed at rural community development. Values of the donors were economic growth and income generation. Values of the government were national development and the expansion of governmental influence over the nation. The Movement established development to be the common value between all actors. However, the Movement equated excessive growth and consumerism to the Buddhist concept of kamasukallikanuyoga (too much into worldly pleasures) and excessive poverty to the other extreme attakilamatanuyoga (the complete denial of the world). The Movement picked the Buddhist concept of Majjimapatipada (The Middle Way) for its model of development – which meant simple living and no desire. In order to go along the Buddhist path of Middle Way, the Movement established Ten Basic Needs for village development: a clean environment, clean and adequate water supply, minimum clothing requirements, balanced diet, simple housing, basic healthcare, simple communication facilities, minimum energy requirements, total and continuing education for all, and cultural and spiritual needs.

Therefore, the Phase 2 of the Sarvodaya Movement provides important insights into how spiritual value systems can be used for multi-actor collaboration and to develop a collaborative language. The Sarvodaya significantly expanded its operations in village development since 1967. The “Hundred Villages Development Scheme”, which began in 1967, ran throughout this Phase (Bond, 2004, p.23).

Phase 3: 1983 – 1993 – Self-evaluation and the return to the rural masses

Phase 3 of the Sarvodaya Movement focuses on the large-scale disruption that occurred to the collaborative relationship between the Movement, the government and international donors. This period began in 1983 and lasted till 1993. Disparities occurred between the Movement and the government in relation to their use of Buddhism for community mobilisation, creating a political conflict between these two actors. During this ten year period, the Movement faced political as well as financial instability as the donors withdrew a large percentage of their funding from the Movement. The Movement had to mobilise its own mass to carry on with its unique objectives – to reinstitute its identity to a shramadana (donation) based Movement, instead of a finance-based one; and to reinstitute its philosophy based on engaged Buddhism. Therefore, this phase of the Movement is exemplary of how religious concepts could be used for mass mobilisation among communities.

The Movement’s leader, Ariyaratne, introduced a new political process in 1992, which he named the critical mass of spiritual consciousness and consensus politics. As Ariyaratne argued, the core of all religions is spirituality, and includes a message of peace, love and harmless coexistence. Ariyaratne used this notion of ecumenical spirituality to create a community of likeminded people who uphold the values of peace and justice, which he called the critical mass of spiritual consciousness. As Ariyaratne believed, the critical mass of consciousness once generated would transfer power to the community to take action against the political structures that create inequality and injustice (Bond, 2004). Consensus politics would arise from amongst the spiritual community who would choose what is right for them in mutual agreement and would replace party politics which leads to separatism (Bond, 2004). As Bond (2004) describes, Ariyaratne initiated this political system by forming a network of village republics as a bottom-up command to challenge the top-down power of the government and multinational corporations.
The Movement expanded its influence to 10,000 rural villages in 1994 ending almost a decade of political and financial struggles.

**Phase 4: 1994- present – Self-assertive consolidation and reestablishment of collaborative networks beyond rural communities.**

A decade long political oppression endured by the Movement ended in this phase and a collaborative relationship was established once again with the government. This is an interesting phase of the Movement as they have adopted technologies and modern sciences in their governance strategies alongside the use of spiritual infrastructure. The Movement is also currently administered by a modern management structure incorporating A.T. Ariyaratne’s ideology. This phase of the Movement is important in environmental governance to examine how spiritual frameworks and technological frameworks can be merged in governance in locally appropriate measures.

In order to keep up with the modern developments in Sri Lanka, the Sarvodaya has adopted a ‘modern’ management structure. Its founder Dr. Ariyaratne plays the role of providing the “ideological and inspirational leadership to the organisation” (Sarvodaya, 2014) even at present. However, the Movement is now also based on modern management models and leadership (Sarvodaya, 2014). Also, the Movement operates on three broad strategic goals, which is detailed in the Sarvodaya Strategic Plan 2005-2010 as the consciousness goal, economic goal and power goal (Sarvodaya, 2013).

As shown in Figure 1, the Sarvodaya Movement has a consciousness sphere at the top, which aims for the spiritual development of Sarvodaya communities. Spiritual development provides religious and spiritual inputs (derived from Buddhism and Gandhian concepts) to the economic and power processes of Sarvodaya projects. According to the most recent publication of the Movement, Sarvodaya (2013, p.14), consciousness domain contains the principles of “Individual Awakening (Loving Kindness, Compassionate Action, Selfless Joy, Equanimity) and the Principles of Group Awakening (Dana, Pleasant Speech, Constructive Action, Equality)”. Consciousness also consists of the awareness of inter-religious and inter-ethnic tolerance. Under the economic domain, Sarvodaya aims for its projects to satisfy basic, secondary and tertiary needs of communities with an intention of delivering production that is sustainable. The ideal economic development model of a Sarvodaya community intends to satisfy Ten Basic Human Needs (which were mentioned above), aiming at a society with neither affluence nor poverty. The economic sphere also aims at the “development of cultural, moral and spiritual values” (Sarvodaya, 2013, p.14). The ‘power’ sphere contains the ideals of good governance and ultimately people’s control over governing institutions. The power sphere aims for bottom-up grassroots participation in decision making and project management where “power is really with the people at community level” (Sarvodaya, 2013, p.14).

At present, the Movement is spread to over 15,000 villages in Sri Lanka. One third of these villages are not supported by outside funding but based on “self-sustaining development activities” (Sarvodaya, 2014).

**Conclusion**

The paper looked at how the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, a religion-based grassroots movement in Sri Lanka innovated Buddhist concepts and methods in a socially, economically and politically appropriate way to address some pressing governance challenges it faced in its fifty-year lifespan. Through this examination, the paper also demonstrated how the Sarvodaya Movement’s use of religious concepts in these four phases addressed three major issues faced by social movements in environmental governance. These are, the difficulty in altering worldviews and values; difficulty to create collaborative networks; and the difficulty in mass mobilisation. Therefore, this paper addressed a significant gap in risk governance literature through its
examination of how religious resources can be used to find solutions to some significant problems encountered by social movements in governance. Also, additionally, the work of the Movement in Phase 4 demonstrated how religious concepts could be used resourcefully to generate a fusion between ideology and modernity.

References


Laughing through the discomfort: Navigating neoliberal feeling rules in a Tumblr attention economy

Akane Kanai
Monash University, Melbourne

Abstract

The practice of femininity is a complex balancing act, with heightened expectations of resilient individuality in keeping with expectations of contemporary neoliberal citizens and workers, entangled with requirements of normative femininity. I argue that as part of the gendered expectations of individuality within digital ‘attention economies’ (boyd 2011; Fairchild 2007; Marwick 2015), there is a requirement on young women to manage their emotions to be amenable to others. Drawing on Hochschild’s (1983) work on emotional labour, I use a set of humorous GIF reaction blogs to show how young women navigate neoliberal feeling rules to maintain visibility and accessibility for readers.

Keywords: Femininity; emotional labour; regulation; youth; attention economy; Tumblr

Introduction: playing by the rules

In early 2012, an anonymous Tumblr blog, WhatShouldWeCallMe (‘WSWCM’) suddenly exploded into popularity. The blog’s humorous style of narration attracted up to 1.5 million views per day a few months after inception (Eckerle 2012) and also inspired a number of spin off blogs with the same format. Using incongruous GIFs (animated, looping images) and captions in its posts, the blog articulated relatable feelings and struggles of youthful, feminine everyday experience. Such posts spanned moments like ‘sitting in a morning work meeting without any coffee’ and ‘when my best friend ditches me to hang with her boyfriend’. The blog was featured on sites like The Huffington Post and USA Today and its creators, two best friends who met in university, were interviewed by Forbes journalist Meghan Casserly in March 2012. In response to Casserly’s question about their winning formula for humour, one blogger responded:

Definitely self-deprecating humour. That’s where [blogger 2] and I really get going. Neither one of us takes the other or ourselves seriously and we’re constantly talking about what wastes of lives we are. I mean, we’re kidding obviously, we’re in school to be attorneys, but that’s the funniest part of the site to me. (Casserly 2012).

I begin with this remarkable, yet mundane joke about being ‘wastes of lives’ despite being ‘in school to be attorneys’ to foreground how contemporary femininity is a complex thing which young women must navigate and manage. The practice of femininity is a tricky balancing act, with heightened expectations of resilient individuality in keeping with expectations of contemporary
neoliberal citizens and workers, entangled with requirements of normative femininity, online and offline. Young women must fulfil the space of power which has been allocated to them, but importantly, whilst not transgressing gendered expectations of being pleasing to others (McRobbie 2009). Commenting on the contemporary requirement to continually be ready to adapt and re-invent the self, Negra (2008) observes the concomitant affective obligation for women to maintain a level of ‘serenity’ while doing so. Online, Banet-Weiser (2011; 2012) argues, this produces an ideal ‘interactive subject’ who adapts her brand through the architectures of gendered online feedback, producing a feminine self ideal for digital circulation.

Drawing on the work of Arlie Hochschild in relation to emotional labour, I point to the way in which neoliberalism is lived, not just as a set of life regulations, but as a set of ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild 1983). One must have the right feelings for the right context (Hochschild 1983) and if one's feelings diverge from the appropriate ones, one must work on them to make them ‘fit’. I argue that as part of the gendered expectations of a highly marketised individuality within digital ‘attention economies’ (boyd 2011; Fairchild 2007; Marwick 2015), there is a heightened requirement on young women to manage their emotions to be amenable and agreeable for others. Even in the face of an increasingly regulatory media environment where women's bodies are intensely monitored and appraised, and the pervasive discourse of ‘healthism’ (Rose 1999) governs bodily practices and consumption, young women are exhorted to be ‘normal’, carefree and confident (Gill 2007). They must be positive; indeed, it is ideal if young women have a good sense of humour.

This paper will examine the discursive and ‘affective’ (Wetherell 2012) negotiations of WSWCM and five of its spinoff blogs on Tumblr in relation to feeling rules about the body and food consumption. In the context of WSWCM and its spinoff blogs, such feeling rules regulate how young women may speak of feminine burdens of management, limiting their articulation to upbeat, punchy quips. While resistance to and transgression of norms of body regulation are articulated, I suggest that the success of these blogs is predicated on their adherence to feeling rules about how young women are to manage gendered pressures. The ability to individually bear gendered struggles with good humour produces moments of resilient, pleasing femininity, amenable to circulation within Tumblr's attention economy.

Youthful femininity, relatability and Tumblr's attention economy

Tumblr is a microblogging platform where one may ‘follow’ one's favourite blogs, and reblog and like others' posts. It is marketed as a ‘creative’ platform where one can ‘follow the world’s creators’ (Tumblr 2015). Tumblr has been argued to be a site where youth feel they can be themselves (Renninger 2014), as well as a site of queer and trans* exchange (Cho 2011; Fink and Miller 2014). It has been estimated that women use the platform slightly more than men, and that Tumblr’s demographic is more youth-based than other platforms, with 45% of its users under the age of 35 (Austin 2013). However, work on the youthful femininities which are produced through its platform is still a developing area of research.

In contrast to social platforms like Facebook and Twitter which have been argued to produce norms of self-branding and the drive to increase visibility (Brandes and Levin 2014; Bucher 2012; Marwick and boyd 2011), Tumblr operates on norms of public anonymity (Cho 2011) whereby most of the content uploaded by its users is publicly available, but under pseudonymous accounts. On Tumblr, the number of followers on one's blog is not shown automatically, unless the blogger decides to publish this statistic themselves. Yet, it may still be argued that Tumblr provides an architecture whereby attention is quantified and measured. Posts on Tumblr indicate the number of interactions or ‘notes’ at the top of the post, showing how many users have liked or reblogged the post.
Reblogging is an enormous contributor to the production of content on Tumblr. In 2013, it was estimated that 95% of all content on Tumblr at any given point is reblogged (Strle 2013). Reblogging as a function suggests that a Tumblr user must not only like the blog post, but it must also speak to that Tumblr user on a personal level since reblogging a post makes it a visible part of their own blog, like a ‘pin’ on Pinterest. In contrast to a platform like Facebook which is predicated on maintaining existing networks of one’s contacts, on Tumblr, blog posts are addressed to unknown groups defined by their imagined commonality with the individual blogger. The attention economy of Tumblr, with its norms of public, pseudonymous expression operates on how social knowledges and experiences may be boiled down into imagined commonalities for people that one may not personally know.

I suggest that posts that express a personal experience, as the WSWCM blog posts do, are more likely to be reblogged in Tumblr’s attention economy if they are deemed to be recognisable, relatable and reflect the thoughts or experiences of others in a pleasing, or at least, non-compromising way. In relation to WSWCM and its spinoff blogs, it is clear from their popularity that the quotidian struggles and setbacks that they narrate are highly relatable. The minute management of femininity is an easily recognisable set of problems. These blogs document a highly relatable bundle of issues to do with gendered regulation, but articulate them in a way that is funny. The regulation of young women is posited as a complex thing which young women navigate, individually, but are able to laugh about. The blogs' self-deprecating humour works in a double sense: first, articulating personal negotiations of neoliberal regulation; and second, improving circulation of the blog posts through connecting to common anxieties in a pleasurable, non-compromising way for both authors and readers.

Making fun of food and body regulation
I examine the affective and discursive tactics of WSWCM and related blogs through one key site of feminine regulation: the body and food consumption. Food intake and its relation to the female body has been argued to be a highly relatable problem which women collectively recognise, reflected in media ranging from self-help literature to women’s magazines (Winch 2013). In making my point about the way in which the burden of body and food regulation is widely recognisable, I argue that at the same time, feeling rules regarding the articulation of this burden are often closely adhered to so that its recognition does not cause discomfort. I underline how food, even positioned as it is as one of the central struggles of managing femininity, is discussed in such a way that it cannot be explicitly called out as a problem. While a blogger might voice some discontentment, she cannot show that the regulatory matrix governing food consumption bothers her too much.

I draw attention to the way in which the feeling rules surrounding one’s articulation of self-regulation require humour. The self-deprecating humour of the posts allows the blogger to make light of unattractive feelings, presenting herself for the humorous pleasure of the reader. The use of humour creates value from unpalatable feelings which can then be circulated in the digital attention economy, and is key to defusing the perception that one is overly impacted by the feelings of frustration, shame, or resentment unbefitting a strong, neoliberal subject.
As an example, I turn to the post of one of the spinoff blogs relating to the situation ‘when there’s too many hot guys by where I’m laying out and I instantly regret eating this week’. The scenario suggests that the body of the blogger is stretched out for potential viewing and evaluation by the ‘hot guys’, resulting in the self-policing by the blogger. The reaction to this scenario is produced through a dramatic GIF of young actress Jennifer Lawrence enacting terror, shaking, her hands clutching her head with the caption ‘MY BODY ISN’T READY’.

The above post references potential surveillance by ‘hot guys’, but the frustration and terror of one’s body being seen is borne as an individual burden, rather than taken out on the potential ‘hot guy’ spectators.

In the above post documenting fears of being watched by ‘too many hot guys’, I suggest that the humour is partly derived from the sheer exaggeration of the sentiment of unreadiness. But the way that the undesirability of one’s body after eating is expressed through the idea of ‘readiness’ is telling of the way that bodily appearance is deeply entangled within neoliberal understandings of the self. Rather than using more basic and direct physical descriptions such as ‘ugly’ or ‘fat’, the horror of a non-normative body is expressed through the more sophisticated psychic expression of (a lack of) ‘readiness’.

Expression in terms of ‘readiness’ eschews the neat and obvious labelling of the ‘right’ weight or body shape; rather, it orients attention to how one feels, as an individual. Ringrose and Walkerdine (2008) and Tincknell (2012) suggest makeover discourses produce emotional redemption through the transformation of the body into a slimmer, more youthful looking ‘version’ of itself. The effect of these discourses is to produce the non-normative body as a site of abjection. Further, by suturing the transformation of one’s body into discourses of self-care (Negra 2008), this burden of abjection is borne by the individual. As Negra (2008) emphasises, much of the rhetoric of ‘body perfectionism’ carefully reassures women of their own agency and competency of self-management. Women, then, only have themselves to blame for these feelings of horror if they do not ‘choose’ to take care of themselves, and to be ‘ready’ when the time requires it. Thus, the scream ‘my body isn’t ready’ thus takes on the burden of male surveillance, bearing it with good humour, showing that the blogger is managing this burden herself. This performance of managing individualises gendered concerns into an amenable unit of distribution: the blog post which can be disseminated.

Sometimes, there is explicit resistance to governmental directives to monitor one’s food consumption, performed through actively avowing a love of food. However, I observe this is rarely done without some form of defensiveness. When ‘my reaction to every single meal’ is documented on WSWCM through a chubby young man whose face speaks volumes of excitement, hands rubbing together in glee, this can be seen as a method of connecting with others and sharing a joy of anticipating eating. Yet, I suggest why it is humorous lies in mocking the idea that one would look forward to consuming food all the time; essentially, it is a joke about gluttony and the way it detracts from conventions of feminine elegance and parsimony. The female glutton is suggestive of non-normative bodily traits associated with the female ‘grotesque’ (Winch 2013), which has a history of being played for laughs. Indeed, the post mobilises assumptions around
the chubbiness of the young man, as a way of demonstrating one’s unbridled, unfeminine delight in food consumption.

The admission of gluttony speaks to a recurring genre in the way the love of food comes across in these blogs: the confessional. One either draws attention to food deemed unhealthy, or to the volume of the food consumed, in citation of the norms of healthism discussed by Rose (1999). Healthism, as Rose observes, is a form of normativity which renders bodies governable according to its standards. Such governmentality has particular resonance in middle class cultures, where ‘health’ becomes a catch-all justification for food and body regulation. However, health becomes equated with thinness for women in particular. For example, I point to the post articulating the feeling ‘when a really skinny person is talking about how much junk food they eat’. The GIF, a closeup of the face of drag queen Bianca del Rio, captures pursed lips combined with a slow, unimpressed, blinking accentuated by the stupendous length of her false eyelashes.

Though other posts articulate a joyous and copious consumption of junk food, the bored distaste shown on the face of del Rio here, suggests the skinny person, or rather, the skinny girl is not permitted to do so. The skinny girl’s body is held to express the idea that her food issues are resolved by her slim body. If talking about food is received in the interests of relatable body concerns, the skinny girl is not permitted to be part of this shared feminine anxiety. Her body speaks for itself; she does not have a ‘struggle’ to document.

Food, then, is almost always politicised in this meme set. What I suggest is made visible here, through the posts, is both the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of standards of body regulation, coupled with the ability to articulate one’s individual management of these standards in an ultimately benign way. Accordingly, a complex entanglement of affects and narratives about food consumption emerges. Even holding up excessive eating as a form of proud transgression can be seen as the visible effect of the compulsion to take a stance in relation to food. The way in which food consumption is repetitively documented in terms of volume suggests that the distinction between ‘not caring’, and the self-governing practice of documenting and counting food, is liminal and prone to rupture.

Concluding thoughts: regulation and resilience
By knowing the feeling rules, young women can try to have it both ways: they can perform minor transgressions, but still be recognised as individuals who are able to manage. Humour is used in the blogs to show that one is not really a ‘victim’ of those rules regarding body regulation, which the expression of anger or a distinctly unfunny dejection might reveal. The repetitive documenting of the transgression of the food rules must not be deemed too anxious, or too sad.
In the WSWCM blogs, humour is a way in which prickly and messy affects are converted into value. Positivity, as van Dijck (2013) notes, is an affect which enables further circulation in social networks where sociality, expressed through circulation, is programmed to generate economic value. Such an evaluation of the economic value of affect and its circulation underpins the reason, van Dijck (2013) suggests, Facebook employs a ‘like’ rather than ‘disgust’ button. Humour, then, is a technique employed in the blogs to render disgruntlement with the terms of feminine bodily normativity a lighter burden which is amenable to further circulation. According to the norms of circulation of these blogs, self-branded foibles must be made funny for consumption by others. Though a young woman may not feel happy about her body, she is encouraged to communicate this dissatisfaction in a comical fashion, at once shoring up the importance of the body regulatory standard but importantly, bearing it with good humour. Above all, the neoliberal subject is not a burden to others; she cheerfully manages her own burden.

In their conversion of the difficulties and dangerous pleasures of food consumption into shareable, humorous moments, we can observe the understood importance of relatability. Sharing one's troubles in a feminine world where these troubles are likely to be recognised provides a form of legitimation. On Tumblr, the humour of the moment in the post becomes even more important to sustain a fairly abstract relationship between bloggers and reader, in a context where they usually do not know each other. Humour becomes a form of fun, easy connection in a relation which is mainly imagined through the textual transaction rather than sustained through other means. The mutual recognition in the joke invites further connection in the consumption of more upbeat moments, based on shared struggles. It also presumes a form of invulnerability on behalf of both bloggers and readers which flatters both sides of the branded relationship. Both, as Tumblr users, can participate in a shared imaginary where one is able to manage. The reader can thus continue to consume and co-create experiences of resilient femininity, participating in a digital public where the discomforts of contemporary femininity are acknowledged, but where all manage to go on.

References
Casserly, M. (2012) '#WhatShouldWeCallMe Revealed: The 24-Year Old Law Students Behind


Tattoos, piercings and youth: How does body modification fit into young people’s life circumstances?

Carley Fraser

Monash University

Abstract

Tattoos and body piercings are forms of body modification which have received increasing attention in recent times, particularly in relation to young people. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether young people’s participation in tattooing and body piercing aligns with particular life trajectories that have become associated with the concept of Emerging Adulthood. Using survey data from a large sample (n=1,927) of young Queenslanders participating in the Social Futures and Life Pathways (‘Our Lives’) project, I examine how young people’s participation in tattooing and body piercing varies according to factors including career, partnering and residential circumstances, controlling for a range of socio-demographic factors. The findings of these analyses indicate significant correlations between having a tattoo or piercing and gender, religiosity, personal income and involvement in post-secondary education. Correlations were also found between piercings, sexual orientation and father’s occupation. These findings have implications how body modification is currently understood at a socio-cultural level, as well as how it fits into young people’s broader sense of identity and increasing independence during their transition to adulthood.

Keywords: body modification; tattoos; body piercing; youth; demographics.

Changing understandings of, and participation in, body modification practices

Body modification has been defined as “cosmetics, coiffure, ornamentation, adornment, tattooing, scarification, piercing, currying, branding, and other procedures done mostly for aesthetic reasons” (Myers 1992, p. 267). Of these practices, tattooing and body piercing have received an increasing amount of attention recently. In a 20th century Western context, tattoos have been affiliated with lower social status and deviancy (Roberts 2012), including criminals and gang members, those of marginalised social and occupational status, such as prostitutes and sailors, as well as youth subcultural groups and psychological patients (Ferreira 2014; Wohlrab, Stahl, Rammsayer & Kappeler 2007). Body piercings have held connotations with homosexuality, involvement in sadomasochistic sexual subculture and youth subcultures, such as punk (Hewitt 1997).
A surge in popularity of both practices has been attributed to ‘mainstreaming’ outlets, including the media and entertainment industries for tattoos (Kosut 2006), and the fashion industry for body piercing (Stirm 2003). Not only have these sources generated new understandings of these practices, but they have arguably challenged some of the longer-standing cultural associations highlighted above. For instance, Kosut (2006) asserts that the tattoo community has undergone a ‘demographic shift’ and now “transcends age, class and ethnic boundaries” (Kosut 2006, p.1036). However, as DeMello (2004) notes, the ‘traditional’ tattoo community remains – but these groups no longer feature as prominently in wider discourse about tattoos. As a whole, changing understandings of who participates in tattooing and piercing suggests changing social values around these practices.

Despite limited research on the socio-demographic correlates of body modification, that which does exist suggests several trends. General population studies have demonstrated rates of body piercing at approximately 8-10% in Australia (Makkai & McAllister 2001), with higher rates appearing among women, young people and those of lower socio-economic status in the UK (Bone et al. 2008). Rates of tattooing in the Australian general population are approximately 14% (Heywood et al. 2012), though with rates as high as 24% in the US (Laumann & Derick 2006). Mixed results have been demonstrated in terms of gender, with higher rates of tattooing among men generally, but also among younger women in an Australian context (Heywood et al. 2012). This study also found higher rates among those in their 20s and 30s, among men with lower education levels and men working in trades. Other studies have shown associations between modified individuals, lower socio-economic status and educational achievement (Silver et al. 2009), educational aspirations and less positive school attitudes (Dukes & Stein 2011). A number of these findings appear to correspond with associations of tattooed individuals being of lower social status or working-class, and of young people with piercings rebelling against traditional institutions. However, they also suggest some broad social changes surrounding these practices, such as higher rates of tattooing among young women working against masculine associations with this practice (Atkinson 2002). Both factors suggest a need to understand where socio-demographic associations are demonstrated among those with tattoos and piercings.

Where body modification fits into young people’s lives

Youth is often considered a distinct period in the life-course – this proposition is put forward by Arnett (2000) in his concept of Emerging Adulthood. Arnett (2000, p. 469) suggests that the ages of 18-25 are a time “of relative independence from social roles and from normative expectations,” with an emphasis on identity exploration and demographic variability. At the same time, youth transitions are considered different from those of past generations, with current patterns including increased participation in post-secondary education and in a ‘precarious’ labour market, and delaying parenthood and marriage (Cuervo & Wyn 2011). This transition is also characterised as being increasingly complex and unpredictable, but with patterns of broader social inequality remaining (Cuervo & Wyn 2011).

Based upon these understandings of youth, it might be expected that young people’s engagement in body modification practices is related to identity exploration and emerging independence during their transition into adulthood. However, with the impact of inequality present, differences in engagement with these practices might be expected across social factors. With youth viewed as a period where transitions to adulthood are no longer as linear in some areas as before, and body modification practices seen to transcend social boundaries they were previously associated with, there is a need to undertake a preliminary investigation into whether socio-demographic factors and life circumstances are associated with differences in engagement in body modification practices by young people. As such, the research question which will guide exploration of this area is as follows:
How do young people who participate in tattooing and piercing differ in terms of socio-demographic characteristics and their present life circumstances?

**Methods**

In order to address this research question, I will employ a quantitative research approach, utilising secondary survey data collected as part of the Social Futures and Life Pathways (‘Our Lives’) Project. This multi-wave cohort study follows the lives of young people from Queensland, and their changing values and aspirations across a range of areas over time.

At present, four waves of survey data collection for this project have been undertaken. The first wave was administered in 2006 (Year 8, ages 12/13). In recruiting participants in the original cohort, an attempt was made to recruit all year 8 students from all high schools in Queensland. A response rate of 55% for schools and 34% of students within those schools was obtained, with a total of 7,031 respondents. Follow up waves of data collection were then conducted in 2008, (Year 10, ages 14/15; n = 3,653) and in 2010 (Year 12, ages 16/17; n = 3,209). Wave four (2013, ages 19/20, n = 2,206) was the first survey completed after respondents had finished high school. Fieldwork in wave 4 consisted of online surveying and Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI).

Unless otherwise specified, all variables for analysis are drawn from Wave 4. Table 1 provides the distribution of each of the measures to be considered. Where appropriate, system missing responses have been added to categories which account for missing values. After excluding missing cases on certain key analytic variables, the final analytic sample contained 1,927 respondents.

A binary logistic regression analysis will be executed to demonstrate the likelihood of having a tattoo or piercing across all categories of each IV, in comparison to a reference category. The reference category is generally chosen based upon the highest number of respondents within this category. A value which expresses how much the model itself accounts for the overall variation in having a tattoo or piercing, the Nagelkerke pseudo r-square, is also included in this analysis.

**Dependent variables**
The dependent variables in this study are tattoos and body piercings. Respondents were originally asked to indicate the number of according body modifications they had within a range of 0-20. For simplicity, responses have been transformed into categorical variables indicating if a respondent does or does not have a tattoo or body piercing, respectively.

**Table 1. Distribution of measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has piercings</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has tattoos</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>% or Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual/straight</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisexual, gay, lesbian or other</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure/don't know, prefer not to say</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
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</table>
Dependent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion (1-10)</td>
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</tr>
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Geographic region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional/remote</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Highest level of parental education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than year 12</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree or above</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
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Mother's/father's occupation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Mother</th>
<th>Father</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not employed</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
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Employment status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part-time/casual</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
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Income (per year)

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<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $5000</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$5001-10000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10001-15000</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15001-20000</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20001-30000</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $30000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer not to say/skipped</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
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</table>

Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a relationship (not living together)</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting/married</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
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Living arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living with parents</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not living with parents</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent variables

Demographic factors were included for respondents' gender, sexual orientation, religiosity and geographic region. Due to some response categories of sexual orientation having too few responses for effective analysis, final response categories were coded as ‘Heterosexual/straight’ (reference cat.), ‘Bisexual, gay or lesbian or other’, and ‘Don’t know/unsure, prefer not to say or skipped’. Religiosity was controlled for with a continuous measure, where respondents rated the importance of religion in their life on a scale of 1-10 (1=’not at all important’, 10= ‘the most important thing in my life’). Geographic region is based on respondents' postcodes and
differentiates between those ‘Major Cities’ (reference cat.) and those living in ‘Remote/Rural’ areas.

Parental socio-economic status was controlled for using two variables drawn from Wave 3 of data collection. Firstly, highest parental education level asks respondents to indicate the highest level of education achieved between both parents, from ‘Less than year 12’, ‘Year 12’, ‘Vocational’, ‘Bachelor’s degree or higher’ (reference cat.) or ‘Don’t know’. Respondents were asked to indicate their mother’s and father’s occupations, which were then coded into broad categories of ‘Managerial’, ‘Professional’ (reference cat.), ‘White collar’, ‘Blue collar’, ‘Not employed’ or ‘Don’t know’.

Lastly, respondents’ current life circumstances were accounted for with measures reflecting their career, partnering, and residential arrangements in early adulthood. Study status was examined with a measure of whether or not respondents were undertaking studies at the time of the survey. Employment was examined with a measure of respondent’s employment status and income. Employment status measured whether respondents were in part-time or casual work (<35 hours per week, reference cat.), full time work (>35 per week) or not working. Respondents indicated their gross income level from less than $5000 per year up to more than $80000 per year. These categories were recoded the reflect respondents’ overall distribution towards the lower end of this range, with a new upper threshold of ‘more than $30000’ (reference cat.). Respondents relationship status variable included three categories: ‘Single’ (reference cat.), ‘In a relationship (but not cohabiting)’ and ‘Cohabitating/married’. Finally, respondents’ residential arrangement was examined with a variable indicating whether or not they were still living in the parental home.

Results
Table 2 displays the results of the logistic regression model analysing whether or not respondents had one or more tattoos. The Nagelkerke pseudo r-square value indicates that the model containing all variables explained around 15% of the overall variation in tattoo prevalence. Of the demographic controls included in the model, gender and religiosity significantly predicted whether or not respondents had a tattoo. Females were twice as likely as males to have one or more tattoos, whilst for every one point increase in religiosity the likelihood of having a tattoo decreased by around 10%. Meanwhile, when all the variables in the model are accounted for, sexual orientation, geographic region, and the parental SES controls were found to be uncorrelated with tattoo prevalence.

<p>| Table 2: Logistic regression of odds of having a tattoo (1= Has one or more tattoos) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Demographic factors            | O.R.            | 95% C.I.        |
| Gender                         |                 |                 |
| Male (ref)                      |                 |                 |
| Female                         | 2.008***        | 1.459, 2.763    |
| Sexual orientation             |                 |                 |
| Heterosexual/straight (ref)    |                 |                 |
| Gay or lesbian, bisexual or other | .995          | .596, 1.662     |
| Unsure/don’t know/refused      | .699            | .257, 1.898     |
| Importance of religion (scale 1-10) | .897*** | .850, .947     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic region</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban (ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/remote</td>
<td>1.105</td>
<td>.804,1.521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parental SES factors

Highest parental education level

Bachelor’s degree or higher (ref)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>1.359</td>
<td>.909,2.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12</td>
<td>1.408</td>
<td>.871,2.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than year 12</td>
<td>1.335</td>
<td>.816,2.183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mother’s occupation

Professional (ref)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>.406,1.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>.655,1.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>.890</td>
<td>.440,1.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>.562,1.491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Father’s occupation

Professional (ref)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>.969</td>
<td>.603,1.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>1.466</td>
<td>.861,2.496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>1.230</td>
<td>.767,1.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed</td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>.421,1.812</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current situation

Employment status

Part-time/casual (ref)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.624,1.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>.692,1.617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personal income

More than $30000 per year (ref)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$20001 – 30000 per year</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>.471,1.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15001 – 20000 per year</td>
<td>.542*</td>
<td>.306,.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10001 – 15000 per year</td>
<td>.350**</td>
<td>.193,.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5001 – 10000 per year</td>
<td>.203***</td>
<td>.106,.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $5000 per year</td>
<td>.247***</td>
<td>.126,.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer not to say/skipped</td>
<td>.527*</td>
<td>.285,.975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Study status
Only two of the current situation variables – personal income and involvement in study - were found to be significantly correlated with whether or not respondents had a tattoo. There was a strong, positive relationship between income and having a tattoo – generally speaking, the higher a respondent’s income, the greater the chances were that they had at least one tattoo. Compared to those in the highest income bracket ($30k or more), respondents who earned between $15k-$20k were 46% less likely to have a tattoo. This relative decline in odds rose to 65% for respondents who earned $10k-$20k, and peaked at 80% for those who earned $5k-$10k. Finally, respondents who were not still involved in any post-secondary study two years after high school were around 20% more likely to have a tattoo.

Table 3 indicates the results of the logistic regression model analysing whether or not respondents had one or more body piercings. The pseudo r-squared value indicates that the model containing all variables explained around 27% of the overall variation in the prevalence of body piercings. All demographic factors considered except for geographic region significantly predicted having a body piercing. Females were approximately 12 times more likely than males to have a body piercing. Those who identified as bisexual, gay, lesbian or another sexual orientation, and those who indicated they were unsure or preferred not to specify their orientation were approximately 2.3-2.4 times more likely to have body piercings. A one point increase in the importance placed on religion indicated a 10% decrease in the likelihood of having a piercing. Of the parental SES controls in this model, only father's occupation was found to be significantly correlated with whether or not respondents had body piercings: those whose fathers worked blue-collar jobs were around 60% more likely to indicate having a piercing than those whose fathers worked in professional occupations.

Table 3: Logistic regression of odds of having a piercing other than an earring (1=Has one or more piercings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic factors</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.431***</td>
<td>8.063,19.166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Sexual orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual/straight (ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay or lesbian, bisexual or other</td>
<td>2.409**</td>
<td>1.545, 3.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure/don't know, prefer not to say or skipped</td>
<td>2.310*</td>
<td>1.118, 4.774</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Importance of religion (scale 1-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of religion (scale 1-10)</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.902***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.859,.946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Geographic region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic region</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban (ref)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.743, 1.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/remote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Parental SES factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest parental education level</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree or higher (ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>1.201</td>
<td>.832, 1.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>.646, 1.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than year 12</td>
<td>1.260</td>
<td>.800, 1.986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mother's occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional (ref)</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>.960</td>
<td>.602, 1.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>.820</td>
<td>.570, 1.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>.933</td>
<td>.495, 1.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed</td>
<td>.787</td>
<td>.503, 1.231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Father's occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional (ref)</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>.553, 1.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>.705, 1.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>1.603*</td>
<td>1.053, 2.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed</td>
<td>1.359</td>
<td>.748, 2.470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Current situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part-time/casual (ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td>.487, 1.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>.776, 1.623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Personal income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More than $30000 per year (ref)</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$20001 – 30000 per year</td>
<td>1.327</td>
<td>.812, 2.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15001 – 20000 per year</td>
<td>.571</td>
<td>.318, 1.026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As with the results for tattoos, personal income and study status were the only current situation variables found to significantly predict one's likelihood of having at least one piercing. The odds of having a piercing differed significantly only when comparing those who earned more than $30k per year and those who earned $5k-10k and less than $5k per year: these two groups were approximately 55% and 70% less likely to report having piercings, respectively. Finally, those who were not currently studying in post-secondary education were 60% more likely to indicate having a piercing than those who were studying.

**Discussion**

The purpose of this study was to address how young people who participate in tattooing and piercing differ in terms of socio-demographic characteristics and current life circumstances. Overall, it was demonstrated that these factors account for the variation in engagement in tattooing and body piercing to a degree, and that there were significant correlations between young people's participation these practices and a number of the factors of interest.

Considering these variables individually reveals that these practices are not necessarily reflecting traditional groups who engage in them, but rather, in some cases they have shifted away from those associations. This is the case for gender, where women were found to be more likely to have tattoos, which have roots in male-dominated occupational groups and subcultures. This also reflects recent research which demonstrates increasingly popularity of tattoos among women (e.g. Heywood et al. 2012; Laumann & Derick 2006). Similarly, the finding that tattooed and pierced young people are more likely to have higher incomes works against framings of young people with these modifications, such as deviancy, lower social class and lack of connections to institutions (Dukes & Stein 2011; Adams 2009).
Despite these developments, a number of the differences found do seem to be connected to traditional associations of body modification, including connections to sexual preferences (Hewitt 1997). The findings that young people who have tattoos and piercings are more likely to be earning higher incomes and not studying may link their occupational pathways to a more working-class orientation. As such, it can be considered that some socio-demographic associations with body modification practices have transcended their traditional meanings, whereas others appear to reflect these.

Another implication of these findings is that engagement in tattooing and piercing does not appear to be correlated with markers of independence in terms of work, relationship status and residential status. Such findings reflect the lack of demographic predictability and identity exploration associated with emerging adulthood (Arnett 2000). However, differences in income level and study status suggest that engaging in these practices as a form of identity exploration is limited or enabled by economic resources and institutional involvement. Furthermore, the socio-demographic differences found in regards to gender, sexuality and religiosity also highlight that body modification practices may be influenced by particular socio-demographic factors during this time.

This research presents a preliminary analysis of the relationship between having a tattoo or a piercing, and socio-demographic factors. These results provide a starting point for further investigation into the influence of broader social factors in the decision to engage in body modification practices. Further research is needed to examine young people's motivations for undergoing body modification, and how these contribute to their broader understandings of their own emerging identities and life pathways.

References


Urban Growth, Youth and Environmentalism driving Local Initiatives in Bandung, Indonesia

Meredian Alam¹ Pam Nilan*

¹PhD Candidate in Sociology and Anthropology. *School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Newcastle, NSW

ABSTRACT
Neoliberalism in urban Indonesia has been marked by massive industrialisation. As elsewhere, many of today’s environmental problems are direct or indirect consequences of the everyday behaviours of people in the past and the present who will not be here in 50 years. With the city of Bandung as an example this paper looks at local anti-development environmental initiatives enacted by different grassroots organisations comprised primarily of young people who might well become the country’s leaders of the future. Drawing on fieldwork between 2013 and 2014, the paper examines how these youth-dominated organisations have challenged rampant development and industrialisation. The purposeful collective identity of young environmentalists is also briefly considered.

Keywords: urban environmental problems, young people, activism, local initiatives

Youth and Environment
Youth are at the forefront of movements that seek to bring about justice and social change, including environmentalism. Young people have every reason to feel concerned, since they will literally inherit the earth. We know that the period of youth and emerging adulthood is an important time of transition to adult roles and responsibilities, including civic engagement (Arnett 2006). Due to their strong idealism and energy, pro-environmentalist youth organizers can be very effective in reaching out to other young people and members of their communities (Riemer and Patterson 2009).

However, this does not mean all youth are activists in the making. Wray-Lake, Flanagan, and Osgood (2010) examined international trends in young people’s environmental attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours across three decades. They found an overall decline in personal conservation behaviours and increase in assigning environmental responsibility to the government. Other studies also suggest that environmental concerns have recently become less salient among young people (for example, Twenge, Campbell and Freeman 2012). It is perhaps surprising then to find a strong presence of young people in environmental activism in several rapidly developing Indonesian cities, including Bandung. This paper explores that phenomenon.
Urban Crisis in Bandung

Indonesia faces environmental challenges from both poorly regulated development and growing population pressure. Cities have grown exponentially, along with the middle class. Urban public spaces are littered and polluted. There is little regulation of polluting activities, and minimal public consciousness of uncontrolled building and industrial development. Nevertheless, environmental groups, often founded and led by young people, try to raise the consciousness of the population (Nilan 2015). Pro-growth urban planning and fast-tracked development reduces physical public urban space. Decentralisation has accelerated flow of investment into urban areas (Aritenang 2013). Enhanced by the technological affordances of SMS and social media, there is mounting social protest, not least because the government has ignored the public in decision-making.

Broadly speaking, environmentalist views in Indonesia are most often framed around conservation concerns (di Gregorio 2012), and Bandung proves no exception because rapidly growing industrialisation and commercialisation have impinged upon its urban environment (Arifwidodo 2014). Bandung was the second largest metropolitan area in Indonesia in 2011, with 2,420,146 inhabitants living in a 153 km$^2$ area (Statistical Bureau of Bandung 2011). This prosperous city is a centre of information and technology innovation. Indonesia’s largest telecommunications company headquarters is located here. Attempting to sustain strong growth, the municipal government has boosted a ‘creative-based’ cultural economy, which has encouraged more people to come to the city for jobs and further their education (Soemardi and Radjawali2004).

Martin-Iverson (2014: 534) notes Bandung’s historical orientation to global modernity and cosmopolitan culture. In Dutch Colonial times it was known as the ‘Paris of Java’, and is now a showcase for the nation’s modernisation and a centre for manufacturing and education (…) something of a “style capital” for Indonesia, a major centre for many interrelated creative industries, including fashion, music, visual arts and new media’. However, the consequences of untrammelled development have been disastrous. A recent study reveals ‘rapid land use changes, unmanageable traffic conditions, and uncontrolled population’ (Arifwidodo 2014: 243). Lack of regulation, accountability and proper planning has caused recurring problems that the local government has not been able to control.

Under a government-led development profile called the Bandung Metropolitan Area (BMA), foreign and domestic investors flocked from the capital city, Jakarta, to invest in Bandung property acquisitions and hospitality businesses. This has led to spatial pressures in Bandung, marked by declining public space in the city. The government has attempted to resolve this issue by sacrificing some significant historical sites for the sake of commercial needs. Their actions demonstrate how urban development often attempts to spatially homogenise a city for commercial purposes (Mirza 2010). In other words, the local government is dismantling the memory of the past to craft new faces of the city (Kusno 2010).

Li (2007: 263) acknowledges that while individual Indonesians may become environmentalists, it is through collective knowledge and initiative that significant pro-environmental action groups come about and make change. Young people – who do not have political power - have taken the lead in such organisations, and they reach out to members of the Bandung public from all walks of life. Martin-Iverson (2014: 535) notes that Bandung is a significant ‘centre of modern urban youth culture’ in Indonesia. He also notes ‘an assertive pride in the local’ among Bandung alternative music scene youth. Our findings in this paper therefore support the argument of Maffesoli (1996: 1-2) that social movement praxis is a space where transformative potential, ‘is characterised by puissance – the ‘energy and vital force of the people’ rather than pouvoir – top-down institutionalised power’.
Environmentalism as a Local Initiative

Many ‘green’ community organisations and actions have been initiated by young urbanites with a common mission to restore Bandung to a liveable city. For the most part these young people are from middle class backgrounds, and well-educated. While formal learning about the environment is confined to some university courses, informal learning takes place in such collectives. Discussed below are the Bird Conservation Society (BICONS), Culindra, Komunitas Taman Kota (City Park Community), Sahabat Kota (Friends of the City), U-Green, UNPAD Green ID, Greenpeace Youth Volunteers Bandung and Backsilmove. A general characteristic of the organisations is firstly that the founders were creative young people aged between 19 and 29 years old; and secondly that they attract young members.

BICONS was founded in 1999 by a group of university students studying Biology. They protested the decline in local bird species and habitat due to intense urban development (Suharko et al. 2014). BICONS has since extended its activities to research, training, environmental education and outreach. To encourage awareness of local bird habitats there is Sunday Bird Watching (SBW) which offers one day training in observing birds in designated areas of Bandung where birds nest and flock. Enthusiastic young BICONS members conduct the training.

Three organisations aiming to revive sustainable use of urban parks are Culindra, Komunitas Taman Kota and Sahabat Kota. The young artists of Culindra provide an annual urban festival - Parktivity - to educate Bandung people about pro-environmental behaviour using a simple urban market format. People visit stalls displaying environmental demonstrations and experiments, such as bio-porous absorption holes, organic fertiliser and the management of household waste. The festival takes place in two prominent parks with shadytrees and greenery. An open-mike and band show is staged to attract young visitors and others to socialise, hang out, and learn about the environment. Through its Green Invasion Project workshop, Culindra encourages an environmentally friendly lifestyle among senior high school students. Following the workshop, each school starts a ‘green’ student group to disseminate information about the value of parks for public socialising. When the extensive Babakan Siliwangi (Baksil) city forest was about to be commercialised, Culindra took part in the protest campaign with an open air concert called ‘Baksil Afternoon Party’, which aimed to sensitise its young audience to the ecological crisis facing the urban forest. Culindra partnered with the Sanggar Olah Seni (Art Workshop) organisation, Sundanese painters headquartered in the northeast area of Babakan Siliwangi forest to stage the party.

Komunitas Taman Kota (City Park Community) was founded by a youthful Adjo Akasia (Suharko et al. 2014) to draw school-aged children to parks and introduce them to socio-ecological functions of socialising in nature and learning about the environment. Komunitas Taman Kota conducts drawing and colouring competitions, a free children’s book library, sporting activities, traditional games, a nature adventure, a collective lunch or potlach, and a second-hand book sale – all in parks. For young people there is the weekly Senjalogi event including open-air music concerts and art performances. Young people in Bandung now lack public space for expressing their identity. Senjalogi allows them to showcase their artistic talent, build more networks for socialising, and nurture their love for green spaces. Komunitas Taman Kota is currently concerned about the city’s lack of trees to help absorb carbon monoxide gas. They recently conducted guerrilla seed-bombing on kerbsides. Similar organisation Sahabat Kota was founded in 2007 by six university students discontented with the limited number of urban playgrounds. At first they simply provided school holiday activities. Later, urban ecological adventures were developed. Children were transported to city forests, rivers and parks to teach them about the vital function of public space. Great interest saw this become an annual school holiday program. Sahabat Kota has forged partnerships with local stakeholders Nature
Conservation Agency and Construction Work Agency to collectively contribute to sustainable cityplanning.

University students actively contribute to promoting pro-environmental attitudes. One student-led organisation, U-Green, organises an annual Sekolah Hijau Muda (Young Green School) three month course. Young people study diverse subjects relating to forest degradation, waste management, animal conservation and ecological philosophy. Field trips to devastated nature sites demonstrate on-going environmental problems. The U-Green Wild Animal Welfare program includes Fauna Day which teaches school aged children about the ethical treatment of animals. Sustainable Waste Management is modelled through the implementation of 3R (Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle) on campus. At a different university, UNPAD Green ID devotes its attention to the development of the campus as an environmentally friendly space. They campaign on waste separation and management. They also host a nature photography competition, a candle-lit green music concert, an environmental road show and a sustainability campaign in local neighbourhoods.

Worldwide ENGOs have extended their working operations to Bandung. For example, Greenpeace Volunteers Bandung has worked on the conservation of the Citarum River. In 2012, on their own initiative, young volunteers ceremoniously carried contaminated river water through the city centre on a day of celebration. The effect was extraordinary, as they wore astronaut outfits while walking along the street with the bottled contaminated water. Their involvement looks to have been instrumental in the success of the Greenpeace Citarum River project, since there was markedly less local property damage after the 2012 floods. When the Babakan Siliwangi urban forest was threatened by government-approved developers in 2013, Greenpeace youth volunteers independently founded the protest organisation Backsilmove to present young people’s grievances against the development site plan. Using SMS and social media, they successfully mobilised a protest rally of young people which processed from the city forest to the parliamentary building. With national media cameras focused on them, Greenpeace Volunteers Bandung presented a dramatic theatrical performance that symbolised their disgruntlement and opposition to the government-sanctioned plan. The rally was widely publicised in Indonesia’s two prominent newspapers, KOMPAS and Media Indonesia. The forest was eventually saved due to the collective efforts of many youth-based organisations.

Collective youth identity

None of these organisations could function without the concerted efforts of young people. Interviews with Bandung environmental youth activists revealed a strong commitment, for example, ‘we need to do something, and remaining silent is not a solution’ (William, M, 23). One young woman declared staunchly,

A real activist is someone who can defend her ideology with whatsoever means she has. Aside from that, she must be able to measure the risk and protect herself from any threat. Being in a movement is not necessarily shouting out loud in front of the public, but we should be able to face groups who disagree with our standpoints (Larissa, F.19).

Hung (2011) indicates that young people who develop a strong attachment to place can become highly aware of the social, spatial, political and economic forces that impact on their communities, and Larissa seems to exemplify that kind of ‘located’ political activist stance. Moreover, it seems that for many of them love of nature was an important motivation,

In early 2013 I was shocked to hear that part of Babakan Siliwangi would be developed as a (hotel)/restaurant complex. As someone who loves nature that moment wrenched my feelings and put me down. When I heard that so many newspaper headlines were covering the annexation of Babakan Siliwangi my hands were shaking. It was like I had lost my own home (Gibran, M.22).
Gibran’s reaction to the proposed degradation of an urban green space was clearly emotional. This finding aligns with the claim by James, Bixler and Valda (2010) that early and sustained involvement in nature and with environmental causes leads to a crystallization of a young person’s identity around their environmental work as they journey towards adulthood.

Greenpeace Volunteers Bandung was a rallying point for young activists because they learned a great deal that made sense of pro-environmental feelings they had earlier in life,

Before joining Greenpeace I had been concerned with our people’s behaviour. They are not thankful to God who has bestowed Bandung with clean air and nature air to be protected, conserved, and preserved (...) there are no shady places on the street side to sit but the government workers are felling the trees for flyovers and they allow private companies to install advertising roll banners which are only profitable for some (Cindy, F, 21).

This supports the argument of Hung (2011: 578) that ‘young people’s experiences, perception, and attachment to different places inform the strategies and stances of their social and political activities’. The young people acted on their own emotional reactions to disturbing environmental degradation of the familiar urban landscape.

Greenpeace Indonesia offers specific training for young urban volunteers that requires a sense of purpose and consolidates a feeling of collective identity in the struggle for sustainability.

Once we are trained by Greenpeace every volunteer will be assigned a task related to the local residents or at the grassroots and we must be willing to accept that offer (Anita, F, 19).

This echoes the finding of Chan (2009: 257) on the evolution of environmental activist identities, ‘the story progresses through high points, low points, and turning points that focus on themes of agency and developing a sense of identity as an agent of change’. It seems that through their experiences with nature and their early community awareness, a merging of the self with the environment occurs such that a motivation toward, and commitment to, environmental activism emerges for Bandung activist youth who share a collective ‘green’ identity.

**Conclusion**

According to Escobar (1999), what we perceive in the environment as natural is always also cultural and social. In the context of capitalism, commercial interests will translate environmental resources into economic assets that can leverage profitability for investment. They earn profit by the direct exploitation of nature and compromise environmental sustainability for future generations. These processes have led to concerns about urban environmental loss in many Indonesian cities. This paper has briefly shed light on some of the key youth-based organisations in Bandung that are challenging the status quo of untrammelled urban development. While the number of these organisations is not large, they have emerged as transformative players (Nilan and Wibawanto 2015) in shifting the consciousness of the urban citizenry to alternative visions for making the city sustainable.

**References**


“The Precariat, Ph.D”: Relating Standing’s notion to contingent academic labour

Christian John Mauri
Murdoch University

Abstract: With precarious modes of employment becoming normalised across almost every sector of the economy, we are witnessing an expanding glut in contingent academic labour. This has led to a revival of the notion of the precariat (precarious + proletariat), thanks in no small part to the work of economist, Guy Standing (2011). Standing argues that the rise in insecure labour and corresponding erosion of occupational narratives has led to the emergence of the precariat as a highly significant “class-in-the-making”. This quasi-class-based notion resists the paradigmatic individualism of neoliberalism, by framing individual precariousness in the context of broader socio-economic trends. However, while those in contingent academic labour are a part of this group, the inclusion of academic workers in Standing’s formulation contradicts several of its key conditions, which he lays out regarding the precariat’s lack of labour related security. This paper addresses this limitation by connecting the precariat to the complementary notion of the cognitariat (cognitive + proletariat); thereby opening it up to considerations specific to academic labour, and contributing to both the inclusiveness and nuance of what is set to become an increasingly relevant notion.

Key Words: Neoliberalism; Precariat and Cognitariat; Higher Education.

Introduction

The accelerating expansion of PhDs is not being matched by the opportunities available for those seeking secure employment in the academic job market (Cryanoski et al. 2011; Harman 2010). Universities are rolling back secure positions in favour of cheaper alternatives, such as contingent contracts which offer little by way of present or future security. This is linked to a broader trend of precarious modes of employment becoming normalised across almost every sector of the economy, to the benefit of organisations steeped in the managerial governance of neoliberalism: a conflict based paradigm concerned with the commodification of as much of the world as possible, the privileging of economic rationalism, and a fetish for efficiency (Ward 2012: 31). In order to compete in such an environment, individuals are increasingly expected to engage in unpaid and time-consuming work-for-labour, such as internships, social networking via conferences, or the production of academic publications.
As a result, we are witnessing an expanding glut in precarious relations to labour, with the notion of the *precariat* (precarious + proletariat) – a term first used by French sociologists to describe sessional workers – receiving revived attention (Standing 2011: 9). This is thanks in no small part to the work of economist, Guy Standing (2011: 7), who argues that the rise in insecure labour and the corresponding erosion of occupational narratives has led to the emergence of the precariat as a highly significant “class-in-the-making”. This quasi-class-based notion resists the paradigmatic individualism of neoliberalism by framing individual precariousness in the context of the broader socio-economic trends and organisational agendas faced by many workers. However, while those in contingent academic labour are a part of this group, their inclusion in the precariat contradicts several key conditions laid out by Standing regarding the precariat’s categorical lack of labour related security. This paper addresses this limitation by connecting the precariat to the complimentary notion of the *cognitariat* (cognitive + proletariat); thereby contributing to both the inclusiveness and nuance of what I expect will become an increasingly relevant notion, and opening it to considerations specific to university employment.

**The Precariat**

Standing divides the precariat into three factions: (1) the old and under-educated working-class; (2) the migrant and ethnic minorities who put up with insecurity in order to focus on economic survival; and (3) the educated and mostly young population who are slipping into cycles of contingent labour due to changing job-market demands and opportunities for career advancement. The inclusion of this third faction within the precariat has proven to be a point of contention between Standing and other economists. Take for example a lively discussion, posted in June on the BBC podcast, “Thinking Allowed”, between Standing and London School of Economics research fellow, Lisa McKenzie. McKenzie argued that members of this educated group spend less time than others among the precariat, thanks to their credentials and various forms of social and cultural capital. This emphasis on time, privilege, and social mobility is well placed; after all, a stop-over in the precariat that lasts a few years during the transition from university to a career is quite different to a terminal stay without a higher education degree.

The word “proletariat” points to a typology of class as it relates to labour, while “precarious” presents a typification of experiences within a nexus of insecurity, uncertainty and contingency. It is therefore unsurprising that the conjunction “precariat” would lead to a definitional conflict between exclusivity and legitimacy on the one hand, and inclusivity and risk on the other. It is this latter focus which underlies Standing’s approach in opposition to McKenzie’s. This is clear in his succinct answer to the question “who enters the precariat?”: “everybody, actually” (Standing 2011: 59). In other words, it is clear that Standing is not interested in locating his project squarely within the walls of class-theory, for the notion of the precariat is not necessarily about determining rigorous rules for all-in-or-out membership of a homogenous group. Nor is it about the homogenisation of experiences irrespective of context. Rather, it provides a conceptually promising ideal-type for addressing how the interconnected socio-economic developments of the contemporary world are linking otherwise heterogeneous groups by way of increasingly precarious relations to labour. Thus, the conceptual essence of Standing’s precariat is at once a dynamic potentiality and immediate condition – as is quite appropriate to a fractured group characterised by uncertainty, chance and change. This inclusivity leads to the crux of my argument for the inclusion in the precariat of those aspiring to a secure career in academia, and should be kept in mind for what follows.

According to Standing, what brings these factions together is seven forms of labour related security: (1) labour market security, as in the ability to find employment; (2) employment security, as in regulations on hiring and firing; (3) job security, whereby you can retain your niche and potential for upward mobility; (4) work security, which provides limits on work time
and compensation for mishaps; (5) skill reproduction security, to keep the worker up to date; (6) income security; and – most importantly for this discussion – (7) representation security, which allows for a shared voice in the labour market (to which I add media representation). According to Standing it is the absence of each of these securities which characterise the precariat as a fractured whole. Six of these insecurities can be dealt with swiftly: for the contingent academic workforce fits the bill due to their precarious relationship to labour, employment and job security. The same cannot be said for skill reproduction security and income security: for universities offer both employment training and standard contracts to their sessional staff.

The deviation that concerns me most is from security number seven: representation via access to a collective voice in the labour market. While this is ostensibly tied to Standing’s (2011: 9) interest in the absence of unions in many domains of the precariat, it also underlies his emphasis that the precariat lack the sense of identity and camaraderie around which empathetic professional relations can be built. This is simply not the case for those engaged in contingent academic labour, for the collective voice of sessional and salaried staff is represented across their respective institutions through unions such as the NTEU, as well as through social media. Indeed, while writing this paper I received an invitation from The Australian Sociological Association (TASA) to participate in a live Twitter discussion, titled #securework. Within one hour the feed had received over 1,500 tweets, with many featuring the term precariat, and linking to blogs by sessional and secure staff alike. In contrast to the weakened social ties that are central to the fractured precariat envisioned by Standing, these forums reveal a self-conscious, empathetic and vocal occupational community.

With the previous emphasis on inclusivity in mind, these blatant contradictions of Standing’s explicit conditions can be brushed off as merely cosmetic. However, the same cannot be said of a condition which Standing does not include in the previous framework, though treats as vital nonetheless, that is: “no secure occupational identity; [and] no occupational narrative they can give to their lives” (Standing 2011: 9; 2014: 10). While this will no doubt be the case for many within the first and second factions of the precariat, for many engaged in contingent academic labour this could not be further from the truth. After all, while academic work cannot guarantee a secure occupational identity in the long-term formal sense, it can certainly allow for something of an occupational calling and corresponding vocational/professional narrative – assuming that the worker is able to work within their own disciplinary area. This gap in Standing’s formulation can be filled by a notion that more adequately accounts for and conceptualises the spirit of a particular sort of precariat which is growing more relevant by the day: the cognitariat.

The Cognitariat

The term “cognitariat” is used by Antonio Negri (2007: 211) to describe those highly educated people who engage in labour organised around informational technologies and the production of intellectual commodities. It is composed of: (1) people who engage with labour related to fields of knowledge and their corresponding demands; (2) who, qualifications notwithstanding, are at risk of getting caught in contingent cycles of insecure sessional work; (3) though – and this is crucial – are able to perceive and navigate such a precarious existence differently to, say, the undereducated labourer or insufficiently established migrant. This is due to their credentials and access to social, cultural and intellectual capital. This is a necessarily broad description, for one would be hard pressed to provide a specific organisational description of what such labour or the commodities it produces might involve beyond that of “soft-skills” or “to do with knowledge” – after all, the fields of the cognitariat range from science and technology, to communications and social media, to the highly specialised research skills of the academic disciplines.

Members of the cognitariat share in a distinct relationship to the rapidly developing and globally competitive markets, geared toward the commodification of knowledge and the production and
exchange of intellectual property. Governments have responded to these developments through policies which stake the growth of nations on their increased production and deployment (not to be confused with cultivation and employment) of these wage workers of knowledge (Bradley et al 2008; Cutler 2008; Harman 2010). The emphasis that this high speed knowledge economy and corresponding policies places on innovation requires a workforce that is able to adapt and update in an environment which Negri (2007: 183, 212) describes as the “terrain of tendency”. While this terrain is traversed in some manner by all of the precariat, it is particular to the cognitariat, insofar that they do so consciously and in the context of ongoing epistemic and material shifts (Delanty 2001). For this group the relationship to skill-reproduction security is particularly strained: thus questions like “will I get the job?” and “what will I do when it ends?” are accompanied by “how will I manage such and such application or article?”, “am I up to date?”, and “how will I find the time and money to address these things?” This unpaid cognitive-work-for-labour, in conjunction with the spread of contingent work across almost every sector of an economy geared toward the commodification of knowledge, has led to an expansion in what Negri (2007: 212) calls the “precariatisation of the cognitariat”. At this point the similarities to Standing’s concerns should be becoming clear.

Negri’s rough outline is coloured in by Toby Miller (2012: 259), who portrays the cognitariat as people with “heady qualifications”, generally occupying spaces within and between education, government, and capital. Their identity involves the intermingling of ideals and vocations with insecure labour processes and professional networks (to which Miller also adds an emphasis on technological savvy and media know-how). To this Miller (2011: 1837) attributes “conditions of existence … [which are] created by complex social relations, even as they often engage in an identity formation that locates them in a seemingly autotelic mode of being”. For some, these conditions are built around the idealisation of flexibility and freedom in a world that rewards calculated risks, without the prohibitions (or safety nets) that previous generations provided in the form of cultural and socially stratified classes, communities, and unions. Others will simply see a precarious existence as part and parcel of pursuing their vocation (Archer 2008: 272-4). Miller acknowledges this by referring to the cognitariat tendency to make a fetish of the distinction between the corporeal (action) and the aesthetic (reason).

It can help to think about this in terms of the distinction between work and labour, which Standing adopts from Hannah Arendt (Standing 2011: 13, 117; see Arendt 1958). “Work” is viewed as those activities which are done both for their own sake and to strengthen community, and is closely associated with “play”, which signified both leisure and learning. “Labour”, on the other hand, may be interpreted as those activities that need to be done and/or has exchange value. Due to the emphasis that the contemporary capitalist system places on the production, innovation and endless exchange of commodities (often referred to collectively as “growth”), labour has been put on a pedestal, while work (and thus workers) has been devalued and subject to restructuring so as to better fit with labour. Those human activities which contradict this structure risk being framed in terms of privilege (for the few) or idleness (for the many). This is complemented by the paradigmatic individualism of neoliberalism, which, with its emphasis on the commodification of as much of the world as possible, conflates work and play with labour, rewarding people for their ability to treat themselves as commodities and manage the otherwise distinct domains of life accordingly.

**Cognisant Subjects of the Precariat**

By ignoring the existential dimensions here associated with the cognitariat, we risk excluding the very real possibility for vocational narratives and corresponding identity formation within the precariat. In so doing, Standing presents a framework which is ill-equipped for dealing with how the contradictions between experiences of labour and its material conditions may be inflamed,
concealed, or reframed in different domains of employment, as well as by broader socio-economic developments. For example, the labour that takes place within universities is still infused with work and, to an extent, play: sessional researchers contribute to scholarly communities and produce knowledge without regard for financial exchange value, even as they are put under pressure to procure research funding. Teachers looking for employment from one semester to the next strengthen the community through the preservation of Enlightenment values.

These positive existential qualities and the attraction of work/play is crucial to understanding PhD candidates’ willingness to pursue the degree and potential career in spite of the material risks and demands, and is often cited alongside the more varied and idiosyncratic motivations (Brailsford 2010) – a point nicely captured by Leonard’s (et al. 2005) appropriately titled, “To prove myself at the highest level”. These vocational aspirations (which universities simultaneously encourage on principal and exploit for profit) are explored by Hughes and Tight (2013), who draw on Bunyan’s allegory, “The Pilgrims Progress”, as a parallel to the PhD process, highlighting the distinction between the aesthetic journey and corporeal work which underlies the experiences of many candidates. For Miller (2012: 259), the nomadic life of the pilgrim may well be seen as prophetic for those who fancy an aesthetic career in academe; for the failure (or even resistance) to consider the material conditions that would underlie such an existence results in what he describes as the “dreamy self-exploitation” of “autotelic subjects who regard being a part of the gentried poor and dedicated to the life of the mind as fulfilling in themselves or as passports to a labour market that will ultimately reward them fairly”. My concern is how an overemphasis on such narratives, whereby many enter into contingent academic labour, via the impression of a career path signposted for those in pursuit of what we may loosely call “the life of the mind”, can distort the material inequalities faced by the precariat. In this regard we may joke with a new notion: “precognitariat” – those clever people who foresee a precarious future and pursue it nonetheless.

Conclusion

A significant portion of the contingent labour of the burgeoning precariat will take place in an increasingly competitive knowledge economy. This economy is comprised of job-markets which for the first time in history expect the population to have a higher level of educational achievement than is required for the labour it will likely undertake. The lot of the cognitariat will therefore become an increasingly relevant part of the precariat. Both of these notions are important, for they enable us to consider how the personal troubles of a precarious existence are not necessarily the problem of isolated individuals. Rather, they are indicative of broader socio-economic trends which encourage organisations to roll back the modes of labour security listed by Standing, in favour of alternatives deemed more economically efficient. This places greater pressure on individuals to engage in unpaid work-for-labour, in order to increase their odds in competing for both contingent and secure positions. Within such a context, the growing popularity of Standing’s notion provides us with a promising conceptual identification that is far more suitable than ambiguous and isolating terms such as “youth-unemployment”, “sessional-workers”, or “contingent-staff”.

However, the potential for shared occupational identities and narratives should not be excluded out of hand in order to fit with the generally undesirable conditions described by Standing. Nor should the presence of positive existential dimensions exclude groups engaged in contingent labour from the precariat. Rather, such narratives can provide insight into the social environment in which the labour takes place – even as they develop in support of, resistance too, and in either case in conjunction with such contexts. It is therefore my argument that a focus on how the development and influence of these distinct (but not uniquely) cognitariat qualities are facilitated by the institutions in which they work – even as these institutions implement efficiency measures
which will only make it harder to reconcile such aspirations with their material conditions – can complement our understanding of the burgeoning precariat in a neoliberal society, the knowledge economy, and our academic midst.

References
In search of a better future: Aspirations and challenges for young rural to urban migrants: a case study in Hanoi, Vietnam

Thao Thi Thanh Dang

School of Social Science, The University of Queensland

Abstract: Young people’s aspirations for the future and their sense of competence or ability to achieve these ends are crucial areas of study because youth’s aspirations, expectations, and plans serve as important guideposts to the future (Bandura et al. 2001, Schneider and Stevenson 1999). This paper examines aspirations for future lives of young people who migrated from rural to urban areas in Vietnam. It draws on interview data with twenty young migrants, aged 18 to 24, from a larger research project which explores the lived experiences and identities of young rural to urban migrants in Hanoi. Using Appadurai’s framework (2004) of ‘capacities to aspire’, this paper shows the way in which young migrants shape their futures and the factors that constrain them. The findings demonstrate that after migrating to the city, young people formed various pathways to their future, whether to acquire better jobs skills, start their own small business, or migrate further away, taking into consideration their limited social and financial capital. Furthermore, they hold strong hope and positive attitudes toward a better life in the future.

Key words: young migrants, Vietnam, aspirations, future

Introduction

It is argued that aspirations can be a critical contribution to raising attainment, increasing employability and enhancing social mobility (Spohrer 2011). Studies indicate that migrants carry with them hopes and dreams of a better life than the one they leave behind. Migration might be able to bring hope of new beginnings and improved life chances. Employment is placed as highly important to young people as being employed not only provides income but also through employment young people can prove themselves, their sense of identity, and independence (ILO 2011). However, global unemployment rates among young people (aged 15-24) are about three times higher than adult rates (ILO 2011). In developing countries, there is an increasing number of young people migrating both within and across national borders for employment opportunities. It was reported that young people are 40 percent more likely to move from rural to urban areas or across urban areas than older individuals (World Bank 2007). In Vietnam,
The body of literature on youth rural-to-urban migration in developing countries through examining how young rural-to-urban migrants shape their imagined future lives after migration and factors constraining them from realising their dreams. Theoretically, the paper adopts the framework of ‘capabilities to aspire’ from Appadurai (2004) who conceives aspirations as “a navigational capacity which is nurtured by the possibility of real-world conjectures and refutations (and)... thrives and survives on practice, repetition, exploration, conjecture and refutation” (2004: 69). This framework adds nuance to our concept of aspirations. To aspire is presented not as a dichotomous variable that one either has or does not have, but rather as a capacity that is a site of “interplay between agency and social structures” (Archer, DeWitt, and Wong 2013: 59). How and what young migrants are aspired for are understood against the backdrop of a transitional economy of Vietnam.

This paper comprises four sections. The next section provides a background context of youth rural-to-urban migration in Vietnam where this study took place. It is followed by an outline of the research methodology and a brief description of the participants’ profiles. The third section presents core empirical findings of aspirations of young migrants who participated in this study. Some discussions of the findings will be provided before concluding the paper.

Youth rural-urban migrants and aspirations

It is argued that youth rural-urban migration is strongly linked with rural disadvantage and the results of frustration of individual aspirations (Furlong and Cooney 1990). Young people have been identified as being among the most disadvantaged and restricted by rural living (Chapman and Shucksmith 1996). It is a global trend, in particular in developing countries that young people who grow up in rural communities have a tendency to leave their hometown for jobs or education and training opportunities. Like many other developing countries, rural-urban migration of young people is a dynamic and emerging issue in Vietnam. Recent statistics and surveys (UNFPA Vietnam 2010; UNFPA 2011; GSO 2004, 2009) emphasize the increasing trend of youth migration and its implications to the development of the country as well as the well-being and mental health of migrants. Various issues faced by young migrants have been identified in empirical studies such as uncertainty of employment (Dang, Le, and Nguyen 2005), the high levels of exploitation and vulnerability (Duong 2007, Nguyen 2012), high risks of involvement in accidents at work, and other health concerns (ILO 2013; Bui and Kretchmar 2008; Clatts et al. 2007; Nguyen et al. 2012; Van Nguyen, Dunne, and Debattista 2013).

Empirical studies on the topic of youth migration and their future aspirations tend to focus more on the motivations and drivers before migrating and lived experiences at migration destinations (Gaetano 2004; Jie 2011; Li 2006; Tran 2002; Brauw and Harigaya 2007; Karis 2013). Studies dealing with the question of what is the next plan after migration tend to focus more on inquiring where the migrants plan to settle in the long run. For example, rural migrants in urban China face a dilemma of not finding a suitable urban place for them as they fail to integrate well into the city life but they no longer find themselves fitting into countryside life after migration (Jacka 2005; Beynon 2004). Similarly, Vietnamese rural to urban migrants have to straddle between rural and urban areas to secure their income from the city and at the same time maintain their social
relationships and responsibilities in their hometown (Agergaard and Vu 2011; Catherine Locke 2012; Nguyen 2008). Besides, a recent study on aspirations of young migrants in the apparel and textile industry in China indicates that young migrants’ desire for ‘proper’ jobs, opportunities to learn new things and to become independent is one piece among very limited study on this topic (Centre for Child Rights and Coorporate Social Responsibility 2012).

Research methodology and interviewee profile
This paper draws on a doctoral research project which examines the lived experiences and identities of young people who migrate from rural to urban areas in Vietnam using three qualitative data collection methods; participant interviews, adapted photovoice, and field observation. Field study was conducted in four districts in Hanoi including Hoan Kiem, Ba Dinh, Cau Giay, and Dong Anh from November 2012 to February 2013. The research site is shown in figure 1. For this paper, only interview data from the broader study is used. Hanoi is the capital city of Vietnam with a population of about 7 million people, excluding an estimated one million unregistered migrants (VoV.vn 2014). It is one of the most popular destinations for rural to urban migrants in Vietnam, second to Hochiminh City (UN Habitat 2014).

The study sample was purposively selected to access a range of youth migrant experiences, but is not statistically representative. The inclusion criteria included young male and female migrants, aged from 18 to 24 years old who migrated to Hanoi for employment one to four years ago. Twenty young migrants, aged 18-24, living and working in Hanoi participated in this study. Most were from poor farming family backgrounds and had low levels of education, ranging from primary education to higher school education, and a few had completed vocational training courses. The research participants were employed in various jobs such as construction workers, hairdressers, shop assistants, domestic workers, and manufacturing workers.

Figure 1. Research sites in Hanoi, Vietnam

Findings: Aspirations for what?
The interview material revealed that most participants emphasised the economic dimension of their futures with the top priority given to better employment, and financial resource improvement, or in general ‘a better life’. While discussing future imagined lives, young migrants mentioned various possible options that they would pursue in the future, and these can be categorised in three
main themes: (i) vocational skills acquisition; (ii) opening a small business; and (iii) migrating further to somewhere else for better opportunities. Each direction is presented in the following.

**Better employment through vocational skills acquisition**

Most young migrants in this study expressed an aspiration of having a better job in the future. A better job, according to them, was one with higher wages (compared to their current wages), more stable (both in terms of working hours and income), and not too physically demanding. Many expressed their desire to learn and improve their job skills in order to get better jobs in the future. The majority of the participants did not have any vocational training before they migrated to work in the city of Hanoi. They were mainly employed in unskilled labour jobs with low payment, such as domestic workers, shop assistants, and factory workers. They developed different ideas and plans for their future. For example, Hang, currently a domestic worker, planned to get another skilled job in the future. She explained:

> Working like this [as a domestic worker] cannot continue in a long run. I am still working here for them [the employer's family] but til early next year when the smaller baby grows up more, they [her employers] will let me to attend a job skill training course [in the evening]… in order to have a more sustainable job in the future… as once I get married, I cannot live far away from my family to be a live in domestic worker like this…. I also think that I need to have a certain type of job skill which helps bring a better life (Hang, female, 18, domestic worker).

For Hang, her desire to learn a specific job skill in order to get a 'proper' job was also a strategic preparation to start her own family life. A more stable job was what many young migrants aimed for, but they were also aware of the need for skills upgrade to make it happen. In addition, a job was not simply a source of income, but the type of occupation was also considered as a social class marker which young migrants wanted to change. For instance, Minh were employed as a worker at a foreign invested electronic factory, but he did not want to be a manual worker for the rest of his life. He noted:

> You know no one wants to be a worker. No one wants to be a worker in a life time… I have to learn something, some sort of job skills that give me another job, a career (Minh, male, 20, factory worker).

Unlike older generations of migrants who tend to stick with the same job, younger migrants in this study showed their aspirations and expectations to make progress in their future through the acquisition of job skills to make a 'career' not just a job. Respondents mentioned a variety of vocational skills that they figured out as potential options for them to get more desirable jobs such as electricians, hospitality, tailoring, hairdressing, and so on. However, at the same time, many expressed their concerns about the affordability and time constraints in making their study plans happen. For instance, Nga, a sale assistant, commented:

> I prefer to learn hairdressing. I want to take the course, but if I do so I won’t have money to send to my parents, to support my younger siblings for their schooling. I feel for my parents and for them, so I was reluctant not to spend on the course…. Learning at the salon they will feed me and accommodate me, but they won’t give any pay. Without receiving a wage I don’t have money to send to my parents… so I leave the idea. I still like to learn to become a hairdresser, but my situation does not let me…. I have to continue working to send money to my parents (Nga, female, 20, sale assistant).

Nga was not the only participant who experienced this challenge between earning and investment into job skills upgrade. The tension between one’s wish and financial constraints was shared by other participants as well. They encountered a dilemma of lacking financial resources to invest into their cultural capital (in skills training) in order to move ahead. The situation of lacking initial financial capital might lead young migrants into a vicious circle of insufficient financial capital to invest into enriching cultural capital leading to no opportunity to increase their economic capital.
to help to result in ‘a better life’. Since resources (that support the capacity to aspire) are usually unevenly distributed (Bourdieu 1986), so too the effort required in reaching the desired aim will also be unevenly distributed (Appudarai 2004).

Entrepreneurial dreams
About one fourth of the respondents showed an interest in opening their own shops in the future. They shared their plans of saving and accumulating work experiences from their jobs to do so. A range of business options were mentioned, for example, a grocery store, a tea and coffee stall, a café restaurant, a hairdressing salon. It was observed that those respondents who had intentions to run their own business often used to work for or currently worked in a business environment. For example, Duc, a metal worker of a family owned enterprise, wanted to open his own metal workshop. Mai, a hairdresser planned to open her own hair dressing store. In addition, Nam, who used to be a bartender at a bar, shared his aspiration to open a café:

I want to open my own café. … I will work for a restaurant or a bar for some more time to get more practical experience. Working and learning at the spot you might think that you have known a lot, but things are changing you cannot know or be up to date with all the new things in the industry… (Nam, male, 24, factory worker)

This shows that working environments in which the participants were employed influenced their views towards employment aspirations. Working experiences accumulated in such working environments are important cultural resource which enables the possibility to follow the aspiration for setting up a business. In addition, the business networks that they established through their jobs also facilitated them to think of their own business plan.

In some cases, some participants transferred their knowledge and experiences to their friends and relatives back in the village through their visits by helping them with various things that they picked up from their work in the city. Nam also said that he was going to help his friend with setting up and running a café in a town. Research also shows that migration tends to facilitate entrepreneurial development in rural areas through remittance-sending to family members or starting up their own businesses on returning (Centre for Child Rights and Coportate Social Responsibility 2012; Hoang and Magnani 2010). The close linkage between their original places and the city helped young participants to realise potentials for self-employment in their hometowns. Those entrepreneurial respondents revealed that they were trying to save up and accumulate more practical experience before investing in their own businesses in the future. Interestingly, quite a few of them considered the future imagined businesses in their hometown as additional income for their family on top of farming.

While having a belief in attaining a better employment status many participants worked very hard in realising them. For extra income, quite a few participants took a second job after their main job’s working hours; most factory worker participants frequently took on overtime shifts. In addition, many tried to cut their spending such as rental costs by sharing a room with more people; not buying a television to cut electricity bills; cooking at home instead of buying take away food. They tried to spend less and save more in order to invest in their future plans. Furthermore, a number of participants thought of migrating to somewhere else, particularly overseas as they heard of the fortune of making a lot money than working domestically.

Hopes for better economic outcomes through further migration
Though fewer respondents who wished to migrate to somewhere else, those who had intentions to do so wanted to go longer distances such as to the South of Vietnam and overseas. Domestically, Hochiminh City is the most popular destination for rural to urban migrants in Vietnam. It not only attracts people from surrounding provinces in the South, but many from the Northern and
Central regions too. Cuong who had migrated to work in the South before, planned to return there for long term settlement. He said:

I am planning to go to Saigon again in the future, maybe next year. My brother will be working by next year when he completes his university degree... Because my mother wants to remarry soon, my father is now living alone in the village. He drinks a lot. If I have a stable job [in Saigon], I want to take my father along with us (Cuong, male, 23, builder).

For Cuong, migrating to the South was not only for his career developments, but also for the reunion of his family. In addition to migrating to other cities within Vietnam, some participants also aspired to migrate overseas. The participants who dreamed of working overseas said that they had given lots of effort and had spent quite a lot of money to apply for a ‘labour export’ position, but they were not yet successful by the time this study conducted. Hung, one of the participants in this group, said:

I really want to go to Japan but my road towards Japan is very thorny so far... I have lost thirteen million [one and a half thousand AUD], language learning cost, uniform, food and accommodation costs within six month [for pre-departure training course with the recruitment agency in Vietnam] it cost me more than thirteen million... (Hung, male, 21, sale person).

A few common things were shared by those who wished to migrate further. First, they had learnt about opportunities in potential migration destinations through their friends and co-villagers, or knew someone in their networks who had done so. Second, they were inspired by the fact that their fellow villagers who worked overseas sent home very good amounts of money. However, international migration transaction costs are very expensive. In order to have a work position in Taiwan and Japan, usually a Vietnamese labour candidate is required to pay a large amount of money as a secured deposit to the recruitment agency based in Vietnam. For example, Hung explained to me that it required eighty million Vietnam Dong (equal to about four thousand Australian Dollars) for a job in Taiwan, and one hundred million (equal to five thousand Australian Dollars) for a position in Japan). Those who manage to migrate to more developed countries in the regions to work often need to get loans from their relatives or banks. Hung, however, was from a poor family that could not support him. Nga, another participant, shared a similar story of her dream to migrate to Taiwan to earn more money, but she failed to get a bank loan to finance her immigration costs. Regardless of going through all these obstacles, both participants still held their hopes to make it happen one day.

International migration seems to be an attractive option for some young people. Many people in Vietnam, particularly the young, try to seek fortunes by immigrating to work in more developed and higher wage countries in the region such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere in the world (Centre of Overseas Labour). However, international migration often requires much higher costs and is a more complicated procedure compared to internal migration. Therefore, not many people can actually achieve international migration.

Discussion and Conclusion
The above narratives show that young migrants’ hopes and preferences were focused on economic and material goals. One explanation for this might be that most participants were from poor family backgrounds whose families and their main concerns were to ensure to have enough food to put on the table. Strong emphasis was given to having a good job by which they mean one that give high and stable income. Employment was the top priority of young people in contemporary Vietnam so as to survive and thrive given there is no unemployment welfare available in the country. This finding supports Appadurai’s argument that “aspirations are not merely individual, but rather they were culturally located, formed in the thick of social life” (Appadurai 2004: 67).
It was evident that some participants had to consider and balance their wishes for their future in the city with the responsibilities that they hold to their parents such as such as Cuong and
Nga. In Vietnamese culture, sons and eldest children are often tied with larger responsibility of care giving to their parents when they get old, while this duty is more relaxed for daughters and younger children of the family.

Secondly, unlike a view that capability to aspire of the poor is lower than the better off; ‘to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty’ (Appadurai 2004: 59), I would argue from the evidence on aspirations of young migrants in this study (considered as economic and socially disadvantaged group) that they did not necessarily have lower aspirations but, rather different based on their calculation of their available and potential economic, social and cultural resources in order to consider more realistic options for their futures. In fact, the data showed that none of the participants expressed their preferences for farming as what their parents did. The hardship and poverty that they saw from their parents’ life actually triggered them to aspire for a better life, out of the farm. Working on the farm was considered to be a last option when they did not have any other thing to go for, or an additional option to add on for the family. However, it should also be noted that aspirations and future are often a mystery and uncertain and often to be against the rational calculation of individuals. Therefore aspirations are very much dynamic and changing over time. Especially being young, the participants were expected to be exposed to more new experiences and their perspectives might change along with their new experiences.

In addition, there were numerous structural constraints and barriers which might prevent them from realising their dreams. Financial constraint was the most frequently mentioned hurdle, being identified as one of the most important constraining factors that prevented them from realising their future plans. It all required financial investment whether to take vocational training, to open a business, or to migrate further somewhere else, particularly migrating overseas. The resources that support the capacity to aspire are not, as argued by Appadurai (2004), evenly distributed, so too the effort required in reaching the desired aim will also be unevenly distributed. This acknowledges that there are many social factors – including friends, schools, family, and the local environment (Wilks and Wilson 2012)– that influence young people’s aspirations and how robust or connected to reality these aspirations are. Nevertheless, the participants demonstrated their agency by exhibiting their capacity to aspire, to work hard in order to achieve what they aspired for in order to escape poverty, lifting their living standard, and gain social mobility—through employment, training and gaining more financial capital. They not only hold positive attitudes to the future, showed their belief on their attainments of their aspirations, but also worked hard towards it. Many took extra jobs, overtime shifts, and so on to increase their financial capital and accumulated their skills and knowledge through their jobs to boost their cultural capital, the two types of capital which are keys to gain position in the field (Bourdieu 1990).

In conclusion, the migration journey from rural to urban areas of many young migrants is a journey to find a better future, a journey of enhancing their capability to aspire. The new work and living experiences in the city proved to act as learning process that enable capacity to aspire from ‘wishful thinking’ to ‘thoughtful wishing’ as termed by Appadurai (2004:82). However, there were tensions between what they hoped for and the capabilities to realise them. Support for young migrants, both financially and socially, from families, communities and the government is crucial for them to move forward toward better lives in the future.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank you all the participants for their participation in this project. The author gratefully acknowledges Associate Professor Paul Henman and Dr. Peter Westoby for feedback on this paper and PhD supervision for the broader research project. Many thanks go to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Earlier version of this paper was presented
at the 10th Postgraduate forum at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. I am grateful for thoughtful questions and comments from the audience, particularly Dr. Maria Platt’s feedback. The research project receives financial supports from the Government of Vietnam through Ministry of Education and Training and the University of Queensland, Australia.

References


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About the artist

Bernard Lee Singleton was born in Cairns and raised in Coen, a small aboriginal community in Cape York Peninsula of Far Northern Queensland. Bernard’s mother is a Djabuguy woman born in Mona Mona mission and his father is of Umpila (East Coast Cape York) and of Yirrkandji man from Yarrabah mission.

Bernard has been painting and drawing since childhood and his style evolved from his exposure to sacred sites and artefacts from a young age. He recalls always being with his father, an Archaeological Relics Ranger, and mother, a very knowledgeable rainforest woman, to many Aboriginal sites and story places. It is from these experiences that inspire his choice of vibrant earth colours in his artwork. Each piece of art reflects a story or legend, an interpretation of daily life or hunting, gathering or a traditional practice most of which are generations old.

Artwork is just a small part of Bernard’s cultural practices; he also specialises in recreating traditional artefacts and tools and Warma (traditional dancing). Growing up in Coen meant he had to learn tribal lore, hunting and fishing skills and corroboree. Bernard was taught by many elders in Coen including his Grandparents and Mother in Oak Forest, Kuranda.

An emerging artist and part time cultural performer Bernard continues his work through numerous Art or Cultural projects in the Cairns area and travels throughout Australia and overseas as an ambassador for his country and to represent his people.

Artist: Bernard Lee Singleton  
Medium: Flat acrylic on canvas  
Title: "Darrwuy wabarra-a-galvin" the birds are gone hunting.

The 6 original pieces together form a painting titled “Darrwuy wabarra-a-galvin” which means the birds are hunting. All these birds are found in the Wet Tropics region near the coast. The small fish are Bulumay the mullet fish which most of the birds go hunting for. The shells are Nautilus shells or Miya Miya The Eels signify the circle of life or the cycle of the seasons in my country the wet and dry, Gurrabana and Gurraminya. They are also the babies of the rainbow serpent, Gudjugudju.